Judgment D.P.SINHA, J. 1. Civil Writ Jurisdiction Cases Nos. 205, 206 and 207 of 1976 (R) have been heard together and this judgment disposes of all these writ cases. C.W.J.C. No. 205 of 1976 (R) 2. The petitioner, Niranjan Maiti, in his petition has prayed for quashing the order dated the 4th Sept,1976 (Annexure-5) passed by the Land Reforms Deputy Collector, Dhalbhum, at Jamshedpur (Respondent No. 1) acting as Authority appointed under S. 20 (1) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act), directing him to pay Rs. 1,296/- as arrears of wages and Rs. 500/- by way of compensation, to Kanhai Munda, respondent No. 2. 3. The grievance of the petitioner is that respondent No. 1 has made the direction for making the above payments to respondent No. 2 without giving him an opportunity to produce his witnesses and without even examining the witnesses for respondent No. 2 in his presence, It is further alleged that in response to the notice which had been served on the petitioner by respondent No. 1, he filed a show-cause stating that respondent No. 2 did not work for a single day for him during the year 1975-76 and so far as respondents Nos. 3 to 5 were concerned, they did work for him, but only occasionally during the said year and they had been paid their wages in full according to the rates fixed under the Act. When the petitioner appeared before respondent No. 1, while he was present in the Dakbungalow at Bahragora, he found that several other agriculturists had also been noticed and were present there. Respondent No. 1 asked all the parties to settle their differences mutually and to facilitate the same, he adjourned the hearing of the cases to 26-7-76, but on that day also, the hearing was adjourned to 4-9-76. In the meantime respondents Nos. 3 to 5 individually swore affidavits stating that they had been paid their wages fully and they had no dispute with the petitioner. The petitioner appeared before respondent No. 1 on 4-9-76 also and it was on that date that he filed his show-cause together with the affidavits of respondents 3 to 5. It is alleged that respondent No. 1 did not examine any of the claimants or witnesses. The petitioner appeared before respondent No. 1 on 4-9-76 also and it was on that date that he filed his show-cause together with the affidavits of respondents 3 to 5. It is alleged that respondent No. 1 did not examine any of the claimants or witnesses. Even the Labour Inspector and the Mukhiya were not examined as witnesses and they did not make any statement in the presence of the petitioner. It is asserted that the petitioner was ready with his witnesses in support of his defence, particularly with respect to the fact that respondent No. 2 had not worked even for a single day for him in the year, 1975-76. It is said that respondent No. 1 passed the impugned order in utter disregard of the legal procedure and the principles of natural justice. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further contended that the claim was barred by limitation and this fact had not been taken in to account by respondent No. 1. 4. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondent No. 1, by the Law Clerk of the Office of respondent No. 1. In paragraph 12 of the affidavit, it has been asserted that on the date of the hearing i.e. 4-9-76, the case had been enquired into summarily and respondent No.2, the local Mukhiya and the Labour Inspector had been examined and it was incorrect to say that respondent No. 1 had not examined them. There are other assertions also in the counter-affidavit to which it is not necessary to refer for the reasons which I shall hereafter state. 5. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has contended that the Authority (respondent No. 1) acted in utter disregard of the provisions of S. 20 (3) of the Act in as much as he Sid not examine the witnesses in support of the allegations made by respondent No. 2 and he failed to pass an order on the basis of the affidavits filed by respondents 3 to 5 showing full satisfaction of their dues and that, therefore, the impugned order is fit to be quashed in so far as it relates to respondent No. 2 and in so far as respondents 3 to 5 are concerned, the proceedings instituted on their behalf should be dropped in view of their affidavits. So far as respondents 3 to 5 are concerned, respondent No. 1 has said in the impugned order (Annexure-5) that although affidavits had been sworn by them it was not possible for him to express any opinion with regard to them as they were not present before him and he was not in a position to question them about their dues. 6. With regard to the claim of respondent No. 2, respondent No. 1 has said in the impugned order that the Mukhiya of the Gram Panchayat and the Labour Inspector who were present told him that the petitioner had not paid the arrears to any of his Mazdoors and after having heard both the parties, he was satisfied that the petitioner had not paid the arrears of wages to respondent No. 2 and that he was liable to pay the same and accordingly, he directed that he should pay Rs. 1,296/- towards the wages and Rs. 500/- by way of compensation to him (respondent No. 2) or else the amounts would be realised from him by attachment of his properties. 7. It is quite apparent from the impugned order that respondent No.1 held the inquiry not in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Act, but in a purely ad hoc and arbitrary manner. The Authority to hear and decide claims regarding payment of less than minimum rates of wages etc. under the Act is appointed under sub-section (1) of S. 20 of the Act. Sub-sec. (2) thereof in its first proviso lays down that every application for such claims shall be presented with in six months from the date on which the minimum wages etc. became payable. In its second proviso, it has been provided that any such application may be admitted after the said period of six months when the applicant satisfies the Authority that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period. Sub-s. (3) lays down the manner in which the claim will be decided by the Authority. It provides that when any application under sub-sec. (2) is entertained the Authority shall hear the applicant and the employer, or give them an opportunity of being heard, and after such further inquiry if any, as it may consider necessary, may, without prejudice to any other penalty to which the employer may be liable under the Act, direct payments as mentioned in that sub-sec. (2) is entertained the Authority shall hear the applicant and the employer, or give them an opportunity of being heard, and after such further inquiry if any, as it may consider necessary, may, without prejudice to any other penalty to which the employer may be liable under the Act, direct payments as mentioned in that sub-sec. Sub-sec. (6) lays down that every direction of the Authority under Section 20 shall be final. Sub-sec. (7) provides that every Authority appointed under sub-section (1) shall have the powers of a Civil Court under the Civil P. C. 1908, for the purpose of taking evidence and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and compelling the production of documents and every such Authority shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for all the purposes of S. 195, Chap. XXXV of the Code of Criminal Procedure. No provision for appeal or revision has been made in the Act, and Section 24 lays down that no court shall entertain any suit for recovery of wages in so far as a direction has been made by the Authority under S. 20 of the Act. 8. In view of the above provisions and particularly of sub-s. (3), the Authority is bound to hear the applicant and the employer or give them an opportunity of being heard and decide the matter judicially. This means that the applicant and the employer would he entitled not only to examine themselves but also to examine witnesses and produce documents in support of their respective contentions. There cannot be a proper hearing without such an opportunity being afforded to them. This further means that if any of the parties produce witnesses and examines them, the other party is entitled to cross-examine them and since no appeal has been provided, the Authority need not record the statements of the witnesses made in their examination-in-chief and cross-examination in full, but it should make a memorandum of the substance of the deposition of each witness to be kept on the record so that it may appear to the satisfaction of all concerned that the Authority has considered and decided the matter judicially as required by the statute and not arbitrarily or according to his own notion of justice. Rule 29 of the Bihar Minimum Wages Rules 1951, which are rules duly made under S. 30 (1) of the Act, may also be referred to in this behalf. It provides as follows "29, Appearance of parties (1) If an application under sub-sec. (2) of S. 20 or S. 21 is entertained, the Authority shall serve upon the employer by registered post or specal messenger a notice in form IX to appear before him on a specified date with all relevant documents and witnesses, if any, and shall In form the applicant of the date so specified." The above rule also clearly indicates that the parties are entitled to produce all relevant documents and witnesses, if any, which they may like to produce in support of their respective contentions. 9. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the procedure prescribed by sub-sec. (3) of S. 20 had not been followed by the Authority (respondent No. 1) appears to be correct. Although respondent No. 1 has mentioned in the impugned order, which is the only record of what had happened before him on 4-9-1976 on which date the matter had been heard and the impugned order passed, that he had heard the parties, he does not appear to have examined the parties and their witnesses in the manner the law required him to do. He appears to have simply casually asked the opinions of the Mukhiya and the Labour Inspector, who were present before him as to how the matter stood and thereupon they had replied in a general way that the petitioner had not paid any wages to any of his labourers. It: is quite obvious that no opportunity was given to the petitioner to cross-examine the said witnesses and although his lawyer was present, he could not get any opportunity to cross-examine those witnesses in view of the fact that they were not formally examined in the manner required by the law. The statements in the counter-affidavit that the witnesses had been examined by the Authority is hardly of any value as it has been sworn by a Law Clerk who had admittedly no personal knowledge about it. It is, therefore, clear that the impugned order of the Authority (respondent No. 1) contained in Annexure-5 had been vitiated by failure on its part to act according to law. It is, therefore, clear that the impugned order of the Authority (respondent No. 1) contained in Annexure-5 had been vitiated by failure on its part to act according to law. It further appears that the question of limitation has also not been considered by the Authority although this was an obvious point which should have been considered. 10. For the reasons stated above. it must be held that a failure of justice has been occasioned on account of the Authority not having dealt with the matter according to the law. The application is accordingly allowed and the impugned order (Annexure-5) in so far as it relates to respondent No. 2, is here by quashed and the Authority is directed to decide the dispute with regard to the claim of Kanahai Munda (respondent No. 2) according to the law in the light of the observations made above. So far as the petition relates to respondents Nos. 3 to 5, the impugned order shows that the Authority did not dispose of the disputes relating to them in spite of the affidavits said to have been sworn by them, on the ground that they were not present before him and, therefore, he was unable to question them about the contents of the affidavits. 11. It is urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the affidavits which went unchallenged should have been accepted by the Authority and since he failed to do so., it should be accepted by this Court and the case as against the said respondents be ordered to be dropped. It is not known as to whether the Authority has or has not taken any further action with regard to the said respondents. There is nothing in the order sheet of the proceedings to show that any further step had been taken with regard to the said three respondents (No. 3 to 5). In the circumstances, it is ordered that in case, the cases relating to respondent Nos. 3 to 5 have not as yet been disposed of, the Authority shall proceed to deal with them and dispose them of as early as possible in accordance with the law. C. W. J. C. No. 205 of 1976 (R) is allowed accordingly. In the circumstances of this case, there will be no order as to costs. C. W. J. C. No. 206 of 1976 (R). 12. C. W. J. C. No. 205 of 1976 (R) is allowed accordingly. In the circumstances of this case, there will be no order as to costs. C. W. J. C. No. 206 of 1976 (R). 12. In this case, Jagarnath Pal is the petitioner and the impugned order which is also an order under S. 20 of the Act has been passed by the Authority (respondent No. 1) in favour of Brjoy Chandra Mali alias Manjhi and Dhanu Munda, who are respondents 2 and 3, respectively. The petitioners case is that respondents Nos. 2 and 3 worked only occasionally for him in the year 1975-76 in connection with his cultivation and they had been paid their wages in cash and kind and nothing was due to them. When the matter came up for hearing before respondent No. 1, the said two respondents admitted before him that they had been paid ten quintals of paddy each in full satisfaction of their claims and the petitioner also made a similar assertion before him. In spite of all that, respondent No. 1 directed, by the impugned order (Annexure-1) dated 4-9-76, that the petitioner should pay by 13-9-76, Rs. 702.56 otherwise, he would have to pay double the amount. There is a counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent No. 1 by the same law Clerk who has filed the affidavit in C. W.J. C. No. 205 of 1976 (R). It has been contended by Mr. Ranen Roy, learned counsel for the petitioner, that the order directing payment of the admittedly satisfied dues is perverse. 13. The order on the face of it appears to be perverse, because respondent No. 1 has ignored the admissions made by respondents Nos. 2 and 3 themselves as also the assertion of the petitioner before him that wages had been paid in full and that nothing was due. He has done so only on the ground that the Labour Inspector and the Mukhiya had no knowledge about such payments. This obviously means that without there being any evidence that the payments as alleged by the petitioner and as admitted by respondents 2 and 3, who were the beneficiaries had not been made, it has been held that no such payment had been made. Such a conclusion cannot but be held to be perverse. This obviously means that without there being any evidence that the payments as alleged by the petitioner and as admitted by respondents 2 and 3, who were the beneficiaries had not been made, it has been held that no such payment had been made. Such a conclusion cannot but be held to be perverse. The Authority is required to decide the matter on the evidence produced before it and not arbitrarily or on the basis of mere conjectures as has been done in this case. The application is allowed and the impugned order, dated 24-9-76 contained in Annexure-1 is hereby quashed, and the claim of respondents Nos. 2 and 3 is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. C. W. J. C. No. 207 of 1976 (R). 14. In this case, Chittaranjan Ojha is the petitioner and the impugned order, dated 24-9-76 (Annexure-3) under S. 20 of the Act has been passed by the Authority (respondent No. 2) in favour of the Respondent No. 1, namely, Krishna Chandra Patar. The petitioners case, as made out in the petition, is as follows. He is a small cultivator having a cultivation of 21/2 acres of land and he engages casual labourers from time to time for the cultivation. Respondent No. 1 worked for him in the year, 1975-76 for a total period of 60 days only for which he was paid his wages in cash and kind in full and when he was noticed by respondent No. 2, he appeared before him on 12-7-76, whereupon he directed the parties to amicably settle the dispute and fixed 26-7-76 for hearing. On that date, before the Labour Inspector and several others, a payment voucher was drawn up and respondent No. 1 accepted that he had worked only for 60 days during the year 1975-76 and he had been given by the petitioner 1.80 quintals of paddy according to the rates fixed under the Act and that he was still to get 60 Kgs. of paddy in full satisfaction of his wages due and that the same had been delivered to him by the petitioner on 25-7-76 in presence of the Labour Inspector and several other gentlemen who had affixed their signatures on the voucher in token of the delivery. of paddy in full satisfaction of his wages due and that the same had been delivered to him by the petitioner on 25-7-76 in presence of the Labour Inspector and several other gentlemen who had affixed their signatures on the voucher in token of the delivery. On 25-7-76 itself, respondent No. 1 got prepared a compromise petition accordingly and agreed to file the same before respondent No. 2 on the next date fixed in the case praying for withdrawal of the case. A true copy of the said compromise petition is Annexure 2 to the application. Accordingly, on 4-9-76, he appeared before respondent No. 1, filed the said petition (Annexure-2) and also stated that he had received all his dues from the petitioner and he had no further claim. The Labour Inspector supported him. Respondent No.2 neither examined any other witness nor took any other evidence from any of the parties, but all the same by the impugned order, dated 4-9-76 (Annexure-3) directed the petitioner to give to respondent No.1, 1.20 quintals of paddy over and above 60 Kgs. already delivered to him with the observation that the quantity of 60 Kgs. was very low. A counter-affdavit has been filed by the Law Clerk above mentioned who appears to have no personal knowledge about the contents of the same and he appears to have derived his knowledge only from the records of the case. 15. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has contended that despite the fact that the matter had been compromised amicably and all the dues had been paid to respondent No. 1 and the Labour Inspector had confirmed before him that the quantity mentioned in the compromise petition had been actually delivered to respondent No. 1, he has arbitrarily decided that the quantity delivered was too low without in any way showing as to how it was low or too low. He further contended that respondent No. 2 had passed the impugned order without adverting to the statements contained in the petition of compromise, with the result that miscarriage of justice had occurred. 16. He further contended that respondent No. 2 had passed the impugned order without adverting to the statements contained in the petition of compromise, with the result that miscarriage of justice had occurred. 16. On a perusal of the impugned order (Annexure-3), there is little doubt left that the contentions of the learned counsel are correct and that the order had been passed by respondent No. 2 not on the basis of the evidence adduced before him, but entirely on the conjecture that the quantity paid was very low. There is hardly anything in the order which would indicate how he had come to the conclusion that 1.20 quintals of paddy was still payable by the petitioner. This was a finding based absolutely on no evidence. In the circumstances, it is quite obvious that respondent No. 2 had passed the impugned order (Annexure-3) in complete disregard of the provisions of sub-sec. (3) of S. 20 of the Act which requires the claim to be decided on the basis of evidence produced by the parties. In the circumstances, the impugned order, dated 4-9-76 (Annexure-3) is hereby quashed and the claim case against the petitioner is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Ch. SIA SARAN SINHA, J.: 17. I agree. 17 The authority appointed to hear and decide the claims arising out of the payment of less than the minimum rates of wages has to discharge quasi judicial functions. In this connection, the following observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court, in the case of Siemens Engineering & Manufacturing Co of India Ltd. V/s. Union of India reported in (1976) 2 SCC 981 : ( AIR 1976 SC 1785 ) may usefully apply to such quasi-judicial proceedings (at p. 1789 of AIR): "If courts of law are to be replaced by administrative authorities and tribunals, as indeed, in some kinds of cases, with the proliferation of Administrative Law, they may have to be so replaced, it is essential that administrative authorities and tribunals should accord fair and proper hearing to the persons sought to be affected by their orders and give sufficiently clear and explicit reasons in support of the orders made by them. Then alone administrative authorities and tribunals exercising quasi-judicial function will be able to justify their existence and carry credibility with the people by inspiring confidence in the adjudicatory process. Then alone administrative authorities and tribunals exercising quasi-judicial function will be able to justify their existence and carry credibility with the people by inspiring confidence in the adjudicatory process. The rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is, like the principle of audi alteram partem, a basic principle of natural justice which must inform every quasi-judicial process and this rule must be observed in its proper spirit and mere pretence of compliance with it would not satisfy the requirement of law." Order accordingly.