Judgment :- 1. These two appeals arise from a judgment of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Palghat, in a case under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, hereinafter called the Act. There were 8 accused persons before the trial court and on the conclusion of the trial all except the second and fifth accused were acquitted. Accused Nos. 2 and 5 were convicted under S.16 (1) (a) (i) and ii) and S.16 (1) (f) of the Act and each of them was sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/-. The first accused is said to be trading in edible oils in Big Bazaar, Palghat. The second accused, M/s, M. A. Venkitachalam Chettiar & Sons, is a partnership concern and the third and fourth accused are it's partners. The fifth accused is M/s. T. V. A. Murukesan & Bros., another partnership concern having accused 6, 7 and 8 as its partners. 2. On February 19,1976, at about 10.45 a.m. pw.1, the Food Inspector, visited the business place of the first accused. There were altogether 47 tins of gingelly oil found in the premises of the shop. Out of this, 27 tins were having genuine Agmark containing guaranteed gingelly oil and the remaining 20 tins which did not contain genuine Akmark, were found kept separately with labels 'T. V. M. Brand' alleged to be belonging to the 5th accused. All these tins were sealed, unopen and intact. On suspicion that the twenty tins which had no proper Agmark contained adulterated articles, one of them was opened and a sample of 500 ml. of gingelly oil was purchased by Pw.l for the purpose of analysis after complying with the due formalities under the Act. The remaining 19 tins and the balance left in the opened tin were seized by Pw.l and the same were released on kychit to the first accused who produced them later in court. The sample was divided into three parts in accordance with the provisions of the Act and one of the three parts was sent to the Public Analyst for analysis, another part was given to the first accused and the third one (M.C. 1) was produced in court. As per Ex. P8, the report of the Public Analyst, the sample was found adulterated. As per Ex. P8, the report of the Public Analyst, the sample was found adulterated. Thereafter the first accused was prosecuted on two charges, namely, (I) that he sold adulterated food article to the Food Inspector; and (2) that he stored 20 tins of misbranded gingelly oil. During inquiry on the basis of the evidence disclosed during the examination of pw.1 and on getting the names of the warrantors from the memo filed by the first accused, the trial court in exercise of the powers under S.20A of the Act impleaded accused 2 to 8 as additional accused in the case. After impleadment Pw. 1 was examined afresh and one more witness (Pw.2) was examined on the side of the prosecution. 3. In denying the guilt, the first accused pleaded that all the 20 tins of oil including the one from which the sample was taken by the Food Inspector were obtained by him from the second accused and the same were covered by Ex Dl(a) warranty issued by the second accused; that as soon as he noticed some difference in the Agmark on each of these tins, he kept them separately with the intention of sending them back to the second accused and that they were not intended for sale. 4. The second accused denied the issue of any warranty in respect of these articles: while the fifth accused denied having sent any such articles to the first accused. 5. The other accused stated that they had nothing to do with the first accused. 6. Dws.1 to 5 were examined and Exs. Dl and Dl (a) to D6 were marked on behalf of the first accused. 7. The trial court on a consideration of the evidence finding that all the 20 tins seized by the Food Inspector were covered by Ex. Dl (a) warranty issued by the second accused acquitted him of all the charges. Holding that the prosecution had failed to prove the necessary ingredients under S.17 of the Act, the third, fourth, sixth, seventh and eighth accused were also acquitted, but it convicted and sentenced the second and fifth accused as aforesaid finding that 20 tins of oil were delivered to the first accused by them. 8. The above accused who have been convicted have filed Crl. Appeal No. 169/78 challenging their convictions and sentences; while Crl. Appeal. 8. The above accused who have been convicted have filed Crl. Appeal No. 169/78 challenging their convictions and sentences; while Crl. Appeal. No. 353/77 is filed by the Food Inspector against acquittal. 9. Mr. Chandramohan Das, learned advocate appearing for the appellants in Crl. Appeal No. 169/78, attacked the convictions and sentences passed against them, mainly on the ground that the entire procedure of impleading accused 2 and 5 before the trial court was without jurisdiction and that on that short ground accused 2 and 5 are entitled to an acquittal. The counsel also argued that there is no reliable evidence to show that the 20 tins seized by the Food Inspector from the possession of the first accused were sent by accused 2 and 5. 10. Mr. Krishnankutty Achan, the learned advocate appearing for the appellant in Crl. Appeal No. 353/77, attacked the acquittal of the first accused only of the second charge, namely, that he had stored for sale misbranded gingelly oil. The acquittals of accused 3,4,6,7 and 8 of all the charges were attacked only on the ground that the necessary requirements under S.17 of the Act had been proved in the case and the trial court was in error in holding otherwise. 11. It was placing reliance on a Full Bench decision of this Court in in Food Inspector v. Seetharam Rice & Oil Mills (1974 KLT. 685) that the learned advocate appearing for the appellants in Crl Appeal No. 169/ 78 submitted that the impleadment of accused 2 to 8 by the trial court at a stage before the commencement of trial of the original accused was without jurisdiction. The counsel also submitted that a learned Single Judge of this Court in Mathew v. Food Inspector (1977 KLT. 664) on a wrong assumption that the decision of the Full Bench referred to above has been overruled by the Supreme Court in Bhagwan Das v. Delhi Administration (AIR. 1975 SC. 1309) has held that conclusions 1 and 3 arrived at by the Full Bench are wrong and have been overruled by the Supreme Court and that conclusion 7 requires modification. It was further submitted that nowhere in the detailed judgment of the Supreme Court in Bhagwan Das's case (AIR. 1975 SC. 1309) it has either overruled or rejected any of the 7 conclusions of the Full Bench. It was further submitted that nowhere in the detailed judgment of the Supreme Court in Bhagwan Das's case (AIR. 1975 SC. 1309) it has either overruled or rejected any of the 7 conclusions of the Full Bench. The learned advocates appearing for the Food Inspector (complainant) and the first accused also submitted that the Full Bench decision of this Court reported in Food Inspector v. Seetharam Rice & Oil Mills (1974 KLT. 685) has not been overruled to any extent by the Supreme Court. 12. The scope and effect of S.20A directly arose for consideration in Food Inspector v. Seetharam Rice & Oil Mills (1974 KLT. 685). All the aspects regarding the stage and the manner in which a manufacturer, distributor or dealer has to be impleaded, as the case may be, and the procedure that has to be followed thereafter have been considered by the Full Bench in the decision referred to above. 685). All the aspects regarding the stage and the manner in which a manufacturer, distributor or dealer has to be impleaded, as the case may be, and the procedure that has to be followed thereafter have been considered by the Full Bench in the decision referred to above. After a careful and detailed consideration of all these aspects the Full Bench arrived at the following conclusions: "(i) S.20A of the Act envisages a joint trial of the vendor and the manufacturer or distributor or dealer of any article of food, as the case may be; (ii) The powers given under S.20A can be invoked only during the trial of any person, not being the manufacturer distributor or dealer of any article of food, for any offence under the Act; (iii) Under this section it is imperative on the part of the court to implead a manufacturer, distributor or dealer of any article of food, whenever the court is satisfied on the evidence adduced before it, that such manufacturer, distributor or dealer is also concerned with the offence with which the vendor, the original accused, is charged; (iv) The satisfaction referred to in this section is to be reached by the court on the basis of the materials already on record and no hard and fast rule or any guideline can be laid down regarding the data or quantum of materials necessary or sufficient to reach this satisfaction; (v) Even if a manufacturer, distributor or dealer is not present in court, the magistrate is empowered to implead such a manufacturer, distributor or dealer without a complaint or written consent or sanction as contemplated under S.20 of the Act; (vi) Impleading under this section can be done at any stage after the commencement of the trial and before the conclusion of the trial of the vendor, the original accused, by convicting or acquitting him and not thereafter; and (vii) After impleadment of the manufacturer, distributor or dealer, as the case may be, the entire proceeding against the original as well as the newly added accused shall commence afresh in accordance with law." 13. We have been taken through the judgment of the Supreme Court in Bhagwan Das's case (AIR. 1975 SC. 1309). None of the seven conclusions arrived at by the Full Bench has been overruled or rejected by the Supreme Court in the above case. In Bhagwan Das's case (AIR. We have been taken through the judgment of the Supreme Court in Bhagwan Das's case (AIR. 1975 SC. 1309). None of the seven conclusions arrived at by the Full Bench has been overruled or rejected by the Supreme Court in the above case. In Bhagwan Das's case (AIR. 1975 SC. 1309) it is only in Para.13 of its judgment that the Supreme Court has made a reference to the decision in Food Inspector v. Seetharam Rice & Oil Mills (1974 KLT. 685). The Supreme Court has also referred to two other decisions in this paragraph, viz., B. M. Chakra v. The State (AIR. 1966 Punj. 421) and P. B. Kurup . Food Inspector (1969 KLT. 845) We think it appropriate in this context to extract the following passage in Para.13 of the judgment in Bhagwan Das's case (AIR. 1975 SC. 1309), where alone Food Inspector v. Seetharam Rice & OH Mills (1974 KLT. 685) is referred to: "We are also unable to accept as correct a line of reasoning found in AIR. 1966 Punj. 421 (supra) and Food Inspector, Palghat Municipality v. Seetharam Rice & Oil Mills, 1974 FAC p. 534 (Crl. Appeal Nos. 222, 223, 225 to 227/73, etc. etc. decided on 3-7-1974)= (1975 Crl. L.J. 479) (Ker) and in P.B. Kurup v Food Inspector, Malappuram Panchayat (1969 Ker. L.T. 845) that, in every case under the Act there has to be initially a prosecution of a particular seller only, but those who may have passed on or sold the adulterated article of food to the vendor, who is being prosecuted, could only be brought in subsequently after a warranty set up under S.19 (2) has been pleaded and shown to be substantiated." What was held as unacceptable was the above line of reasoning that a warrantor could be brought in only after a particular seller has been prosecuted and he has substantiated his plea under S.19 (2) of the Act. The Full Bench in Food Inspector v. Seetharam Rice & Oil Mills (1974 KLT. 685), with great respect, has not approved or upheld such a line of reasoning. No doubt such a reasoning has been given in Kurup's case (1969 KLT. 845) following the decision of the Punjab High Court in Chakra"s case (AIR. 1966 Punj. 421). In Kurup's case (1969 KLT. 685), with great respect, has not approved or upheld such a line of reasoning. No doubt such a reasoning has been given in Kurup's case (1969 KLT. 845) following the decision of the Punjab High Court in Chakra"s case (AIR. 1966 Punj. 421). In Kurup's case (1969 KLT. 845), a learned Single Judge of this Court held that a warrantor can normally be hauled up when it is seen that he has issued a false warranty; but in any event at the initial stage, the prosecution must proceed against the dealer, and only when he pleads by way of defence that the article is covered by a warranty and satisfies the court that the warranty is proper and in the prescribed form, the question of his exoneration can come. In Chakra's case (AIR. 1966 Punj. 421) it was held by the Punjab High Court that there was no justification for the pros3cution of a person, firm or company who was alleged to have supplied goods to the dealer from whom the sample was purchased by the Food Inspector in the same trial as the dealer from whom the sample was taken, that a firm or company could only be brought into the case after the accused vendor who actually sold the adulterated article had set up the defence contemplated under S.19 (2) of the Act and complied with other provisions of the sub-section and his trial had concluded with a successful defence by him under S.19(2). In this context, it appears to be clear that in Bhagwan Das's case, AIR. 1975 SC. 1309, the Supreme Court was, with great respect, really referring to the line of reasoning in Chokra's case (AIR. 1966 Punj. 421) and Kurup's case (1969 KLT. 845) 14. It was the decision of a Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in Delhi Municipality v. Laxmi Narain (1973 Crl. L.J. 690) that was challenged before the Supreme Court in Bhagwan Das's case (AIR. 1975 SC. 1309). On the facts, S.20A of the Act has no application at all to that case. There the concerned Food Inspector filed a complaint before the trial Magistrate against Laxmi Narain from whom he purchased the sample of food article which was found to be adulterated on analysis and M/s Bhagwan Das Jagdish Chander from whom Laxmi Narain purchased the food article under a warranty, for offences punishable under the Act. There the concerned Food Inspector filed a complaint before the trial Magistrate against Laxmi Narain from whom he purchased the sample of food article which was found to be adulterated on analysis and M/s Bhagwan Das Jagdish Chander from whom Laxmi Narain purchased the food article under a warranty, for offences punishable under the Act. Laxmi Narain pleaded that the article sold by him to the Food Inspector was covered by a warranty issued by M/s. Bhagwan Das Jagdish Chander and in the course" of the proceedings an application was filed praying that M/s. Bhagwan Das Jagdish Chander, the warrantor, may be discharged or acquitted so that Laxmi Narain can examine him as a defence witness to prove the warranty. The trial magistrate allowed the application and acquitted Jagdish Chander, a partner who represented the firm, on the ground that Laxmi Narain would be deprived of a valuable right unless it was done. It was relying on Chokras' case (AIR. 1966 Punj. 421) that the trial magistrate acquitted Jagdish Chander; and on the conclusion of the trial Laxmi Narain also was acquitted. Thereafter the magistrate impleaded the manufacturers M/s. Gouri Shanker Prem Narain under S.20A of the Act. The acquittal of Laxmi Narain and Jagdish Chander was challenged by the Delhi Administration before the High Court. The two points that came up for decision before the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court were (i) whether a a joint trial of the vendor, the distributor and the manufacturer for offences under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 is illegal and (ii) what is the scope of S.20A of the said Act. The joint trial of these two persons was not under S.20A of the Act but under the general provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The question that came up for consideration was whether a joint trial of these two persons was permissible under S.239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1898 (hereinafter called the Old Code) corresponding to S.223 of the Code of 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the New Code). The question that came up for consideration was whether a joint trial of these two persons was permissible under S.239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1898 (hereinafter called the Old Code) corresponding to S.223 of the Code of 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the New Code). The Full Bench held that a vendor, a manufacturer, a distributor and a dealer of an adulterated article of food can be jointly tried for offences committed by them under the Act, if their case fell within the scope of clauses (a) to (d) of S.239 of the old Code and that there was no illegality for having tried Laxmi Narain and Jagdish Chander jointly as their case came within clause (d) of S.239 of the Old Code. In such a case what has to be looked into is whether the allegations made in the complaint disclose whether the case falls under any of the relevant clauses of S.239 of the Old Code corresponding to S.223 of the New Code. On the scope of S.20A of the Act, the Full Bench held that the powers under that section can be invoked only during the trial of the vendor and that is after the trial of the vendor has commenced and before it has concluded and not after that; and that S.20 A of the Act is not subject to S.239 of the Old Code but is a self-contained section which is complete in itself. In Bhagwan Das's case (AIR. 1975 SC. 1309) the Supreme Court held that "in a suitable case, a vendor, a distributor, and a manufacturer could be tried together provided the allegations made before the Court show that there are connecting links between their activities so as to constitute the same transaction." It is clear from the context in which it appears that the decision on the point related only to S.239 of the Old Code and the connected provisions in that Code 15. It appears therefore to be fairly clear that the decision of the Full Bench of this Court has not been overruled by the Supreme Court and that the learned Single Judge, with respect, was not right in stating that the decision has been overruled by the Supreme Court. We consider the decision in Mathew v. Food Inspector (1977 KLT. 664) as one not laying down the correct law on the point. We consider the decision in Mathew v. Food Inspector (1977 KLT. 664) as one not laying down the correct law on the point. That decision is overruled The learned Single Judge, with respect, appears to have wrongly proceeded on the assumption that S: 20A of the Act confers powers on a complainant for impleading the manufacturer, distributor or a dealer. After referring to the decisions of the Supreme Court, the learned Single Judge has laid down three alternatives which are open to the complainant under S.20A of the Act. A plain reading of S.20A clearly shows that the complainant has no locus standi in a matter arising under S.20A. The impleading contemplated thereunder is to be done by the trial magistrate during the trial of an offence under the Act of a vendor on being satisfied on the evidence before him that a manufacturer, distributor or dealer was concerned with that offence. 16. Provisions in S.233 to 239 of the Old Code corresponding to S.218 to 223 of the New Code are general provisions which apply to all cases contemplated under S.4 of the New Code, corresponding to S.5 of the Old Code, including prosecutions under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. There is nothing in this Act making them inapplicable to prosecutions under that Act. Provisions in S.20A are not in supersession or substitution of these general provisions but in addition to them. No doubt S.20A of the Act is an enabling section and it does not bar a separate trial. But the provisions in S.20A of the Act are laid down to be followed in a proper and suitable case. If resort is made to S.20A and the magistrate seeks to exercise the enabling power thereunder to implead the persons mentioned in the section, then satisfaction of the condition referred to therein is mandatory. The Supreme Court said in V. N. Kamdar v. Delhi Municipality (AIR. 1973 SC. 2246) that, when once the magistrate seeks to exercise the enabling power on being satisfied on the evidence before him that the persons mentioned in S.20A of the Act are concerned with the offence or offences with which the original accused, the vendor, was being tried, it is imperative that such person or persons should be impleaded. 1973 SC. 2246) that, when once the magistrate seeks to exercise the enabling power on being satisfied on the evidence before him that the persons mentioned in S.20A of the Act are concerned with the offence or offences with which the original accused, the vendor, was being tried, it is imperative that such person or persons should be impleaded. While dealing with the scope of S.20A of the Act, it was held in that case that "in order to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and conflict of findings, it is imperative that the Magistrate should implead these persons under S 20-A whenever the conditions laid down in the section are satisfied." The very language in S.20A clearly indicates that the procedure contemplated therein after the impleadment of manufacturer, distributor or dealer, as the case may be, is a joint trial and to be fair to the newly added accused the entire proceedings should be commenced afresh against all the accused including the original accused. The scope of S.20A has to be judged by the language of the section itself and not with reference to S.239 or 351 of the Old Code respectively corresponding to S.223 and 319 of the New Code. S.20A states that in a case where the court exercises its enabling power it has to proceed against the person impleaded in the manner stated thereunder, that is, as though a prosecution had been instituted against him under S.20. This is but a joint trial. The decision in Kamdar's case (AIR. 1973 SC. 2246) has been fully approved in Bhagwan Das's case (AIR. 1975 SC. 1309). Although the Supreme Court in Bhagwan Das's case (AIR. 1975 SC. 1309) held in agreement with the Full Bench decision of the Delhi High Court in Delhi Municipality v. Laxmi Narain (1973 Crl.L.J. 690) that joint trial in that case was not illegal, on the special facts of that case, the appeals were allowed to the extent that the charge was quashed 17. What falls next for consideration is whether the impleadment of accused 2 to 8 under S.20A was one without jurisdiction. What falls next for consideration is whether the impleadment of accused 2 to 8 under S.20A was one without jurisdiction. The contention raised on behalf of the newly added accused persons is that this section confers jurisdiction on the court to implead persons mentioned therein only during the trial and that in the instant case the trial had not commenced, as no charge had been framed against the original accused when they were impleaded. The Full Bench in Food Inspector v. Seetharam Rice & Oil Mills (1974 KLT 685) observed that trial in a warrant case commences only after framing of a charge. The two decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above also state that persons mentioned in S.20A can be impleaded only during the course of trial. The case on hand is admittedly a warrant case instituted otherwise than on police report and the trial is governed by the provisions in S.244 to 249 of the New Coda (S.252 to 259 of the Old Code). The trial in a warrant case instituted upon a police report is governed by S.238 to 243 of the New Code (S.251A(1) to (10)) of the Old Code. 18. The word "trial" has been used in various sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Old and the New, in different contexts with different meanings. In certain sections this word has been used in a very general and wide sense, while in certain other sections this has been used in the limited or strict legal sense. Therefore, this expression cannot be given a uniform or fixed meaning. Wherever this term appears, its meaning has to be understood according to the context in which it has been used. The term "trial" has not been defined under the Old or the New Code, although they contain the definition of the word "inquiry". There can be no doubt that the framers of the Code intended to maintain a distinction between the expressions "inquiry" and "trial". Looking at the definition of "inquiry", it may not be. unreasonable or improper to state that this definition impliedly, gives us the meaning of "trial". There can be no doubt that the framers of the Code intended to maintain a distinction between the expressions "inquiry" and "trial". Looking at the definition of "inquiry", it may not be. unreasonable or improper to state that this definition impliedly, gives us the meaning of "trial". It can be said that "inquiry" stops when "trial" be-bins, or, that every proceeding preceding a "trial" is an "inquiry"although in the ordinary parlance or in the popular or the general wide sense of the term, "trial" begins or opens as soon as the court takes cognizance of the offence or the accused appears before court. The expression "trial" generally means the determination of issues arising in a particular case. The word "trial" has its origin from French "trier" and Latin "tres, tria". In the general talk when we speak of "trial" of persons what are really tried in a civil as well as a criminal case are issues. A "trial" can conclude only in a conviction or an acquittal, while at the conclusion of an "inquiry" the accused is either discharged or a charge is framed against him. An order of discharge would not be a bar for initiating fresh proceedings against an accused, while in the case of an acquittal or conviction on the conclusion of a "trial", he is entitled to raise the plea of autrefois acquit or convict, as the case may be. 19. The word "trial" in S.238 of the New Code (sub-section (1) of S.251A of the Old Code) and the word 'tried" in sub-section (4) of S.251A of the Old Code, corresponding to sub-section (2) of S.240 of the New Code, are used in different senses depending upon the contexts in which they are used. While the term "trial" in S.238 of the New Code (S. 251A(1) of the Old Code) is used in a wide and popular sense, the word "tried" in sub-section (2) of S.240 of the New Code (sub-section (4) of S.251A of the Old Code) is used in a strict legal sense. It may be noted in this regard that the word "trial" is absent in S.244 of the New Code (S. 252 of the Old Code) whereas the word "tried" appears in sub-section (1) of S.256 of the Old Code and sub-section (4) of S 246 of the New Code which is the corresponding provision. It may be noted in this regard that the word "trial" is absent in S.244 of the New Code (S. 252 of the Old Code) whereas the word "tried" appears in sub-section (1) of S.256 of the Old Code and sub-section (4) of S 246 of the New Code which is the corresponding provision. This Court had occasion to consider some of these questions in State of Kerala v. Achutha Panicker (1975 KLT. 703) (see also AIR 1953 M.B. 1; ILR. 38 Mad. 585 and ' ILR. 32 Mad. 220). In the absence of an express definition of the word "trial in the Code, we have to examine the various sections of the Code in which the word "trial" appears. While interpreting the word "tried" appearing under S.494 of the Old Code, the Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. Ram Naresh (AIR. 1957 SC. 389) held as follows: "The words "tried" and "trial" appear to have no fixed or universal meaning. No doubt, in quite a number of sections in the Code the words "tried" and "trial" have been used in the sense of reference to a stage after inquiry." In In-re Pakkirisamy Pillai (AIR. 1962 Mad. 142), while considering the meaning of the term "trial" used in S.251A (1) of the Old Code (S. 238 of the New Code), it was observed by the Madras High Court that the word "trial" has been used in sub-section (1) of S.251A not in a strict sense but only in the sense of a proceeding of the nature of an "enquiry" commencing from the appearance of the accused, although the proceeding contemplated therein is called a "trial". In Fakruddin v. State Police (AIR. 1962 Andhra Pradesh 236) it was held that an order of discharge in a warrant case instituted on police report is not different in nature from the one passed under sub-section (2) of S.253 and that the charge framed under sub-section (3) of S.251A (S. 240 (1) of the New Code) when the Magistrate is of the opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence triable under Chapter XXI (Chapter XIX of the New Code) is the stage at which the "trial" of a warrant case commences and till then the procedure concerns the preliminary steps. In a warrant case, whether instituted on police report or otherwise, the "trial" commences only after the framing of a charge against the accused and in a summons case the "trial" begins as soon as the accused appears before the court and the particulars of the offence are put to him. In a recent decision in Ratilal Bhonji v. State of Maharashtra (AIR. 1979 SC. 94), the Supreme Court has held: "The trial in a warrant case starts with the framing of charge; prior to it, the proceedings are only an inquiry." In the instant case admittedly no charge had been framed against the original accused when the additional accused were impleaded. It was after the examination of Pw.1 and before a charge was framed against the original accused that accused 2 to 8 were impleaded. The power under S.20A of the Act can be invoked only during the trial S.351 is the only section in the Old Code which enables a court during trial to bring in or add a person attending a criminal court although not under arrest or upon summons, as an accused. The corresponding provision in the New Code is S.319. The use of the words "inquiry" as well as "trial" in both these sections and the omission to use the word "inquiry" in S.20A of the Act are significant, and assume importance in this regard. Construing the word "trial" appearing in S.20A of the Act with reference to the language used in the section and the context in which it has been used, it is clear to us that this word has been used in the strict legal sense in this section and not in the popular or general wide sense. It was at the stage of inquiry before a charge was framed against the original accused that these accused persons were impleaded. This is clearly illegal. S.20A of the Act does not warrant the impleading of the manufacturer, distributor or dealer at a stage before trial of the original accused commenced. On the facts and in the circumstances of this case, the learned magistrate was not right in impleading accused 2 to 8 before trial commenced. It has also not been proved by satisfactory and acceptable evidence that the oil tins involved in this case belonged to the 5th accused. On these grounds they are entitled to an acquittal. On the facts and in the circumstances of this case, the learned magistrate was not right in impleading accused 2 to 8 before trial commenced. It has also not been proved by satisfactory and acceptable evidence that the oil tins involved in this case belonged to the 5th accused. On these grounds they are entitled to an acquittal. There is also no reliable evidence which satisfies the requirements of S.17 of the Act so as.to make accused 3, 4 and 6 to 8 liable for the offences alleged to have been committed by the firms. In either view, the acquittal of these accused is only right. 20. The appeal against the first accused is directed only against his acquittal of the charge of having stored misbranded gingelly oil. Attacking this order of acquittal, the learn d advocate contended that Ex. D1 (a) warranty cannot in any way enable the first accused to get himself exonerated of the charge of having stored misbranded oil. It was on the basis that the first accused was a vendor entitled to the benefit under S.19(2) of the Act that he was acquitted of the first charge by the trial court. This acquittal has not been challenged before us. The counsel for the first accused submitted that storing simpliciter is not an offence and that unless it is proved by the prosecution that, the storage of the misbranded articles was for sale, his client cannot be convicted under the Act. The counsel relied on the evidence of Pws.1 and 2; the statements in Ext. P5 mahazar and the evidence of Dw.5 in support of his contentions. According to him, 60 tins of gingelly oil were delivered to him under Ex. D2 delivery note by the second accused on 18-2-1976. All these tins were covered by Ext. D1 (a) warranty issued by the second accused. As soon as he took delivery of these tins, he found 20 tins out of them had no proper agmark. Immediately these 20 tins were removed from the rest and kept separately to be sent back to the second accused and they were not intended for sale. The evidence shows that on the same day first accused tried to contact the second accused over phone to inform him about this; but he could not get him over phone. Immediately these 20 tins were removed from the rest and kept separately to be sent back to the second accused and they were not intended for sale. The evidence shows that on the same day first accused tried to contact the second accused over phone to inform him about this; but he could not get him over phone. It was on the next day that the Food Inspector visited his shop and seized these 20 tins. "The evidence of pws.1 and 2 shows that these 20 tins were found kept separately from the remaining tins, that the first accused represented to pw. 1 that these 20 tins were not intended for sale and that as he found no proper Agmark on them he had contacted the second accused to get his instructions as to what steps he should take in respect of these 20 tins. This was followed by Ex. D4 letter dated 19 2-1976 which also states that these tins were kept separately awaiting instructions from the sender. In the light of the evidence and the circumstances disclosed in the case, it cannot be held that the acquittal of the first accused was wrong or perverse. In the result, the convictions and sentences passed against accused 2 and 5 are set aside, their appeal is allowed, and they are acquitted. Fine, if any, paid will be refunded to those appellants. Crl. Appeal No. 353/ 77 has no merits and the same is hereby dismissed.