( 1 ) THIS criminal petition under S. 482 Cr. P. C. is directed against the order made by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bellary framing charges in C. C. No. 3385 of 1975 for the offences of criminal conspiracy under sec. l20-B and criminal breach of trust under Secs. 406 and 408 of the i. P. Code. ( 2 ) THE petitioner is one D. Garudaraj alias D. G. Raj and is stated to have been the Sales Representative, Supplies Division, Mysore State agro Industries Corporation Ltd, Bellary. This accused along with ten others is being indicted for the said three offences and the gravamen of the charge is that they violated Government Order and circular instructions issued by the Director of Agriculture, Bangalore and the general Manager of the Mysore State Agro Industries Corporation and assisted in the supply of fertilisers to certain persons who were not authorised to receive them. Accordingly, the petitioner with whom we are concerned is stated to have issued two release orders, at Bellary one dated 2-8-1972 and the other dated 16-8-1972 in favour of M|s. Veera venkateswara Traders of Sindhanur and B. Sreenivasa Setty of Moka village, respectively. These two release orders dealt with fertilizers of the quantities of 9 tons and odd and 2 tons and odd in favour of the two respective persons. Since this was done by the petitioner (A. 10) contrary to the instructions issued under the Government Order and the circulars aforesaid, it was stated that he enabled the two named persons to make some wrongful gain with the corresponding loss to other consumers. According to the circular orders dated 30-5-1972 and 21-6-1972, due to shortage of fertilizers a scheme was set up for their distribution. In the circular of 30th May 1972 several Committees, district level and taluk level, were constituted and one of the functions allocated to these committees was to implement the policy decision of the Government relating to the procurement and distribution of the fertilizers. In that circular letter it was specifically pointed out by the Director of Agriculture that permits were to be issued by the officials specified therein and only upon these permits, the fertilizers could be distributed. The other circular of 21st June 1972 very much reiterated the contents of the circular dated 30th May 1972 and further provided that maximum quota was to be given to the local Co-operative Societies. The other circular of 21st June 1972 very much reiterated the contents of the circular dated 30th May 1972 and further provided that maximum quota was to be given to the local Co-operative Societies. The prosecution case was that A. 10 being the Sales Representative was sent copies of these circulars and as such he was supposed to be aware of the Government order. Si'nce M/s. Veera Venkateswara Traders and Sreenivasa setty did not possess the required permit, they were not entitled to receive the quota of fertilizers. That facility was extended to them at the instance of A. 10 because he issued the two release orders in their "favour. According to the prosecution, that conduct on the part of A. 10 led to some wrongful gain to these persons with the corresponding wrongful loss to others and as such A. 10, in violation of the directions issued under the Government Circulars, dishonestly disposed of the fertilizers and thus committed the offence of criminal breach of trust under S. 405. ( 3 ) THIS in short was the prosecution case for which the aforementioned charges were framed by the Magistrate against A. 10. Being dissatisfied with the order of the learned Magistrate, the present petition under S. 482 is filed. ( 4 ) IT is manifest, A. 10 could be discharged only if he satisfied; that upon considering the police report and the documents sent along with it and the statement if any of the accused himself, the Magistrate would have considered that the charge against him was groundless. In other words, under S. 240 the charge could be framed against him only if there was a ground for presuming that he committed an offence triable by the Magistrate of the nature specified in the charge. As observed by a learned Judge of this Court in Manjoorkhan vs. State of mysore, AIR. 1962 Mys. 106=1962 Myslj. 532. there is nothing particularly recondite or abstruse in the language employed in the two Ss. 239 and 240 of the new Code. In 'the context, the word "ground" must be taken to have been used in its ordinary dictionary sense, meaning basis, foundation or valid reason. 1962 Mys. 106=1962 Myslj. 532. there is nothing particularly recondite or abstruse in the language employed in the two Ss. 239 and 240 of the new Code. In 'the context, the word "ground" must be taken to have been used in its ordinary dictionary sense, meaning basis, foundation or valid reason. On the ratio of that authority Sri C. B. Motaiya the learned Counsel for the petitioner accused contended that the prosecution had to furnish a reasonable basis or foundation for presuming that the accused had committed the offence. In century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. , Ltd. , vs. State of Maharashtra , AIR. 1972 SC. 545. their Lordships held that if there is no ground for presuming that the accused had committed an offence, the charges must be considered to be groundless, which is the same thing as saying that there is no ground for framing the charges. This necessarily depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and the Magistrate is entitled and indeed has a duty to consider the entire material referred tor in S. 239. In Paritosh Khan vs. The State, AIR, 1958 Cal, 709. while dealing with the question of the charge being groundless, a learned Judge of that High court observed, that in order to arrive at that finding, the evidence proposed to be offered by the prosecution taking at its highest must be held not reliable. On the basis of these decisions, the learned State public Prosecutor rather contended that the evidence so far adduced in the present case is to be judged in this perspective of the law relatable to the phrase "the Magistrate considered the charge against the accused to be groundless" or the language that "there is ground for presuming that the accused had committed an offence. " According to the learned counsel, the evidence adduced so far contained, in the police report and the documents sent with it under S. 173 and examinstion of the accused, if any, do not lead to any such inference that even a reasonale basis cannot be found for the prosecution or that the evidence taken at its highest could not lead to an inference that the accused had committed an offence triable by the Magistrate. ( 5 ) SRI Motaiya the learned Counsel for the petitioner was very well aware of the restricted jurisdiction of the High Court under S. 482 and therefore, he referred to two other decisions of the Supreme Court in support of his contentions. The first case is in K. P. Kapur v. Sate of punjab ,air. 1960 SC. 866, in that case their Lordships were dealing with the previous S. 561a. Sri Motaiya the learned Counsel emphasised the specific observation in that judgment which deals with those category of cases where the inherent jurisdiction to quash the proceedings can and should be exercised, namely, that the allegations in the first information report or the complaint even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged. As observeed by their Lordships, in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises, as it is a matter of merely looking at the complaint or the first information report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. The attempt of the learned Counsel was to bring the case within the folds of this observation of the Supreme Court. The other case relied upon by the learned Counsel is the latest on the subject, by the Supreme Court of which the report is in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy , 1977 2 SCC. 699. The learned Counsel referred to the following observations by their Lordships in that case:"the saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a Court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. Sri Motaiya rather contended that the case against A-10 would again fall within the ambit of this observation of the Supreme Court. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. Sri Motaiya rather contended that the case against A-10 would again fall within the ambit of this observation of the Supreme Court. On the facts of that case, however, it was held by their Lordships that a few bits here and a few bits there on which the prosecution proposed to rely were "woefully inadequate for connecting the respondents with the crime", howsoever skilfully one could attempt to weave those bits into a presentable whole. Being governed by that observation, their Lordships further held that in the circumstances of that case it was a sheer waste of public time and money to permitt the proceedings to continue against the respondents. It was further observed by their Lordships that in that case the fact of the matter was that there was no material on the record on the basis of which any Tribunal could reasonably come to the conclusion that the accused were in any manner connected with the incident leading to the prosecution. One has to weigh the facts narrated in this case with these observations made by their Lordships in the latest decision presumably under Sec. 482 of the CPC. ( 6 ) THE learned State Public Prosecutor referred to the aforementioned two circular orders dt. 30-5-1972 and 21-6-1972 and contended on the basis of these circular orders, which no doubt contained the Govt instructions which were to be observed by the Sales Representative to which category A-10 belonged, that since these two circular orders were very much brought to the notice of A-10, he was presumed to have known that M/s Veera Venkateswara Traders and Sreenivasa Setty were not entitled to receive the quota of fertilizers. In that connection, the learned counsel also referred to the statements of CWs. 39, 40, 41 and 42 examined during investigation. From the statements of these witnesses, no doubt it was prima facie established that B. Sreenivasa Setty and m|s Veera Venkateswara Traders had no permit to receive the quota of fertilizers. A-10 no doubt issued the two release orders, one in favour of b. Sreenivasa Setty and the other in favour of Mis Veera Venkateswara traders. From the statements of these witnesses, no doubt it was prima facie established that B. Sreenivasa Setty and m|s Veera Venkateswara Traders had no permit to receive the quota of fertilizers. A-10 no doubt issued the two release orders, one in favour of b. Sreenivasa Setty and the other in favour of Mis Veera Venkateswara traders. The main contention on behalf of A-10 appears to be that he received certain chits from A-1 who was the Regional Manager and his higher officer. In those chits the cases of Mjs Veera Venkateswara Traders and B. Sreenivasa Setty were recommended and following that recommendation, A-10 issued the two release orders. It is also clear that a-10 merely issued the two release orders and the subsequent delivery order as well as the invoices were prepared by some other accused. If the knowledge about the circular orders can be imputed against A-10, perhaps he would not have acted on those chits and, at any rate, would have made further enquiries from A-l as to whether those two persons were the permit holders for the quota of fertilizers. His omission to do so, especially when he was aware of the circular orders, led to an inference, as submitted by the learned State Public Prosecutor, that A-10 was in line with A-1 and both wanted to benefit M/s Veera Venkateswara Traders and B. Sreenivasa Setty. According to the learned Counsel that could form a reasonable basis for the inference that they wanted to give wrongful gain to these persons and, because they did not perform their duty in consonance with the orders issued by the Govt, the offence of criminal breach of trust was committed. At any rate, that was a prima facie inference which could be drawn from the two circular orders and the conduct of A-10, for having issued the two release orders on the basis of those chits alleged to be sent to him by A-1. During investigation CW. 2 the Internal Audit Officer was also examined. He too threw light on the two circular orders and compliance to be made by the Sales Representative. ( 7 ) SRI Motaiya the learned Counsel pointed out that in the first information report the name of A-10 was not mentioned, but, to my mind that would not be a very material point for consideration at this stage 'of the trial. ( 7 ) SRI Motaiya the learned Counsel pointed out that in the first information report the name of A-10 was not mentioned, but, to my mind that would not be a very material point for consideration at this stage 'of the trial. The real test would be, if the prosecution case taken at the highest made out a case Against the accused. In other words, could the prosecution claim a reasonable basis for the prosecution. It does not appear to be a case of that category as was decided by their Lordships in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy (supra), nor could it be stated that some unconnected bits of evidence here and there were availed of by the prosecution and "woefully inadequate" story was given so that there was absolutely no material on the record on the ba,sis of which the Court could reasonably come to the conclusion that no offence is committed. In my opinion, it could not be that the charge against a-10 is groundless. ( 8 ) REGARDING the charge of conspiracy, it was also stated that there -was no evidence to connect A-10 with that offene. But again it would be rather premature to arrive at that inference. If charges 12 and 13 could be proved against A-10, perhaps it may not be difficult to draw an inference for the charge of conspiracy under S. 120b. Therefore, it could not be stated in respect of the charge of conspiracy as well that there was no material to connect the accused with that charge. ( 9 ) IN this view of the matter, I do not think, a case for interference is made out under S. 482 nor could it be stated that the order of the learned magistrate framing a charge resulted in an abuse of the process of the Court or the ends of justice in any manner were defeated. The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court, in my opinion, cannot be invoked and the petitior is devoid of any merit and is dismissed. ( 10 ) HOWEVER, before parting with this case. I should keep regard against any observation made by this Court while making this order and would like to make it clear that the learned trial Judge would not be influenced in any manner against the accused on account of these observations. --- *** --- .