Short Note : It has been found by the first appellate Court that the plaintiff Bhagwan Das purchased a house on 17th January 1951 in the name of his son Narayan Das who was then a minor. This house is in Sleemabad on the Mirzapur Road. Some time in 1955, Bhagwandas erected the Tapra in question. This Tapra is nothing but a roof of asbestos sheet which is affixed to a beam on that wall of the house which faces the road. The construction can be described to be a shed. It has been found that this Tapra or shed covers one of the doors of the house which opens on the road and part of the stair-case which is used for going to the second storey of the house. It is also clear that the land beneath this shed or Tapra is Government land lying between the road and the house. The house referred to above was purchased by the defendant Beera in the name of his wife Devkibai (defendant) on 4th August 1962. The sale deed is Ex.D-6 which was executed by the plaintiff's son Narayandas who by then had attained majority. The plaintiff's case is that the construction referred to as Tapra was his construction and that it was not conveyed to the defendants by the sale deed Ex.D-6. The plaintiff alleged that possession of Tapra was not given to the defendants after the sale and that the defendants on 26th September 1962 took possession of the Tapra forcibly. The defendant's case, on the other hand, was that the Tapra was sold to them along with the house because it formed part of it. 2. The trial Court as well as the first appellate Court have gone by the measurements of the house given in Ex.D-6. The measurements of the house given in Ex.D-6 do not cover the land below the Tapra. The lower Court have therefore, concluded that the Tapra was not sold to the defendants. On this basis, the plaintiff's suit has been decreed. It may be mentioned that the defendant Devkibai died during the pendency of the suit and appellant No.2 Harkhe was substituted as legal representative in her place. Held : Having heard learned counsel, I have reached the conclusion that this appeal must be allowed. On this basis, the plaintiff's suit has been decreed. It may be mentioned that the defendant Devkibai died during the pendency of the suit and appellant No.2 Harkhe was substituted as legal representative in her place. Held : Having heard learned counsel, I have reached the conclusion that this appeal must be allowed. From the description of the construction which is in dispute in this litigation, it will be clear that it is nothing but a shed that hangs with the support, of the house which admittedly belonged to the defendants. It is also clear that the shed covers a door of the house opening towards the road as also a part of the staircase leading to the second storey. Indeed, this has been found to be so by the first appellate Court. It has not been proved by the plaintiff that Narayandas, his son, was separate from him or that he had separate earnings. The finding of the first appellate Court is that the house was purchased by the plaintiff in the name of Narayandas in 1951 when Narayandas was a minor. The sale of the house by Narayandas in favour of the defendants was obviously with the consent of the plaintiff. The Tapra was not a separate construction. It was a part of the house although it may have been erected subsequent to the purchase of the house in the name of Narayandas. The most important thing to be taken note of is that in Ex.D-6 the eastern boundary of the house where the Tapra hangs is shown as the road and not the Tapra. If the intention of the parties was not to sell the Tapra, the Tapra would have been shown as the eastern boundary and not the road. Having regard to the nature of the construction and the fact that the road is shown as the eastern boundary, I am of opinion that the parties intended that the Tapra, which was a part of the house, should pass to the purchasers. It is no doubt true that the measurements do not include the land below the Tapra probably for the reasons that the land below it was Govern-land, but non-inclusion of the land within the measurements does not benefit the plaintiff. Having regard to all the circumstances, I have no doubt that the intention was to convey the whole house which included the Tapra. Having regard to all the circumstances, I have no doubt that the intention was to convey the whole house which included the Tapra. The plaintiff, therefore, cannot be granted a decree for possession of the Tapra. Appeal allowed.