( 1 ) THE petitioner is the holder of a parcel of agricultural land measuring 5 acres 7 guntas in Survey No. 45 of Kudumallige village Thirthahalli taluk, Shimoga Dist. The second respondent Sooranna Heggade, a native of S. Kanara Dist, made an application under S. 48a of the Karnataka land Reforms Act, 1961, for registering him as the occupant of the said land. The Land Tribunal, Thirthahalli, has granted that application overruling the contention of the petitioner-landholder that the second respondent is not a tenant and the land was and is under his personal cultivation. The order of the Tribunal has been challenged by the land-holder on the ground that the said decision is vitiated as the Tribunal has ignored the presumption arising under S. 133 of the Karnataka Land Revenue act and further that Ext. P1 relied on by the Tribunal for reaching its conclusion, is wholly irrelevant for the purpose of the decision. The question fs whether the order of the Land Tribunal is vitiated for the reasons urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. ( 2 ) THE Record of Righs for the period immedately prior to 1st March, 1974 shows that the land-holder himself was personally cultivating the land. The second respondent the applicant before the Land tribunal, has stated in his application under S. 48a of the Land Reforms act that the Record of Rights does not contain his name and that he has also no receipt or other documentary evidence to support his claim. His case is that he has been cultivating the land for the last 30 years. The tribunal has noted the fact that the Record of Rights does not support the claim of the second respondent. Nowhere in the order of the Tribunal, it has been stated that the presumption arising under S. 133 of the Land revenue Act has been rebutted by the circumstantial evidence or any direct evidence. The Tribunal proceeded to refer to the oral evidence adduced on both sides and reached the conclusion that second respondent was a tenant personally cultivating the land in question. ( 3 ) THERE is a statutory presumption that an entry in the Record of Rights is true unti] the contrary is proved or a new entry is lawfully substituted therefor. The Tribunal proceeded to refer to the oral evidence adduced on both sides and reached the conclusion that second respondent was a tenant personally cultivating the land in question. ( 3 ) THERE is a statutory presumption that an entry in the Record of Rights is true unti] the contrary is proved or a new entry is lawfully substituted therefor. The burden of proving that the entry in the Record of rights is not true is on the party alleging that such entry is not true. It was for the second respondent to shift that burden from him to the petitioner-landholder. ( 4 ) A special rule of evidence arising out of the statutory presumption under S. 118 (a) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, has been explained by the Supreme Court in Kundan Lal Kallaram v. Custodian Evacuee property, Bombay, AIR 1981 SC 1316. The same principle has to be applied to cases where a statutory presumption arises under S. 133 of the Land Revenue act. Once it is shown or admitted that the entry in the Record of Rights is to the effect that the land-holder is personally cultivating the land, the statutory presumption is that it is not a tenanted land so as to vest the same in the State Govt under S. 44 of the Land Reforms Act. The statutory presumption, however, is a rebuttable presumption. Either the State or the person claiming to be a tenant, has to lead evidence to show the contrary. Where the Tribunal ignores the statutory presumption and records a finding that the applicant, though his name is not entered in the Record of Rights, is a tenant such a decision is vitiated. The Tribunal has to take into consideration not merely the oral evidence but also the circumstantial evidence in the case. ( 5 ) ACCORDING to the evidence adduced before the Tribunal in the instant case, it is admitted that the second respondent did not receive any levy notice demanding delivery of paddy or rice. It is common knowledge that levy demand notices are served on persons cultivating paddy in an area of five acres or more. In the instant case, the extent of the holding is more than five acres. Ordinarily, one should expect the issue of levy demand notices to persons cultivating the holding. It is common knowledge that levy demand notices are served on persons cultivating paddy in an area of five acres or more. In the instant case, the extent of the holding is more than five acres. Ordinarily, one should expect the issue of levy demand notices to persons cultivating the holding. In a case where the record of Rights does not show the name of the person claiming to be tenant, the Tribunal has to closely examine the circumstantial evidence and find out whether the statutory presumption is rebutted. Mere statement that a number of witnesses have been examined on one side or the other, will not justify ignoring the statutory presumption. The case of the petitioner before the Tribunal was that the second respondent was only an agricultural labourer and for that purpose the second respondent was given a house near the holding. It is common knowledge that agricultural labourers are provided living quarters by land-holders. The mere fact that the second respondent resides in a building near the holding, does not necessarily lead to the inference that he is tenant of the holding. If the second respondent was an agricultural labourer permanently employed by the petitioner, people would have seen the second respondent carrying on agricultural operations in the holding. But such an agricultural labourer, who either ploughs or harvests, does not become a tenant. Under the Land Reforms Act, an agricultural labourer does not have the status of a tenant. ( 6 ) THE Tribunal has relied on Ext. P1 which is a certificate issued by the Secretary of a Co-operative Society. The said certificate states that the second respondent was admitted as a member of that Society and he was given a loan of Rs. 200 on 7-4-1961 and another loan of Rs. 150 on 24-3-1962. What the Tribunal has to consider is whether the land was personally cultivated by the land-holder or the person alleging to be the tenant, immediately prior 1o 1-3-1974. Ext. P1 has no relevancy as it relates to the year 1961-62. Besides, Ext. P1 does not state that the second respondent was the cultivator of the land now in dispute. Therefore, Ext. P1 was wholly irrelevant for the purpose of deciding the issue before the land Tribunal. Ext. P1 has no relevancy as it relates to the year 1961-62. Besides, Ext. P1 does not state that the second respondent was the cultivator of the land now in dispute. Therefore, Ext. P1 was wholly irrelevant for the purpose of deciding the issue before the land Tribunal. Where a Land Tribunal, which is a quasi-judicial authority and which has to decide the property rights of parties, ignores the statutory presumption arising under S. 133 of the Land Revenue Act and relies on a document which is wholly irrelevant for the purpose of deciding the issue, such a decision is vitiated and the same is liable to be quashed. I accordingly allow this writ petition, quash the impugned order and remit the matter to the Land Tribunal, Thirthahalli Taluk for adjudication afresh in the light of this order. The Tribunal will make a fresh adjudication after affording both parties a reasonable opportunity of being heard. Ordered accordingly. Rule made absolute. Parties to bear their own costs. --- *** --- .