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1977 DIGILAW 131 (KER)

C. C. TRANSPORTS CO. v. STATE OF KERALA

1977-06-16

K.K.NARENDRAN, V.P.GOPALAN NAMBIYAR

body1977
Judgment :- 1. The appeal is by one of the private operators against the decision of a learned judge dismissing bis writ petition challenging the order approving a nationalisation scheme under S.68-D of the Motor Vehicles Act. Ext. P-3 dated 181972 is the notification under S.68-C of the Act; Ext. P-4 is the objection preferred by the appellant to the notification. That stated that the requirements of S.68-C for formulation of the draft scheme, were not satisfied or present, and that there is nothing to show that an efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-ordinated road transport service could be provided by the proposed scheme A hearing of the objections was afforded by the Chief Minister on 22 61976. Ext. P3 preliminary scheme under S 68-C of the Motor Vehicles Act was finally published on 27101976. The scheme was approved under S.68D(2) and Ext. P5 is a copy of the approved scheme. Thereafter, action was taken under S.68-F (2) of the Act. Ext. P-o series represent the action so taken. The writ petition was to quash these proceedings relating to the nationalisation scheme. 2. The contention urged before the learned judge was that the bearing and determination of the objections involved in the approval of the nationalisation scheme was a quasi-judicial process which required a quasi-judicial approach and that the said principle had not been borne in mind and no quasi-judicial decision which recorded reasons in a speaking order bad been passed by the Chief Minister. The argument was repelled by the learned Judge. Before us again, arguments were addressed in regard to the nature and scope of the statutory provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and the process involved in the approval of a nationalisation scheme, from the stage of the publication of the notification under S.68-C to the stage of approval under S.68-D. We were also taken through a series of decisions, from, perhaps the earliest, in G. Nageswara Rao v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (AIR 1959 SC. 308). A cleavage of judicial opinion is reflected in regard to the nature of the functions involved in modifying and approving a scheme of nationalisation under the provisions of the Act, the majority of judges holding that the process involved was quasi-judicial, and the dissenting judges being of the view that the process was essentially administrative and not quasi-judicial. 308). A cleavage of judicial opinion is reflected in regard to the nature of the functions involved in modifying and approving a scheme of nationalisation under the provisions of the Act, the majority of judges holding that the process involved was quasi-judicial, and the dissenting judges being of the view that the process was essentially administrative and not quasi-judicial. The view of the majority judges was followed in H C. Narayanappa v. State of Mysore (AIR. 1960 S. C. 1073) (Paragraph 14), Malik Ram v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 1961 SC. 1575) and C. S Bowise v. State of Andhra Pradesh (AIR. 1964 SC. 962 at 976). Counsel for the appellant contended that the uniform trend of these decisions was broken by two decisions of the Supreme Court, namely, C. M. P Co op. Society v. M. P. State (AIR 1967 S.C 1815 para 8), and Sarjoo Prasad v. State of Bihar (AIR. 1977 S.C. 24 at 26 Para.8). Arguments addressed to us ranged over a wide ground, which, it seems unnecessary to cover. The question agitated was whether, and it so; how far, a speaking order was a necessary element in the determination of objections to the scheme of nationalisation Counsel for the respondent invited our attention to Sen Datt v. Union of India (AIR. 1969 S.C. 414 para 10), for the proposition that there is no general or universal rule that every quasi-judicial order must be accompanied by a speaking order; and again, a decision in M S.R.T. Corporation v. B.R.M. Service (AIR 1969 SC 329) to the same effect. He further read to us the decision in Mohammed Ibrahim v. S.T A. Tribunal, Madras (AIR. 1970 S.C.1542 Para.7 and 8) for the position that the provision for appeal is not decisive or conclusive of the quasi-judicial nature of the function involved. Our attention was called to the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in C K John v. State of Kerala & Others (1970 KLR. 603) that there was no need to communicate the order individually to the various objectors who had raised objections in the course of the proceedings in question. (The Kerala Law Reporter shows the decision to be of a learned judge, but it was, in fact, of a Division Bench). 3. 603) that there was no need to communicate the order individually to the various objectors who had raised objections in the course of the proceedings in question. (The Kerala Law Reporter shows the decision to be of a learned judge, but it was, in fact, of a Division Bench). 3. It was really an interesting exercise to wade through the thread of these decisions and to cull out the ratio from the intricate maze of precedent. We feel, despite the great research and able exposition of counsel, that there would be no justification in this case for getting enmeshed in the niceties of this branch of the law. It was pointed out. for instance, by counsel for the appellant that the decision in Sen Datt v Union of India (AIR 1969 SC. 414) cannot be understood as having sanctioned the principle that a reasoned order is not necessary; because, in that case, the reasoned order of the court-martial was affirmed by the confirming authority. It was pointed out that the affirmation carried with it an approval of the reasons given by the court-martial. Even so, counsel for the appellant has put forward certain intelligible ground for distinguishing the decisions cited by counsel for the respondents. 4. It appears to us, certain principles are plain and well-settled. We see the proposition established by the earliest of these decisions in G. Nageswara Rao v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (AIR. 1959 SC. 308), that the process involved in notifying and approving a scheme of nationalisation is a quasi-judicial process. A hearing and determination of the objections to the notified scheme in an objective fashion being a prime necessity, has the same been afforded in this case? is the next question On the one side, we have the two decisions of the Supreme Court in C M.P. Co-op. Societies v. State of M.P. (AIR. 1967 SC.1815 para 8) and Sarjoo Prasad v. State of Bihar (AIR. 1977 SC. 24) to the effect that an approval of the scheme after hearing the objections is a sufficient indication in itself of an objective assessment and determination of the objections. We are bound by these decisions, and we cannot easily accept the argument of the counsel that these decisions are at variance with the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court starting from G. Nageswara Rao v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Tranport Corporation (AIR. 1959 SC. We are bound by these decisions, and we cannot easily accept the argument of the counsel that these decisions are at variance with the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court starting from G. Nageswara Rao v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Tranport Corporation (AIR. 1959 SC. 308). We think too, that no real conflict is involved between the two sets of decisions. It is one aspect of the quasi judicial process involved, which is explained in the two later decisions. The principle, as we understand, is that the order approving a nationalised scheme, symbolises, and can well be regarded as the quintessence of a determination of the objections. How far the stamp of approval can be a substitute for a speaking order, spoken of in some of the decisions as an elementary requirement of a quasi-judicial process, may be an interesting academic pursuit; but on the facts, and on the state of the authorities, we think it should cause little difficulty. So understood, we are of the view that there has been no violation of the statutory provisions in this case and that the order approving the scheme is not vitiated by any illegality. 5. The learned judge, in the course of his judgment (vide Para.18 of the judgment) noted that complaint against the impugned order was that it had Lot dealt with all the objections raised. He further noted that' the "Chief Minister d alt with the question that was strongly placed before him That leaves us to expound the further difficulty that confronts the appellant in this case. Counsel for the party-respondent urged, and it was reiterated by the learned Government Pleader, that although the written objections to the draft scheme urged the objections as to efficiency, adequacy, economy etc. of the transport services proposed to be introduced, these were not pressed at the time of the hearing; and that the only two objections pressed were; (1) that some time should he allowed at least before the scheme is implemented, and (2) that some overlapping should be allowed. It was pointed out that these aspects have been dealt with in the Chief Minister's order. The appellant's counsel urged that the written objection shad not been given up, and that the objections voiced therein had to be dealt with in accordance with law. It was pointed out that these aspects have been dealt with in the Chief Minister's order. The appellant's counsel urged that the written objection shad not been given up, and that the objections voiced therein had to be dealt with in accordance with law. These proceedings under Art.226 are quite inappropriate to resolve the controversy We would prefer to go by what is stated in the Chief Minister's order. In the circumstances, this should be an additional hindrance and difficulty for us, in accepting the appellant's argument that there has been no objective consideration, assessment, and of the determination of the objections urged before the Chief Minister to the draft scheme. 6. In the result, on an analysis of the facts and the circumstances disclosed in this case, we are not satisfied that there has not been due compliance with the statutory provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, namely, S.68-C and 68-D. We are in agreement with the learned judge that there was a proper consideration and disposal of the objections and a determination of the objections. We affirm the judgment of the learned judge and dismiss this appeal with no order as to costs. Dismissed.