JUDGMENT - TULZAPURKAR, Ag. C.J.:---By this writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution India, 18 petitioners who are carrying on certain business of their own outside the limits of Sholapur Municipal Corporation but who have their factories within the Industrial Area demarcated by the Municipal Commissioner, Sholapur for the purpose of exemption of octroi duty, are challenging the legality of the Corporations Resolution, dated 26-3-1974 as well as Public Notice, dated 17--1974 issued by the Commissioner and threatened action pursuant thereto of withdrawing the exemption already granted to them and the petitioners have prayed for quashing of the said resolution and the said notice. 2. A few facts giving rise to the petition may be stated: petitioners Nos. 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15 and 17 are the partnership firms duly registered under the Indian Partnership Act while petitioners Nos. 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16 and 18 are the partners of their respective firms and all the petitioners are carrying on their business outside the limits of Sholapur Municipal Corporation. Petitioners Nos. 1 to 4 are doing business of Spinning Waste Cotton, petitioners Nos. 5, 6 17 and 18 are doing business of processing the yarn, while rest of the petitioners are doing business of sizing cotton yarn. It appears that all of them have invested huge amounts ranging from Rs. 4 lacs to Rs. 20 lacs in their respective business as per particulars furnished in the statement annexed as Ex. A to the petition. The petitioners case has been that they are manufacturing raw materials required for Jakard Chaddars which are exported outside India and according to them, Sholapur is an important Industrial City famous for manufacturing Jakarad Chaddars, Grey cloth and yarn, but due to increased prices of yarn this bushiness of manufacturing Jakard Chaddars and Grey cloth has been running in loss since last about 5 to 10 years. Respondent No. 1 is Sholapur City Municipal Corporation, constituted under the provisions of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 and respondent No. 2 is the Commissioner being the executive head of the Corporation entrusted of the functions to be discharged by him under the provisions of the Act. Respondent No. 1 is Sholapur City Municipal Corporation, constituted under the provisions of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 and respondent No. 2 is the Commissioner being the executive head of the Corporation entrusted of the functions to be discharged by him under the provisions of the Act. It appears that with a view to develop industries in the Sholapur City in certain specified area the 1st respondent thought granting of exemption of octroi duty on the goods manufactured in certain specified area, particularly the areas which were to be declared and demarcated as "Industrial Area" as per Octroi Rule 5(8). A resolution granting such exemption from octroi on raw materials, plant and machinery and manufactured goods was passed by the Corporation on 6th September, 1971 and the Commissioner by virtue of powers conferred on him under Rule 5(8) of Octroi rules framed by the Corporation exempted the manufacturers and industrialist, who, inter alia, included the petitioners, from payment of octroi in respect of raw materials, machinaries belonging to or imported by them for the purpose of manufacturing, processing, assembling finished articles in the said industrial area as well as on the raw materials to be imported within the Municipal limit for a period of 10 years. According to the petitioners, by his resolution as well as the exemption that were granted under Rule 5(8) of the Octroi Rules the petitioners became entitled to exemption from octroi levy on the importation of raw materials, plant, machinery etc. as well as on goods manufactured in that area for a period of 10 years. It is the petitioners case that because of the abovementioned exemption that was granted the petitioners invested huge amounts as shown in the particulars in the statement (Ex. A to the petition) and effected forward contracts to sell, manufactured goods at a low price, that the octroi leviable, if exemptions were not to be granted to them, varied from Rs. 1.20 to Rs. 3.20 per Rs. 100/- and according to them, but for the exemption granted they would not have invested such huge amounts in their respective business. The petitioners case further has been that the General Body of the 1st respondent-Corporation cancelled the exemption of octroi granted earlier by its resolution No. 343 dated 26-3-1974. 1.20 to Rs. 3.20 per Rs. 100/- and according to them, but for the exemption granted they would not have invested such huge amounts in their respective business. The petitioners case further has been that the General Body of the 1st respondent-Corporation cancelled the exemption of octroi granted earlier by its resolution No. 343 dated 26-3-1974. According to them, by this resolution the 1st respondent-Corporation demarcated certain other industrial areas or estates wherein were included only Industrial Estate declared by the Government of Maharashtra towards Hotagi Naka and Industrial Area declared by Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation towards Akalkot Naka and granted exemption of octroi only to those industries who would be carrying on business in those areas and by that very resolution the survey numbers in which the petitioners had been carrying on their business in their respective factories which had been initially demarcated as industrial area, under the former resolution, were omitted from demarcated area. A copy of this resolution withdrawing octroi concession has been annexed as Ex. D to the petition. It appears that pursuant to this resolution that was passed by the 1st respondent-Corporation, the 2nd respondent (Commissioner Sholapur Municipal Corporation) issued a public notice on 17th May, 1974 whereby he brought to the notice of the general public that two separate areas-one outside Hotagi Naka and the other outside Akalkot Naka-had been demarcated afresh as areas where exemption from octroi duty would be applicable and that except the aforesaid areas mentioned as Industrial Area and Estate, all the other previously demarcated are as Industrial Estate and Area had been omitted and by that public notice, public was informed that this change would take effect from 1st June, 1974 and the concerned parties should take note of this. It appears that individual notices on similar lines were also issued by the 2nd respondent to the proprietors who had their factories within the former demarcated area to which the exemption had applied and copies of the public notice and one of such individual notices have been annexed as Ex. F to the petition. It appears that individual notices on similar lines were also issued by the 2nd respondent to the proprietors who had their factories within the former demarcated area to which the exemption had applied and copies of the public notice and one of such individual notices have been annexed as Ex. F to the petition. The petitioners, feeling aggrieved by the withdrawal of this exemption of octroi, have approached this Court by this writ petition, whereby they have challenged the legally and validity of both the Municipal resolution as well as the public notice dated 17-5-1974 as well as the action threatened to be taken in pursuance thereto, principally on two grounds. 3. In the first place, the petitioners have contended that the withdrawal of exemption of octroi sought to be given effect by the impugned Municipal resolution and the impugned notice of the Municipal Commissioner is not in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law and hence such withdrawal purported to be given effect to is illegal, without jurisdiction hence deserves to be quashed. Secondly, the petitioners have raised the plea of promissory estoppel and contended that the respondents are estopped from withdrawing the said exemption of octroi, inasmuch as, relying upon the representation made by the respondents on the earlier occasion that the exemption from octroi under Rule 5(8) of the Octroi Rules would be available to those industries who carry on their business within the demarcated area for a period of 10 years, the petitioners have invested lacs of rupees in their factories and, therefore, it is not open to the respondents now to withdraw the exemption as they have purported to have done. 4. At the outset it may be stated that Mr. Naik appearing for the petitioners fairly conceded before us that the petitioners would not be in a position to press their plea of promissory estoppel which they have raised as and by way of challenging the withdrawal of exemption, especially because proper and relevant material on the basis of which such plea could be substantiated has not been put forward by the petitioners before the Court. He, therefore, stated that he would not be pressing that alternative ground on which the withdrawal of exemption from octroi has been challenged by the petitioners. He, therefore, stated that he would not be pressing that alternative ground on which the withdrawal of exemption from octroi has been challenged by the petitioners. The only question that needs to be considered by us is whether the withdrawal of exemption which is purported to be done by the respondents by means of impugned resolution (Ex. D) and impugned public notice (Ex. F.) is in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law or not and whether such withdrawal of exemption is within the powers of by the Municipal Commissioner under Rule 5(8) of the Octroi Rules of Sholapur Municipal Corporation. In our view, this contention really turns upon the proper and true intepretation of Rule 5(8) of the Octroi Rules. 5. Before we deal with the question of proper construction on Rule 5(8) of the Octroi Rules, it will be desirable to refer to the relevant provisions of the Bombay Principal Corporations Act, 1949 which deals with the imposition of tax called octroi. It cannot be disputed that no tax can be levied or collected except by authority or law and Article 265 of the Constitution is quite clear in that behalf. So far as the municipal taxation under the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 is concerned, that topic is death with in Chapter XI of the Act, section 127, which is the first section in Chapter XI, runs thus : 127(1) For the purposes of this Act, the Corporation shall impose the following taxes, namely : (a) property taxes; (b) a tax on vehicles, boats and animals. (2) In addition to the taxes specified in sub-section (1) the Corporation may for the purposes of this Act and subject to the provisions thereof impose any of the following taxes, namely- (a) octroi; .. .. .. ... (3) The municipal taxes shall be assessed and levied in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the Rules. It will thus appear clear that section 127 of the Act, which deals with the Municipal taxation, classifies Municipal taxes into two categories : (a) category in which an obligation is cast upon the Corporation to impose certain taxes viz. (3) The municipal taxes shall be assessed and levied in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the Rules. It will thus appear clear that section 127 of the Act, which deals with the Municipal taxation, classifies Municipal taxes into two categories : (a) category in which an obligation is cast upon the Corporation to impose certain taxes viz. property taxes and a tax on vehicles, boats and animals and (b) category which could be regarded as comprising optional taxes which the Corporation has been empowered to levy by conferring a discretion on the Corporation, and a list of such optional taxes is given in sub-section (2) of section 127 and one of such optional tax which the Corporation can levy is octroi, sub-section (3) of section 127 makes the position quite clear that all the Municipal taxes, whether of obligatory character or optional character, must be assessed and levied "in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules". The next material section would be section 149 of the Act. It prescribes the procedure to be followed in levying other taxes, meaning optional taxes. The material part of section 149 is to be found in section 149(1)(a) and the said provision runs thus: 149(1) In the event of the corporation deciding to levy any of the taxes specified to sub-section (2) of section 127, it shall make detailed provision, in so far as such provision is not made by this Act, in the form of rules modifying, amplifying or adding to the Rules at the time in force for the following matters, namely :--- (a) the nature of the tax the rates thereof the class or classes of classes of persons, articles or properties liable thereto and the exemption therefore, in any, to be granted; ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... From the aforesaid provision it will appear clear that so far as optional tax which the Corporation has been permitted to levy at its discretion, that is to say, those which have been specified in sub-section (2) of section 127, it has been provided that in the event of the Corporation deciding to levy an of such taxes, it shall make detailed provision therefore in the form of rules and the rules have to deal with the matters like rates of taxes, the class or classes of person articles or properties liable thereto as well as exemptions therefrom if any, to be granted. In other words, not merely the levy of optional tax is to be done by means of framing Rules in that behalf but even granting of exemption from payment of such tax is also required to be done by Rules to be done by means of framing rules in that behalf but even granting of exemption from payment to such tax is also required to be done by Rules to be framed in that behalf. Under sub-section (2) of section 149 the Rules which the Corporation shall frame are required to be submitted to the State Government and the State Government may either refuse to sanction them or refer them back to the Corporation for further consideration or sanction them either as they stand or with such modifications as it things fit, not however involving an increases in the rate or rates of the levy or the extent thereof, and the rules would become operative after such sanction has been accorded by the State Government. Under section 453 of the Act, which occurs in Chapter XXIX dealing with the topic of Rules, Bye-laws, Regulations and Standing Orders it has been provided that the rules in the Schedule as amended from time to time shall be deemed to be part of the Act and under section 454 the Corporation has been conferred power of making alterations or additions to rules that are to be found in the Schedule not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act to provide for any matter dealt with or for any of the purposes specified in the said Schedule. Under section 455 it is provided that the power to make, to add, alter or rescind any Rule under section 454 shall be subject to the sanction of the State Government and to the condition of the Rules being made after previous publication section 457 sets out the matters in respect of which Rules may be made by the Corporation and under sub-clause (7) of that section one of the matters in respect of which rules could be made is Municipal taxes. It may be stated that the Schedule to the Act contains Chapter VIII which provides for taxation rules and special provisions relating to octroi and Tolls are to be found in Rules 26, 27, 28 and 29 etc. However, it appears that the Sholapur Municipal Corporation found it necessary to rescind these Rules pertaining to octroi and tolls etc. Which are contained in Chapter VIII of the Schedule to the Act and in its place it framed its own Rules, called Octroi Rules, 1967 which came into effect from 1-1-1967 after going through all the requisite formalities. Under these octroi Rules, 1967 Rule 5 dealt with exemption from levy of octroi. It appears that in January 1969 Rule 5(8) was amended and the amended Rule 5(8) of 1969 with which we are concerned in the instant case runs thus : "5(8): In respect of raw materials or machinery belonging to and imported by any industrial, manufacturing, processing or assembling concern established or to be established in the Industrial Estate or Area for the purpose of manufacturing, processing or assembling, finished articles or goods in the said Industrial Estate or Area as also all finished goods or articles manufactured, processed or assembled in the said Industrial Estate or area and imported therefrom into the Sholapur City, the Commissioner shall not levy octroi for a period of 10 years from the date of demarcation of such area as an Industrial Estate or such area or in the case of the Industrial Estate established by the Government for a period of 10 years from 1-4-1968, provided that this exemption shall not be given in respect of any raw materials, imported for the purpose of refilling, packing or re-packing only. Explanation.---Materials or machinery mentioned herein shall include :--- (i) Plant and machinery including spares and replacements. Explanation.---Materials or machinery mentioned herein shall include :--- (i) Plant and machinery including spares and replacements. (ii) Construction materials that is to say, iron, steel, cement or bricks required by such undertakings for building purposes. (iii) Diesel Oil and petroleum products used for the purpose of generating electricity or motive power, as well as coal or coke used as industrial fuel. (iv) Diesel Oil, and petroleum products used for transport vehicles. Provided that no exemption from octroi shall be given or claimable unless the importer produces at the time of import but not afterwards, a certificate in the form prescribed in Schedule P signed by the proprietor or the Manager of the said Industrial concern certifying that the raw materials or the machinery that are being imported are the property of the ownership of the said Industrial concern and that the said materials or machinery are to be used or intended to be used by the said Industrial concern for the purpose of manufacturing, processing, or assembling finished Articles in the said Industrial Estate or Area. For the purpose of this exemption "Industrial Estate or Area" shall mean the area which the Commissioner may from time to time demarcate for the purposes of this rule as the area in which Industries can be suitably located in the Corporation limits or on the outskirts in the interest of Industrialisation of the City of Sholapur. For the purpose of this exemption "Industrial Estate or Area" shall mean the area which the Commissioner may from time to time demarcate for the purposes of this rule as the area in which Industries can be suitably located in the Corporation limits or on the outskirts in the interest of Industrialisation of the City of Sholapur. The Industrial Estate or Area shall also mean the Industrial Estate established by the Government which is at present situated outside Corporation limits Sholapur Hotagi Road." It will appear clear from the aforesaid provision of Rule 5(8) that in respect of raw materials or machinery belonging to or imported by any industrial, manufacturing, processing or assembling concern established or to be established in the Industrial Estate or Area for the purpose of manufacturing, processing or assembling, finished articles or goods in the said Industrial Estate or Area as also all finished goods or articles manufactured proceeded or assembled in the said Industrial Estate or Area and imported therefrom into the Sholapur City, the exemption from levy of octroi for a period of 10 years from the date of demarcation of such area as an Industrial Area had been granted and the granting of such exemption was obligatory or compulsory, inasmuch as, the aforesaid provision clearly recites that "the Commissioner shall not levy Octroi for a period of 10 years from the date of demarcation of such Area as an Industrial Area". Further. It appears that in pursuance of power conferred upon the Commissioner by the penultimate para of Rule 5(8) the 2nd respondent demarcated certain survey number as Industrial Area in terms of Octroi Rule 5(8) with a view to grant exemption to goods manufactured in the area so specified and the survey numbers which were included in the Industrial Area related to relevant survey numbers in which all the petitioners had their manufacturing concerns or factories. It is common ground that such demarcation of Industrial Area which included survey numbers in which the petitiones had factories was actually done by the 2nd respondent on 29-8-1972 and the exempt from octroi became effective from 1-9-1972 for a period of 10 years. It is common ground that such demarcation of Industrial Area which included survey numbers in which the petitiones had factories was actually done by the 2nd respondent on 29-8-1972 and the exempt from octroi became effective from 1-9-1972 for a period of 10 years. The petitioners grievance is that by a later resolution passed by 1st respondent on 20-3-1974 two additional areas were demarcated as Industrial Estate or Industrial Area for the purpose of granting exemption from levy of octroi to concerns which were located in those areas but at the same time the octroi concessions that were granted to the petitioners under the earlier resolution under Rule 5(8) were withdrawn. The relevant portion of this latter resolution dated 26-3-1974 runs thus : "Octroi concessions are hereby withdrawn with regard to other places given by various resolutions previously of the Corporation except mentioned above. The Commissioner shall take necessary steps as regards above mentioned subject." Pursuant to this resolution the 2nd respondent (Commissioner, Sholapur Municipal Corporation) issued a public notice on 17-5-1974 bringing to the notice of the concerned parties that except the areas mentioned in that public notice which have been declared as Industrial Estate (meaning two additional areas-one outside Hotagi Naka an the other Akalkot Municipal Naka), all the other previously demarcated area as Industrial Estate and area has been omitted and by that notice the Commissioner also informed the concerned parties that this change will take effect from 1st June, 1974. It is the aforesaid resolution of the Corporation and the public notice issued by the Commissioner that are being challenged by the petitioners before us as being illegal and beyond the powers of the Sholapur Corporation as well as the Commissioner, in that the requisite procedure required by law has not been followed while withdrawing the exemption already granted. 6. Mr. Naik appearing for the petitioners has pointed out that under sub-section (3) of section 127 all Municipal taxes, which would include octroi, are required to be assessed and levied in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules. 6. Mr. Naik appearing for the petitioners has pointed out that under sub-section (3) of section 127 all Municipal taxes, which would include octroi, are required to be assessed and levied in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules. He has also pointed out that under section 149(1)(a) in regard to optional taxes the Corporation is required to make detailed provision in the form of Rules and the Rules must deal with the nature of the tax, the rates thereof, the class or classes of persons, Articles or properties liable thereto and the exemptions therefrom, if any, to be granted and according to Mr. Naik, it was pursuant to this provision of the Act that the 1st respondent-Corporation framed these Rules called Octroi Rules, 1967 and the relevant Rule 5(8) which dealt with the granting of exemption was amended in 1969. He has, therefore, contended that since the exemption from levy of octroi had been granted by framing requisite Rule viz. Rule 5(8) of the Octroi Rules, the withdrawal of such exemption, which had been initially granted after following the provision of Rule 5(8), could only be effected by means of either rescinding Rule 5(8) itself or by framing another Rule withdrawing the exemption or cancelling the exemption. According to him, instead of following this procedure, which was obligatory on the Corporation, the Corporation merely passed a resolution of the type indicated in Ex. D to the petition and the 2nd respondent has purported to take action pursuance of that resolution by issuing a public notice of the type the copy of which has been annexed as Ex. F to the petition and according to him, the Commissioner has not been conferred power of withdrawing or cancelling the exemption already granted under Rule 5(8) of Octroi Rules. The Commissioner, he argued, has resorted to the device of redemarcating the areas which were already demarcated as Industrial area for the purpose of withdrawing or cancelling the exemption already granted. F to the petition and according to him, the Commissioner has not been conferred power of withdrawing or cancelling the exemption already granted under Rule 5(8) of Octroi Rules. The Commissioner, he argued, has resorted to the device of redemarcating the areas which were already demarcated as Industrial area for the purpose of withdrawing or cancelling the exemption already granted. He urged that no such power to redemarcate Industrial Area which had already been demarcated for the purpose of granting exemption has been conferred upon the Commissioner and, therefore, if such exemption from the levy of octroi was to be withdrawn or cancelled, the same could have been done by framing fresh Rule in that behalf or by deleting Rule 5(8) altogether, which could be done after following the procedure of framing Rules prescribed by the Act. We find considerable substance in this contention of Mr. Naik. 7. It was not disputed by Mr. Kadam appearing for the respondent-Corporation and the Municipal Commissioner that ordinarily it was open to the Corporation to withdraw any exemption granted by framing fresh rule in that behalf or by deleting Rule 5(8) itself. But according to him, that was not the only mode by which the exemption from the levy of octroi that was granted in the instant case could be withdrawn or cancelled; he urged that the power to grant exemption from the levy of octroi would include the power to withdraw the exemption thus granted. But according to him, that was not the only mode by which the exemption from the levy of octroi that was granted in the instant case could be withdrawn or cancelled; he urged that the power to grant exemption from the levy of octroi would include the power to withdraw the exemption thus granted. He also urged that similarly if by Rule 5(8) the Commissioner had been conferred power to demarcate certain area as Industrial Area for the purpose of granting exemption, the Commissioner would impliedly have the power to alter or redemarcate or to reduce the extent of the area which had already been demarcated for the purpose of granting exemption and this is exactly what the Commissioner has done in pursuance of resolution that was passed by the Municipal Corporation on 26th March, 1974 and in that behalf strong reliance was placed by him upon the penultimate para of Rule 5(8), which runs thus : "For the purpose of this exemption Industrial Estate or Area shall mean the area which the Commissioner may from time to time demarcate for the purposes of this Rule as the area in which Industries can be suitably located in the Corporation limits or on the outskirts in the interest of Industrialisation of the City of Sholapur." 8. Considerable emphasis was laid by him upon the fact that power or discretion has been conferred upon the Commissioner to demarcate certain area as Industrial Area for the purpose of granting exemption and he urged that since the power has been conferred upon the Commissioner "from time to time to demarcate any area as an Industrial Area", it should be held that the Commissioner has been conferred power to redemarcate or alter the area already demarcated for the purpose of granting exemption or altering the said area or reducing the extent of that area for the purpose of granting exemption from the levy of octroi, and in support of his contention reliance was placed upon the provisions of sections 14 and 21 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904. 9. The question thus turns upon the proper interpretation or construction of the penultimate para of Rule 5(8) of the Octroi Rules. As a matter of pure construction it appears difficult to accept the contention urged by Mr. Kadam before us. 9. The question thus turns upon the proper interpretation or construction of the penultimate para of Rule 5(8) of the Octroi Rules. As a matter of pure construction it appears difficult to accept the contention urged by Mr. Kadam before us. Under the relevant penultimate paragraph it has been provided that for the purpose of this exemption Industrial Estate or Area shall mean the area which the Commissioner may from time to time demarcate for the purposes of this Rule as the area in which Industries can be suitably located. In the first place, it is clear that power or discretion has been given to the Commissioner under this provision to demarcate certain area as Industrial Area for the purposes of this Rule, that is to say, for the purpose of granting exemption from the levy of octroi. Normally the dictionary meaning of the expression to demarcate is to mark out the limits; to determine as a boundary or limit; and the expression demarcation means Marking of boundaries, action of marking the limits of, delimitation; separation, and according to this meaning the only power that could be said to have been conferred upon the Commissioner would be the power to mark out the limits of or to determine as a boundary. There is no power conferred upon the Commissioner either to vary or alter so as to reduce the area which has already been demarcated by him as Industrial Area for the purpose of Rule, that is to say, for the purpose of granting exemption. If the words in the penultimate para of Rule 5(8) were to the effect: to demarcate or redemarcate, the position would have been entirely different and such a provision could have squarely supported Mr. Kadams contention. Mr. Kadam, however, strongly relied upon the expression from time to time occurring in the phrase the Commissioner may from time to time demarcate for the purposes of this Rule the area as Industrial Area and, according to him, the user of the expression from time to time suggests that the power to demarcate an area as Industrial Area would imply the power to redemarcate or redraw the area already demarcated. It is not possible to accept this submission of Mr. Kadam for the simple reason that even the expression from time to time, according to the dictionary, means. It is not possible to accept this submission of Mr. Kadam for the simple reason that even the expression from time to time, according to the dictionary, means. At more or less regular intervals; now and again; occasional, continuously or at all times,; the applicable meaning would be now and again and if that is the meaning of the expression from time to time, all that the penultimate paragraph does is that it empowers the Commissioner to demarcate area from time to time i.e. now and again as Industrial Area for the purpose of the Rule that is, for the purpose of granting exemption; in other words, the plain meaning of the phrase "the Commissioner may from time to time demarcate for the purposes of this Rule the area as Industrial Area would be that at one point of time he could demarcate an area A as Industrial Area for the purposes of Rule, further demarcate another area B second time or second occasion and on a third occasion he could still demarcate further area as Industrial Area for the purpose of the Rule. In other words, the normal connotation of the phrase would be that the Commissioner has been conferred the power to demarcate area one after another, that is to say, he could go on adding such areas as Industrial Area for the purpose of this Rule, that is to say, for the purpose of granting exemption from time to time as and when occasion arises, but this is far from saying that the Commissioner has been given power to redemarcate the area which has already been demarcated by him for the purpose of the Rule by altering the same or reducing the same. On a plain construction, therefore, it is not possible to accept Mr. Kadams contention that the power to demarcate the area as Industrial Area for the purpose of this Rule implies the power to redemarcate or redraw a particular area by altering the same or reducing the same or by withdrawing the same from Industrial Area already demarcated. There is yet another reason why the contention of Mr. Kadam is unacceptable to us. There is yet another reason why the contention of Mr. Kadam is unacceptable to us. It will appear clear from the reading of the entire Rule 5(8) that the only power or discretion which seems to have been vested in the Commissioner is with regard to topic of demarcating the area as Industrial Area for the purpose of the Rule and no other discretion or power seems to have been conferred upon him in respect of any other topic dealing with granting of exemption from the levy of octroi duty; for instance, the operative part of the Rule itself categorically lays down that the Commissioner shall not levy octroi for a period of 10 years from the date of demarcation of such area as an Industrial Area. In other words, it is by Rule itself that exemption for a period of 10 years has been granted and the Commissioner has no discretion whatsoever to reduce the period of 10 years and if this is the correct position, as it emerges clearly from the operative part of the Rule, it will be difficult to consider the penultimate para of Rule 5(8) in a manner so as to confer upon the Commissioner the power or discretion even to interfere with the period of 10 years which has been fixed by the operative part of the Rule, for if the construction as suggested by Mr. Kadam is to be accepted, it will confer upon the Commissioner the power or discretion to redemarcate the area which has already been demarcated as Industrial Area for the purpose of granting exemption resulting in withdrawal of exemption which has already been granted to certain specified area even within the period of 10 years which has been fixed by the operative part of the rule. Such a consequence obviously could not be said to have been intended when penultiamte paragraph of Rule 5(8) was framed. It was sought to be urged by Mr. Kadam before us that the entire exemption albeit for a period of 10 years as contemplated by the operative part of the Rule itself depended upon demarcation of certain area as Industrial Area by the Commissioner and, therefore, the Commissioner could withdraw exemption by redemarcating the area which has already been demarcated as Industrial Area for the purpose of the Rule even before the period of 10 years shall have expired. It is not possible to accept this contention of Mr. Kadam for the simple reason that though it is true that the entire exemption from the levy of octroi for a period of 10 years is contemplated by the operative part of Rule 5(8) is dependant upon the demarcation of certain area by the Commissioner as Industrial Area, once such a demarcation has been made by the Commissioner in exercise of the power conferred upon by him by the penultimate para of Rule 5(8), the exemption contemplated by the operative part of the Rule for the full period of 10 years immediately comes into operation and then the question would be whether the penultimate paragraph of the Rule should be so construed as to confer power upon the Commissioner to withdraw that exemption by resorting to the device of redemarcating the area by way of altering the same or reducing the same which has been already demarcated as Industrial Area for the purpose of the Rule. As we have pointed out above, the operative part of the Rule does not confer any discretion or power upon the Commissioner to interfere with the period of 10 years which has been fixed by the operative part and the only discretion or power which has been conferred upon the Commissioner is to be found in the penultimate paragraph which deals with the power merely to demarcate from time to time area as Industrial Area for the purpose of the Rule, that is, for the purpose of granting exemption. 10. Therefore, in the first place, it is not possible to accept Mr. Kadams contention that the power to demarcate conferred upon the Commissioner by the penultimate para of Rule 5(8) implies within itself the power to redemarcate which has already been demarcated as Industrial area. 10. Therefore, in the first place, it is not possible to accept Mr. Kadams contention that the power to demarcate conferred upon the Commissioner by the penultimate para of Rule 5(8) implies within itself the power to redemarcate which has already been demarcated as Industrial area. But assuming for the purpose of argument that we are wrong in this construction of penultimate para of Rule 5(8) and even if it were assumed for the purpose of argument that the power to demarcate would imply the power to redemarcate which has already been demarcated as Industrial area for the purpose of the Rule still, such implied power cannot be resorted to by the Commissioner so as to restrict or cut down the operation of exemption for a period of 10 years contemplated by the operative part of the Rule and, therefore, in either view of the matter the resolution of the Municipal Corporation as well as the public notice issued by the Commissioner pursuant to that resolution whereby the Commissioner has purported to redemarcate the area which had already been demarcated as Industrial area for the purpose of granting exemption with a view to completely take out that area from the purview of the exemption already granted will have to be regarded as illegal and without jurisdiction. 11. On the proper construction of Rule 5(8) reliance was placed by Mr. Kadam upon sections 14 and 21 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904. Section 14 runs thus : "Where, by any Bombay Act or Maharashtra Act made after the commencement of this Act any power is conferred on any Government, then that power may be exercised from time to time as occasion requires." In the first place, the section in terms would be clearly inapplicable to the facts of the present case, for it deals with conferral of power on any Government by Bombay Act or Maharashtra Act and in the present case we are concerned with the power of the Commissioner of Sholapur Municipal Corporation and secondly, all that section 14 says is that when any power is conferred upon Government by Bombay Act or Maharashtra Act, then that power may be exercised from time to time as occasion requires. It does not say anything more than the penultimate para of Rule 5(8), namely that for the purpose of granting exemption the Commissioner may from time to time demarcate the area as Industrial Area presumably as the occasion arises. In our view, therefore, section 14 cannot be availed of by the respondents in support of their contention. 12. Section 21 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, on which reliance was placed by Mr. Kadam runs thus : "21. Where, by any Bombay Act or Maharashtra Act, a power to issue notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws is conferred, then that power includes a power exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like sanction and conditions (if any), to add to amend, vary or rescind any notifications, Orders, Rules or bye-laws, so issued." In our view, even this section 21 is inapplicable to the facts of the present case. In the first place, it refers to a power conferred to issue notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws by any Bombay Act or Maharashtra Act and all that the section says is that when such power is conferred, then that power will include power exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like sanction and conditions, to add to, amend, vary or rescind any notifications, Orders, Rules or bye-laws, so issued. Even if the principle enunciated in this section is to be applied to the facts of the present case, it will appear clear that under this principle, by the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 power could be said to have been conferred upon Sholapur Municipal Corporation to frame a Rule in connection with the levy of octroi and in connection with granting exemption from the levy of octroi and under this principle such power having been conferred upon the Corporation, the Corporation will also have a power to add to, amend, vary or rescind such Rules that may be made by the Corporation, subject of course, to other procedure being followed in the matter of framing the Rules. In fact, that is the very contention which was urged by Mr. In fact, that is the very contention which was urged by Mr. Naik before us, that such withdrawal of exemption from the levy of octroi could have been done by the Corporation by issuing or framing another rule specifically providing for either cancellation of earlier Rule 5(8) or providing for cancellation or withdrawal of exemption already granted but instead of resorting to this normal method, the Sholapur Municipal Corporation and the Commissioner have purported to withdraw the exemption granted by resorting to penultimate para of Rule 5(8) of the Octroi Rules, and as we have indicated above, such action on the part of either the Corporation or the Commissioner would be beyond the purview of the power conferred or contemplated by penultimate para of Rule 5(8) of the Octroi Rules. 13. In our view therefore, neither section 14 nor section 21 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 applies to the facts of the present case on which reliance was place by the respondents in support of their contention. 14. In the result, the petition succeeds and the Rule is made absolute in terms of prayers (b) and (c) of the petition. The resolution of Sholapur Municipal Corporation dated 26th March, 1974 as well as the public notice dated 17th May, 1974 issued by the 2nd respondent as also whatever individual notices that the Commissioner (2nd respondent) might have issued, pursuant to Corporations resolution (Ex. D) are quashed. The respondent will pay the costs of the petition to the petitioners. -----