A. K. SEN, J. ( 1 ) IN this Rule the petitioner challenges the validity of an order dated May 4, 1976, passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Howrah, whereby the learned Magistrate discharged the sole accused under S. 245 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure holding the charge to be absolutely groundless. It would be necessary to refer to certain facts in the background to appreciate the dispute now raised before this court and the challenge thrown to the validity of the impugned order. ( 2 ) ON May 4, 1972, the accused opposite party Sarat Chandra Dey filed a verified application before the learned District Judge, Howrah, in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 22/72 under Order 39 Rule 2 (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure read with S. 151 thereof alleging therein that one Kali Sankar Chatterji had, in disobedience of an injunction earlier passed by that Court, removed the fencing on the suit land on April 28, 1972 at 9 a. m. along with a large number of goondas. It was claimed by Kali Sankar Chatterjee that such a statement was maliciously false and contrary to Sarat Chandra Dey's own statement made in a previous petition dated march 12, 1973 filed in Miscellaneous Case No. 10/73 wherein he had clearly acknowledge that he himself had removed the fencing from the suit land. On an application made by the said Kali Sankar Chaterjee the learned District Judge held a preliminary enquiry under S. 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and on such enquiry the learned District Judge came to the conclusion that the verified statement made by the said Sarat Chandra Dey before him on May 4, 1972, was a false statement and false to the knowledge of the maker. He, therefore, directed a complaint to be lodged as against Sarat Chandra Dey for such an offence being committed. ( 3 ) ACCORDINGLY, the learned District Judge lodged a complaint under S. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate on May 28, 1975. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate took cognizance on consideration of the complaint so lodged under S. 199/200 of the Indian Penal Code and issued summons on the accused opposite party Sarat Chandra Dey. The accused Sarat Chandra Dey appeared and was released on bail. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate took cognizance on consideration of the complaint so lodged under S. 199/200 of the Indian Penal Code and issued summons on the accused opposite party Sarat Chandra Dey. The accused Sarat Chandra Dey appeared and was released on bail. The case was adjourned for taking of evidence and the records of the miscellaneous cases were called for. At that stage without, however, taking any evidence the successor in office of the Chief Judicial Magistrate passed the impugned order discharging the accused under S. 245 (2) of the new Code of Criminal Procedure on the ground that on the petition of complaint itself the charge is absolutely groundless. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate in passing the aforesaid order of discharge took the view that statements though false made in verified pleadings do not constitute an offence under Ss. 193, 199 or 200 of the Indian Penal Code or under the allied provisions of the said Code. According to him, such statements were not made on oath and they were not declarations within the meaning of Ss. 199 and 200 of the Indian Penal Code and would not be equivalent to evidence on oath as in the case of an affidavit. In this view the learned Magistrate came to the conclusion that on the facts set out in the petition of complaint no case of any offence can be said to have been made out and since the complaint itself discloses no offence the charge must be held to be groundless. Thus, though the learned Magistrate did not enter into the merits and did not allow any evidence to be led in support of the charge leveled in the petition of complaint he came to the conclusion, more as a principle of law that a statement even if false when made in a verified pleading would not constitute any offence under Ss. 193, 199 and 200 of the Indian Penal Code or under the allied provisions of the said Code. Feeling aggrieved by this order Kali Sankar Chatterjee, the complainant has now moved this Court with the above revisional application disputing the correctness of the view taken by the learned Magistrate and consequently the validity of the order made thereon. ( 4 ) MR. Feeling aggrieved by this order Kali Sankar Chatterjee, the complainant has now moved this Court with the above revisional application disputing the correctness of the view taken by the learned Magistrate and consequently the validity of the order made thereon. ( 4 ) MR. Mukherjee, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner, has contended that thee is some difference between an offence under S. 199 of the Indian Penal Code and S. 193 thereof so that even if the offence alleged does not constitute an offence under S. 199, it does not follow as a necessary corollary that there could be no offence made out under S. 193 of the Indian Penal Code. He has pointed out that the learned Magistrate has failed to note the distinction between the offences contemplated by Ss. 193 and 199 of the Indian Penal Code and in that view having come to the conclusion that the impugned statement does not constitute a declaration within the meaning of S. 199 of the Indian Penal Code, the learned Magistrate made an erroneous deduction that no offence under S. 193 of the said Code can either be said to have been made out. It has been strongly contended by Mr. Mukherjee that when the accused opposite party filed an application under Order 39 Rule 2 (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure he really invited the Court to take action for disobedience of the Court's order and impose a penalty. Such an application was required under the law to be verified and the accused opposite party did verify the statement made in the said application but made false allegations therein knowing them to be false only for the purpose of inducing the Court to take penal against the complainant. Making of such a statement in a verified application would constitute, according to Mr. Mukherjee, an offence of giving false evidence within the meaning of S. 191 of the Indian Penal Code punishable as such under S. 192 of the Indian Penal Code. Mr. Mukherjee has strongly disputed the correctness of such a broad view taken by the learned Magistrate that a statement though false made in a verified pleading would never constitute an offence of giving false evidence punishable under S. 193 of the Indian Penal Code. Alternatively, Mr. Mr. Mukherjee has strongly disputed the correctness of such a broad view taken by the learned Magistrate that a statement though false made in a verified pleading would never constitute an offence of giving false evidence punishable under S. 193 of the Indian Penal Code. Alternatively, Mr. Mukherjee has contended that in any event such a statement would constitute an offence of giving false information which the accused knows or believes to be false to a public servant to use his lawful power to the injury of another person punishable under S. 182 of the Indian Penal Code. In fairness, however, Mr. Mukherjee has conceded that there is an element of doubt as to whether the alleged false statement made by the accused opposite party in his verified application would constitute any offence under S. 199 of the Indian Penal Code. ( 5 ) MR. Amarendra Kumar Pal, learned Advocate on the other hand appearing on behalf of the accused opposite party, has supported the order as passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate. It has been contended by Mr. Pal that a statement though false when made in a verified pleading would not constitute any offence either under S. 193 or under S. 199 of the Indian Penal Code. According to Mr. Pal, parties to a litigation should be free to make such pleading as may be found necessary and when such pleading by itself does not constitute any evidence, falsity of any statement made in such pleading though verified would not render the person making the statement liable for prosecution either under S. 193 of the Indian Penal Code or under S. 199 thereof. It has been pointed out by Mr. Pal that the view which the learned Magistrate has taken in based on a Bench decision of this Court in the case of Rash Behary Ray and Others v. Emperor, A. I. R. 1930 Cal 639 and as such it cannot be said that the learned Magistrate was in any way wrong in arriving at his conclusion that the petition of complaint discloses no offence. ( 6 ) MR. S. S. Pal, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the State, however, does not support the order of the view taken by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate. ( 6 ) MR. S. S. Pal, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the State, however, does not support the order of the view taken by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate. ( 7 ) ON the rival contentions thus put forward before me a short but an important question of law arises for my consideration. That question is - does a person commit any offence punishable either under S. 193 of the Indian Penal Code when he makes a false statement in a verified pleading. It should be noted that under S. 193 of the Indian Penal Code giving of false evidence by itself would not be punishable unless such false evidence is given intentionally. Similarly under S. 199 of the Indian Penal Code making of false statement in a declaration which is by law receivable as evidence would not by itself be punishable under S. 199 unless when making such a false statement the maker either knows or believes the same to be false or does not believe the same to be true. Mens rea to the extent as aforesaid is an ingredient of the offence punishable under either of the aforesaid two provisions of the Indian Penal Code. In the present case this aspect has not been gone into since the learned Magistrate has not entered into the merits nor taken any evidence. He, on the other hand, proceeds on a proposition that irrespective of whether mens rea is there or not making of such a false statement in a verified pleading would not constitute any offence either under S. 193 of the Indian Penal Code or under S 199 thereof. It is the correctness of such a proposition of law as enunciated by the learned Magistrate which falls for determination by me in this Rule. I am afraid that the proposition of law as enunciated by the learned Magistrate is too wide and cannot be said to be correct. ( 8 ) SECTION 191 defines what constitutes the offence of giving false evidence. I am afraid that the proposition of law as enunciated by the learned Magistrate is too wide and cannot be said to be correct. ( 8 ) SECTION 191 defines what constitutes the offence of giving false evidence. Excluding the two exceptions which are not relevant for our present purpose S. 191 provides ?whoever being legally bound by an oath or by an express provision of law to state the truth, or being bound by law to make a declaration upon any subject, makes any statement which is false, and which he either knows or believes to be false or does not believe to be true, is said to give false evidence. ? There is no dispute that whoever commits such an offence is punishable under S. 193 of the Indian Penal Code. In the present case the accused opposite party made an application under 39 Rules 2 (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure before the learned District Judge inviting the learned District Judge to determine judicially whether the person complained against had violated any order of injunction so that he should be subjected to such penalty as prescribed by the said provision. Such an application under Rule 16 of the Civil Rules and Orders framed by this Court under the provision of the Code of Civil Procedure was required to be verified in the manner prescribed by Order 6 Rule 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provision is otherwise applicable to plaints and written statements. Order 6 Rule 15 being applicable it is quite evident that the accused opposite party who was the applicant was bound by the express provisions thereof to state the facts truthfully in the verification appended to the said application. Such being his legal obligation, if he had made a false statement in such a verification he undoubtedly commits an offence with the meaning of S. 191 of the Indian Penal Code as soon as it is provided that in making such a false statement he knew or believed the same to be false or did not believe the same to be true. Sections 191 and 193 of the Indian Penal Code are thus squarely attracted and it is difficult to accept a wide proposition of law as enunciated by the learned Magistrate that making of a statement though false in verified pleading would never constitute an offence under S. 193 of the Indian Penal Code. ( 9 ) THE learned Magistrate no doubt relies on a Bench decision of this Court in Rash Behary Ray and Others v. Emperor (supra) but in my view the said decision does not support such a wide proposition as sought to be enunciated by the learned Magistrate. In that case the petitioner was being prosecuted under S. 193 of the Indian Penal Code not for making any statement which was not true in his written statement but for an omission on his part to say something which the learned Judge, by reason of the term of Order 8 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, thought that he ought to have stated in the written statement. It was obvious no doubt by this Court that ?it is perhaps a little unfortunate that by reason of the provisions of the Code pleadings, such as written statements, have to be verified because in many cases persons in verifying their pleadings, defendants their written statements or plaintiffs their plaints, are often found to say something which is not strictly true; for example, a defendant may deny the making of a contract or deny that a certain transaction took place, in order to force the plaintiff to give evidence and be subjected to cross-examination in the matter or to put the matters raised in issue. But I do not think that he renders himself liable for prosecution for perjury for making false statements. ? In spite of a little ambiguity in the observation as aforesaid, read in the context this observation cannot in my view be read to support a wide proposition that statements even though false and falsely made to the knowledge of the person making the same in a verified pleading would not constitute any offence within the meaning of S. 191 of the Indian Penal Code. This decision only lays down that the Court must be very cautious in its approach in prosecuting a person for making any statement claimed to be false in his pleading so that the party's right to plead freely is not curtailed and he can take appropriate pleading throwing the burden on the opponent to prove the case to the contrary. A view of the nature taken by the learned Magistrate would, in my view, frustrate the object behind the provisions under Chapter XI of the Indian Penal Code and more particularly S. 191 thereof which was meant to avoid the courts being deceived or misled by dishonest litigants through maliciously false pleadings. ( 10 ) THAT the decision relied on by the learned Magistrate cannot go to support the wide proposition of law enunciated by the learned Magistrate would be made clear if we refer to another Bench decision of this Court in the case of Trailokya Nath Banerjee v. Radharanjan alias Bonomali Bhattacharji, 25 Calwn 886. In that case the defendant filed a verified written statement in which he denied having executed a certain hand note. Such a statement having been found to be false he was being prosecuted under S. 199 of the Indian Penal Code. In considering the legality of otherwise of such a prosecution it was held that though making of such a statement would not constitute of an offence under S. 199 of the Indian Penal Code but it would constitute an offence punishable under S. 193 of the Indian Penal Code. It was observed as follows: - ?it was argued before us that this section can have no application to the facts alleged. That is principally correct. But when reference is made to S. 191 it will be seen that though S. 199 may not be applicable S. 193 will clearly apply. ? Mr. Mukherjee has rightly drawn my attention to a number of decisions taking the same view in other High Courts. Reference to all of them is not considered necessary by me. But when reference is made to S. 191 it will be seen that though S. 199 may not be applicable S. 193 will clearly apply. ? Mr. Mukherjee has rightly drawn my attention to a number of decisions taking the same view in other High Courts. Reference to all of them is not considered necessary by me. In the case of Emperor v. Padam Singh AIR 1930 All 490 a question of law raised in the same manner as now before me was considered in a Division Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court and it was held that since under Order 6 Rule 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure there is an express provision of law requiring the defendants to confirm the truth of the statement made by him in the preceding clause of his written statement, if he does so knowing that that verification is false, he is declared by legislature in S. 191 as giving false evidence thereby making him liable under S. 193. On this view I am unable to accept the conclusion of the learned Magistrate that the petition of complaint in the present case discloses no offence. At least an offence under S. 193 of the Indian Penal Code has been made out and it is necessary that the trial should proceed to find out how far the accused opposite party can be said to have committed such an offence with reference to its ingredients. ( 11 ) I, however, agree with the learned Magistrate that on the petition of complaint no offence under S. 199 of the Indian Penal Code can be said to have been made out. Under S. 199 whoever makes a false statement in a declaration which is by law receivable as evidence knowing the same to be false he incurs liability under S. 199. But in order to constitute an offence under this provision the statement must be made in a declaration which must be receivable as evidence. There can be no dispute that the statements made in the verified pleadings do not constitute evidence and are not receivable as such. In order to obtain an order or a decree on the basis thereof the petitioner or the plaintiff is required to adduce evidence and prove the claim on evidence. There can be no dispute that the statements made in the verified pleadings do not constitute evidence and are not receivable as such. In order to obtain an order or a decree on the basis thereof the petitioner or the plaintiff is required to adduce evidence and prove the claim on evidence. Such being the position, making of a false statement in a verified pleading would not constitute an offence under S. 199 and such was also the view expressed by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Trailokya Nath Banerjee v. Radharanjan alias Bonomali Bhattacharji referred to hereinbefore. On the conclusions as above, I must hold that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Howrah, went wrong in discharging the accused opposite party under S. 245 of the New Code of Criminal Procedure without going into the merits solely on the view that the charge itself is groundless. The said order is, therefore, set aside and the case is remanded to the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Howrah for trial in accordance with law. The Rule made absolute.