JUDGMENT Roy, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated March 21, 1967 passed in Title Appeal No. 773 of 1966, by Sri K.K. Sarker, Additional District Judge, 11th Court, Alipore, affirming thereby the judgment and decree dated March 31, 1966, made by Sri Raghabendra Banerjee, Subordinate Judge, 5th Court, Alipore, in Title Suit No. 30 of 1964. 2. Although in a second appeal of the present nature findings of fact are not open for challenge, in this cage however the lower appellate Court in arriving at such findings did not give effect to the presumption arising out of the entries in the Record of Rights and as such the findings of fact became open for challenge in this appeal in view of the Privy Council decision in the case of (1) Shankar Rao v. Shambhu Wallad, 45 CWN 57. Accordingly we are considering facts as we do in Appeals from Original Decrees. 3. The plaintiff respondent No. 1 (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff) on or about May 25, 1964, brought Title Suit No. 30 of 1964 against the defendant-appellants (hereinafter referred to as the defendants), for declaration of title, recovery of possession and mesne profits in respect of 3 cottas of homestead and with an one storied building standing thereon and as recorded in R.S. Plot No. 1673 of Khatian Nos. 703/1 and 667/7 of Mouja Naihati (hereinafter referred to as the suit properties). It was the case of the plaintiff that originally a plot of land measuring more or less 6 cottas was taken settlement of by Md. Reza from the erstwhile Mitra landlords (hereinafter referred to as the Mitras) in the year 1929. According to the plaintiff out of the said 6 cottahs of land, the said Md. Reza demised 3 cottas in the northern portion in favour of Abdul Khalek Ansari (hereinafter referred to as the Khalek) on August 21, 1929 at a rental of Rs. 15/- per year and built a one-storied building thereon. According to the plaintiff out of the said 6 cottahs of land, the said Md. Reza demised 3 cottas in the northern portion in favour of Abdul Khalek Ansari (hereinafter referred to as the Khalek) on August 21, 1929 at a rental of Rs. 15/- per year and built a one-storied building thereon. That the said Khalck in his turn on May 8, 1930 obtained a Mourasi Mokarari Patta in respect of 2 cottas of land out of the said 3 cottas from some of the superior Mitra landlords and thereafter he continued to possess the same till his death in the early part of 1950 without any obstacle or obstruction from anybody and after the death of the said Khalek, his 3 sons, a widow and his mother inherited the said properties. The plaintiff's further case is that due to communal riots, the heirs of the said Khalek kept the disputed house under lock and key and shifted elsewhere and thereafter they sold the suit properties by a registered Kobala dated February 9, 1953 (Ext.2) for valuable' consideration to the plaintiff and transferred all their rights, title and interest in the same to him. It has also been stated that in the meantime some persons broke open the lock and entered into the suit properties as a result whereof the plaintiff had to move the competent authority under the provisions of Rehabilitation of the Displaced Persons and Eviction of Persons in Unauthorised Occupation of Land Act, 1951 (Act XVI of 1951), for the purpose of ousting the trespassers and after a protracted proceeding got back possession of the entire property on February, 3, 1962, when the last of the trespassers left. The plaintiff then kept the house on lock & key but on the following date the defendants forcibly broke open the padlock and wrongfully trespassed into the suit property. After failing to get back possession in a proceeding under Sec. 145 Cr. P.C. the plaintiff had to file the above suit. 4. The suit was contested by the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 and their defence inter alia was that the settlement of 6 cottas of land was not obtained in the year 1929 by the said Md. Reza alone, but the said settlement was taken jointly by Md. P.C. the plaintiff had to file the above suit. 4. The suit was contested by the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 and their defence inter alia was that the settlement of 6 cottas of land was not obtained in the year 1929 by the said Md. Reza alone, but the said settlement was taken jointly by Md. Reza and his brother Abdul Sattar (hereinafter referred to as the Sattar) out of their joint funds, each having equal share in the 6 cottas of the land in question. It has been asserted that under the Mourasi Mokarari Patta, the said Khalek obtained 3 annas 11 gandas share in interest of the superior landlords belonging to the Mitras and accordingly CS Record of Rights recorded Khalek as a cosharer landlord along with Mitras in respect of the Khatian to which appertains the suit property in Dag No. 1673. It has further been alleged that the Kabuliyat alleged to have been executed by the said Md. Reza was illegal and fraudulent and furthermore the same was never given effect to or acted upon and the Patta dated May 8, 1930 being a unilateral document, no title could have been acquired on the basis of the same or under it. It has also been contended that the said Md. Reza and his brother, the said Sattar built there, out of their joint funds, 2 buildings on the lands measuring 6 cottas, one in the southern portion which was two storied and one on the northern portion which was single storied. The said 2 brothers also possessed in equal share the properties in question and paid rates, rents and taxes accordingly. Their further defenee was that the said Md. Reza and the said Sattar permitted the said Khalek to live in the building on the suit properties and in fact the said Khalek had no right, title or interest therein. According to the defendants the said Md. Reza while living jointly with the said Sattar died leaving his widow Latifunisa Bibi and 2 sons, viz. Nurul Huda and minor Nurul Alam, who continued to possess the properties jointly along with the said Sattar. Their further case was that Latifunisa Bibi for self and after obtaining permission from the District Judge as a guardian of the minor Nurul Alam along with Nurul Huda, executed a registered Kobala (Ext. Nurul Huda and minor Nurul Alam, who continued to possess the properties jointly along with the said Sattar. Their further case was that Latifunisa Bibi for self and after obtaining permission from the District Judge as a guardian of the minor Nurul Alam along with Nurul Huda, executed a registered Kobala (Ext. A) dated December 26, 1950 for valuable consideration in favour of one Jagannath Sharma respondent No.2 above named, in respect of the undivided half share of 6 cottas of land and the building standing thereon. That by another purchase dated July 7, 1952 (Ext. A1) from the said Sattar, Jagannath Sharma became the owner of the remaining half of the entire six cottas and since such purchase, Jagannath had been in possession of the entire six cottas by paying rates, taxes and rents and also by getting his name mutated. Their further defence was that after Khalek's death, his widowed mother and other members of the family were in permissive use and occupation of the suit properties but because of the communal trouble of 1947 they gave up possession in favour of the owners and as a result thereof, the licence was also terminated. Their further defence was that the said Md. Reza and the said Sattar, after obtaining khas possession of the property had kept it under lock and key but later on due to communal troubles, some displaced persons broke open the lock and started living in the house forcibly and taking that opportunity and also with the intention to make illegal gain, the plaintiff obtained the collusive Kobala in Ext.2 which is dated February 9, 1953, without any consideration from the heirs of the said Khalek, in his favour. But even inspite of that the plaintiff could not get possession of any portion of the properties. It was also alleged in the defence that after the refugees had left on January 27, 1952, Jagannath Sharma was allowed to keep the property under lock and key, on obtaining khar possession and shortly thereafter, on February 3, 1962 he sold the suit property to the said defendants for a consideration of Rs. 6500/- and in fact possession was delivered in their favour. According to the defendants the plaintiff with the help of his men attempted to dispossees them on February 4, 1962 and thereafter made an application under section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Ext. 6500/- and in fact possession was delivered in their favour. According to the defendants the plaintiff with the help of his men attempted to dispossees them on February 4, 1962 and thereafter made an application under section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Ext. 8) and that too after having failed to get possession. The said defendants further asserted that the plaintiff well knew at all material times that Jagannath Sharma had purchased the suit property in respect of which he fraudulently obtained an infructous document from the heirs of the said Khalek. It was also asserted that the CS and RS records were correct and as a result thereof the said defendants claimed to have possession of the entire suit property not only for living there with the family but also for getting the names mutated in the books of the Municipality and on payment of rents, rates and taxes (Exts. 4- 4 (n), apart from making repairs of the house and taking electric connections therein in 1962. Such possession was also asserted for the fact of letting out a put of the premises to tenants. It was also claimed that the defendant No.3 Jagannath Sharma was impleaded unnecessarily. Apart from the defence as mentioned hereinbefore, it was also claimed that the suit was speculative, not maintainable and harassing and furthermore it was contended to be bad for misjoinder of parties and on the ground of limitation. 5. On the pleadings as aforesaid, the following issues were framed for determination : (1) Is the suit bad for misjoinder of parties? (2) Is the defendant No.2 a necessary party to the suit? (3) Is the suit barred by limitation? (4) Has the plaintiff any right, title and interest in the suit property? (5) Is the plaintiff entitled to any damages from the Defendant Nos.1 and 2 ?, and Is he entitled to any relief as prayed for? (6) To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled? 6. The suit was decreed on contest against defendant Nos. 1 and 2 and the plaintiff's title to the suit property was declared with a further direction that he would be entitled to recover possession of the properties. There was a further direction on Defendant No.1 to deliver possession of the properties to the plaintiff within a month from the decree with a corresponding default clause. 1 and 2 and the plaintiff's title to the suit property was declared with a further direction that he would be entitled to recover possession of the properties. There was a further direction on Defendant No.1 to deliver possession of the properties to the plaintiff within a month from the decree with a corresponding default clause. The plaintiff was also found to be entitled to get a decree for Rs.100.00 P. on account of mesne profits. 7. Although issue No. 1 as aforesaid was not pressed, yet on consideration of the relevant fact on the learned Subordinate Judge held the defendant No.3 Jagannath Sharma to be a proper though not a necessary party and as such he held that the suit could not fail for joining him. Issue No.2 was answered in the negative and on consideration of the evidence of Jagannath Sharma (DW 2) and the exhibits, it was observed that the suit was not barred by limitation. It was also observed that since neither defendants nor Jagannath, possessed the suit property namely, the northern portion of the 6 cottah property, the suit was not barred by time. In respect of issue No.3, which is perhaps and practically the main issue to be decided in the suit, it was held that the sale in favour of the plaintiff through Ext. 2 was valid and as such he acquired a valid right, title and interest in the suit properties. In view of the findings as above, the other two issues viz., issue Nos. 4 and 5 were also answered in favour of the plaintiff. 8. In. the appeal, viz., Title Appeal No. 773 of 1965, which was taken from the said determination of the learned Subordinate Judge in Title Suit No. 30 of 1964, the point which came up for consideration was whether the plaintiff had right, title and interest in the property and the learned Additional District Judge, by his judgment and decree dated March 21, 1963, dismissed the appeal on contest with costs against the appearing parties and exparte against the rest without costs and thereby affirmed the judgment and decree of the learned Subordinate Judge. 9. Those determinations have been impeached in this appeal and Mr. Ghose contended them to be erroneous and perverse on the face of the evidence on record. 9. Those determinations have been impeached in this appeal and Mr. Ghose contended them to be erroneous and perverse on the face of the evidence on record. He in fact strongly assailed the findings of the Courts below on issue No.3 and contended that on a proper construction of the documents and consideration of the evidence on record, the Court of appeal below should have held that at all material times, the plaintiff had and still has no right, title and interest in the suit properties. 10. It was firstly contended by Mr. Ghose that the Kabuliyat from Khalek to Md. Reza. dated August 21, 1929, Ext. 1(b), should have been held to be a fictitious one and in any event it should have been held that the same was never acted upon and as such the said exhibit should have been omitted from consideration; secondly, it was contended by him that the entries in the Assessment Registers. (Ext. 4), not having been duly proved, but they having been only produced, no reliance should have been placed on them; thirdly, he contended that the legal effect of the entries in the recent record of rights, particularly the background of the decision of the settlement were not duly considered; fourthly, it was submitted that Exts. A and A1 were not correctly considered or construed and fifthly and lastly, it was contended that on merits and as appeared from the other exhibits viz., the several documents, deeds and records and more particularly in view of Exts. 6-6(c) viz., the order sheet in the Act VIII case, the determination as made should be held to be clearly erroneous. 11. In support of his first and fourth points Mr. Ghose first took us through the documents (i) Ext. 1 dated July 30, 1929 which is a Kabuliyat from Md. Reza to Panchkari, (ii) Ext. 1(a), Kabuliyat dated August 16, 1929 from Md. Reza to K. Mitra, (iii) Ext. 1(b) Kabuliyat dated August 21, 1929, from the said Khalek to Md. Reza, (iv) Ext. 1(c), a Kabuliyat dated November 27, 1929 from Sattar to K. Mitra and (v) the Kabuliyat Ext. 1(d) which is dated August 5, 1929 from Md. Reza to Panchkari, (ii) Ext. 1(a), Kabuliyat dated August 16, 1929 from Md. Reza to K. Mitra, (iii) Ext. 1(b) Kabuliyat dated August 21, 1929, from the said Khalek to Md. Reza, (iv) Ext. 1(c), a Kabuliyat dated November 27, 1929 from Sattar to K. Mitra and (v) the Kabuliyat Ext. 1(d) which is dated August 5, 1929 from Md. Reza to M. Mitra and (vi) Exts, A-A1, dated December 26, 1950 & July 7, 1952 the defendants' title deeds and contended that these documents of title have not been rightly construed and considered and furthermore the character Ext. 1(d), which confers Mourashi right has not at all been considered. Mr. Das Gupta appearing on behalf of the plaintiff respondent contested the points raised by Mr. Ghose. He has also placed the relevant exhibits, along with the statements in the written statement and has clearly pointed out what lands have been sought to be transferred by each of them. He has further contended that the determination was done on due consideration of those exhibits and furthermore the case of co-sharer as was sought to be done and established, has been rightly disbelieved. He further submitted that Exts. A & A1 would show that the southern portion and more particularly about 3 cottas of land on the south was purchased by Jagannath and not the northern portion as claimed. 12. By Ext.1, Md. Reza got the settlement of 2 out of 6 cottas from the 1/3rd co-sharer Mitra landlords on an annual rent of Rs.10/-. By Ext. 1(d) another 2 cottahs were taken settlement of from another group of landlords at the same annual rent of Rs.10/- and under Ext. 1 (a) 10 chittacks of land were taken settlement from another landlord on an annual rental of Rs. 2/2 only. So the three Kabuliyats together cover about 4 cottahs and 10 chittacks of land and thus fall short of 6 cottahs. Though on the lapse of such a long time, the plaintiff, the subsequent purchaser has not been able to prove the deed of settlement of the balance, it must however be remembered that it is the common case of both the plaintiffs and the defendants that the entire 6 cottahs were taken settlement of by Md. Reza. It is true that according to the defendants such settlement was taken by both the brothers, Md. Reza. It is true that according to the defendants such settlement was taken by both the brothers, Md. Reza and Sattar, there is no evidence of such settlement being taken by Sattar. Ext. 1 (c), on the other hand, only shows that Sattar took settlement of superior interest of Mitra landlords in 10 chittacks of which the settlement wall in favour of Md. Reza. Be that as it may, Exts.1, 1(a) & 1(d) clearly show that at least 4 cottahs 10 chittacks was taken settlement of by Md. Reza and of the said land of 3 cottahs was settled in favour of the plaintiff purchaser, Khalek by Ext. 1(b). Evidence on record will establish that the structure on the northern side of 6 cottahs was built by Khalek and not by Md. Reza or Sattar Such right to build on the 3 cottahs of land settled in favour of Sattar was granted by Ext. 1(b), the reserve rent whereof was Rs. 15/-. From those evidence it is apparent that Md. Reza settled the suit lands in favour of Khalek. The argument that Ext. 1(b) in the absence of corresponding dhakhilas should be held to have not been acted upon has also no basis as there is ample evidence to show that the same was acted upon. Khalek went into possession, built his own house and continued to enjoy the same. That apart, there is some evidence of payment of rent through P.W.2 and no evidence to prove the allegation that Ext. 1(b) was never acted upon. Ext. 3(a), the patta dated 8.5.1930 by some of co-sharers superior landlords in respect of a share of such interest in favour of Khalek also would go to show that Khalek acted upon the settlement in Ext.1(b) when he built his Own house on the land so settled and enjoyed the same. It further appears from Ext. 10, the application filed by Md. Reza's widow in the Act VIII case, for permission to sell the share of the minors that the sale proposed was of the southern 3 cottahs with the two storied pucca building thereon and not the suit land on the north. Permission being granted on such an application (Ext.13) Ext. A was executed. Exhibit Al is the alleged purchase of the share of Sattar. Permission being granted on such an application (Ext.13) Ext. A was executed. Exhibit Al is the alleged purchase of the share of Sattar. Both these purchases show that when Jagannath's purchase was only the two storied house on the south and not the suit property. Thus from the said Exts. A-A1 it appears that Jagannath purchased the Southern portion and his evidence was that he got his name mutated in the Municipality and in the landlord's sherista prior to 1962 would be of no avail or assistance since his own admission in evidence is that he got possession only in 1962. That apart, Ext.4, viz. certified copies of the Assessment Registers of the Naihati Municipality covering a period from 1935-36 to 1939-40, proves the existence of a single storied building with 3 rooms on holding No.8 of Mitrapara, which was assessed in the name of Abdul Khalek shows that the lands in question were in constant and continuous possession of the said Khalek on due payment of tax by him. The fact of Khalek's possession for the subsequent period from 1940-41 to 1944-45 and thereafter 1945-46 upto the year 1955-56 is further proved by Exts. 4(b), 4(c) and 4(d) since holding No. 10 Mitrapara was previously numbered as holding No.8. Here, on his second branch of argument, Mr. Ghose submitted that these exhibits were not duly proved and were not legal evidence and the more so when they were not proved by the person who prepared them, In support of his contentions, Mr. Ghose placed reliance on the case of (2) Durgabala Biswas v. Nityananda Roy, 59 CWN 367, where, in a proceeding for standardisation of rent under the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provision) Act, 1950 it has been observed that where the Rent Controller fixes the rent on wholly inadmissible 'evidence, the order fixing standard rent cannot be upheld. Mr. Ghose next relied on the case of (3) Jitendra Nath Joardar v. Makhan Lal Choudhury, 61 CWN 175, where it has been observed that : "A certified copy of the document described as an 'Inspection Book of Lands and Buildings' maintained by the Corporation of Calcutta is not admissible under section 35 of the Evidence Act. The entries in such book which plainly show that the amount of land was inserted on the basis of statements made by the tenants are hearsay evidence. The entries in such book which plainly show that the amount of land was inserted on the basis of statements made by the tenants are hearsay evidence. There is nothing in section 136 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923 which authorises or requires the executive officer or the person acting under his authority to make entries of the measurements in a book described as the "Inspection Book of Lands and Buildings". If the making of the entry is neither authorised nor required by the statute, it cannot be said that the Assessment Inspector who made the entry did so in discharge of his official duty or in performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law of the country. The document described as "Inspection Book of Lands and Buildings" maintained by the Corporation of Calcutta is not a public document within the meaning of section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act". 13. This contention of Mr. Ghose cannot however be accepted as these documents are clearly admissible under Sec. 35 of Indian Evidence Act. They are the entries in a register prescribed to be maintained under S.136 of the Bengal Municipal Act, and the Rules framed thereunder. The entry as the owner is an authorised entry and on the evidence of P.W. 1 such entries have been duly proved. Moreover P.W. 3, the tax collector of the municipality has already proved possession of the suit holding by the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff. 14. That apart, Ext. 6(a) & Ext. 11 are applications filed by Jagannath Sharma, the predecessor-in-interest of the present defendants and they show that he himself. applied for permission to purchase the interest of the minor heirs of Khalek in the suit property thereby acknowledging title and possession of such heirs in the suit property. Exts. 7 and 6 go to show that in 1953, the widow of late Khalek obtained permission from the District Judge in Act VIII case and sold the share of minor heirs of Khalek in favour of the plaintiff. On consideration of evidence there is no way out but to hold that Jagannath's title to the suit properties has not at all been made out and on the other hand the right, title and interest of the plaintiff has been well established. Plaintiff's possession until dispossessed by the displaced persons have also been established by evidence both oral and documentary. Ext. Plaintiff's possession until dispossessed by the displaced persons have also been established by evidence both oral and documentary. Ext. 9 is the order in the providing for eviction of the displaced persons dated 14.3.1956 shows that it was the plaintiff who obtained such an order and not the defendants or their predecessor-in-interest as claimed by them. Hence the defence version of Khalek and his heirs being licencees only has not been established. Thus the plaintiff respondents, being purchasers for value, acquired perfect title. 15. On the third branch of his submissions, Mr. Ghose submitted that both the C.S. and R.S. records being in favour of the defendant appellants, there must be presumptions of correctness attached to them, unless rebutted, and there having no such evidence in rebuttal, the entries in the corresponding records should have been held in favour of his clients. In support of his contentions, Mr. Ghose first relied on the case of (4) Rani Harshamukhi Dasi v. Kshitindra Deb Roy & Ors, 47 CWN 662, wherein it has been observed that where there is an entry in the record of rights, the entry will be presumed to be correct unless the contrary is proved and it is not necessary for the person relying upon the presumption to adduce evidence to show that there was foundation for the entry. He next relied on the case of (5) Jathindra Nath Malik v. Sushitendra Nath Palit, 69 CWN 210, wherein the principle as enuntiated in Rani Harshakukhi's case (supra) has been reiterated and it has been observed that the principle of presumption of correctness of the entries in the Record of Rights finally published under the Bengal Tenancy Act, is applicable to the Record of Rights published under the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953, and it is for the parties relying on such presumption to prove the foundation or basis of the correctness of the entries of the record of rights. The Record of Rights in the present case would stand in the way of the plaintiff getting the decree. So far as CS Record is concerned it does not support either of parties. Obviously that records Md. Reza and his brother to be in possession on settlement. But on our findings made hereinbefore, Md. Reza's brother had only an interest in the superior interest, the settlement was made exclusively to Md. Reza by the Mitras. So far as CS Record is concerned it does not support either of parties. Obviously that records Md. Reza and his brother to be in possession on settlement. But on our findings made hereinbefore, Md. Reza's brother had only an interest in the superior interest, the settlement was made exclusively to Md. Reza by the Mitras. Such recording was made either before or without reference to the subsequent settlement by Md. Reza to Khalek which has been well established on other evidence. So far as the entry in R.S. Records is concerned, it not wholly against the plaintiff. It records plaintiff's possession though as wrongful. The order of the Revenue Officer goes to show, that he misread plaintiff's purchase as purchase of merely superior interest and as such refused to record him to be in possession on his own rights. But since he was found to be in possession, he was recorded as in wrongful possession. But on our findings made hereinbefore such an entry is clearly erroneous and the presumption arising therefrom should stand rebutted. 16. On the fifth viz., the last point, i.e. on merits, Mr. Ghose placed reliance on Ext.3, the certified copy of the Patta of Abdul Sattar dated November 27, 1929, from the Mitras, Exts.3(a), 4, 4(a), 5, 5(a) and 6 to 6(e) and submitted that they have not only been not considered duly and in any event the learned Courts below acted illegally, with material irregularity and in improper use of jurisdiction in accepting into evidence the certified copy of the Kabuliyat, Ext. 1(b) executed by Khalek in favour of Md. Reza. 17. So far as the first part of this contention of Mr. Ghose is concerned, it would appear from discussions made hereinbefore, that the courts below were not wrong in their reading or construction of documents referred to by Mr. Ghose. The only point which calls for consideration is, whether the certified copy of the Kabuliyat was admissible and whether the courts below acted wrongly in accepting the same in evidence or in placing reliance on them. But this objection is belated and cannot be entertained when no objection was taken as to its admissibility without proof of the original at the trial court. The original was not in the possession of the plaintiff or his predecessor-in-interest. Moreover the argument of Mr. But this objection is belated and cannot be entertained when no objection was taken as to its admissibility without proof of the original at the trial court. The original was not in the possession of the plaintiff or his predecessor-in-interest. Moreover the argument of Mr. Ghose on the question of admissibility of certified copy cannot be accepted in view of Sec. 65 (c) of the Evidence Act. It is a Kabuliyat granted by Khalek to Md. Reza in the year 1929. Neither of them is alive. Plaintiff is the purchaser from the heirs of Khalek and as such it was not reasonably possible for him to produce the original. A question similar to the present one, came up for consideration in a Bench decision of this Court in the case of (6) Anima Das Sharma & Anr. v. Rev. Dr. Lawrence Trevor Picachy & Ors., 80 CWN 788 wherein it has been observed that: "It is the requirement of the appellate court to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause that the appellate court may admit additional evidence under order 41 Rule 27, Civil Procedure Code, subject, however to this that even though the appellate court may be able to pronounce judgment it may still admit additional evidence if it considers that in the interest of justice something which remains obscure should be filled up so that it can pronounce its judgment in a more satisfactory manner. The presumption of section 90 of the Evidence Act, 1872, is not applicable to certified copies of documents. The fact that the original documents are registered documents there is a presumption as to the due execution thereof by persons alleged to have executed the same in view of section 57(5) and section 60(2) of the Registration Act, 1968. Although a broad proposition cannot be laid down that whenever certified copies of registered documents are produced there is no necessity of proving the execution of the same, in accordance with section 67 of the Evidence Act, 1872, but where there is loss of evidence relating to the execution of any document, the court may in a suitable case rely on the certificate of registration as prima facie evidence of proof of execution". Thus I hold that the certified copy of the Kabuliyat in the instant case was rightly admitted into evidence. 18. Thus I hold that the certified copy of the Kabuliyat in the instant case was rightly admitted into evidence. 18. On our finding as to possession by the plaintiff upto 1962 made hereinbefore no question of limitation does arise. 19. In view of the above the points argued by Mr. Ghose fail, so also the appeal and the same is dismissed. There will however be no order for costs. Let the records be send down at an early date. Sen, J. : I agree.