JUDGMENT M.P. Mehrotra, J. - This second appeal by the defendant arises out of a suit for possession by pre-emption over the property described at the foot of the plaint on payment of Rs. 9,000 or such other amount as may be decided by the court. The allegations in the plaint are briefly as follows : In the city of Muzaffarnagar towards the south of the Shamli Road is the Mohalla known as Abupura. This mohalla consists of various smaller Mohallas and Thakurdwara is one such smaller mohalla where the property in dispute is situated. The plaintiff alleges that the custom of pre-emption prevails in the whole of Abupura and it is not necessary to make demands according to Mohammadan law. The plaintiff claims that he is a co-sharer and also a participant in appendages in a big Haveli of which a portion is in dispute in the suit. The grievance is that Shri Chand, defendant No. 2 secretly sold away the portion in dispute to the defendant No. 1, Mangi Ram on 22-10-1969 for a sale consideration of Rs. 9,000. This step was taken according to the plaintiff to harass him because Shri Chand, defendant No. 2, had been involved in a civil litigation with him. The plaintiff Jyoti Prasad, claims that in view of the custom of pre-emption, which prevails in the locality, he has a right to pre-empt the said sale. On the basis of the aforesaid sale deed dated 22-10-1969 Mangi Ram defendant No. 1 applied on 8th December 1969 to be made a party in suit No. 1176 of 1967 pending between the plaintiff and Shri Chand. The plaintiff alleges that it was then that he came to know for the first time about the aforesaid sale deed dated 22-10-1969. It is alleged that the plaintiff made a demand to pre-empt the property then and there and that he also moved an application in the court in which the aforesaid suit No. 1176 of 1967 was pending but the steps proved of no avail. Thereafter the plaintiff gave a notice dated 22-12-1969. The defendant No. 1 by his reply dated 5th January, 1970 denied that the plaintiff had a right of pre-emption. He, however, expressed his readiness to sell the property on certain terms and conditions which were not acceptable to the plaintiff. Thereafter the plaintiff gave a notice dated 22-12-1969. The defendant No. 1 by his reply dated 5th January, 1970 denied that the plaintiff had a right of pre-emption. He, however, expressed his readiness to sell the property on certain terms and conditions which were not acceptable to the plaintiff. Thereafter another notice was given by the plaintiff to the defendant No. 1 on 23-5-1970 but that also proved of no effect, Hence the suit. The defendant No. 1, Mangi Ram, alone contested the suit. He asserted that Thakurdwara was not a part of the mohalla Abupura. His contention was that the two were separate mohallas. It was denied that the custom of pre-emption prevailed in mohalla Thakurdwara. In any case such a custom, even if prevalent, was void and illegal as the same was violative of Article 19 of the Constitution of India. It was further alleged that the haveli in question had been partitioned long back and each portion was an independent separate entity. Consequently it was denied that the plaintiff was a co-sharer or a participant in the appendages in respect of the accommodation which was purchased by the defendant No. 1 from the defendant No. 2. The defendant also denied that the plaintiff came to know of the sale deed dated 22-10-1969 on 8th December, 1969 as alleged by the latter. The plaintiff, according to the contesting defendant, knew of the said sale deed much earlier. It was further alleged that no demand to pre-empt the property was made by the plaintiff on 8th December, 1969 and no copy of the alleged application said to have been made in the aforesaid suit was supplied to the said defendant. The defendant No. 1 also claimed that he had been a tenant of the defendant No. 2 in the property since before the sale deed in question and that he had carried out repairs therein. The plaintiff was not entitled to get back possession as sought by him in the suit. 2. The trial court framed the necessary issues and tried the suit. It decreed the same. The lower appellate court affirmed the decree of the trial court. The defendant No. 1, Mangi Ram, has now come up in the instant second appeal and in support and opposition thereof I. have heard learned counsel for the parties. 3. 2. The trial court framed the necessary issues and tried the suit. It decreed the same. The lower appellate court affirmed the decree of the trial court. The defendant No. 1, Mangi Ram, has now come up in the instant second appeal and in support and opposition thereof I. have heard learned counsel for the parties. 3. On behalf of the appellant the fold lowing points were pressed: (1) No demand was made immediately after the execution of the sale deed on 22-10-1969. Reliance was placed on two cases : N. C. Sarma v. R. C. Chakrabarti, (AIR 1921 Cal 162) and Lokrnan Das v. Sheoraj Kumar (AIR 1955 NUC (All) 1498). (2) The contesting defendant, Mangi Ram, had purchased the accommodation in dispute from Shri Chand, defendant No. 2. Shri Chand, in his turn, had purchased from one Nanak Chand to whom a portion of the Haveli had fallen on partition among the co-owners. Shri Chand was admittedly a stranger to the family. The defendant No. 1 did not claim any right of pre-emption in 1966 when Shri Chand, a stranger, obtained the property by purchase from Nanak Chand. Hence, the right of pre-emption not having been claimed by the plaintiff in 1966 against Shri Chand, was permanently waived and lost and the same could not be claimed against the subsequent transferees of Shri Chand. The plaintiff-respondent No. 1 was estopped from claiming the said right of pre-emption in respect of subsequent transfers which took place after Shri Chand, a stranger, purchased the property in 1966. Reliance was placed on the following cases : Rameshar Prasad v. Ghisiawan Prasad, AIR 1929 All 531: (1929 All LJ 665); Sunder Lal v. Ghissa, AIR 1929 All 589 (2) : (1929 All LJ 1087); Narayandas v. Jagan Nath (AIR 1950 Madh Bha 85); Syed Oon Mahomed v. Mt. Bint Zohra ( AIR 1925 All 645 ). (3) The contesting defendant, Mangi Ram, purchased the rest of Shri Chand's portion during the pendency of the suit in 1971. There has been no claim on the part of the plaintiff to pre-empt the subsequent sale in favour of the contesting defendant effected on 8th February, 1971. Bint Zohra ( AIR 1925 All 645 ). (3) The contesting defendant, Mangi Ram, purchased the rest of Shri Chand's portion during the pendency of the suit in 1971. There has been no claim on the part of the plaintiff to pre-empt the subsequent sale in favour of the contesting defendant effected on 8th February, 1971. In view of this aspect of the matter, the defendant, Mangi Ram, became a co-sharer in the property along with the plaintiff and, therefore, the plaintiff did not have any superior right to pre-empt him in respect of the earlier sale dated 22-10-1969. It was contended that the decisive date for adjudication the plaintiff's claim to pre-emption is not the date of the institution of the suit but the date of the decree and in the instant case before the suit came to be decided, the aforesaid sale had taken place on 8th February, 1971 which gave the status of a co-owner to the defence dant, Mangi Ram, also and, therefore, the plaintiff's right of pre-emption, if any, stood destroyed on the material date, namely, when the suit was decided by the trial court. Reliance was placed on the following cases: Jagat Singh v. Sher Singh (1954 All LJ 588); Jai Narain v. Phal Narain ( AIR 1948 All 192 ); Hans Nath v. Ragho Prasad, AIR 1932 PC 57 : (1932 All LJ 190); Baldeo Misir v. Ramlagan, AIR 1924 All 82 at p. 83: (21 All LJ 648 at p. 649); Bhagwan Das v. Chet Ram ( AIR 1971 SC 369 ); Rikhi Ram v. Ram Kumar ( AIR 1975 SC 1869 ) and Sulan v. Masitu, AIR 1926 All 749 : (24 All 14 1003). (4) The right of pre-emption could be claimed in the instant case only on the basis of co-ownership. After the partition of the property there was no co-ownership and, therefore, the right of pre-emption could not be claimed by the plaintiff. In this connection attention was drawn to the plaintiff's statement under O. 10, R. 2, C.P.C. made on 30-8-1972. In the alternative, it was contended that even if the plaintiff could claim the right of pre-emption on the basis of co-ownership it could only be in respect of the Dahleez and the inner and outer Sahans which alone could be said to have remained jointly owned. In the alternative, it was contended that even if the plaintiff could claim the right of pre-emption on the basis of co-ownership it could only be in respect of the Dahleez and the inner and outer Sahans which alone could be said to have remained jointly owned. It was not admitted that there was any transfer of the Dahleez and the inner and the outer Sahans by the sale deed dated 22-10-1969. However, even if the sale deed be construed to have affected a transfer of the said jointly owned properties, even then the right of pre-emption could be claimed only in respect of the said Dahleez and the inner and outer Sahans which could jointly be owned and not in respect of other portions which were sold to the defendant No. 1 by the sale deed. Reliance was placed on Mulla's Mohammadan Law, 17th Edn. p. 252, Note 245; Mt. Zainab Bibi v. Umar Hayat Khan, AIR 1936 All 732 : (1936 All LJ 456) and Mst. Mohmudi v. Mustaque Ali (1958 All LJ 559). (5) The right of pre-emption is a very weak right and the purchaser is entitled to do everything in law to defeat such right. Reliance was placed on Bishan Singh v. Khazan Singh ( AIR 1958 SC 838 ); Radhakrishan v. Shridhar ( AIR 1960 SC 1368 ) and Bhagwan Das v. Chet Ram ( AIR 1971 SC 369 ). It was contended that in the instant case the defendant Mangi Ram could not make use of the upper portion without passing through and making use of the Dahleez, the staircase and the Sahans. Thus, even if the plaintiff succeeds, the said defendant cannot be prevented from going to the upper portion through the Dahleez etc. on the ground floor. No privacy is, therefore, left which could justify the plaintiff's claim to pre-emption, 4. On behalf of the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 the following contentions were made- (1) In the instant case the right of preemption, though based on Mohammadan law, was available as a matter of custom which stood fully proved from the evidence on record. Mohammadan law of pre-emption is administered in India as a rule of justice, equity and good conscience. (2) The plaintiff-respondent claimed the right of pre-emption on two grounds namely, that he was a co-sharer Shafie Sharik and a joint user of amenities and appendage Shafie Khalit. Mohammadan law of pre-emption is administered in India as a rule of justice, equity and good conscience. (2) The plaintiff-respondent claimed the right of pre-emption on two grounds namely, that he was a co-sharer Shafie Sharik and a joint user of amenities and appendage Shafie Khalit. It was contended that the right to claim pre-emption on the said two grounds has been upheld by the Supreme Court. In this connection attention was drawn to Bhau Ram v. Baij Nath ( AIR 1962 SC 1476 ) and Sant Ram v. Labh Singh ( AIR 1965 SC 314 ): (1964 All LJ 852). Attention was also drawn to the Division Bench case reported in Mahboob Hasan v. Ram Bharosey ( AIR 1966 All 271 ) (1965 All LJ 1178) and to the Full Bench decision reported in Jagdish v. Brij Raj ( AIR 1972 All 313 ) : (1972 All LJ 413). (3) It was contended that the fact that the subsequent sale deed dated 8th Feb., 1971 executed by Shri Chand in favour of Mangi Ram in respect of the upper portion was allowed to become final did not affect the plaintiff's right in respect of his earlier sale deed dated 22-10-1969 which was impugned in the instant litigation. In this connection reliance was placed on Section 19 of the Agra Pre-emption Act of 1922 which had a proviso as follows: "Provided that no voluntary transfer made in favour of the vendee after the institution of a suit for pre-emption shall defeat any right which the plaintiff had on such date of the institution." It was contended that Hans Nath v. Ragho Prasad ( AIR 1932 PC 57 ) : (1932 All LJ 190) did not remain good law in view of the subsequent addition of the aforesaid proviso to S. 19 of the Agra Pre-emption Act. Reliance was placed on Mt. Balkesha v. Harakh Chand (AIR 1934 All 255) : (1934 All L.3 25) (FB); Mst. Hankar Kunwari v. Ishwar Dayal (AIR 1932 All 469) : (1932 All LT 313); Tyabji's Muslim Law, Sections 612 and 635, 4th Edn., Nadir Hussain v. Sadiq Husain ( AIR 1925 All 361 : 47 All 324) : (23 All LJ 138); Zamani Begam v. Khan Muhammad (AIR 1924 All 251) : (21 All LJ 908) and Kaleshar Rai v. Nabiban Bibi (1906 ILR 28 All 642) : (3 All Lj 426). (4) The fact that the plaintiff did not choose to pre-empt the sale by Nanak Chand in favour of Shri Chand in 1966 did not affect his right to impugn the sale deed effected by Shri Chand on 22nd Oct., 1969 in favour of Mangi Ram. It was contended that every sale gave a fresh right of pre-emption. Reliance was placed on Hamedmiya v. Benjamin (AIR 1929 Bom. 206). (5) The right of pre-emption comes into existence only when a sale deed is executed and any acquiescence made earlier will not defeat the right after the sale. Reliance was placed on Govindsa Marotisa v. Ismail (AIR 1950 Nag 22) and Zamani Begam v. Khan Muhammad (AIR 1924 All 251) a (21 All L.J 908). 5. I do not find force in the first contention which was raised on behalf of the applicant, namely, that the suit was not maintainable on the ground that no demand for pre-emption was made immediately after the execution of the sale deed dated 22nd Oct., 1969. Both in N. C. Sarma v. R. C. Chakrabarti (AIR 1921 Cal 162) and Lokman Das v. Sheoraj Kumar (AIR 1955 NUC All 1498) it has been emphasised that the demand should be made immediately on the news having been received by the pre-emptor of the transfer. A finding of fact has been recorded in the courts below that the plaintiff came to know of the sale deed dated 22nd Oct., 1969 for the first time on 8th Dec., 1969 when the appellant-defendant No. 1, Mangi Ram, applied to be made a party in suit No. 1176 of 1967. It has also been found as a fact that immediately the plaintiff claimed a right of pre-empition in respect of the said sale. The aforesaid findings of fact cannot be allowed to be challenged in the instant appeal and, therefore, it cannot be held that the suit was bad on account of the delay in claiming the right of pre-emption in respect of the impugned sale deed. 6. So far as the second contention on behalf of the appellant is concerned, again I find the same untenable. It is true that no right of pre-emption was claimed against a stranger, Shri Chand when a co-owner, Nanak Chand transferred his interest in the property in favour of the former. 6. So far as the second contention on behalf of the appellant is concerned, again I find the same untenable. It is true that no right of pre-emption was claimed against a stranger, Shri Chand when a co-owner, Nanak Chand transferred his interest in the property in favour of the former. The cases on which reliance has been placed on behalf of the appellant, however, do not support the contention that a right of pre-emption, if not claimed in respect of an earlier sale deed, cannot be claimed in respect of a subsequent sale deed. It is obvious that a right of pre-emption which is claimed on the basis of co-ownership or on the basis of the joint user of amenities and appendages is not destroyed by a non-challenge to an earlier sale deed. The effect of a sale deed in favour of the stranger, which is not challenged, is that the stranger himself becomes a co-owner or a joint user of the amenities and appendages. However, when such a co-owner seeks to transfer in favour of any stranger then the other co-owner is entitled to assert his right of pre-emption on the ground of his co-ownership or on the ground of joint user of amenities and appendages and an unchallenged sale deed in favour of a stranger makes the latter a co-owner of the property but it certainly does not destroy the other co-owner's status as a co-owner of the property. The right to claim pre-emption arises on the ground of such status and since that status remains unimpaired it seems to me that a co-owner's right to pre-emption cannot be said to be lost merely because an earlier sale deed in favour of a stranger by another co-owner is not challenged by the other co-owner. The cases reported in Syed Oon Mahomed v. Mt. Bint Zohra ( AIR 1925 All 645 ) Rameshwar Prasad v. Ghisiawan Prasad (AIR 1929 All 531) : (1929 All LJ 665); Sunder Lal v. Ghissa ( AIR 1929 All 589 (2)): (1929) All 14 1087 and Narayandas v. Jagan Nath (AIR 1950 Madh Bha 85) are all cases in which the controversy has been examined in respect of one and the same sale deed. It was considered as to what would be the effect of a consent or acquiescence etc. It was considered as to what would be the effect of a consent or acquiescence etc. given by a pre-emptor to a transfer on his subsequent effort to pre-empt the property. They are not cases where the courts might be called upon to consider the effect of not getting an earlier sale deed in favour of a stranger pre-empted on the pre-emptor's claim to pre-empt a subsequent sale deed executed by the earlier purchaser of the property. In AIR 1962 SC 1476 the right of pre-emption based on co-ownership was held to be valid. It was observed (at p. 1488) : "The result of the law of pre-emption in favour of a co-sharer is that if sales take place the property may eventually come into the hands of one co-sharer as full owner and that would naturally be a great advantage." Viewing the matter in this light it seems to me that a co-sharer may allow a stranger to become another co-sharer in the property and yet may claim the right to pre-empt the sale, when such stranger purchaser transfers the property in favour of a subsequent purchaser. A co-sharer may have no objection to one stranger and may have his objection to another stranger who is sought to be brought as a co-owner in replacement of the former stranger purchaser of a portion of the jointly owned property. 7. I shall advert to the third contention raised on behalf of defendant-appellant hereafter. But before I do so I will take up the fourth contention raised on his behalf. I do not think that it is correct to say that there was no co-ownership in the property. Even though there was partition amongst the co-sharers it is abundantly clear from a reference to the documents on record that at least certain portions were kept common. The user of amenities and appendages was also kept common. This is clear from the recitals in the impugned sale deed dated 22nd Oct., 1969. The trial Court, while deciding issue No. 2, noted that, "........Defendant No. 1 in his statement under Order 10, Rule 8, C. P. C., on the other hand, admitted that the Dahliz of the house in suit and that of the Haveli was common and that the Baggar (i. e. Haveli or the whole house) belonged tq him and the plaintiff jointly. Thus, the evidence on the record squarely shows that the different portions in the Haveli are not entirely separate house or separate entities. A number of items therein are still joint or common in use, particularly the entrance and the staircases. The larger portion in the Haveli admittedly belongs to the plaintiff. Consequently, I hold that the plaintiff is both a co-sharer (Shaft-i-sharik) and participator in appendages (Shafi-i-Khalit) in the Haveli and as such has a right to pre-empt the porperty in suit." The lower appellate court affirmed this finding. Therefore, I do not think that the appellant is right in his contention that there was no co-ownership left in the property in question. I also do not accept the contention that the right of pre-emption could be claimed only in respect of co-owned property. Apart from the aspect of co-ownership it has to be seen that the right has been claimed also on the ground of Shafi-i-khalit i. e. on the ground of joint user of amenities and appendages. The right of pre-emption based on this ground is not restricted only to a right to get pre-emption in respect of such joint amenities and joint appendages. It extends to the en-tire property in respect of which the joint amenities or appendages exist and can be availed of. In this view of the matter, if the plaintiff is held entitled to pre-empt on the basis of his being a Shafi-i-khalit it cannot be argued that he can pre-empt only the portions which are commonly used such as staircase etc. and not the rest of the portion comprised in the impugned sale deed dated 22nd Oct., 1969. It is obvious that stair-case and other amenities or appendages exist for the benefit of the rest of the portion which was sold by the sale deed. I do not think that the reliance on Mulla's Mahomedan Law, 7th Edn., Note 245 page 252 is in any way helpful to the appellant, The said Note is as follows : "Suit for pre-emption; What the claim must include. Where the property is sold to a single buyer, a person claiming to pre-empt must pre-empt the whole interest comprised in the transfer to the buyer. Where the property is sold to a single buyer, a person claiming to pre-empt must pre-empt the whole interest comprised in the transfer to the buyer. A suit which does not ask for pre-emption of the whole of such interest is defective, and should not be entertained." In my view, this Note instead of helping the appellant helps the plaintiff-respondent. Similarly, I do not find anything in Mst. Mohmudi v. Mustaque Ali (1958 All LJ 559) to support the appellant's contention. The head note in the said case lays down as under (at p. 560): "Where under one and the same deed of sale property as to which the pre-emptor has a right of pre-emption under the Mahommedan law is sold along with other property as to which he has no right of pre-emption and which share of the property in fact belongs to the pre-emptor in his own right, he can sue for pre-emption of the property which he is entitled to pre-empt under the law and his suit would not fail by reason of his having included property which he is not entitled to pre-empt." But in the instant case we are not facing a situation where pre-emptible property might be said to be joint with non-pre-emptible property. In this very case it has been laid down that a suit for partial pre-emption would be bad. Therefore, if the plaintiff could succeed in his claim for pre-emption it could be with reference to the entire sale deed dated 22-10-1969 and he could not succeed by seeking to pre-empt only the jointly owned items such as the Dahliz and the Sahan, the staircase, the Nalis etc. 8. This brings me to the appellant's third contention and, in my opinion, the appeal is entitled to succeed on the basis of the said contention. It may be recalled that Shri Chand had purchased the entire interest from Nanak Chand in 1966. Nanak Chand's share comprised of portions on the ground-floor and on the upper storey. Broadly, the portion on the ground-floor was sold by the impugned sale deed dated 22nd Oct., 1969 in favour of the appellant. The portion on the upper storey was sold in favour of the appellant on 8th Feb., 1971. Nanak Chand's share comprised of portions on the ground-floor and on the upper storey. Broadly, the portion on the ground-floor was sold by the impugned sale deed dated 22nd Oct., 1969 in favour of the appellant. The portion on the upper storey was sold in favour of the appellant on 8th Feb., 1971. This subsequent transaction dated 8th Feb., 1971 took place during the pendency of the suit in the trial Court, The trial Court decided the suit on 16th July, 1973 and it is not disputed that on the date of the said decision the plaintiff had lost his right to pre-empt the said sale deed dated 8th Feb., 1971. Even though in para. 36 of the written statement of the appellant-defendant No. 1 a reference was made to the said subsequent transfer, still, the date of the sale deed was not given and the full significance of the said transaction was not realised during the trial of the suit. Subsequently, during the pendency of the appeal in the lower appellate court, by an amendment three new paras numbered as 36A, 36B and 36C were allowed to be added to the said written statement and it was contended that in view of the aforesaid sale deed dated 8th Feb., 1971 the appellant-defendant No 1 himself had become Shafi-i-Khalit and Shafi-i-Sharik. The lower appellate court has considered the effect of the sale deed dated 8th Feb., 1971 but has held that the plaintiff's right to pre-empt did not stand defeated by the said subsequent transaction. In my opinion, the approach of the lower appellate court is not correct. When the plaintiff was claiming the right of pre-emption on the basis of his being Shafi-i-Sharik and Shafi-i-Khalit on the ground that certain items in the property were kept joint and certain amenities and appendages were to be jointly used, then I fail to see why the same right and status could be denied to the defendant appellant when he purchased the upper portion on 8th Feb., 1971. On the execution of the sale deed dated 8th Feb., 1971, Shri Chand went out of picture and the appellant, Mangi Ram, became completely substituted in his place. There is clear recital in the deed dated 8th Feb., 1971, that certain items such as Sahan, Dahliz etc. would be jointly owned. On the execution of the sale deed dated 8th Feb., 1971, Shri Chand went out of picture and the appellant, Mangi Ram, became completely substituted in his place. There is clear recital in the deed dated 8th Feb., 1971, that certain items such as Sahan, Dahliz etc. would be jointly owned. Similarly, the staircase was to be used by the co-owners of the property, In this view of the matter, the status of the defendant in consequence of the execution of the deed dated 8th Feb., 1971, became that of a Shafi-i-Sharik and a Shafi-i-Khalit in the same manner as the plaintiff was claiming the said rights. The plaintiff, therefore, could not be said to have a better right to pre-empt the property in comparison to the defendant after the execution of the aforesaid deed dated 8th Feb., 1971. In some cases decided by this Court, for example, Sultan v. Masitu (AIR 1926 All 749) : (24 All LJ 1003) it has been held that the mere execution of such a deed will not defeat the right of pre-emption which is being claimed by the plaintiff unless the period of limitation for preempting such a document has expired. The said controversy will become only academic because, admittedly the deed dated 8th Feb., 1971, became final as it was not sought to be pre-empted during the period of limitation. The law is very clear that a plaintiff can succeed in his claim to preempt a property only if he has a superior right to the defendant. If both the plaintiff and the defendant stand on the same footing, in other words if both of them are either Shafi-i-Sharik or Shafi-i-Khalit, then the plaintiff cannot succeed. See Hans Nath v. Ragho Prasad ( AIR 1932 PC 57 ) : (1932 All LJ 190); Jai Narain v. Phal Narain ( AIR 1948 All 192 ) and Jagat Singh v. Sher Singh (1954 All LJ 588). In this view of the matter, it is held that the plaintiff did not have a superior right against the defendant as the latter had also acquired the status of Shafi-i-Sharik and Shafi-i-Khalit on the date when the suit was decided i. e. on 16th July, 1973. In this view of the matter, it is held that the plaintiff did not have a superior right against the defendant as the latter had also acquired the status of Shafi-i-Sharik and Shafi-i-Khalit on the date when the suit was decided i. e. on 16th July, 1973. In view of the long catena of cases of the Supreme Court, the Privy Council and of this Court to which reference has been made earlier in this judgment, it cannot be doubted that the material date for deciding the plaintiff's right of pre-emption is the date when the suit was decided by the trial Court. In other words, the trial Court was bound to consider the effect of the sale deed dated 8th Feb., 1971, executed in favour of the defendant. It, however, failed to do so. The lower appellate Court did consider the effect of the said document but, in my opinion, its approach was not correct. The Agra Pre-emption Act was repealed by U.P. Act 1 of 1951, hence it cannot be relied on by the respondent. 9. It may be observed that the Supreme Court in various cases has emphasised that the right of pre-emption is a very weak right and the purchaser is entitled to do every thing in law to defeat such a right. The cases have already been noticed in the earlier part of the judgment. In the facts of the instant case, it is obvious that the defendant, by virtue of the subsequent deed dated 8th Feb., 1971, has come to stay in the occupation of the upper storey of the building. He will be enjoying the staircase and other items which have been kept joint and in this aspect of the matter, the considerations which have some times weighed in the court in favour of upholding the right of pre-emption claimed by a plaintiff, do not exist in the facts and circumstances of the instant case. I, therefore, allow this appeal with costs throughout. The judgment and decrees of the courts below are set aside and the plaintiff's suit is dismissed with costs throughout.