Judgment Nagendra Prasad Singh, J. This Civil Revision application has been filed on behalf of the defendants for setting aside order dated 3.1.1975 purported to have been passed under section 11A of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act). 2. It appears that the plaintiff-opposite party filed the suit in question for eviction of the petitioners from a premises fully described in Schedule of the plaint. In the said plaint it was alleged that he was owner and possessor of a house bearing Holding No. 88 in Patna City. In that holding there was a flour mill fitted with electric motors along with other equipments. The petitioners took on lease the aforesaid house along with the flour mill, electric motor and other equipments from the plaintiff on a monthly rental of Rs.130/-. It has been specifically stated in the plaint that out of Rs.130/- Rs.10/-was for the holding and Rs. 120/- was for the flour mill and electric motor. Later, according to the plaintiff these petitioners defaulted in payment of rent. Thereafter, by a notice the tenancy was terminated and the suit in question was filed making a prayer for eviction as well as for arrears of rent. In the Schedule of the plaint, description of the premises was given including the details of the flour mill, electric motors and others electric appliance fitted there in. During the pendency of the suit as already stated above, an application under section 11 A of the Act, was filed for a direction to the defendants to deposit the rent during the pendency of the suit and the learned Munsif by the impugned order, has directed the petitioners to deposit the arrears of rent as well as rent for the future months at the rate of Rs.130/- per month by 15th of the following month. 3. 3. The main grievance made on behalf of the petitioners is that the order aforesaid passed by the learned Munsif directing the petitioners to deposit the arrears of rent as well as the future rent in purported exercise of powers conferred on him by section 11 A of the Act, is wholly without jurisdiction inasmuch as in the facts and circumstances of the present case the provisions of the Act, are not applicable, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that an order under section 11A of the Act, can be passed only in respect of premises which can be a building within the meaning of the Act. The word 'building' has been defined under section 2 (aa) to mean as follows:- "building' means any building or hut or part of a building or hut, let or to be let separately for residential or non-residential purposes and includes- (i) The garden, grounds and outhouses if any, appertaining to such building or hut or part of such building or hut: and (ii) any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building or hut or part of a building or hut" The definition of the word 'building' may include a building which is used for residential or non-residential purposes and will include garden, grounds and outhouses appertaining to such building and any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building. But, the question is as to whether this definition will include a flour mill. Learned counsel for the petitioners has urged that reading the allegations made in the plaint itself, it is apparent that the dominant object of the transaction was to lease out the mill in question along with a portion of the building. In this connection, learned counsel has also drawn our attention to the document of lease which has been executed between the parties and on the basis of which the petitioners were inducted. A copy of that document has been flied on behalf of the plaintiff-opposite party before this Court along with an affidavit. From that also it appears that Rs. 120/- was to be paid as the rent for the flour mill and Rs. 10/- was payable as rent for the building. In this deed also details of the flour mill, machinery etc. have been given and tights and liabilities in respect there of have been recited. From that also it appears that Rs. 120/- was to be paid as the rent for the flour mill and Rs. 10/- was payable as rent for the building. In this deed also details of the flour mill, machinery etc. have been given and tights and liabilities in respect there of have been recited. Learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-opposite party while supporting the order in question submitted that the lease was a composite lease, the primary object where of was to let out a portion of the building along with machinery affixed thereto and it will be covered by the definition of building under the Act. This aspect of the matter has been subject matter of controversy from time to time. In the case of Konijeti Venkeyya and another V. Thammana Peda Vonkala Subbarao and another, a similar question arose in respect of a building which contained a factory. In that case it was pointed out by Viswanath Sastri. J., that in cases where the machinery and plant are housed which cannot be installed or worked except in a building, the court should examine as to what is the dominant part of the demise and what is the purpose for which the building was let out. On a consideration of the materials on record it was held that the lease was for running the factory, and, as such the provisions of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent) Control Act, had no application. Again a Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Amritlal N. Shah V. Alia Annapurnamma had to consider as to whether a Talkie House which had been let out with furniture, electrical fittings etc. will be deemed to be a building within the meaning of the aforesaid Act, and the claim that it was a building was negatived. Similar view was expressed in the case of S. Raja Chetty and another V. Jagannathadas Govindas and other. In the case of Uttamchand V.S.M. Lalwani the Supreme Court had-an occasion to consider as to whether a building having a Dal mill will be included in the definition of 'accommodation' given under the' Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act. The definition of 'accommodation' given under that Act, was much wider than the definition of 'building' given under the Act. There even 'fittings affixed to such building' were also to be deemed to be part of the building. The definition of 'accommodation' given under that Act, was much wider than the definition of 'building' given under the Act. There even 'fittings affixed to such building' were also to be deemed to be part of the building. Still it was held that the dominant intention of the lessee in accepting the lease was to use the building as a Dal mill. It was pointed out that although in the document the Dal mill had been leased out along with the building in which it had been installed, but it cannot be considered to be a fitting referred to in the definition, which obviously refer to such fittings which are made in the building to afford Incidental amenities for the person occupying the building. Again in the case of Dwarka Prasad V. Dwarka Das Saraf the question which came up for consideration was as to whether the definition of 'accommodation' given in U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, will include a cinema house with its equipments. The definition of 'accommodation' in the U.P. Act, was also more or less similar to the aforesaid Madhya Pradesh Act, and it included any fitting affixed to such building. Still the Supreme Court held that it was not governed by the provisions of the U.P. Act, dominant object being for running the cinema business, because the rent included for the building as well as the costly fixtures intended for the cinema business. 4. In my opinion, reading the allegations made on behalf of the plaintiff in the plaint and the document of lease, it has to be held that the primary object of letting out the premises in question was for running the flour mill by the petitioners. I have already pointed out that the definition of 'building' includes the use of a building for non-residential purpose. But, here primarily the Mill has been leased out. The matter would have been entirely different if the building had been leased out by the plaintiff and later a flour mill would have been started by the defendants. In such a situation, I am inclined to hold that there was a composite lease in respect of the part of the building as well as the flour mill to the defendant-petitioners, the dominant object whereof is to lease out to the defendants to enable them to run the flour mill. In such a situation, I am inclined to hold that there was a composite lease in respect of the part of the building as well as the flour mill to the defendant-petitioners, the dominant object whereof is to lease out to the defendants to enable them to run the flour mill. Such transactions will not be governed by the provisions of the Act. 5. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff-opposite party has drawn our attention to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Karnani Properties Ltd. V. Miss Augustine and others where a question had arisen as to whether the municipal holding, collectively known as Karnani Mansions in Calcutta, containing several flats and shop-rooms let out to different tenants having fans and other fittings and with supply of electrical energy for consumption by the tenants, will be deemed to be a premises within the meaning of West Bengal Promises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act. It had been urged that as even the charges for electrical energy had been included in the rent, it would not be covered by the definition of the 'premises'. That argument was repelled and it was held that even such premises were included within the definition of 'premises' given under that Act. In my opinion, this judgment is of no help to the plaintiff. The definition of 'premises' under that Act, was of a very wide nature and while construing that it was held that it will also include special facilities and convenience given by the landlord to the tenants. The definition of 'building' given in the present Act, is entirely different. 6. Learned Counsel appearing for the plaintiff-opposite party has also referred to the case of Kali Prasad V. Jagdish Pada and Dr. S.M. Usman V. Muhammad Sulaiman and another. In both these cases the dominant purpose of the lease was for the purpose conceived by the definition of 'building' given under the Act. 7. Accordingly, I hold that the provisions of the Act, are not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case; as such the learned Munsif had no jurisdiction to pass an order in purported exercise of power conferred on him by section 11 A of the Act. 8. In the result, the application is allowed, and the order impugned is set aside. In the circumstances of the case, however, there will be no order as to costs. 8. In the result, the application is allowed, and the order impugned is set aside. In the circumstances of the case, however, there will be no order as to costs. It will be open to the plaintiff-opposite party to take such steps as may be available to him in law for the purpose of pursuing the suit in question under general law. I agree. Application allowed.