Short Note : 1. This appeal is by the defendant State of Madhya Pradesh and others, arising out of suit for declaration that termination of service of plaintiff Inder Singh was invalid and that he continues to be in the employment of the State of Madhya Pradesh. The plaintiff has succeeded in both the Courts below. 2. Admittedly, the plaintiff was appointed temporarily until further orders as officiating forest-guard by order No. 316 dated 24-7-1961 (Ex. P-5) passed by the Divisional Forest Officer, Damoh Division, wherein it was expressly stated that his services were liable to be terminated at any time without notice. Thereafter, while the plaintiff continued in that temporary service, his services as officiating forest-guard were terminated as no longer required by Order No. 11 dated 4-1-1967 (Ex. P-6) passed by the Divisional Forest Officer, Damoh Division. This led to the filing of the present suit by the plaintiff for a declaration that he continued in the service of the State of Madhya Pradesh, the termination of his service being illegal because that action was taken without any departmental enquiry being held against him. 3. The defendants contested the suit alleging that the plaintiff's service was temporary which was liable to termination at any time and that termination of plaintiff's service was not as a measure of penalty on account of which the prior department enquiry was not necessary. Admittedly, no stigma is cast against the plaintiff by the order of termination (Ex P.6) and order ex-facie suffer from no infirmity. 4. The trial Court as well as the first appellant Court both have held that the plaintiff was a quasi-permanent government servant in accordance with rule 3 of the Madhya Pradesh Government Servants (Temporary and Quasi permanent Service) Rules, 1960 (here-in-after called the Rules). On that finding being reached, the mode of termination of plaintiff's service is undoubtedly illegal. Held : The only question in this appeal is whether the plaintiff enquired the status of a quasi-permanent servant under the aforesaid rules. If the answer is in the affirmative then there is no dispute that the termination of plaintiff's service was invalid and the Courts below were right in granting such a declaration. It is equally beyond doubt that if the answer is in the negative, then the order of termination (Ex. If the answer is in the affirmative then there is no dispute that the termination of plaintiff's service was invalid and the Courts below were right in granting such a declaration. It is equally beyond doubt that if the answer is in the negative, then the order of termination (Ex. P-6) being ex-facie unassailable as casting no stigma on the plaintiff, this appeal has to succeed and the suit has to be dismissed. Admittedly this question has to be answered with reference to rule 3 as it stood at the time of termination of the plaintiff's service, i.e. in 1967. The history of the amendments made in these rules is given at length in a Division Bench decision of this Court in A.D. Tannirwar v. State of M.P. and another (1976 M.P.L.J. 667) and the rules as they existed from time to time from their commencement are also quoted therein. It is, sufficient to refer to that decision alone for this purpose. 5. For our purpose, we have to look to rule 3 as it existed prior to its amendment with effect from 11th January 1974 where by clause (iii) was inserted therein. As the rule then stood, the government servant was deemed to be in quasi permanent service only if he had been in temporary service continuously for more than three years and a declaration in the manner provided therein had been made by the appointing authority. It was not as if on completion of three years temporary service, the Government servant automatically became a quasi-permanent servant. In the present case, admittedly there was no such declaration even though the plaintiff had completed three years temporary service It is, therefore, not possible to accept the argument of Shri Halve that on completion of three years temporary service plaintiff automatically become quasi-permanent servant under rule 3 as it then stood. Shri Halve also argues that for the purpose of construing rule 3 as it stood in 1967, the intention of the Legislature must be gathered from the subsequent amendment made in 1974. I am unable to accept such an argument. The plaintiff whose service had come to an end in 1967 cannot by any stretch of imagination be given the benefit of an amendment made years thereafter in 1974. I am unable to accept such an argument. The plaintiff whose service had come to an end in 1967 cannot by any stretch of imagination be given the benefit of an amendment made years thereafter in 1974. It may be mentioned that a retrospective amendment was made subsequently in December 1975 nullifying the amendment of 1974, the effect of which is considered at length in A.D. Tannirwar's case (supra) but in the present case I am not concerned with that question. The plaintiff's service came to an end before there could be any question of his getting benefit of the amendment made in 1974. 6. The Court below has clearly misconstrued the provisions of rule 3 in order to reach the conclusion that the plaintiff had acquired a quasi-permanent status prior to termination of his temporary service in 1967. That being the only basis of the decree passed in plaintiff's favour, it has to be set aside. Appeal allowed. Suit dismissed.