Short Note : 1. This is a plaintiff's second appeal arising out of a suit for possession of 0.80 acres of Khasra No. 449/1, situate within the municipal limits of Raipur city; removal of the structures made thereon by the defendant No. 1 and for mesne profits. The original plaintiff was Sattulal on whose death his legal representatives were impleaded in his place and they are the present appellants. The original defendant No.2 was Ramprasad, a nephew of plaintiff Sattulal, and he too having died, his legal representives are the present respondents Nos. 2 to 6. 2. The area of entire Khasra No. 449/1 was 1.01 acre. The plaintiff Sattulal claimed to have purchased it from its admitted previous owner Laxminarayan by virtue of sale-deed Ex. P-1 dated 27-11-52. According to the plaintiff's case, the defendant No.2 Ramprasad trespassed over a part of this land some time in 1953 and made some constructions thereon over 0.20 acres thereof. The remaining area of 0.80 acres is alleged to have been also trespassed by these defendants and the defendant No.1 who is a tenant of defendant No.2 in an adjoining property is alleged to have occupied the suit plot having the area 0.80 acres some time in the year 1955. The present suit is only in respect of 0.80 acres of Khasra No. 449/1 and no action has been taken by the plaintiff to recover possession of the remaining area of 0.20 acres from the defendants. In short, the plaintiff's case is of his dispossession from the suit lands some time after his purchase vide Ex. P-1 in 1952 from the former owner Laxminarayan. 3. The defendant No. 1 claims possession over the suit land as a tenant of defendant No.2. Admittedly some time in the year 1944 there was a partition between plaintiff and defendant No.2. Defendant No.2 claims that he has been in possession of the entire Khasra No. 449/1 through Laxminarayan who was their Munim prior to the partition. It is claimed that the said Laxminarayan was indebted to them and at the time of partition in 1944, a part of the debt due from Laxminarayan was allocated to the share of defendants No.2 and it was for repayment of that debt that Laxminarayan made an oral sale in favour of defendant No.2 coupled with delivery of possession. In this manner, defendant No.2 claims actual possession ever since then. In this manner, defendant No.2 claims actual possession ever since then. 4. The trial Court decreed the suit but on appeal, the District Court has reversed the decree and dismissed the suit. The first appellate Court has held that execution of the sale-deed Ex. P-1 dated 27-11-52 by Laxminarayan in favour of plaintiff Sattulal was proved. However, it has been further held that at least since 1945 defendant No.2 Ramprasad was in exclusive, continuous, peaceful, uninterrupted and hostile possession of the suit land to the knowledge of the true owner, On the basis of this finding, this suit tiled on 6-10-1960 was held to be time barred. This has led to the present appeal. Held : In view of the first appellate Court's finding of fact that defendant No.2 Ramprasad has been in actual possession of the suit land since 1945 in open assertion of his hostile title, this appeal has to fail unless the appellants are able to get over this finding of fact. Shri K. P. Munshi, learned counsel for the appellants, has, therefore, advanced the following arguments: (1) The finding on the question of possession is vitiated because the rasid-bahi (Ex. P-2), copies of Khasra (Ex. D-4 & D-6) have been ignored, which constitute importa11t evidence on this point. (2) The oral evidence adduced in the present case does not amount to legal evidence for the purpose of proving the requisite animus to constitute adverse possession. 5. Having heard learned counsel at length, I am of the opinion that both these arguments have to be rejected. 6. Ex. P-2 rasid-bahi is only for the period subsequent to the sale-deed of 1952 and shows only the fact of payment of revenue. Ex. D-4 is a copy of Khasra for the years 1949-50 & 1950-51. EX.D-6 is similarly a copy of the Khasra for the years 1948-49 to 1952-53. The fact of payment of revenue as shown in the rasid-bahi is merely one circumstance for appreciation of evidence and is not decisive of the question of possession. This evidence does not tilt the balance on the question of possession and cannot be called a vital or important piece of evidence as suggested by Shri Munshi. The fact of payment of revenue as shown in the rasid-bahi is merely one circumstance for appreciation of evidence and is not decisive of the question of possession. This evidence does not tilt the balance on the question of possession and cannot be called a vital or important piece of evidence as suggested by Shri Munshi. Moreover, this relates to the entire Khasra No. 449/1 when admittedly no steps have been taken by the plaintiff to recover the remaining 0.20 acres of the same Khasra number admittedly in possession of defendant No.2 even though purchased by the plaintiff by the same sale-deed. So far as the Khasra entries are concerned, the first appellate Court has held that the presumption arising from the Khasra entries has been adequately rebutted. It is, therefore, obvious that these documents have not been ignored. Shri Munshi then relied on the Khasra entries to argue that the same show the actual possession of Laxminarayan, the vendor of the plaintiff within twelve years of the suit which would enure the benefit to the plaintiff. It is difficult to read these documents in that manner. 7. In none of these documents the actual possession shown is that of Laxminarayan. The very foundation for such an argument is, therefore, absent. The first argument, therefore, fails and is rejected. 8. The other argument is also devoid of any substance. Shri Munshi has read out the oral evidence. I am unable to accept that this evidence does not constitute legal evidence to prove the requisite animus as suggested by Shri Munshi. The evidence clearly is that defendant No.2 treated the suit plot as his own and this was done by him openly. Thus, open assertion of a hostile title has clearly been stated by the witnesses. An attempt was made at the hearing then to suggest that defendant No.2 Was in possession as a shikmi or sub-tenant of Laxminarayan. Such an argument has to be rejected outright for the simple reason that this is nobody's case. It is also significant that Laxminarayan, though available, was not examined by the plaintiff who claims to have obtained actual possession from him prior to his dispossession subsequent to the sale in 1952. 9. This is a suit governed by the old Limitation Act and on the plaintiff's own case. It is also significant that Laxminarayan, though available, was not examined by the plaintiff who claims to have obtained actual possession from him prior to his dispossession subsequent to the sale in 1952. 9. This is a suit governed by the old Limitation Act and on the plaintiff's own case. Article 142 of the old Limitation Act was applicable so that it was for the plaintiff to prove that he or his predecessor-in-title was in possession within twelve years of the suit. This he has been unable to do and on the contrary it has been found as a fact that defendant No. 2 has been in possession at least from 1945, i.e. 15 years prior to the date of suit. On this finding, the suit was obviously time barred even if Article 144 of the old Limitation Act applied. Thus, there is no ground to interfere in this appeal. Appeal dismissed.