N. K. Mukherjee v. Brajogopal Halder — 1977 DIGILAW 150 (CAL)

JUDGMENT B.C. Ray, J. This Rule arises out of an application dated 11th April, 1972 passed by the Building Tribunal, Corporation of Calcutta in Appeal No. 5 of 1971-72 against the order of the Commissioner, Corporation of Calcutta dated November, 18, 1970 in Case No. 7/D of 1968-69. 2. The Opposite Party No. 1 Dr. Brojo Gopal Halder who is alleged to be a monthly tenant in respect of the disputed premises being No. 109/1, Beliaghata Main Road, Calcutta under the Opposite Party No. 2, Trustees of Calcutta Zoroastrian Communities Religious and Charitable funds since February, 1950 obtained sanction of the two separate plans from the Corporation of Calcutta for construction of certain sheds upon the said land measuring about 16 Bighas. The said plans were numbered as B.S. Plan No. 114(M) dated December 23, 1959 and B.S. Plan No. 93(M) dated September 19, 1962. On June 6, 1963, and on December 12, 1966, the Opposite Party No. 1 was found to have made some unauthorised construction on inspection by the officers of Corporation of Calcutta. A demolition case under S. 414 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951 (West Bengal Act XXXIII of 1951) was started against the Opposite Party No. 1. This case was numbered as Case No. 7/D of 1968-69. The said demolition case was heard by the Commissioner, Corporation of Calcutta on April 27, 1968. On that day the Opposite Party No. 1 and the Opposite Party No. 2 were present at the time of hearing. It was stated on behalf of tile Opposite Party No. 2, the landowner that the structures were constructed without any sanction of the Corporation and also without any permission from the land owner. Shri Halder, the opposite party No. 1 on the other hand, stated that he had a sanctioned plan and some deviations from the said plan had only been made. The opposite party No. 1 further admitted that some portion of the premises was being used for a warehouse. The case was adjourned to enable the parties concerned to produce necessary documents in original in establish their case. It was also ordered that no further time would be granted. This order was directed to be communicated to both the owner of the structures and the tenant. On 31st of March, 1969, the Commissioner, Corporation of Calcutta passed the following order :- "Shri T.P. Mitra, Solicitor with Mr. It was also ordered that no further time would be granted. This order was directed to be communicated to both the owner of the structures and the tenant. On 31st of March, 1969, the Commissioner, Corporation of Calcutta passed the following order :- "Shri T.P. Mitra, Solicitor with Mr. J. Gazdar, Secretary, to the Trustees present on behalf of the complainant. Shri Halder was directed to produce relevant documents in support of his claim in the case and it was further directed that no further time would be granted. Therefore, Shri Mitra submitted that the case be disposed of in his absence although he prays for time. The hearing of the case be adjourned till 16th of April 1969 and no further adjournment shall be granted. The party be duly notified by Registered Post with A/D. On 16th of April, 1969, the said demolition case came up for hearing and the Commissioner adjourned the same till 23rd April, 1969. On that day i.e. 23rd April, 1969 the following order was made: "Owner absent, complainant present, notice has been served on the owner repeatedly but in spite of that he is absent. From the departmental report, I am satisfied, that the constructions have been done in recent times and also without sanction, Ordered that the unauthorised structures be demolished". 3. Against the said order, the Opposite Party No. 1 on 26th August, 1969 sent a letter to the Commissioner, Corporation of Calcutta requesting him to give him a hearing of the said demolition case which were disposed of ex parte against him. 4. This application was heard on 18th November, 1970 and the Commissioner passed an order to the effect that the unauthorised structures directed to be demolished by his order dated 23rd April, 1979 were those structures only which, were made in deviation from the said two sanctioned plans Nos. 114(M) dated 23.12.69 and 93(M) dated 19.9.62. On May 17, 1971 the opposite party No. 1 filed an appeal under S. 414(A) of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951 to the Building Tribunal. This appeal was numbered as appeal No. 5 of 1971-72, Though the appeal was filed out of time, no application was filed under S. 5 of the Limitation Act explaining the delay and praying for condoning the same. This appeal was numbered as appeal No. 5 of 1971-72, Though the appeal was filed out of time, no application was filed under S. 5 of the Limitation Act explaining the delay and praying for condoning the same. On 14th September, 1971 on the application of the opposite party No. 2 to the Tribunal, the opposite party No. 2 was added a party respondent to the said appeal. The appeal was taken up for hearing on January 25, 1972 when sane preliminary objections were raised on behalf of the petitioner as well as on behalf of the Opposite Party No. 2 as to the maintainability of the appeal on the ground that the appeal was barred by limitation and that there being no statutory provisions for review, the time taken in the disposal of the review application could not be excluded in computing the period of limitation for the said appeal and the appeal was not competent inasmuch as the impugned order was not an order under S. 414(3) of the said Act. On April 11, 1972 the Tribunal after hearing the parties passed an order holding that the appeal against the order dated 18.11.70 was not barred by limitation and it would also not be barred by limitation if it was treated as an appeal against the order dated 23.4.69 as the period during which the review application was pending before the Commissioner should be excluded. 5. It is against this order this application has been moved and a rule and an interim order of stay of all further proceeding in appeal No. 5 of 1971-72 pending before the Building Tribunal was obtained. 6. Mr. Sunil Kumar Basu learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner has submitted in the first place that the order appealed against being passed on 18.11.70 and the appeal being filed on 17.5.71, that is about six months after the order passed by the Commissioner on review is barred by limitation and the Tribunal having held that the appeal was prima facie barred by limitation acted illegally and without jurisdiction in not returning the memorandum of appeal to the appellant. It has next been submitted by Mr. Basu that no application for explaining the delay in filing appeal praying for its condonation was filed. It has next been submitted by Mr. Basu that no application for explaining the delay in filing appeal praying for its condonation was filed. Moreover, it appears from the order of the Commissioner dated 18.11.70 that the opposite party No. 1 was himself present when the said order was passed. Mr. Basu submitted that no statement has been made in the memorandum of appeal that the opposite party No. 1 was not present at the time the said order was passed. Mr. Basu has further submitted that it is incumbent upon the appellant to explain in each and every day's delay and no sufficient cause having been made out for not filing the appeal in time and there being no prayer for condonation of the delay in filing the appeal the Building Tribunal should have held that the appeal was barred by limitation and it should have dismissed the appeal in view of the provisions of S. 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Mr. Basu has thirdly submitted that the Commissioner, Corporation of Calcutta has no power to review an order passed under S. 414 of the Calcutta Municipal Act and as such the order of the Commissioner passed on November 18, 1970 is wholly without jurisdiction. In this connection Mr. Basu has cited one unreported decision of this court. Mr. Basu has also submitted that the impugned order being without jurisdiction the appeal against the said order under S. 414(3) of the Calcutta Municipal Act which is only appealable under S. 414(A) of the Calcutta Municipal Act. It has been lastly submitted by Mr. Basu that the appeal has been filed only against the order dated 18th November, 1970 and not against the order passed under S. 414(3) of the said Act on April 23, 1969. The Tribunal acted illegally and without jurisdiction in treating the appeal as an appeal against the order dated April 23, 1969 and in holding that the appeal was not barred by limitation without considering that the time taken in disposal of the review application could not be deducted in computing the period of limitation. 7. Mr. The Tribunal acted illegally and without jurisdiction in treating the appeal as an appeal against the order dated April 23, 1969 and in holding that the appeal was not barred by limitation without considering that the time taken in disposal of the review application could not be deducted in computing the period of limitation. 7. Mr. Saktinath Mukherjee, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the Respondent No. 1 has submitted that the opposite party No. 1 stated in the petition of appeal before Building Tribunal that he came to know of the ex parte order passed by the Commissioner on 23rd April, 1969 on 2nd May, 1969 and thereafter he made an application for review of the said order before the Commissioner. The order of the Commissioner which was passed on November 18, 1970 modifying his earlier order was communicated to the opposite party No. 1 and received by him on April 20, 1971. The appeal was filed on 17th May, 1971 Mr. Mukherjee submitted that the appeal before the Building Tribunal is not barred by limitation inasmuch as time will run from the date when he received the order and not from the date of making of the order. He further submitted that the appellant is entitled to exclusion of the time between the passing of the order by the Commissioner and the date the order was actually Communicated to the petitioner under S. 12(2) of the Limitation Act as time requisite for obtaining a copy of the order. There is no mode of pronouncing judgment in presence of the parties in the Calcutta Municipal Act and as such the words “date of the order” as used in S. 414(A) of the said Act, Mr. Mukherjee submitted, should be interpreted as meaning the date when the order is actually communicated to the party. On this point Mr. Mukherjee has referred to two decisions reported in AIR 1975 SC 2085 and AIR 1976 SC 2101 , It has been next submitted by Mr. Mukherjee that though the Commissioner has no power to review his own order still as a quasi-judicial authority he as has power to correct or rectify his own mistakes and to save a party from the adverse effect of court's own action. This is what has been done in the present case. Mukherjee that though the Commissioner has no power to review his own order still as a quasi-judicial authority he as has power to correct or rectify his own mistakes and to save a party from the adverse effect of court's own action. This is what has been done in the present case. The earlier order dated 23rd April, 1969 was modified by the Commissioner by making it clear that those constructions which are in deviation from the two plans sanctioned by the Corporation would be demolished. In this connection Mr. Mukherjee has referred to the decisions reported in 67 CWN 935, 75 CWN and 76 CWN 652. 8. Mr. Mukherjee has in the next place submitted that even if the impugned order passed by the Commissioner on review is without jurisdiction, the appeal against the said order is competent inasmuch as the original order being modified is non-existing and the only order against which appeal can be preferred is the order modifying the earlier order on review. The decisions in AIR 1968 Patna 352, 69 CWN have been referred to. 9. Mr. Mukherjee lastly submitted that S. 5 of the Limitation Act does not contemplate that a written application is necessary for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. He submits that if the facts are already on record it is sufficient if an oral prayer is made for condoning the delay in filing the appeal. The decision reported in AIR 1959 Punjab 646 has been cited in this connection. 10. It appears that a demotion case No. 7/D of 1968-69 had been started against the Opposite Party No. 1 for making certain unauthorised and illegal constructions and he was asked to show cause as required under sub-s 1 of S. 414 of the said Act. It also appears that notice of the said demolition case was duly saved on the opposite party No. 1 who, as appears from the record of the Corporation of Calcutta, duly appeared on 24th May, 1968 before the Commissioner and stated that he had sanctioned plan for making the construction. The opposite party No. 1 also admitted that some deviations from the said plan had been made. The hearing was adjourned and the opposite party No. 1 was directed to produce the relevant documents on the next date. It was also ordered that no further time would be granted. The opposite party No. 1 also admitted that some deviations from the said plan had been made. The hearing was adjourned and the opposite party No. 1 was directed to produce the relevant documents on the next date. It was also ordered that no further time would be granted. On 23rd April, 1959 the opposite party No. 1 though duly served by a notice about the date of hearing of the said demolition case did not appear on that day and the Commissioner passed an order directing demolition of the unauthorised structures. It appears from the statements made in the petition of appeal that on May 2, 1969 the opposite party No. 1 came to know of this ex parte order of the Commissioner and thereafter made an application for review of the said order before the Commissioner Corporation of Calcutta. On November 18th, 1970 the Commissioner passed an order modifying his earlier order to the effect that the unauthorised structures directed to be demolished are those structures which were done in deviation from the two sanctioned plans No. 114(M) dated 23.12.59 and No. 93(M) dated 19.9.62. Against this order the opposite party No. 1 filed appeal No. 5 of 1971-72 under S. 414(A) of the Calcutta Municipal Act. Section 414(A) of the said Act provides that a person dissatisfied with an order of the Commissioner made under S. 414(3) of the said Act may present an appeal accompanied by a copy of the order to the Tribunal within 30 days from the date of this order. In this case it is evident that the appeal against the order dated 18th November 1970 was filed by the opposite party No. 1 on May 17, 1971, that is about more than six months alter the date of passing of the order and as such the appeal appears to be barred by limitation. It has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that the appeal being barred by limitation, the Tribunal ought not to have entertained the same and ought to have returned the memorandum of appeal to the appellant. It was also contended that in view of S. 3 of the Limitation Act the Tribunal, after having found that the appeal was prima facie barred by limitation was wrong in not returning the memorandum of appeal to the appellant. It was also contended that in view of S. 3 of the Limitation Act the Tribunal, after having found that the appeal was prima facie barred by limitation was wrong in not returning the memorandum of appeal to the appellant. On the other hand, it has been contended on behalf of the opposite party No. 1 that the time for filing the appeal will run not from the date of passing of the order but from the date of communication of the order to the appellant aggrieved by the same. It has also been submitted that the proviso to S. 414 (3) of the said Act clearly enjoins that a copy of the order shall be served on the owner and the occupier of the building or structures and as such the period of limitation for filing the appeal will run from the date of service of the demolition order upon the opposite party no. 1 and not from the date of passing of the order. The opposite party No. 1 appeared at the time of hearing of the application for review on 18th November, 1970 and the order was passed on that day as evident from the order itself. There is averment in the petition of appeal that the opposite party no. 1 was not present when the order was passed by the Commissioner on November 18, 1970. There is a mere bare statement in paragraph 14 of the said petition of appeal that the order of the Commissioner was communicated to him by registered post and he received the same on April 20, 1971. 11. Section 414 sub-s. 1 empowers the Commissioner either to issue a notice requiring the person responsible to demolish any unauthorised construction, alteration or addition or other work or to issue a notice directing the persons responsible to show cause why such unauthorised structures should not be demolished or the alteration should not be made. Sub-section 3 of the S. 414 provides that the Commissioner on being satisfied that the person responsible failed to demolish such unauthorised structures or to show sufficient cause why such constructions of additions or alterations should not be demolished or made can pass an order directing demolition of the unauthorised structures or addition or alteration. Sub-section 3 of the S. 414 provides that the Commissioner on being satisfied that the person responsible failed to demolish such unauthorised structures or to show sufficient cause why such constructions of additions or alterations should not be demolished or made can pass an order directing demolition of the unauthorised structures or addition or alteration. Proviso to sub-s. 3 further provides that a copy of this order shall be served on the owner or the occupier of the building find no action under the said order shall be taken before the expiry of 30 days from the date of service of the said order. Section 414(A) provides for filing of an appeal against an order passed under sub-s. 3 of the S. 414 within 30 days from the date of the order with a copy of the order appealed against to the Tribunal. On a plain reading of these two sections it is quite clear that the proviso to sub-s. 3 of S. 414 has nothing to do with S. 414 (A) of the Calcutta Municipal Act inasmuch as that proviso merely enjoins that the Commissioner has to serve a copy of the order passed under sub-s. 3 of S. 414 on the owner and occupier before taking any action under the said order or before enforcing the demolition order. In other words, this provision merely gives a time to the owner and occupier of the unauthorised structures before enforcing the order of demolition. This cannot be interpreted to mean that the period of limitation for filing an appeal prescribed under S. 414 (A) of the said Act will commence only from the date of service of the copy of the order as provided in S. 414 (3) of the said Act. Moreover, S. 414 (A) expressly provides that an appeal is to be presented within 30 days from the date of the order with a copy of the order to the Building Tribunal. It also appears from rule 5 sub-rule (3) (a) of the Calcutta Corporation Tribunal (Conduct of Business) Rules, 1965 that every memorandum of appeal filed before the Building Tribunal under S. 414 (3) of the said Act shall be accompanied by a certified copy of the order appealed from. It also appears from rule 5 sub-rule (3) (a) of the Calcutta Corporation Tribunal (Conduct of Business) Rules, 1965 that every memorandum of appeal filed before the Building Tribunal under S. 414 (3) of the said Act shall be accompanied by a certified copy of the order appealed from. This clearly means that the time for filing the appeal will commence from the date when the order was passed by the Commissioner under S. 414 (3) of the said Act. 12. In AIR 1959 Calcutta 413, General Electric Co. of India Limited & anr. v. Corporation of Calcutta & anr it has been held that the words "the time requisite for obtaining a copy" are not inapplicable in those cases where the appellant is not required to obtain a copy at his own expenses by applying for it but is entitled by the statute to get a copy from the authority or authorities concerned within certain time. In such a case the time taken by authorities concerned to supply the copy would legitimately be time as required for obtaining copy so far as the appellant is concerned and he will be entitled to its exclusion under S. 12(2) of the Indian Limitation Act in the matter of computation of the period of limitation. This decision in respect of provision of S. 182(3) of the Calcutta Municipal Act which provides that a copy of the order with a copy of the reasons for the order shall be sent by a registered post to the person who gave notice of the objection against the valuation within a fortnight from the date of the order. In the present case, as I have stated before, the statute does not provide for serving a copy of the order passed under S. 414(3) within time fixed under S. 414(3) of the said Act and as such this decision has no application to this case. 13. The case reported in AIR 1975 SC 2085 Madan Lal v. State of U.P. & Ors. in short is that the appellant Madan Lal preferred a claim under S. 6 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 in respect of certain plots of land which were included in a notification under S. 4 of the Act declaring that the State Government decided to constitute the said land and other lands a reserved forest. in short is that the appellant Madan Lal preferred a claim under S. 6 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 in respect of certain plots of land which were included in a notification under S. 4 of the Act declaring that the State Government decided to constitute the said land and other lands a reserved forest. An objection was filed by the D.F.O. North Khari Division to the claim of the appellant. A local enquiry was held on May 3, 1955 when the Forest Settlement Officer directed that the case would be put up for orders but it was not stated when. It appeared from the case record that on May 9, 1955, the Forest Settlement Officer recorded an order tinder S. 11 (1) of the said Act that the appellant provide his claim and directed the D.F.O. to intimate within a certain time if he wants the land on payment of compensation or not. This order according to the State of U.P. who filed the appeal was made without any notice to them and in their absence. The State of U.P. came to know of the order on 24.4.56 and an appeal was filed against the order on July 23, 1956 under S. 17 of the said Act. Section 17, however provides filing of an appeal with in three months from the date of the order. It was held that the Divisional Forest Officer came to know of the order on 24.4.56 and this finding has not been challenged. The question was whether the appeal was barred by limitation. It was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the words "date of order" meant that the date of the knowledge of the order. It has also been held that it is a fundamental principle of justice that they whose rights are affected by an order must have notice of it and as such the date of the order mean the date when the order is either communicated to the party or made known by him actually or constructively. The appeal was held not barred by limitation as the same was filed within the prescribed period from the date of knowledge of the order. 14. In AIR 1976 Supreme Court 2101, Messrs Karamchand Thappar & Bros. (Coal Sales) Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & anr. The appeal was held not barred by limitation as the same was filed within the prescribed period from the date of knowledge of the order. 14. In AIR 1976 Supreme Court 2101, Messrs Karamchand Thappar & Bros. (Coal Sales) Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & anr. it has been observed that provision in S. 9 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1945 confers a right of appeal to a dealer objecting to any order of assessment within 30 days from the service of the copy of the order. The copy of the order having been served after expiry of three years from the date of the order it was held that the appeal which was filed immediately thereafter was not barred by limitation inasmuch as in such case time will not run before the communication of the order. These decisions do not apply to the present case as we have already held that the opposite party No. 1 was present at the time of hearing of the review petition and there is no averment to show that the petitioner was not aware of the impugned order prior to the communication of the demolition order some time in April 20, 1971. 15. We have already held that the opposite party No. 1 was present when the review application was heard by the Commissioner on 18.11.70 and, the order was passed by the Commissioner on that day as evident from the impugned order. We have also held that there is no statement in the petition of appeal that the impugned order was not passed in presence of the opposite party No. 1 who could not know of the same prior to the communication of the order on April 20, 1970. We therefore, hold that the opposite party No. 1 had knowledge of the impugned order as the same was passed on the day the demolition case was heard. The appeal is, therefore, barred by limitation as it was filed on May 17, 1971 against the impugned order dated 18th November, 1970 i.e. beyond thirty days from the date of the order. No application under S. 5 of the Limitation Act has been filed explaining this long delay in preferring the appeal and praying for condoning the delay. The appeal is, therefore, barred by limitation as it was filed on May 17, 1971 against the impugned order dated 18th November, 1970 i.e. beyond thirty days from the date of the order. No application under S. 5 of the Limitation Act has been filed explaining this long delay in preferring the appeal and praying for condoning the delay. There is a bare statement in paragraph 14 of the petition that the Commissioner, Corporation of Calcutta passed the order on November 18, 1970 which was communicated to the appellant by registered post and received by the appellant on April 21, 1971. There is no other averment explaining the delay. It is incumbent upon the appellant to explain this delay in order to get the same condoned under S. 5 of the Limitation Act. In AIR 1926 Patna 73 at page 75, Laurentius Ekka & ors. v Dakhi Korei & anr. it has been held that it is well recognised principle that a petition filed out of time must show on the face of it the reason for the delay and there must be an express prayer for condonation of the delay under S. 5 of the Limitation Act. It has been contended on behalf of the opposite party No. 1 that it is not essential that to get the benefit of S. 5 of the Limitation Act an application is required to be filed with a prayer to condone the delay. If the relevant facts are already on record an oral application to condone the delay will satisfy the requirements of S. 5 of the Limitation Act. The case in AIR 1959 Punjab 646 of Firm Kaura Mal Bishan Doss v. Firm Mathav Das Atma Ram Ahmedabad & anr. was that the firm Kaura Mal Bishan Das brought an action for rendering of accounts and for a decree for such amount as may be found due to it after accounting. The trial court dismissed the suit. The plaintiff preferred an appeal to the court of the senior Subordinate Judge. A preliminary objection was taken by defendant respondent that the subordinate judge had no pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. The memorandum of appeal was returned to the plaintiff appellant who represented the appeal in the court of District Judge, Amritsar on the same day. The plaintiff preferred an appeal to the court of the senior Subordinate Judge. A preliminary objection was taken by defendant respondent that the subordinate judge had no pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. The memorandum of appeal was returned to the plaintiff appellant who represented the appeal in the court of District Judge, Amritsar on the same day. An objection was taken that the appeal was barred by limitation and no application under S. 5 of the Limitation Act being filed praying for condonation of delay the memorandum of appeal should be dismissed. It has been observed that procedure is meant for advancing and not for obstructing the cause of justice and if the entire material was on the record, as in the present case it obviously was, it could not promote the ends of justice, if that material was ignored and the relief refused to the appellant, because he had not claimed it by means of a formal application in writing or that a formal affidavit was not filed. The language of S. 5 of the Limitation Act does not provide that an application in writing must be filed before relief under the said provision can be granted." The decision has no application to the instant case as the facts are entirely different. No application under S. 5 of the Limitation Act has been filed explaining the delay in filing the appeal and there is no prayer for condonation of delay. There is no material on record to satisfy the Tribunal that there was sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the prescribed period. We, therefore hold that the appeal is barred by limitation. 16. It has been contended on behalf of the opposite party No. 1 that the Commissioner has no power to review his own order passed on April 23, 1969 under S. 414(3) of the Calcutta Municipal Act. This submission of law has not been disputed by the learned Advocate for the opposite party no. 1 that in the absence of the specific provision for review in Calcutta Municipal Act, the Commissioner has no power to review his own order. But it is contended on behalf of the opposite party no. 1 that the application filed by the opposite party no. 1 was in substance an application for rectification of the mistakes committed by the Commissioner in making the order dated 23rd April, 1969. But it is contended on behalf of the opposite party no. 1 that the application filed by the opposite party no. 1 was in substance an application for rectification of the mistakes committed by the Commissioner in making the order dated 23rd April, 1969. The said mistakes have been rectified by modifying the said order by passing the impugned order on 18th November, 1970 whereby the Commissioner made it clear that the unauthorised structures which were to be demolished were those structures done in deviation of the two sanctioned plans. This impugned order it is submitted is not one passed on review but in substance an order correcting mistakes by the Commissioner of his earlier order. It has been submitted that every quasi-judicial Tribunal has inherent power to correct his own mistakes. In a Bench decision of this Court reported in 67 CWN 935, Sm Durga Devi & Ors. v. Bhagwandas Jayswal it has been observed by P. Chatterjee, J. that if a party has suffered because of the mistakes of the court or its offices, it is the duty of the court to enquire of the matter and if such a mistake has occurred, the Tribunal has inherent power to correct the said mistakes. In AIR 1957 Calcutta 469, Indira Devi & ors. v. State of West Bengal & ors. where it has been observed that a quasi-judicial Tribunal can not claim or exercise the inherent power of a civil court unless the statute has conferred all the powers of a civil court on such a tribunal either expressly or by implication. The court or Tribunal has power to correct his own mistakes. This decision has been followed in 75 CWN 597 Haji Mahabud Hossain & ors. v. Biswanath Nandi & anr. and it has been held that the tribunal has power to correct his own mistakes and in doing so it acts within its jurisdiction. Thus all the above decisions clearly establish that the tribunal is competent to correct his own mistakes in the order passed by it earlier. 17. In a Bench Decision of this court in 1976 CHN 652, M/s. Agarwal Hardwar Industries v. The Employees’ State Insurance Corporation it has been observed by A.K. Sen, J that though the tribunal possess no inherent power yet it possesses certain powers which are ancillary to the satisfactory discharge of functions with which it is invested. 17. In a Bench Decision of this court in 1976 CHN 652, M/s. Agarwal Hardwar Industries v. The Employees’ State Insurance Corporation it has been observed by A.K. Sen, J that though the tribunal possess no inherent power yet it possesses certain powers which are ancillary to the satisfactory discharge of functions with which it is invested. Investment of such ancillary powers is said to be implied. 18. It has been contended that the order passed on April 23, 1969 under S 414(3) of the said Act is appealable under S. 414(A) of the said Act and not the subsequent order passed on the application for review on 18.11.70 and as such the instant appeal is not maintainable. The original order passed by the Commissioner under S. 414(3) has been modified on the application of the opposite party No. 1 for review of the said order and as such the original order is non est and the appeal is to be filed against the modified order. In 34 CWN 1002, Aditya Kumar Bhattacharjee v. Abinash Chandra Mukhopadhyay & ors. it has been held that a decree is modified in review, to however slight it may be, the modified decree is the final decree for the purpose of an appeal, even though no decree may be drawn up in pursuance of the successful review or a decree is drawn up only to the extent of the modification. An appeal against the decree anterior to the review filed and pending the review, without any appeal from the amended decree is, therefore, incompetent. In AIR 1968 Patna 352, Union of India v. Ramdas Oil Mills it has been observed where jurisdiction is usurped by a court in passing an order against which an appeal could lie if it had been passed with jurisdiction an appeal against the order cannot be defeated on the ground that the order was made without jurisdiction. The unreported decision in C.R. No. 4280 of 1968, Sm. Ram Rati Shaw & Anr. v. Commissioner, Corporation of Calcutta decided on 16.2.71 by their Lordships Amaresh Roy and A.K. De. JJ. observing that no appeal lay against an order rejecting an application for review of the order of demolition passed by the Commissioner under S. 414(A) of the Calcutta Municipal Act is not applicable to this case as the review petition was entertained and the order of the Commissioner was modified. JJ. observing that no appeal lay against an order rejecting an application for review of the order of demolition passed by the Commissioner under S. 414(A) of the Calcutta Municipal Act is not applicable to this case as the review petition was entertained and the order of the Commissioner was modified. In view of the decisions mentioned before, the instant appeal is maintainable. 19. In the premises, aforesaid, we hold that the appeal is barred by limitation. The Building Tribunal acted in excess of the jurisdiction in holding that the appeal is not barred by limitation and it is fit and proper that the said finding should be set aside. We, therefore, make the rule absolute and set aside the judgment of the Tribunal. In view of our finding that no application has been filed under S. 5 of the Limitation Act making out sufficient cause for the delay in filing the appeal, the appeal is dismissed as barred by limitation. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Let the records be sent down to the Tribunal below. N.C. Mukherji, J. I agree. Rule made absolute.