JUDGMENT The petitioner company claimed that it was a lessee of Madhabpur Colliery situated at Kajoragram, P.S. Andal, district, Burdwan. In this Rule it has prayed for a declaration that the West Bengal Estates Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1964 (Act 22 of 1964) is illegal and ultra vires the Constitution of India. It has also prayed that the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 be commanded to cancel and to forbear from enforcing the provisions of the West Bengal Estates" Acquisition Act, 1964 against the petitioner and the respondent No, 4. The petitioner has also prayed that the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 be commanded to forbear from realising any royalty from the re8pondent No, 4 in respect of Madhabpur Colliery. 2. Mr. Tapas Chandra Ray, learned advocate for the petitioner has submitted that in view of enactment of Article 228A of the Constitution by the Constitution (Fortysecond Amendment) Act, 1976 this case may be referred to the learned Chief Justice for constitution of a Bench consisting of five or more judges for determining the question as to the constitutional validity of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition (Amendment) Act, (West Bengal Act 22 of 1964). 3. Having given my anxious consideration to the aforesaid point raised on behalf of the petitioner, I find no substance in the same. The petitioner in its writ petition has not raised any question of Constitutional validity of a central law. Therefore, Article 228A (1) admittedly is not applicable. Clauses (3) and (4) of Article 228A would be attracted in case of determination of questions relating to the constitutional validity of any state law. I am not prepared to accept the submission of the learned advocate for the petitioner that whenever a writ petition contains an averment that a particular state law is constitutionally invalid, the judge or judges hearing the petition would be bound to make a reference to five or more judges. The use of the expression "determine" in Clauses (2) and (3) is significant. In the present context the said expression means a judicial decision for ending or settling a controversy about the constitutional validity of any state law. In other words, it means resolving such a question or issue by reasoning. Therefore Article 228A(2) presupposes existence of a controversy or dispute relating to constitutional validity of any state law. In the present context the said expression means a judicial decision for ending or settling a controversy about the constitutional validity of any state law. In other words, it means resolving such a question or issue by reasoning. Therefore Article 228A(2) presupposes existence of a controversy or dispute relating to constitutional validity of any state law. Further, when questions relating to constitutional validity of any state law is raised in a case, the judge or judges hearing the same are bound to consider whether a determination of the said questions is involved in the case. In other words, the judge or judges have to apply their minds to the question whether determination of the constitutional validity of any state law would be necessary or required for disposal of the case. Where such questions of constitutional validity would not be necessary for deciding the case, the judge or judges cannot make a reference under Article 228A to five or more judges merely for delivering a mere obiter dicta relating to a state law. Therefore, a determination of constitutional validity under Article 228A would be made when the same is called for in deciding a particular case. 4. In this connection reference may be made to the recently framed Clause (a) of Rule 1A Chapter II of the Rules of the High Court at Calcutta, Appellate Side. The said Rule inter alia provides. "Where at any stage of hearing of the appeal, application, writ petition or any other matter it appears to the Judge or Judges constituting a Division Bench or any other Bench consisting of less than five Judges that it involves determination of any question as to the constitutional validity of any State law, the Judge or the Judges constituting such a Bench shall either send the question or the appeal, application, writ petition or the other matter to the learned Chief Justice for constituting a Bench of not less than five Judges for determination of such a question in accordance with Article 228A of the Constitution. The above interpretation regarding the scope and effect of Article 228A(2) finds support from the following facts and circumstances. The above interpretation regarding the scope and effect of Article 228A(2) finds support from the following facts and circumstances. The Statement of Object and Reasons of the Constitution (Fortysecond Amendment) Act, 1976 which inserted Article 228A, inter alia, recited: "Parliament and the State Legislatures embody the will of the people and the essence of democracy is that the will of the people should prevail. Even though Article 368 of the Constitution is clear and categoried with regard to the all inclusive nature of the amending power, it is considered necessary to put the matter beyond doubt. It is proposed to strengthen the presumption in favour of the constitutionality of legislation enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures by providing for a requirement as to the minimum number of Judges for determining questions as to the constitutionality of laws and for a special majority of not less than two-thirds for declaring any law to be constitutionally invalid. It is also proposed to take away the jurisdiction of High Courts with regard to determination of Constitutional validity of Central laws and confer exclusive jurisdiction in this behalf on the Supreme Court so as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings with regard to validity of the same Central law in different High Courts and the consequent possibility of the Central law being valid in one State and invalid in another State. Thus, the object of enactment of Article 228A was to strengthen the presumption of constitutionality of State Legislation. Therefore, a special majority of the judges would be henceforth required for determining the questions as to the constitutionality of laws, but there could be no scope for applying the said presumption of constitutionality where before the enforcement of the Constitution (Forty second Amendment) Act, 1976. The constitutional validity of a State law had been already determined either by the Supreme Court or by the High Court. Article 228A does not either expressly or by necessary implication render inoperative, the judicial decisions pronounced before the commencement of the said Constitution Amendment Act, 1976. The operation of the judicial decisions given prior to the enforcement of Article 228A remains unimpaired. Article 228A does not either expressly or by necessary implication render inoperative, the judicial decisions pronounced before the commencement of the said Constitution Amendment Act, 1976. The operation of the judicial decisions given prior to the enforcement of Article 228A remains unimpaired. Therefore, when in a case coming up for hearing after the commencement of the Constitution (Forty Second Amendment) Act, 1976 a point is raised regarding the constitutional validity of any State Law, the Court may first ascertain whether or not the said controversy about the constitutionality of a State law had been already settled either by the Supreme Court or by the High Court itself. In case there is already a binding precedent on the said point no reference under Article 228A (2) would be necessary. If, on the other hand, the question of constitutionality still remains unsettled, the Court may make a reference under Article 228A (2). 5. If the contrary submissions of Mr. Roy, learned Advocate for the petitioner, regarding the scope and effect of Article 228A be accepted, the same may result in patent absurdities. For example before the commencement of the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, the Supreme Court had already pronounced about the constitutionality of a State Law and the said question is again raised before the High Court in a case coming up for hearing after the commencement of the said Amendment Act. If Mr. Roy is correct in his submission then inspite of the Supreme Court decision the High Court would be required to again determine the same question as to constitutional validity. If two-thirds of the five or more judges determine the question in a way contrary to the decision of the Supreme Court curious results would follow. Further, in case before the commencement of the Constitution (Forty second Amendment) Act either the Supreme Court or the High Court has declared a post-constitutional State Law as invalid, then, the said post-constitutional law would be void ab-initio. I fail to see how the question of constitutional validity of the same State Law can be again agitated after enforcement of Article 228A. I fail to see how the question of constitutional validity of the same State Law can be again agitated after enforcement of Article 228A. Therefore, I conclude that in case the question of constitutionality of a State Law had been already finally decided before the commencement of the Constitution (Forty second Amendment) Act, 1976, the High Court need not invoke Article 228A in deciding a case where the same point of constitutionality is again taken after the commencement of the said Amendment Act. I accordingly reject the submission of Mr. Roy, learned Advocate for the petitioner, on the preliminary point. 6. In the present case, in my opinion, the determination of the point raised by the petitioner regarding constitutional validity of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition (Amendment) Act. (Act 22 of 1964) is not necessary. Mr. Roy has himself placed before me the judgment delivered by me on 29th August, 1972 in (1) CR 7911 (W) of 1968 (Karnani Finance Enterprise Limited v. The State of West Bengal & others). In the said Rule also the petitioner had urged that the amendments made to the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 by West Bengal Act 22 of 1964 were constitutionally invalid. In fact, Mr. Roy himself submitted before me that the grounds taken in the said case are almost indentical with the grounds taken in the present writ petition. In my judgment delivered in C. R. 7911 (W) of 1968 I elaborately discussed the said questions and upheld the constitutional validity of the West Bengal Act 22 of 1964. It was inter alia held that the said amending Act including the provision for insertion of Section 5(2) was within the scope of Article 131A(2)(b). I also rejected the contention that the said Amendment Act infringed Articles 14, 19, 31 (1) of the Constitution. The petitioner, Karnani Finance Enterprise Limited, being aggrieved by the said decision preferred F.M.A. 279 of 1973. The learned Advocate for the petitioner stated before me that A.K. Sen and M.N. Roy, JJ. by order dated 23rd June, 1976 dismissed the said appeal as not pressed. In the above view, this Court has already determined the constitutional validity of the West Bengal Act 22 of 1964 and has pronounced the same to be an intra vires piece of legislation. Therefore, a fresh determination of the said question is not called for. by order dated 23rd June, 1976 dismissed the said appeal as not pressed. In the above view, this Court has already determined the constitutional validity of the West Bengal Act 22 of 1964 and has pronounced the same to be an intra vires piece of legislation. Therefore, a fresh determination of the said question is not called for. Accordingly the provisions of Article 228A are not attracted to the present case. 7. Further, I find that by Constitution (Thirtyfourth Amendment) Act, 1974 the 9th Schedule of the Constitution was amended by inserting a number of Entries after Entry No. 66. Entry No. 82 inserted by the Constitution (Thirty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1974 contains the West Bengal Estates Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1964 (West Bengal Act 22 of 1964). The West Bengal Estates Acquisition (Second Amendment) Act, 1973 (West Bengal Act 23 of 1973) was also inserted as Entry No. 82 by the same Constitution Amendment Act. In the above view, the West Bengal Estates Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1964 (Act 22 of 1964) enjoys protection both under Article 31A and 31B of the Constitution. Therefore, the said Amending Act can not be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Articles 14, 19 and 31. Further, the said Act shall not be deemed to be void or ever become void on the ground that the said provision was inconsistant with or it takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by any of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court or tribunal to the contrary. This is an additional reason why a determination of the question whether the above amending Act of 1964 is ultra vires Articles 14, 19 and 31 is not necessary. 8. Now I proceed to consider the merits of the present case. It is not necessary to lengthen this judgment by giving reasons why this Rule has no merits. The judgment dated 29th August, 1972 in C.R.7911 (W) of 1968 already covers the points raised in the instant petition. Therefore, the said judgment will also govern the present case. 8. Now I proceed to consider the merits of the present case. It is not necessary to lengthen this judgment by giving reasons why this Rule has no merits. The judgment dated 29th August, 1972 in C.R.7911 (W) of 1968 already covers the points raised in the instant petition. Therefore, the said judgment will also govern the present case. Further, after the inclusion of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1964 (West Bengal Act 22 of 1964) in the 9th schedule by the Constitution (Thirtyfifth Amendment) Act, 1974 no question of any repugnancy or inconsistency between the provisions of the said Act and the rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution can or does arise. 9. In the above view I discharge this Rule without any order as to costs.