Order This Rule, at the instance of the petitioner, a fish merchant since 1960, and having a fish stall in the Jubilee Market, Suri, which belongs to the Respondent Suri Municipality (hereinafter referred to as the said Municipality), is directed against a resolution in Annexure "B", which is dated 8th June 1975, directing the levy of toll on sale of fish and an order of consequential cancellation of his licence in Annexure 'D'. 2. There is no dispute that the petitioner, for the purposes of his business and dealing in fish, at all material times has paid the necessary licence fee of Rs.52/- per month to the said Municipality. On or about 31st May, 1975, he learnt about a direction of the Authorities of the said Municipality that all sellers and dealers in fish under them or holding licence for that, will have to pay toll of 10 paise per kilogram per day of fish sold, to them. Since the petitioner considered such levy of toll to be illegal, improper and unauthorised, he raised an objection and further contended the said levy of toll to be mala fide. The said direction was issued by or at the instance of the President of the Suri Municipal Committee (hereinafter referred to as the said Committee), the function whereof, was also considered by the petitioner to be irregular and furthermore he considered the acts of such body to be illegal and also unauthorised. 3. Then on or about 2nd June, 1975, the said Committee through its President issued a show cause notice (Annexure "A") against the petitioner on the allegation that he has refused to pay tolls to the said Municipality. In the said order, there was also a threat that the petitioner's licence for selling fish would be cancelled. The petitioner has alleged that he along with other licence holders made verbal representation against the said mala fide, irregular, illegal and void order to realise tolls. He has stated that in. spite of such representations, on or about 10th June, 1975, he received the purported resolution (Annexure 'B') of the said Committee which was dated 8th June, 1975 and whereby a toll of 10 paise per kilogram of fish as sold per day, was imposed on the licencie holders. He has stated that in. spite of such representations, on or about 10th June, 1975, he received the purported resolution (Annexure 'B') of the said Committee which was dated 8th June, 1975 and whereby a toll of 10 paise per kilogram of fish as sold per day, was imposed on the licencie holders. The petitioner has stated that he made an unsuccessful representation to the President of the said committee, against such illegal, unauthorised, arbitrary and irregular imposition. By the said representation in Annexure 'C', a personal hearing was also asked for. It has been stated that even in spite of such representation and without even disposing of or considering the same duly and legally, the impugned order in Annexure 'D' dated 16th June, 1975, was passed cancelling his licence with effect from 20th June, 1975. It further appears from the letter in Annexure "E" which is dated 21st June, 1975 that the said committee had kept the implementation of the said order of cancellation of licence in abeyance for one day for the purpose of getting an undertaking from the petitioner to pay the necessary toll at the rate as imposed. 4. The respondents nos. 1 and 2 in their return to the Rule, have stated that the petitioner was a habitual defaulter in payment of licence fees for which demand notices have been issued. They have further stated that apart from the Stall whose licence was cancelled the petitioner used to occupy unauthorisedly a portion of the pavement of the Municipal Market, Suri and made no payment for the same. In fact, in spite of due demand being made and raised by the Market Superintendent, the petitioner' has not paid off or cleared his arrears and consequently the show cause notice was issued. The said respondents have further stated that the said Municipality was empowered and entitled to impose toll on trade and other business and as such they by a necessary resolution duly resolved to impose the toll as mentioned hereinbefore and as impeached in this Rule, against all the holders of licence in the said Municipal fish market. They have further stated that excepting the petitioner, all other licencees have paid such toll and are paying the same. In fact, it has been alleged that against such imposition of toll, the petitioner never made any representation. They have further stated that excepting the petitioner, all other licencees have paid such toll and are paying the same. In fact, it has been alleged that against such imposition of toll, the petitioner never made any representation. It has further been alleged that apart from refusing to pay the toll as imposed, the petitioner has challenged the authority of the said Committee in public, and asked the public and all concerned not to pay toll and he was guilty of further encroachment unauthorisedly, causing great inconvenience to the public. It has of course been stated that there was no illegality or any irregularity in the imposition of toll and further such imposition was due, legal and bona fide. In fact, it has been contended that the petitioner was afforded all and every reasonable opportunities in the instant case. 5. Apart from the facts as mentioned hereinbefore, the petitioner has stated that the said Committee, by a notification dated 27th June 1973, was constituted with 14 members. He has given the particulars of those members in paragraph 17 of the petition. He has alleged that since one of those members refused to accept the membership of the said Committee, and another resigned from the same, and there was no replacement for them or any new member being nominated by the State Government, under S. 56A of the said Act, which is to the following effect: 56A. Appointment of Committee in case of delay in forming new body of Commissioners by reason of order of court or for other reason (1) Where after the expiry of the term of office of the Commissioners of a municipality under sub-section (1) or sub-section (5) of Section 56, the State Government is of opinion that by reason of the order of a Court or for any other reason, there is no likelihood of a new body of Commissioners being formed within a reasonable time to take over municipal administration, the State Government may, if it thinks fit so to do in the public interest, by order, appoint a committee consisting of the same number of members as the Commissioners of the municipality to take charge of the administration of the affairs of the municipality in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules and the by-laws made thereunder. (2) No person shall be appointed as a member of the Committee if he is subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in section 22. (3) The State Government shall appoint one of the members of the Committee to be the President and another member to be the Vice-President of the Committee. (4) Upon the appointment of the committee under sub-section (1), all the Commissioners of the municipality continuing in office by virtue of subsection (2) of Section 56 shall be deemed to have vacated their offices as such Commissioners. (5) The members of the Committee shall for all purposes be deemed to be the Commissioners of the Municipality and the President and the Vice-President of the Committee shall be deemed to be the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman, and references in this Act or any other Act or any rule, by law, order or notification made under this Act or any other Act to the Commissioners of the Municipality, the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman shall be construed as references respectively to the President and Vice-President of the Committee. (6) The members of the Committee shall hold office till the date of the first meeting, at which a quorum is present, or the newly-formed body of Commissioners held under the provisions of this Act or any other Act applicable to the area comprised within the municipality. (7) If the office of a member of the Committee falls vacant by resignation, death or otherwise, the State Government shall appoint another person as member to fill the vacancy and if the office of the President or the Vice-President falls vacant for similar reasons the State Government shall appoint one of the members of the Committee to be the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be. There was no properly constituted Committee in the eye of law and as such the entire action taken by them or at their instance was void and without jurisdiction and as such also, the imposition of toll was unauthorised and bad. The allegations in respect of improper or invalid constitution of the said Committee have been hereby denied by those answering respondents. They have not given any particulars but have just stated that the said Committee was duly constituted and the action taken by them was due, just, proper and in appropriate use of their jurisdiction. The allegations in respect of improper or invalid constitution of the said Committee have been hereby denied by those answering respondents. They have not given any particulars but have just stated that the said Committee was duly constituted and the action taken by them was due, just, proper and in appropriate use of their jurisdiction. Those Respondents have further contended that the issue of a writ would not, but a properly constituted suit, would have been the appropriate remedy and as such the writ petition should be deemed to be not maintainable. 6. Mr. Mukherjee, appearing in support of the Rule, in view of the facts as stated herein-before, argued that in terms of S. 123 of the said Act, which is to the following effect:- Section 123: Power to impose taxes - (1) The Commissioners may from time to time, at a meeting convened expressly for the purpose, subject to the provisions of this Act, impose within the limits of the municipality the following rates, taxes, tolls and fees, or any of them:- (a) a rate on holdings situated within the municipality assessed on their annual value; (b) a water-rate on the annual value of holdings; (c) a lighting rate on the annual value of holdings; (d) a conservancy, latrine and drainage rate (hereinafter known as the conservancy rate) on the annual value of holdings; (e) a tax on carriages and on horses and other animals mentioned in Schedule III ; (f) a tax on the trades, professions and callings specified in Schedule IV at such rates as may be fixed by the Commissioners within the maximum rates fixed in the said Schedule; (g) a fee on the registration of carts; (gg) a fee for grant of permission to erect a building other than a hut; (h) tolls on ferries and on bridges; (i) a fee on vessels moored within the limits of the municipality at ghats or landing places constructed and maintained by the Commissioners; and (j) any other tax which the Commissioners are empowered to impose under any law for the time being in force. (2) The Commissioners may, from time to time, at a meeting convened as aforesaid and in accordance with a scale of fees to be approved by the (State Government) charge a fee in respect of the issue and renewal of the licence which may by granted by them under this Act and in respect of which no fee or tax is leviable under sub-section (1). the power of toll, can be adhered to on some specific and particular cases and such power cannot be used in the manner as has been sought to be done in the instant case viz., without specifying the purpose or the benefit for which such imposition was necessary. It was further submitted that carrying of business or trade in fish, not being offensive or dangerous and in any event there having no such allegation in particular, the power if at all, under S. 370 of the said Act, which empowers the municipal authorities to prohibit certain offensive and dangerous trades without licence, was also not available in the case. That apart, it was submitted that the said section had or has no application because the instant case was not one of carrying on the trade without a licence. It was also submitted that since in S. 468 of the said Act, there are specific Provisions for suspension or revocation of licence by the appropriate authority and such section has not been admittedly taken or followed, the instant Rule should succeed. Mr. Mukherjee further submitted that the toll and rates or licence fees cannot be realised simultaneously. On the second brancli of his submissions, relying on S. 56A(7) which is to the following effect: Section-56A(7): If the office of a member of the Committee falls vacant by resignation, death or otherwise, the State Government shall appoint another person as member to fill the vacancy and if the office of the President or the Vice-President fall svacant for similar reasons the State Government shall appoint one of the members of the Committee to be the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be. 7. It was contended that since appropriate number of members, in the facts as stated hereinbefore were not there the decision to impose toll was not or could not be the decision of the said Municipality and as such simposition was void. 8. The defence of the Respondents Nos. 7. It was contended that since appropriate number of members, in the facts as stated hereinbefore were not there the decision to impose toll was not or could not be the decision of the said Municipality and as such simposition was void. 8. The defence of the Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 have been mentioned hereinbefore, and Mr. Amulya Kumar Mukherjee, in fact sought to, substantiate them. That apart, Mr. Pabitra Kumar Basu, the learned Advocate appearing for Respondents Nos. 3 and 4 (although no affidavit was filed by them) submitted that in view of the provision of the Constitution (Fortly-Second Amendment) Act, 1976, the Rule has abated, because of the provisions for appeal in the said Act and that too when such statutory appeal was not preferred or availed of. In support of his contentions, Mr. Basu placed S. 411 of the said Act and made particular reference to S. 530 viz., the provisions for appeal from certain orders of the Commissioners. 9. The question thus to be considered on the pleadings of the parties and the arguments advanced is, what is the character of a 'toll' whether the same is a "tax" or "fee" and whether such imposition in the instant case was justified. 10. The word "toll" is not a new expression but has a well defined meaning in public finance. Tolls have been levied over bridges and roads for several centuries in England and Europe and the levy was made primarily not for increasing the general revenue of the authorities concerned but for the purpose of recouping the expenses incurred in constructing the road and bridges and in maintaining them. In the Encyclopaedia Americana (Volume 26), the expression "toll" has been defined as the fee exacted by those who effect or maintain a bridge for the privilege of passing over the same, a compensation for services, especially for transportation as canal or railway toll. In the Encyclopaedia Britannica (1963 Edn), the following note appears under heading "Toll Bridges".- "Long span bridges are mostly and experience has snown that the most practicable manner in which they can be afforded is to build them as financially self-liquidating projects by charging tolls on the traffic using them." 11. In the Encyclopaedia Britannica (1963 Edn), the following note appears under heading "Toll Bridges".- "Long span bridges are mostly and experience has snown that the most practicable manner in which they can be afforded is to build them as financially self-liquidating projects by charging tolls on the traffic using them." 11. In S. 2 of the Tolls Act, 1857, by merely using the expression "tolls" and by further saying that the tolls shall be levied on roads and bridges made or repaired by the Government a clear jurisdiction has been indicated. The legislative intent of that provision is that the rate of levy should be such as to meet the cost of repair of the roads and bridges and also for liquidating actual expenses incurred in their construction within a reasonable time. The quid pro quo element, which distinguishes fees from taxes is also implied in the expression "toll" and though, it may be a "fee" as ordinarily understood, it will clearly come within the scope of a compensatory tax in terms of the determination of the Supreme Court in the case of Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1962 SC 1406 . The word "toll" under S. 2 of the Tolls Act, 1857 read along with a notification dated 21st October, 1974, as issued thereunder by the Government of West Bengal, came up for consideration in the case of Sushan Chandra Pal & ors. v. State of West Bengal & ors., AIR 1976 Cal. 32 , wherein it has been observed that; By merely using the expression 'tolls' and by further saying that the tolls shall be levied on roads and bridges made or repaired by the Government the Legislature in Section 2 of the Act clearly land down for the guidance of the Government the principle that the rate of levy should be such as to meet the cost of repair of the roads and bridges and also for liquidating actual expenses incurred in their construction within a reasonable time. The element which distinguishes fees from taxes is also implied in the expression "toll" and though it may not be a "fee" as ordinarily understood, it will clearly come within the scope of a compensatory tax. The element which distinguishes fees from taxes is also implied in the expression "toll" and though it may not be a "fee" as ordinarily understood, it will clearly come within the scope of a compensatory tax. It has further been observed in that case that: It is not necessary for the State Government to state in the notification dated 21.10.1974 by which tolls were levied with regard to seven bridges, the actual costs of construction or repairs of each of the seven bridges mentioned therein, powers to levy tolls can be validly exercised under S. 2 for the purpose or creating "Fund" for construction of new bridges and roads in future and maintenance of the existing roads and bridges. 12. The Act has furnished definite guidelines for the Government under S. 2 to fix the rate of tolls to be levied. The word "tolls" in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary is "a sum of money which is taken in respect of some benefit, the benefit being the temporary use of land". The term could properly be applied to any sum of money which was taken in respect of some benefit, being the temporary use of the land. 13. Thus "tolls" are of many kinds and can be levied for various purposes. Besides tolls relating to passage over land or water, some of the other recognised tolls are market toll, fair toll, stallage toll, canal toll, anchorage, piccage, pontage, land-cheap etc. It is tolls relating to passage, which are usually classified in two kinds: toll-thorough and toll-traverse. A toll-through has no connection with the ownership of the land and is usually granted to someone who undertakes to do something for the benefit of the person who uses the passage, e.g. makes the road or a bridge or keeps it in repairs, arranges for a ferry or provides some other facility. A toll traverse is on the other hand connected with the ownership of the land and is allowed to be charged, for the use of the land by the person liable for the toll. This classification is not applicable to tolls of other kinds which have no connection with passage. Usually the consideration is some amenity, service, benefit or advantage which the person entitled to the toll undertakes to provide for the public in general or the persons liable to pay the toll. The term 'toll' as observed in the case of Mst. This classification is not applicable to tolls of other kinds which have no connection with passage. Usually the consideration is some amenity, service, benefit or advantage which the person entitled to the toll undertakes to provide for the public in general or the persons liable to pay the toll. The term 'toll' as observed in the case of Mst. Byebo v. District Council, Nagpur, AIR 1936 Nag. 258, can properly be applied to any sum of money which is taken in respect of some benefit, the benefit being temporary use of canal. 14. The difference between fee and tax and the tests for their determination, has been laid down in the case of Netram Agarwalla & Ors. v. Chairman, Raniganj Municipality & Ors., 59 CWN 872. In that case the Commissioners of Ranigunj Municipality, passed a resolution on the 30th July, 1952, imposing licence fee in respect of certain commodities including "storing of jute" which was fixed at "Two annas a year per maund". The petitioner challenged the validity of the resolution on the ground that the rate of licence fee had no correlation to the service which was proposed to be rendered to the jute trade and that the imposition was in the nature of taxation which was beyond the competence of the Municipality, and it has been held that: "The Municipality had failed to establish the fact that the rate of licence fee that was going to be imposed for storing of jute was proportionate to the service that was to be rendered to that trade and to that trade alone. The levy was in the nature of general revenue to be utilised not only for providing services for the jute trade, but also for diverse other trades and purposes. This is not permissible in the case of a license fee, but is more consistent with the imposition of tax, and the imposition in the present case, was in the nature of taxation' which was beyond the competence of the Municipality. It did not come under any heading of taxation which the State Legislature could impose or what the Commissioners could impose by virtue of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932". 15. In the case of Burmah Shell Oil Storage & Distributing Co. of India Ltd. v. The Licensing Officer of Tamluk Municipality & Ors., 60 CWN 170 the powers vested on the Commissioners of a Municipality under Ss. 15. In the case of Burmah Shell Oil Storage & Distributing Co. of India Ltd. v. The Licensing Officer of Tamluk Municipality & Ors., 60 CWN 170 the powers vested on the Commissioners of a Municipality under Ss. 123 and 182 of the said Act came up for consideration, and it has been held there that: The object of taxation is to raise revenue, and one of the ingredients of this power is that tax is levied according to the paying capacity of the taxpayer. In this it is distinguishable from a pure licensing fee, which has no relation to the paying capacity of the tax payer. Accordingly Sch. IV of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932, which permits the levy of trade tax according to a graduated table is not ultra vires Art. 14 of the Constitution. The power vested in the Commissioners of a Municipality, to impose taxation under sections 123 and 182 of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932, does not amount to unconstitutional delegation of power vested in the Legislature. 16. Whether a licence can be withheld on grounds extraneous to S. 370(2) of the said Act, was considered in the case of Budge Budge Municipality v. Mangru Mia, 57 CWN 25 and it has been observed by the majority decision that: To hold a refusal to issue licences under sections 408 and 418 of the Bengal Municipal Act to be bad, because the grounds mentioned in Section 370(2) of the Act do not exist, cannot be right, because Section 370(2) applies only to licences under Section 370(1) of the Bengal Municipal Act. A licence under Section 370(1) cannot be withheld on grounds foreign to Section 370(2) and on extraneous considerations. 17. It may be observed that Mr. Mukherjee, appearing in support of the Rule, also relied on the determinations of the Supreme Court in the case of Municipal Board of Hardwar v. Raghubir Singh, AIR 1966 SC 1507, in support of his contentions that the imposition of "toll" in the instant case was illegal, unauthorised and incompetent. In that case the Hardwar Municipal Board, in exercise of its powers under S. 128(1)(xiv) U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916 issued a notification dated 29.10.1941, by which it imposed a toll on motor vehicles and tongas entering or leaving the municipal limits with passengers at the rate of 2 annas per passenger. In that case the Hardwar Municipal Board, in exercise of its powers under S. 128(1)(xiv) U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916 issued a notification dated 29.10.1941, by which it imposed a toll on motor vehicles and tongas entering or leaving the municipal limits with passengers at the rate of 2 annas per passenger. By a second notification dated 22.2.1955, issued in exercise of powers under S. 12(1)(vii) of the same Act, the toll was increased to 4 annas per passenger and rickshaw were added to the vehicles. The exemption in respect or persons travelling from Rishikesh was also removed. Toll was collected at the barrier from vehicles entering the municipal limits or departing from it at the rate of 4 annas per passenger travelling by motor, tanga or rickshaws. On a writ petition filed by certain owners of motor vehicles, challenging the toll, a single Judge of the High Court upheld the validity of toll on vehicles entering the municipal limits but held that tolls could not be levied on vehicles leaving Hardwar Municipality. The Division Bench on special appeal modified the order by adding a direction that the Appellate Board should not levy toll on vehicles leaving the municipal limits, which had paid toll on entry into these limits. On further appeal to the Supreme Court, it has been held that: The decision of the Single Judge was correct in the circumstances of the case and no toll could be levied under the Act on vehicles leaving the Municipal limits. Toll as such can only be collected under the Municipalities Act from vehicles entering the municipal limits. This, exhausts all the powers delegated by the Legislature to the Municipal Boards and that power cannot be extended either by considerations derived from the nature of tolls or from the residuary cl. (xiv). In the Hardwar Municipality the power to collect tolls was limited in 1941 by cl. (vii) of S. 128(1) and that power continues to be so limited. The distinction made by the Division Bench between vehicles which need not pay toll on leaving the municipal limits because they have paid toll on entry and vehicles which have not paid any toll till leaving, may not be quite correct. Local authorities like the Board do not act as legislatures when they impose a tax but as the agent of the State legislatures. Local authorities like the Board do not act as legislatures when they impose a tax but as the agent of the State legislatures. Their powers and the extent of these powers must be found in the statutes which creates them and endows them with such powers. 18. Apart from the cases as mentioned hereinbefore, in the case of Md. Yakub Mallick v. Commissioners of the Garden Reach Municipality and anr. AIR 1957 Col. 460, it has been observed that the Commissioners of a Municipality, as a statutory body, must have power to what they have done, otherwise a citizen is entitled to have the order set aside. The power must be found within the four corners of the said Act or the rules and by-laws framed thereunder. 19. Thus, considering the determinations as referred to hereinbefore, and considering the provisions of the said Act it can be easily observed that the said Municipality had and has the power to impose "toll", subject to the conditions that while imposing toll, in terms of the definition and intention of the same, there should be some reason justifying such imposition. Such justifying considerations may be some amenity, service, benefit or advantage, which the person entitled to the toll undertakes to provide for the public in general or the persons liable to pay the toll. The power to impose toll under Ss. 123 and 182 of the said Act can be resorted to on some specific and particular cases and such power cannot be issued in the blank form or manner, as done in the instant case. Such levy of "toll", if the same is in the nature of general revenue, to be utilised not only for providing services for the petitioner or the dealers in fish under the said Municipality, but was also for divers other traders and purposes, would not be permissible I further hold that the powers vested in the Municipality to impose taxation under Ss. 123 and 182 of the said Act does not amount to unconstitutional delegation of power vested in the Legislature. The respondents nos. 1 and 2 in their return to the Rule have not disclosed the necessity for imposition of the toll in the instant case and in fact Mr. Mukherjee, appearing for them, had to concede that there was no such disclosure made. The respondents nos. 1 and 2 in their return to the Rule have not disclosed the necessity for imposition of the toll in the instant case and in fact Mr. Mukherjee, appearing for them, had to concede that there was no such disclosure made. He of course submitted that perhaps such reasons have been recorded in the connected resolution. But unfortunately the said resolution cannot be referred to or relied on as the same was not produced. Furthermore, the said Municipality had and has the right to prohibit certain offence and dangerous trade without licence under S. 370 of the said Act. But the said section would not be of any help or assistance to the said Municipality as admittedly the petitioner holds licence for occupying or holding the fish stall. Mr. Mukherjee further argued that the toll in the instant case was imposed and the licence of the petitioner was cancelled because he was admittedly a defaulter, and in fact has humiliated and is humiliating the authorities of the said Municipality, apart from encroaching on other land on municipal property. Those grounds, in my view, are not germane or relevant for the imposition of toll and that too' without disclosing the background, purpose and basis for the same. For such allegations as mentioned hereinbefore, the municipal .authorities may be entitled to take appropriate steps in accordance with law but not the imposition of toll as made. On the basis of the determination as referred to herein before although "toll" may not be a "fee" as ordinarily understood, it will certainly corny within the scope of a compensatory tax. I further hold that others have paid the toll as contended by respondent Nos. 1 and 2, would be no justification for not entertaining this petition. I hold further that a licence under S. 370(1) of the said Act cannot be withheld on grounds not covered by those in S. 370(2) and on extraneous considerations, as in the instant case. 20. The arguments advanced by Mr. 1 and 2, would be no justification for not entertaining this petition. I hold further that a licence under S. 370(1) of the said Act cannot be withheld on grounds not covered by those in S. 370(2) and on extraneous considerations, as in the instant case. 20. The arguments advanced by Mr. P.K. Basu on the question of abatement of the Rule in view of the provisions in S. 530 of the said Act read and considered in the light of the provisions in the Constitution (Forty Second Amendment) Act 1976, in my view would be of little avail or assistance in the instant case, because the very basis of the imposition of "toll" as mentioned hereinbefore, was without jurisdiction. 21. The other arguments of the petitioner on S. 56A(7) has been rightly contended by Mr. Aniulya Kumar Mukherjee, as without any substance. He has rightly submitted that in the temporary absence of the members, as in the instant case, or so long new members are elected in their place, would not make the Committee non est. So long such vacancies as occurred, are not filled up, the Committee as appointed may discharge their functions and perform their obligations as a duly appointed Committee under the said section. 22. In view of the above, the Rule succeeds in part. The "toll" as imposed is set aside and so also the order in Annexure "D". There will be no order as to costs. Let appropriate writs be issued. 23. I make it clear that this will not however preclude or prejudice the said Municipality to impose "toll" or to take appropriate steps for cancellation of the licence, in accordance with law, if they so intend or advised. Rule made absolute in part.