JUDGMENT 1. THE petitioner M/s. Kedarnath Purusattamdas and Co. (P) Ltd. challenged the validity and legality of the order dated 29th July, 1969 passed by the respondent No. 1, the Authority Under the Payment of Wages Act, West Bengal in P. W. A. Case No. 230 of 1966 holding that work was denied to the workmen intentionally as there was no lay-off as held by the Industrial Tribunal and directing the petitioner company to pay the unpaid wages of the workmen during the period they were not provided with any work and also prayed for a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to forbear from giving effect to the impugned order as well as a writ of certiorari for quashing the same. 2. THE petitioner which is a private limited company constituted under the Indian Companies Act is a manufacturer of steel condute pipes and steel furniture etc. For this manufacturing purposes the petitioner employed some workmen, at its factory at Howrah. These workmen sometime in January, 1964, through their union, Kedarnath Purusattamdas and Co. (P) Ltd. Workers' Union submitted a charter of demands to the petitioner and in order to realise their demands the workers adopted go-slow tactics, absentism and other illegal activities. In the last week of January, 1964, the permanent workmen went on a strike. There was an amicable settlement on 10th of February, 1964 whereby it was provided that the workmen would ensure increased production and the charter of demands submitted by the workmen would be taken up for conciliation after assumption of normal work. It was also agreed upon between the parties that the workmen would be given 10 days' notice-time to resume their duties. In spite of the said agreement a number of workmen refused to join their duties at the schedule time and a dispute was raised on the alleged ground of non-employment of a number of workmen. The said dispute was settled by a tripartite agreement on March 26, 1964. But in spite of these agreements the workmen continued go-slow tactics and indulged in acts of indiscipline and hunger-strike. As a result there was not only fall in production but urgent defense orders could not be executed. The said dispute was settled by a tripartite agreement on March 26, 1964. But in spite of these agreements the workmen continued go-slow tactics and indulged in acts of indiscipline and hunger-strike. As a result there was not only fall in production but urgent defense orders could not be executed. It has been stated that the petitioner company issued notices dated 8th April, 1964 and 10th April, 1964 requesting the workmen to give up go-slow tactics and other acts of indiscipline otherwise it would not be possible for the management to run the factory. The said request, however, was of no effect and the petitioner had to declare lay-off until further notice by a notice dated 11th April, 1964 from 12th April, 1964. There was, however, an amicable settlement between the company and its workers through their union and it was agreed that the lay-off would be lifted on and from August 20, 1964 and the factory would be reopened on August 20, 1964. The petitioner issued individual notices dated August 27, 1964 to its employees including the respondent workmen directing them to resume their duties worth with. It was also mentioned in the said notices that if they would fail to resume their duties it would be presumed that they had no intention to work and their names would be struck off from the company's roll. The respondent workmen, however, did not turn up and report for duties and so their names were struck off from the rolls. The workmen raised an Industrial Dispute in connection with the lay-off and the said dispute was referred by the Government to the 5th Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal for adjudication by Order dated June 25, 1964. The question referred to the Tribunal for decision was :- "whether the lay-off of workmen from 12. 4. 64 was justified ? To what relief, if any, were the workmen entitled ?" 3. PURSUANT to the notices issued by the Tribunal the petitioner as well as the respondents appeared in the said case and filed their written-statements. The petitioner company in the written statement stated that an agreement was entered into with majority of workmen on 19th August, 1964 and workmen had started work on 20th August, 1964. In accordance with the said agreement no compensation was payable for the lay-off. The petitioner company in the written statement stated that an agreement was entered into with majority of workmen on 19th August, 1964 and workmen had started work on 20th August, 1964. In accordance with the said agreement no compensation was payable for the lay-off. In view of the said agreement there was no industrial dispute and as such the learned Tribunal had no cause for adjudication. The workmen, on the other hand, in the written-statement stated that the lay-off imposed on them on and from 12. 4. 64 amounted to a punishment and an act of unfair labour practice and that in the lay off the entire body of workmen was refused employment. The 5th Industrial Tribunal after hearing the parties and Considering the evidences came to the conclusion that the lay-off was not justified on the ground that the notice for lay-off was not in accordance with Section 2 (kkk) of the Industrial disputes Act, 1947 and as such it was not a lay-off. The Tribunal also held that the question of payment for the period of lay-off did not arise as the union did not ask for relief by the payment during the said period. The Tribunal held that the workmen would be taken to have been kept without work or payment of wages without any disciplinary proceedings or order of suspension or on any reason whatsoever and the workmen would be entitled to get all that were due to them in employment. Thereafter the respondents made a composite application on 14th July, 1966 before the Authority Under the Payment of Wages Act, West bengal claiming a sum of Rs. 2,73,264. 50 paise and also compensation. This was registered as P. W. A. Case No. 230 of 1966. The Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, West Bengal, the respondent No. 1 after considering the evidences and hearing the parties allowed the said application by his order dated 29th July, 1969 and directed the petitioner to deposit Rs. 271903-30 paise with compensation of Rs. 10/- for each of the applicants to this Court within one month. It is against this order this application has been moved and the instant Rule was obtained. 4. MR. 271903-30 paise with compensation of Rs. 10/- for each of the applicants to this Court within one month. It is against this order this application has been moved and the instant Rule was obtained. 4. MR. Arun Kumar Dutta (Senior), learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner has submitted that the application under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, is barred by limitation as the same was filed beyond the period prescribed by Sub-section 2 of Section 15 of the said Act. It has been contended by Mr. Dutta, learned Advocate for the petitioner that the application for delayed wages for the wage periods 1. 4. 64 to 30. 4. 66 has been filed on 14th of July, 1966. Proviso to Sub-section 2, of Sec. 14 of the Payment of Wages Act clearly provides that an application for payment of delayed wages is to be made under Section 15 of the Act within 12 months from the date on which the payment of wages were due to be made to the workers. In this case the application has been filed more than two years after the wages were due to be paid and as such the application is barred by limitation. Hence it ought to have been rejected by the respondent No. 1. Mr. Puspamoy Dasgupta, learned Advocate for the petitioner further submitted that the award made by the 5th Industrial Tribunal is without jurisdiction and as such the same can be challenged collaterally in an application under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act. It has been submitted in this connection by Mr. Dasgupta that the tribunal after holding that there was no layoff was not justified in proceeding further to hold that the workmen would be taken to have been kept without work or payment of wages without any disciplinary proceeding and they were entitled to get all that were due to the workmen in employment. Mr. Dasgupta has further submitted that the application ought to have been made under Section 33 (3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, as it is a claim under the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal. The application under Section. 15 (2) is misconceived and it is not, maintainable. Mr. Mr. Dasgupta has further submitted that the application ought to have been made under Section 33 (3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, as it is a claim under the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal. The application under Section. 15 (2) is misconceived and it is not, maintainable. Mr. Dasgupta further submitted that the remedy by way of an appeal under Section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act is illusory and not an effective remedy inasmuch as the petitioner cannot avail of this remedy unless it deposits the entire amount: payable under the order appealed against, even though the impugned order is challenged on the ground that it was wholly illegal and bad. Thus the statutory remedy by an appeal is not an effective remedy. It has also been submitted by Mr. Dasgupta that the amended provision of Article 22,6 (3) of the Constitution did not create any absolute bar to seek relief on an application under Article 226 of the Constitution in a case where the alternative remedy is not a proper and efficacious one. 5. MRS. Manjuli Chowdhury (Sengupta), learned Advocate for the respondents Nos. 3 to 133 has on the other hand, joined issue and submitted that the award of the 5th Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal, was published in Calcutta Gazette on May 20, 1966 and the application under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, had been filed on July 14, 1966 and as such the application was not barred by limitation. It has been further submitted by Mrs. Chowdhury that the limitation for such an application will start on and from the date when the award of the Industrial Tribunal is published determining that there is no lay-off of the workmen which entitled them to get all wages due to the workmen in employment. It is premature to file any application under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 prior to publication of the said award. In support of her contention Mrs. Chowdhury has referred to a decision in 77 C. W. N. 556. (National Tobacco Co. v. State of West Bengal. 6. MRS. Chowdhury has next submitted that the statute itself provides for an appeal against an order passed on an application under Section 15 of the payment of Wages Act, 1936 within 30 days from the date of the order. Chowdhury has referred to a decision in 77 C. W. N. 556. (National Tobacco Co. v. State of West Bengal. 6. MRS. Chowdhury has next submitted that the statute itself provides for an appeal against an order passed on an application under Section 15 of the payment of Wages Act, 1936 within 30 days from the date of the order. The petitioner has not availed of the said statutory remedy which is also an effective remedy. This writ petition is, therefore, liable to be dismissed. Moreover, in view of the amended provisions of Article 226 (3) of the Constitution this writ application is not entertain able as there is an alternative remedy by way of appeal provided in the statute itself and the infraction of right complained of does not come within Clause (a) but within Clauses (b) and (c) of Article 226 (1) of the Constitution and the Rule shall abate. Mrs. Chowdhury has also contended that the award passed by the industrial Tribunal is not at all without jurisdiction and as such it cannot be collaterally challenged in this proceeding under Section 15 (2) of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. 7. THE petitioner company declared lay-off from 12. 4. 64 on issuing a notice of lay-off on 11th April, 1964 and an industrial dispute was referred to the 5th Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal and the issue for adjudication was whether the lay-off of the workmen from 12. 4. 64 was justified. The Tribunal passed an award holding that there was no lay-off in accordance with the provisions of! Section 2 (kkk) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Tribunal also held that there being no lay-off the workmen would be taken to have been kept out of work without any disciplinary proceeding or order of suspension. The workmen were also held to be entitled to get all the wages due to them in employment. This award of the Tribunal was published in the Calcutta Gazette on May 20, 1966. On July 14, 1966, the respondent Nos. 3 to 133 filed a joint application before the Authority Under that Payment of Wages Act, West Bengal, the respondent No. 1 for payment of delayed wages from the period from 1. 4. 64 to 30. 6. 66. This award of the Tribunal was published in the Calcutta Gazette on May 20, 1966. On July 14, 1966, the respondent Nos. 3 to 133 filed a joint application before the Authority Under that Payment of Wages Act, West Bengal, the respondent No. 1 for payment of delayed wages from the period from 1. 4. 64 to 30. 6. 66. It has been urged with vehemence on behalf of the petition that the application under Section 15 (2) of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 is barred by limitation. The first proviso to Subsection 2 of Section 15 of the said Act provides that such an application has to be filed within 12 months from the date on which the wages was due to be paid. Section 5 of the Payment of Wages Act specified the time for payment of wages. In determining the question whether the application is barred by limitation it is necessary to decide the relevant time for making such an application before the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 in a case like the present one where a lay-off has been declared by the company. It is quite clear that unless it is decided by an Industrial Tribunal that the lay-off is not justified or there is no lay-off the workmen are not entitled to make an application to the respondent No. 1, the Authority Under the Payment of Wages Act, for a direction far payment of wages remaining unpaid during the period of lay-off declared by the company and if such an application is made prior to the determination of the question of the legality and justifiability of the lay-off, the application will be pre-mature. In a Bench decision of this Court reported in 77 C. W. N. 556 National Tobacco Co. of India Limited v. State of West Bengal, it has been observed that when an employee is dismissed from service while an industrial dispute is pending before a Tribunal the starting point of limitation for an application for payment of wages under Section 15 (2) of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 is the date on which the Tribunal refuses to approve of the order of dismissal and not the date of the order of dismissal. 8. IN the instant case the lay-off notice was issued on April 11, 1964 declaring lay-off from April 12, 1964. 8. IN the instant case the lay-off notice was issued on April 11, 1964 declaring lay-off from April 12, 1964. An industrial dispute was raised and the award of the Tribunal was published in the Calcutta Gazette on May 20, 1966 wherein it was held that there was no lay-off and the workmen were entitled to get all their wages for the period they had been kept out of work. The application under the Payment of Wages Act was filed on July 14, 1966. The application is, therefore, not barred by limitation as it was filed within the time specified in Sub-section 2 of Section 15 of the said Act, the limitation having started from the date of publication of the award of the Tribunal on May 20, 1966. It has been tried to be contended on behalf of the petitioner that this decision has no application to the present case inasmuch as it was a case under Section 33 of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the order of dismissal cannot take effect unless the same is approved by the Tribunal before which the Industrial Dispute is pending. As I have said before that in the instant case the lay-off of the workmen was challenged in the industrial dispute before the Tribunal and the Tribunal held that there was no layoff. So the workmen, the respondents 3 to 133 were held entitled to their unpaid wages during the period of lay-off by the Tribunal. The period of limitation for an application for payment of delayed wages before the respondent No. 1 will start from the date of publication of this award of the said Tribunal as decided in the said decision. Section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 provides for an appeal against an order by the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, for payment of delayed wages to the workmen and also for payment of compensation, under Subsection 3 of Section 15 of the said Act within 30 days of the date on which the order or direction is made. Subsection 1 (a) of Section 17 further provides that no appeal shall lie unless the memorandum of appeal is accompanied by a certificate by the Authority to the effect that the appellant has deposited the amount payable under the direction appealed against. Subsection 1 (a) of Section 17 further provides that no appeal shall lie unless the memorandum of appeal is accompanied by a certificate by the Authority to the effect that the appellant has deposited the amount payable under the direction appealed against. It has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that this provision for appeal is not an effective remedy but it is an illusory one inasmuch, as the petitioner company is not competent to prefer an appeal against the impugned order unless he deposits the entire amount directed to be paid by the said order which the petitioner challenges as illegal and unwarranted. It has been further submitted that the mere existence of an alternative remedy unless the same is equally efficacious will not preclude the court from giving relief on a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. On the other hand, it has been urged on behalf of the respondents that the court will not exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution if the aggrieved party has not availed of the remedy by way of appeal. The case in 1962 (1) L. L. J., 484 M/s. George Peter Co. v. Its workmen and another was that certain applications under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act claiming leave with wages, balance bonus lay off compensation and retrenchment compensation were made before the authority. The applications were allowed and the employer was directed to pay the said claims. The employer did not prefer any appeal against the said directions under Section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act. After expiry of the period of limitation provided for filing the appeals the employer preferred a writ petition for quashing the directions made by the authority. It was held that the failure to file the appeal under Section 17 of the Act would disentitle the claimant to the writ of certiorari and the application was dismissed. 9. MOREOVER, in Section 58 of the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976, it has been expressly provided that every petition made under Article 226 of the Constitution before the appointed day i. e. 1. 2. 9. MOREOVER, in Section 58 of the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976, it has been expressly provided that every petition made under Article 226 of the Constitution before the appointed day i. e. 1. 2. 77 and pending before the High Court immediately before that day such petition as well as any interim order made thereon shall abate if such petition would not have been admitted by the High Court under the provisions of Article 226 as substituted by Section 38 of the amended Constitution and the interim order shall also stand vacated. It also appears from Section 38 of the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976 that it substituted new Article 226 for the old Article 226 of the Constitution. Excerpts from Article 226 of the Constitution are set out hereunder: - "226. (1) Notwithstanding anything in article 32 but subject to the provisions of article 131a and article 226a, every High Court shall have power throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction to issue to any persons or authority, including is appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quowarranto and certiorari, or any of them,- (a) for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by the provisions of Part III; or (b) for the redress of any injury of a substantial nature by reason of the contravention of any other provisions of this Constitution or any provision of any enactment or Ordinance or any order, rule, regulation, bye-law or other instrument made there under or (c) for the redress of any injury by reason of any illegality in any proceedings by or before any authority under any provision referred to in sub-clause (b) where such illegality has resulted in substantial failure of justice. " article 226 (3) of the Constitution reads as follows:-"no petition for the redress of any injury referred to in sub-clause (b) or sub-clause (c) of clause (1) shall be entertained if any other remedy for such redress is provided for by or under any other law for the time being in force. " 10. " article 226 (3) of the Constitution reads as follows:-"no petition for the redress of any injury referred to in sub-clause (b) or sub-clause (c) of clause (1) shall be entertained if any other remedy for such redress is provided for by or under any other law for the time being in force. " 10. IT is clear from the amended provision of Article 226 of the Constitution that a writ petition for redress of any injury or for the remedy of the infraction of any right referred to in Sub-clauses (b) and (c) of Clause 1 of Article 226 shall not be entertained if there is any other remedy for such redress provided for by or under any other law. In this case there is undoubtedly a provision for appeal under Section 17 of the Act against a direction passed by the Authority Under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. It has also been undisputed that the injury comes within the provision of Sub-clauses (b) and (c) of Article 226 (1) of the Constitution. As such this application under Article 226 is not entertain able in view of the bar created by Clause (3) of Article 226 of the Constitution. Moreover, the application was moved before the coming into force of the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976 and a Rule was issued. In view of the provisions of Section 58 of the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976, this writ petition which is pending on 1. 2. 77 when the said amended Constitution came into force will abate. In a Bench decision of this Court reported in 1977 (1) C. L. J. 237=81 C. W. N. 555, Probodh Chandra Roy v. Life Insurance Corporation of India and others, it has been held that in cases where redress of injuries mentioned in Sub-causes (b) and (c) of new Article 226 (1) can be obtained effectively either by way of a suit or by way of other remedy under the connected statute an application under Article 226 of the Constitution will not ordinarily be entertain able and the same cannot be entertained. It was also held that the application under Article 226 of the Constitution pending on 1. 2. It was also held that the application under Article 226 of the Constitution pending on 1. 2. 77 i. e. the date of commencement of the 42nd Amendment Act, 1976, the case shall abate if it relates to redress on injuries referred to in Clauses (b) and (c) of the present Article 226 (1) of the Constitution. This being the position this writ petition has abated. It has been urged on behalf of the petitioner that the order passed by the Authority Under the Payment of Wages Act is without jurisdiction as it decided that the respondents workmen were entitled to get all their delayed wages even after deciding that there was no lay-off and directed payment of all their wages for the period the workmen were laid off. It has also been urged that the power of the Authority Under the Payment of Wages Act is very limited and the impugned order is liable to be set aside! as the same is without jurisdiction. I have already stated that there was an industrial dispute raised over the issue whether the day-off of the workmen from 12. 4. 64 was justified and what reliefs the workmen were entitled to. The Industrial Tribunal after hearing the parties held that there was no lay off as provided in the Industrial Disputes Act, and workers being kept out of work without any disciplinary proceeding or order of suspension were entitled to get the delayed wages during the period they were kept without any work. 11. ON the basis of this award of the Tribunal the respondents No. 3 to 133 who were workmen of the petitioner company has made application for a direction on the petitioner to pay all their wages due to them in employment. The Authority Under the Payment of Wages Act after hearing the parties and in view of the award passed by the Tribunal directed for payment of delayed wages to the respondents workmen. It cannot therefore be said that this order is without jurisdiction or that the Authority Under the Payment of Wages Act exceeded the jurisdiction conferred upon it under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act and as such the order-in question is not at all liable to be set aside. It cannot therefore be said that this order is without jurisdiction or that the Authority Under the Payment of Wages Act exceeded the jurisdiction conferred upon it under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act and as such the order-in question is not at all liable to be set aside. In A. I. R. 1955 S. C. 412 A. V. D. Costa, Divisional Engineer, G. I. P. Railway v. B. C. Patel and another, it has been held that the Authority Under the Payment of Wages Act has jurisdiction to decide what actually the terms of contract between the parties were, that is to say, to determine the actual wages; but the authority has no jurisdiction to determine the question of potential wages. This case, therefore, does not apply to the facts of the instant case. In A. I. R. 1961 S. C. 970, Sri Ambika Mills Co. Ltd. v. Sri 6. B. Bhatt and another, it has been observed by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the only claims which the authority under Section 15 can entertain are those arising out of deductions or delay made in payment of wages. The jurisdiction thus conferred on the authority to deal with this two category of claims is exclusive. In dealing with the claims arising out of deductions or delay made in payment of wages the authority inevitably would have to consider questions incidental to the said matters. This decision applies to the present case and it clearly lays down that the authority under the Payment of Wages Act in deciding the question regarding delay in payment of wages can determine matters which are relevant for such determination. 12. IN the premises aforesaid all the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner having failed the application is dismissed and the Rule is discharged. In the circumstances of the case there will, however, be no order as to costs. Let the records be sent down to the Tribunal below. Rule discharged.