JUDGMENT K. C. Agrawal, J. - This revision is directed against the judgment and order of the SubDivisional Magistrate, Bulandshahar dated 24 51976 directing the applicant to remove his belongings from the Chabutara of shop No. 107/12 situated at Bazar Lalkuwan, district Bulandshahar. By the said order the SubDivisional Magistrate further issued notice under Section 188 I. P. C. to the applicant to show cause as to why a complaint should not be lodged against him in a proper court. 2. The facts which led to the filing of this revision briefly stated are these. 3. Brij Behari and Rakesh Kumar, opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 of the present revision are the owners of the shop No. 170/12. An application under Section 21 of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 was filed by the opposite parties 2 and against one Shrimati Kusumlata for release of the premises in their favour. The application was allowed by the prescribed Authority under Act 13 of 1972. One Pawan Kumar thereafter filed an objection before the Prescribed Authority to the effect that he was in occupation of the premises and that as the application was not filed against him by the opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3, therefore, the release of the shop could not be made in favour of the opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3. The application filed by him was rejected on February 2, 1974. In pursuance of the order of release made under Section 21 of U. P, Act No. 13 of 1972, the opposite parties 2 and 3, according to their case, succeeded in obtaining possession of the shop on 11th March, 1974. It, however, appears that in suit No. 608 of 1969 Nem Kumar v Brij Behari, Nem Kumar obtained an injunction order on 1131974 restraining the opposite parties Nos, 2 and 3 from taking possession of the aforesaid shop in pursuance of the release order obtained from the Prescribed Authority. On 16th March, 1974 the Prescribed Authority, however, held that since possession had already been delivered to opposite parties 2 and 3, the Prescribed Authority was unable to give effect to the order of the Civil Court granting injunction to the application on 13th March, 1974. On 16th March, 1974 the Prescribed Authority, however, held that since possession had already been delivered to opposite parties 2 and 3, the Prescribed Authority was unable to give effect to the order of the Civil Court granting injunction to the application on 13th March, 1974. Station Officer submitted a report to the SubDivisional Magistrate Bulandshahar that there was an apprehension of breach of the peace due to the dispute relating to the possession of the shop in question hence the shop should be directed to be attached and its possession may be taken. The SubDivisional Magistrate being satisfied that a situation had arisen requiring the passing of an order under Section 145 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure passed a preliminary order on the same day directing the shop to be attached and sealed. In pursuance of the aforesaid order the shop was actually taken possession of by the police and was sealed as well as attached by the police on 2331974 itself. Nem Kumar, the applicant, thereafter appeared in the case and filed an objection against the order of attachment. Similarly, opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 also filed their written statements disputing that there was any apprehension of breach of peace requiring action in proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P. C. to be taken. By the Order dated 22nd April, 1974 the SubDivisional Magistrate finding himself unable to decide the question of possession referred the question for a finding to the Civil Court. The Civil Court held on 16121975 that the shop was in possession of the opposite parties Nos. 2 and Son the date of the passing of the preliminary order. Against this order the applicant went up in revision before the District Judge, Bulandshahar. The revision was, however, allowed on 30576 and the case was sent back to the Munsif for disposal of the issued of possession afresh. Before the question of possession could be decided by the Munsif, the opposite parties 2 and 3 filed an application before the SubDivisional Magistrate to the effect that as the applicant had taken possession of the Chabutara and also one outer almirah of the shop which had been attached in pursuance of the order of the SubDivisional Magistrate on 1331974, therefore, the applicant having committed an offence under Section 188 I P.C. was liable to be punished for the same. A prayer for taking possession of the Chabutara and almirah from the applicant was also made by the opposite parties 2 and 3. The application was resisted by the applicant and it was contended that the applicant could not be removed from the possession of the Chabutara or the almirah as the SubDivisional Magistrate did not pass any order in regard to the attachment of these items and they, in fact, had never been attached. By impugned order dated 24576 the SubDivisional Magistrate found that the Chabutara and the almirah were part and parcel of the shop concerned and thus by taking possession of these items the applicant had disobeyed the order passed by him on 1331974 and thus would be liable to handover the possession of the same to the police. In this view of the matter the applicant was directed to remove his belongings from the Chabutara and outer almirah. By the impugned order a notice was also directed to be issued to the applicant to show cause as to why a complaint be not made against him in a proper court. Against this order and judgment of the SubDivisional Magistrate the applicant preferred a revision before the Sessions Judge. The Revision was dismissed summarily on 961976. Hence this second revision. 4. The first question that was raised by the learned counsel appearing for the applicant in this case was about the correctness of the order passed by the SubDivisional Magistrate. It was contended by him that by the order dated 1331974 the SubDivisional Magistrate had only directed the property to be attached and had not forbidden the applicant from making use of the Chabutara and almirah, therefore, taking of possession of the Chabutara and the almirah by the applicant did not amount to disobedience of the order, dated 1331974. Hence neither the direction for being dispossessed from the Chabutara and the almirah nor issuance of notice for the purposes of lodging a complaint against him was justified. The submission made has no substance. By the aforesaid order the Magistrate had directed the police authorities to take possession of the shop. Admittedly, the shop was taken possession of by the police on 13th March, 1974 and was sealed. The submission made has no substance. By the aforesaid order the Magistrate had directed the police authorities to take possession of the shop. Admittedly, the shop was taken possession of by the police on 13th March, 1974 and was sealed. As the Chabutara and the outer almirah are part and parcel of the shop under attachment, the applicant is not right in his contention that he could interfere with the possession of the police as there was no restraint or direction for him not doing so. Once an attachment is made under Section 145(1) Cr. P. C., the property attached passes in the custodian legislation and the attachment ensures for the benefit of such party as is found by the Magistrate to be in possession of the subjectmatter of the dispute. As the property had come in possession of the court, it is implied that no one including the parties to such proceedings are authorised to interfere with the possession of the court so long as it is not terminated in his favour. It is not necessary at the stage of the passing of preliminary order under Section 145(1) Cr. P. C., to direct the parties not to interfere with the possession of the property during the period of attachment inasmuch as such an order is not required to be passed by a court at this stage. The effect of the attachment is that none of the parties involved in proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P. C., can interfere with the possession. Hence merely because by the Order dated 1331974 the applicant had not been forbidden from interfering with the possession of the Chabutara and the almirah, therefore, he could take possession of the same is wholly incorrect. The very purpose of the proceedings under Section 145 (1) would be defeated and would be rendered ineffective if the submission made by the learned counsel for the applicant is to be accepted. 5. The second submission was that the Chabutara and the almirah were not the subjectmatter of attachment order therefore, taking of possession of these terms by the applicant did not entitle the SubDivisional Magistrate to direct the applicant to remove his belongings from the same. The submission made is without any merit. 5. The second submission was that the Chabutara and the almirah were not the subjectmatter of attachment order therefore, taking of possession of these terms by the applicant did not entitle the SubDivisional Magistrate to direct the applicant to remove his belongings from the same. The submission made is without any merit. The order of attachment was no doubt with regard to the shop mentioned above, but as the Chabutara and the almirah are the part and parcel of the shop no separate order relating to their attachment was required to be made. A court is not required to mention every item comprised in a building or a premises in its attachment order. By the order dated 1331974 the court had directed for the attachment of the shop and as the Chabutara and the almirah were the part and parcel of the shop, it is not possible to hold that they had not been attached and that the applicant could take the possession despite attachment of the shop. 6. It was next contended that as there was no evidence on the record showing that the almirah and the Chabutara were the part and parcel of the shop, therefore the finding of the Magistrate was not based on any evidence on the record of the case. Under the facts and in the circumstances of the present case no evidence was required to be produced for the purpose of proving that they were part and parcel of the shop admittedly when they were affixed to it. 7. The next submission made by the learned counsel was that the SubDivisional Magistrate committed an error in directing the applicant to show cause about the filing of a complaint under Section 188 I.P.C., inasmuch as the ingredients of Section 188 I.P.C., were not made out in the instant case. According to the submission of the learned counsel, a complaint could be filed only when any annoyance is caused to the public at large as a result of his action. The submission made is untenable. It is true that the disobedience of an order promulgated by a public servant which has been made punishable by Section 188 I.P.C., must be a disobedience which causes or tends to cause obstruction, annoyance or injury or risk of obstruction, annoyance or injury to any person lawfully employed. The submission made is untenable. It is true that the disobedience of an order promulgated by a public servant which has been made punishable by Section 188 I.P.C., must be a disobedience which causes or tends to cause obstruction, annoyance or injury or risk of obstruction, annoyance or injury to any person lawfully employed. In my view, in a case where despite an order passed under Section 145 Cr. P. C., a party to that litigation tries to interfere with the property attached or with the possession of the property of the person in whose favour it has been released would certainly cause or tend to cause annoyance to the public at large and to the person concerned. The question as to whether Section 188 I.P.C., applies to disobedience of an order under Section 145 Cr. P. C., was directly raised in the case of Jagpal Singh v. State (1959 A.L.J. 163.). In this case A. N. Mulla, J., held that Section 188 I.P.C., includes in its ambit the orders passed under Section 144 Cr. P. C., as well under Section 145 Cr. P. C. Accordingly, in my view an order under Section 145 Cr. P. C. is an order the breach of which is punishable under Section 188 I.P.C., I, however, also wish to make it clear that since by the impugned order dated 24576 only notice has been issued, it is still open to the applicant to appear before the SubDivisional Magistrate had satisfying him that there was no adequate or good reason for an order but a complaint be filed against him. 8. The last submission made by the learned counsel for the applicant was relating to the validity of Section 145 Cr. P. C., in the ground that the same was hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The submission made by the learned counsel was that when there is apprehension of breach of peace on account of a dispute of immovable property, proceedings could be taken either under Section 145 Cr. P. C. or under Section 107/117 Cr. P. C. and as there is no guideline in the Code as under which circumstance proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P. C., could be instituted, therefore, the aforesaid section confers unguided and arbitrary powers on a Magistrate. Hence the same was liable to be struck down. P. C. or under Section 107/117 Cr. P. C. and as there is no guideline in the Code as under which circumstance proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P. C., could be instituted, therefore, the aforesaid section confers unguided and arbitrary powers on a Magistrate. Hence the same was liable to be struck down. I have although heard counsel for the applicant on the merits of the validity of Section 145 Cr. P. C., but in my view the ground of the invalidity or Section 145 is not open to him in view of the order passed by the President of India in pursuance of the powers conferred on him by Article 352 of the Constitution. According to clause (1) of Article 352 of the Constitution if the President as satisfied that a grave emergency exists where by the security of India or any part thereof is threatened whether by war or external aggression or internal disturbances, he may by proclamati, make a declaration to that effect. On June, 25, 1975 the President of India issued a proclamation of Emergency and the same reads : "PROCLAMATION OF EMERGENCY In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (1) of Article 352 of the Constitution, Fakhruddin Ali Ahmad, President of India, by this Proclamation declare that a grave emergency exists whereby the security of India is threatened by internal disturbance. New Delhi Sd. New Delhi Sd. F. A. Ahmad,the 25th June, 1975 the President of India made the following Order : "In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (1) of Article 359 of the Constitution, the President hereby declares that the right of any person (including a foreigner) to move any court for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Article 14, Article 21 and Article 22 of the Constitution and all proceedings pending in any court for the enforcement of the abovementioned rights shall remain suspended for the period during which the Proclamation of Emergency made under clause (1) of Article 352 of the Constitution on the 3rd December, 1971 and on the 25th June, 1975 are both in force." It is clear from the above proclamation that the right of any person to move any court for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Article 14, Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution shall remain suspended and proceedings pending in any court for the enforcement of the above rights shall remain suspended for the period during which the proclamation of emergency under clause (1) of Article 352 of the Constitution on the 3rd December, 1971 and on the 25th June, 1975, are both in force. Hence, as the right to move a court for the enforcement of a right based on Article 14 is suspended, the applicant is not entitled to challenge the validity of Section 145 Cr. P.C, on the basis of Article 14 of the Constitution. This application in revision was moved by the applicant on 18676 On that date the Proclamation suspending the right of any persons to move this Court was in operation and, as a matter of fact, the applicant should not have been permitted to take this ground in this application, it was the duty of the learned counsel appearing for the applicant to have pointed out this fact to the Court. As the applicant could not move this petition challenging to validity of Section 145 Cr. P. C., he cannot be heard in support of the same. 9. The next prayer of the learned counsel for the applicant was that as the Proclamation issued by the President is still in operation, hearing of this revision be suspended so long as the Proclamation was not withdrawn. P. C., he cannot be heard in support of the same. 9. The next prayer of the learned counsel for the applicant was that as the Proclamation issued by the President is still in operation, hearing of this revision be suspended so long as the Proclamation was not withdrawn. The prayer made is misconceived and was perhaps only made for the purpose of getting the hearing of this case delayed. Inasmuch as when the applicant could not even move this court for the enforcement of the right based on Article 14, it does not lie in his mouth to assert that the hearing of this revision be now stayed as this revision has already been filed by him. Merely, because the applicant has filed this revision that does not mean that he is entitled to get its hearing suspended. Had it been moved at a time when Article 14 was not under suspension, the position would have been different. Although in my opinion, even in that event what is prohibited by Article 59 is the enforcement of a right based on Article 14. The question of enforcement arises only when the petition is to be allowed on that ground. But where, a ground relating to Article 14 has no merits and 3s to fail, the occasion to stay the hearing of such petition due the proclamation issued under Article 352 does not arise, inasmuch as the Court does not enforce the right based on Article 14 of the operation of which has been suspended. 10. Moreover, I would also like to mention that the argument of the validity of Section 145 Cr. P. C., raised by the applicant does not have any substance. Article 14 of Constitution lays down : ''The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within territory of India." The State to whom injunction against denying equality before the law and equal protection of the laws is directed by this Article has been defined for the purpose of this part of Article 12. A reading of that Article would show that (he expression "State" will not include a judicial tribunal. In Porbani Transport Cooperative Society Limited v. Regional Transport Authority (A.I.R. 1960S. A reading of that Article would show that (he expression "State" will not include a judicial tribunal. In Porbani Transport Cooperative Society Limited v. Regional Transport Authority (A.I.R. 1960S. C. 801), the Supreme Court held that the decision of the Regional Transport Authority granting permits right or wrong could not be said to offend Article 14 of the Constitution inasmuch as the Regional Transport Authority acts as a quasijudicial body and if it has made any mistake in its decision there are appropriate remedies available for obtaining relief. It cannot complain breach of Article 14. Similar is the view of the Supreme Court taken in Budhan Chaudhry v. State of Bihar (A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 191). It was held in this case that the Constitution does not assure uniformity of decision or immunity from erroneous actions whether by the Courts or the executive agencies of the State. The judicial decision must of necessity depend on the facts and circumstances of each particular case and what may superficially appear to be an unequal application of law may not necessarily amount to a denial of equal protection of law. Dealing further the Supreme Court said that the discretion of judicial officers is not arbitrary as the law provides for revision by superior courts of orders passed by the subordinate courts in such circumstances there is hardly any ground for apprehending any capricious discrimination by judicial tribunals. 11. According as the discretion to proceed either under Section 107 Cr. P. C., or under Section 145 Cr. P. C. or under both has been given to a court, therefore, the provisions of Section 145 Cr. P. C, cannot be struck down on the ground urged by the learned Counsel for the applicant. A similar argument to the effect that uncontrolled and unguided discretion in the Judges to impose capital punishment or imprisonment for life was hit by Article 14 of the Constitution was not accepted by the Supreme Court in Jagmohan Singh v. State of U. P., (A.I.R. 1973 S. C. 947). A similar argument to the effect that uncontrolled and unguided discretion in the Judges to impose capital punishment or imprisonment for life was hit by Article 14 of the Constitution was not accepted by the Supreme Court in Jagmohan Singh v. State of U. P., (A.I.R. 1973 S. C. 947). It was observed that if a law has given to the Judge a wide discretion in the matter of sentence to be exercised by him after balancing of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the crime, it will be ground to show that there cannot be at all any discrimination since the facts and circumstances of one case can hardly be the same with the facts and the circumstances of the other. The law laid down in the said case of the Supreme Court applies to instant case as well. 12. In view of what I have said above, I do not find it necessary to either refer to or discuss the cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant on the various respects of Article 14 of the Constitution. 13. For the reasons given above, the revision fails and is dismissed. The stay order 18676 shall stand vacated.