JUDGMENT B. N. Sapru, J. - The petitioner in the instant case Major Dhararn Pal Singh Kukrety, is a Permanent Commissioned Officer of the Indian Army. At the relevant time he was posted in the Army School of Mechanical Transport, Faizabad as Officer Commanding. Administrative Wing and the Headquarter Company. An incident appears to have taken place on the night of the 6th/7th of November, 1975 as a result of which he was court-martialled. 2. The General Court-Martial was presided over by Brigadier Surjit Singh Jaspal, Headquarter Central Command. The other members of the Court-Martial were Major Ashok Kumar Bansal, Major Murli Manohar, Capt. Santosh Kumar Tewari, and Capt. Thakur Das Verma. The Court-Martial heard the prosecution evidence, took the statement of the petitioner and also examined the defence evidence. As a result, the Court-Martial by its verdict dated 13-3-1976 acquitted the petitioner, In the verdict it was announced that it was subject to confirmation. The General Officer Commanding Madhya Pradesh, Bihar and Orissa area, who was the confirming authority, did not confirm the verdict of the Court- Martial, and directed that the petitioner should be tried by the General Court- Martial again. The same General Court Martial assembled on 14th April, 1976 at Lucknow and after hearing the parties reaffirmed its verdict of not guilty. This verdict was also announced as being subject to confirmation. The General Officer Commanding, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar and Orissa, respondent No, 3, in the writ petition, forwarded the papers to the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Central Command, Lucknow, as he was of the view that the verdict of the Court-Martial should not be confirmed. According to the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents this action was taken under Rule 70 of the Army Rules. The General Officer Commanding-in- Chief, Central Command by his order dated 25-5-76, which has been filed as Annexure A-I to the counter-affidavit, refused to confirm the verdict of the General Court-Martial. The petitioner was so informed. 3. According to the counter-affidavit filed by Brigadier F.R. Campos. Commander, Allahabad Sub-Area, Allahabad, respondent No. 2, the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Central Command was of the opinion that there was over- whelming evidence on the record in support of the charges and the findings of the General Court-Martial were perverse. It is further stated that the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Central Command was of the view that the petitioner should not be retained in service. It is further stated that the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Central Command was of the view that the petitioner should not be retained in service. Consequently, he forwarded the proceedings along with his recommendations to the Chief of the Army Staff on 29th June, 1976 for suitable action. According to the case of the respondents the Chief of the Army Staff was of the view that the petitioner was not fit to be retained in service and therefore he issued a show cause notice to the petitioner dated 12th Nov., 1976, under Rule 14 of the Army Rules to show cause against action being taken to remove him from service. The show cause notice is dated 12th Nov., 1976, and it recites that the petitioner had been tried by a General Court-Martial and that the Chief of the Army Staff was of the view that a fresh Court-Martial for the trial of the offences was inexpedient and that the Chief of the Army Staff was also of the opinion that the misconduct of the petitioner disclosed in the proceedings before the Court-Martial rendered his further retention into service undesirable. The petitioner was required to show cause within 25 days. A copy of the show cause notice has been filed as Annexure 7 to the writ petition. 4. The first question in this writ petition is whether the show cause notice is valid, or not. The second question that has to be decided is whether the writ petition is maintainable, or not, 5. Section 121 of the Army Act provides as follows: "Prohibition of second trial- When any person subject to this Act has been acquitted or convicted of an offence by a court-martial or by a criminal court. or has been dealt with under any of the Sections 80, 83, 84 and 85, he shall not be liable to be tried again for the same offence by a Court-Martial or dealt with under the said sections." Thereafter S. 153 of the Army Act provides that: "Finding and sentence not valid, unless confirmed-No finding or sentence of a general, district or summary general Court-martial shall be valid except so far as it may be confirmed as provided by this Act." Thus, it is clear that the verdict of a court-martial is not valid except and unless it has been confirmed under the Act. Thereafter S. 160 of the Army Act provides as follows: "Revision of finding or sentence.- (1) Any finding or sentence of a court-martial which requires confirmation may be once revised by order of the confirming authority and on such revision, the court, if so directed by the confirming authority, may take additional evidence. (2) The court, on revision, shall consist of the same officers as were present when the original decision was passed, unless any of those officers are unavoidably absent. (3) In case of such unavoidable absence the cause thereof shall be duly certified in the proceedings, and the court shall proceed with the revision, provided that, if a general court-martial, it still consists of five officers, or if a summary general or district court-martial, of three officers." 6. The question in this case is whether the verdict of the second court-martial required confirmation, or not. Section 160 (1) provides that a finding or the sentence of a court-martial which requires confirmation may be once revised by the confirming authority. The section is silent as to the power of the confirming authority, as to what it can order, if it is dissatisfied with the findings of the general court-martial which is sent for revision under the provisions of S. 160 (1) of the Army Act, Obviously, the power of revision can only be exercised once. The Army Act does not contemplate successive trials by a court-martial till a verdict acceptable to the confirming authority is reached. Section 121 of the Army Act prohibits a second trial by a court martial for the same offence whether any person subject to the Act has been convicted or acquitted of an offence. Section 160 (1) of the Army Act is in the nature of an exception to the law laid down in S. 121 of the Army Act, and must be restricted to the actual language employed in the section. The net result is that if there is a second verdict by a court-martial consequent on a direction by the confirming authority for revision of the verdict, the confirming authority has no option but to confirm the verdict. The net result is that if there is a second verdict by a court-martial consequent on a direction by the confirming authority for revision of the verdict, the confirming authority has no option but to confirm the verdict. Section 154 which provides for the confirmation of the findings and sentence of a general court- martial runs as follows: "Power to confirm finding and sentence of general court-martial- The findings and sentences of general courts- martial may be confirmed by the Central Government, or by any officer empowered in this behalf by warrant of the Central Government." This power has to be exercised in conformity with the scheme of the Army Act. Section 153 which has already been reproduced earlier provides that no finding or sentence of a general, district or summary general court martial shall be -valid except so far as it may be confirmed as provided by the Army Act. In order to give validity to the second verdict of the court-marital consequent on a revision under orders under S. 160 (1) of the Army Act, the confirming authority is bound in law to confirm the verdict so that it has validity. This Court, therefore, holds that Major Dharampal Kukrety stands validly acquitted of the charges framed against him as a result of the second verdict of the general court-martial. 7. The next question that arises is whether it is open to the Chief of the Army Staff to issue the impugned show cause notice to the petitioner under the provisions of Army Rules, 1954. Rule 14 provides as follows: "Termination of service by the Central Government on account of misconduct.(1) when it is proposed to terminate the service of an officer under S. 19 on account of .misconduct, he shall be given an opportunity to show cause in the manner specified in sub-rule (2) against such action: Provided that this sub-rule shall not apply: (a) where the service is terminated on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction by a criminal court; or (b) where the Central Government is satisfied that for reasons to be recorded in writing, it is not expedient or reasonably practicable to give to the officer an opportunity of showing cause. (2) When after considering the reports of an officer's misconduct, the Central Government or the Chief of the Army Staff is satisfied that the trial of the officer by court-martial is inexpedient or impracticable, but is of the opinion that the further retention of the said officer in the service is undesirable, the Chief of the Army Staff shall so inform the officer together with all reports adverse to him and he shall be called upon to submit, in writing, his explanation and defence: Provided that the Chief of the Army Staff may withhold from disclosure any such report or portion thereof if, in his opinion, its disclosure is not in the interest of the security of the State. In the event of the explanation of the officer being considered unsatisfactory by the Chief of the Army Staff, or when so directed by the Central Government, the case shall be submitted to the Central Government with the officer's defence and the recommendation of the Chief of the Army Staff as to the termination of the officer's service in the manner specified in sub-rule (4). (3) Where, upon the conviction of an officer by a criminal court, the Central Government or the Chief of the Army Staff considers that the conduct of the officer which has led to his conviction renders his further retention in service undesirable, a certified copy of the judgment of the criminal court convicting him shall be submitted to the Central Government with the recommendation of the Chief of the Army Staff as to the termination of the officer's service in the manner specified in sub-rule (4). (4) When submitting a case to the Central Government under the provisions of sub-rule (2) or sub-rule (3), the Chief of the Army Staff shall make his recommendation whether the officer's service should be terminated, and if so, whether the officer should be (a) dismissed from the service; or (b) removed from the service; or (c) called upon to retire; or (d) called upon to resign. (5) The Central Government after considering the reports and the officer's defence, if any, or the judgment of the criminal court, as the case may be, and the recommendation of the Chief of the Army Staff. may dismiss or remove the officer with or without pension or call upon him to retire or resign. (5) The Central Government after considering the reports and the officer's defence, if any, or the judgment of the criminal court, as the case may be, and the recommendation of the Chief of the Army Staff. may dismiss or remove the officer with or without pension or call upon him to retire or resign. and on his refusing to do so, the officer may be compulsorily retired or removed from the service on pension or gratuity, if any, admissible to him." 8. Chapter IV of the Army Act deals with the conditions of service. Section 18 provides as follows: "Tenure of service under the Act- every person subject to this Act shall hold office during the pleasure of the President." Section 19 provides "Termination of service by Central Government- subject to the provisions of this Act and the rules and regulations made thereunder, the Central Government may dismiss, or remove from the service, any person subject to this Act." Thereafter S. 191 of the Army Act provides that the Central Government may make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of this Act. Sub-section (2) of that section provides that certain matters may be covered by the rules without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-sec. (1), and the rules may provide for the matters specified in sub-rule (2). The position, therefore, is that the power of the Central Government to dismiss or remove from service any person subject to the Army Act is in its turn fettered by the rules framed under the Act. The stand taken in the counter-affidavit of Brigadier Campos is that the pleasure of the President under S. 18 of the Act and the power of the Central Government under S. 19 of the Act are absolutely untrammelled, cannot be accepted. Section 19 expressly states that the Central Government may dismiss or remove from service any person subject to the Act according to the rules and regulations made by the Central Government. Before the Central Government can dismiss or remove a person from the Army Service it has got to conform to the rules made by the Central Government itself. 9. Rule 14 of the Army Rules, 1954 is to be found in Chapter III. Rule 11 provides that the discharge from service shall not be delayed. Before the Central Government can dismiss or remove a person from the Army Service it has got to conform to the rules made by the Central Government itself. 9. Rule 14 of the Army Rules, 1954 is to be found in Chapter III. Rule 11 provides that the discharge from service shall not be delayed. Rule 12 provides for the discharge certificate and Rule .13 gives a list of competent authorities to discharge a person subject to the Army Act. Rule 13-A provides for the termination of the service of an officer by the Central Government on his failure to qualify at any examination or course. Rule 14 with which we are concerned. deals with the termination of service by the Central Government on account of misconduct. Rule 15 deals with the termination of the service by the Central Government on grounds other than misconduct. Under Rule 15 the Central Government has to give an opportunity to the officer concerned to show cause against the termination of the service. Similarly, Rule 15-A provides for the release of an officer on medical grounds, where again, an opportunity has been provided to the officer concerned to show cause against the findings of the medical board. Thereafter Rule 16 provides for the release of personnel subject to the Army Act from service. Rule 17 provides for the dismissal of removal by the Chief of the Army Staff and by other officers or persons who have been convicted by a criminal court or by a court-martial. Here again an opportunity to show cause has been given to the persons concerned. 10. Rule 14 provides that where it is proposed to terminate the service of an officer under S. 19 of the Act on the ground of misconduct, he shall be given an opportunity to show cause in the manner specified in sub-rule (2) against such action. In the instant case the provisions of proviso B to sub-rule (1) of Rule 14 do not come into play as it is not the case of the Central Government that it is not expedient or reasonably practicable to give the officer an opportunity to show cause because the Chief of the Army Staff has given the petitioner an opportunity of showing cause. 11. 11. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 14 provides that where the Central Government or the Chief of the Army Staff after considering the reports of an officer's misconduct is satisfied that the trial by a court-martial is inexpedient or impracticable, it may serve it show cause notice on the officer concerned together with all the reports adverse to him and call upon him to submit in writing his explanation and defence. In the instant case the Central Govt, who were the authority convening the court-martial obviously were not initially satisfied that the case was not fit for trial by a court- martial. A court-martial was held and thereafter a confirming authority refused to confirm the verdict of the court-martial and a second court-martial was held. On both occasions the court-martial returned a verdict of not guilty. It is, therefore, not possible to hold that the Central Government or the Chief of the Army Staff was satisfied that it was inexpedient or impracticable to hold a court-martial, as far as the petitioner was concerned. The fact that after the non-guilty verdict of the second court-martial the Chief of the Army Staff (thought it inexpedient or impracticable to hold a third court-martial would not, to the mind of this court give him jurisdiction to issue the impugned show cause notice, The Central Government or the Chief of the Army Staff has an option initially either to have the officer concerned tried by a court-martial, or to take action under Army Rule 14. Having decided to court-martial the officer concerned, neither the Central Government nor the Chief of the Army Staff was competent to take action against the officer, after he was acquitted, to take recourse to the provisions of Army R. 14. 12. The impugned notice issued to the petitioner under Army Rule 14, must. therefore, be held to be without jurisdiction. 13. It has been vehemently argued on behalf of the respondents that the petitioner is entitled to no relief under the provisions of Art. 226 of the Constitution. The respondents' case is that the petitioner has (1) suffered no injury by the mere issue of a show cause notice. He can still show cause against the impugned notice; and (2) that the Central Government may still accept his explanation as and when submitted and, therefore, the writ petition is premature. The respondents' case is that the petitioner has (1) suffered no injury by the mere issue of a show cause notice. He can still show cause against the impugned notice; and (2) that the Central Government may still accept his explanation as and when submitted and, therefore, the writ petition is premature. It is further urged that under Art. 226 as substituted by the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976, in particular the provisions of sub-cl. (3), thereof, no petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution can be entertained if any other remedy for such redress is provided for by or under any other law for the time being in force. 14. The first question that arises is whether the petitioner has suffered any injury. In Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 43, pages 1112, 1113 and 1114. the word 'injury' has been defined as follows:- "INJURY. In General A generic term, which, in ordinary modern usage. is of very broad designation, having more than one meaning, for, as indicated in the following sub-divisions, it may have a legal import as well as numerous and comprehensive popular meanings. The exact signification of the word 'injury' has been considered and discussed by courts on numerous occasions, and their rulings are not always harmonious, since it is often difficult to lay down any actual definition of what constitutes an injury, because it is always a question of compound facts. In the broad sense, the term includes injury to person. property, reputation, and rights. Reference to particular applications or specific uses of the word are set out in the note. General and Popular Sense. The word 'injury' has numerous and comprehensive popular meanings, which, however, may be grouped under two general heads: It may indicate a hurt, as distinguished from the infliction of the hurt: or it may indicate the infliction of a hurt, as distinguished from the hurt inflicted. In the latter sense, it has been defined as an act resulting in damage: an act which damages, harms, or hurts; detriment to, or violation of, person, character, feelings. In the latter sense, it has been defined as an act resulting in damage: an act which damages, harms, or hurts; detriment to, or violation of, person, character, feelings. rights, property, or interests, or the value of a thing; a source of harm; a wrong, every wrong, everything that is not done rightly; whatever reduces the utility or mars the integrity of the body; and, in the former sense, as meaning damage, detriment, or harm; damage or hurt done to, or suffered by, a person or thing: detriment to property or interests, or the value of a thing; hurt, hurt or loss caused to. or sustained by. a person: any wrong, damage, or mischief done or suffered; a wrong or damage done to another, either in his person, rights, reputation, or property: any wrong or damage done to that which is good or valuable Examples illustrating the scope of the term. used in its popular sense, are set out in the note. Legal sense. In harmony with the legal concept or principle that no cause of action arises from the doing of a lawful act or the exercise of a legal right if done or exercised in a lawful manner, discussed in Actions 15 b, the word 'Injury' in a legal sense connotes "wrong", implies violation of a legal right, and, as in the popular sense, it may sometimes be used to indicate either the invasion of a right or the damages resulting from such invasion, the word being frequently used indiscriminately in these two different senses. So, in common use, it is employed broadly enough to cover both the damages and the injuria of the common law, and at this day its common and approved legal usage extends to and includes any hurtful or damaging effect which may be suffered by anyone, and is often used even in statutes and other instruments, not in its technical legal sense, but in its popular and usual sense, as meaning damage resulting from an unlawful act or from a violation of a legal right. In the strict sense of the law, however, especially the common law, its meaning corresponds to its etymology, discussed in the definition of the word 'injure'......... In the strict sense of the law, however, especially the common law, its meaning corresponds to its etymology, discussed in the definition of the word 'injure'......... and it has been said that the word has a legal import, having acquired in law a well defined and well understood meaning, so that its generally accepted legal definition is more restricted. It means a wrongful invasion of legal rights, and is not concerned with the hurt or damage resulting from such invasion, being thus used in the familiar law phrase "damage without injury", or its Latin equivalent, "damnum absque injuria", and therefore. in its strict, technical, legal sense, "injury" has been defined to be a legal wrong as would be the subject of an action for damages at common law; an actionable wrong; an actionable wrong to property in the abstract, as distinguished from a physical hurt or damage to a specific article of property: the deprivation of a legal right; something for which an action will lie on behalf of the injured person; a tort; the unlawful infringement or privation of a right; a wrong done to a person, or, in other words, a violation of his right, a wrongful act or tort which causes loss or harm to another." 15. We are not interpreting the Constitution of India and to give the word 'injury' a narrow definition which would restrict the rights of a citizen vis-a-vis the State. We must. therefore. give the' word 'injury' a meaning which will broaden the concept of the term. "In jury" must be defined in the legal sense to cover both damnum and injuria of, the common law. The word 'injury' must be interpreted to mean a wrongful invasion of legal rights and is not concerned with the actual hurt or damage suffered from the invasion of such legal rights. It can include damage without injury. The learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents has urged that unless damage accompanies injury, there can be no injury. This argument must be rejected. A mere threat of damage in this case is enough to sustain the maintainability of this writ petition. This argument of the learned Junior Standing Counsel Mr. Chand Kishore is, therefore, rejected. 16. The learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents has urged that unless damage accompanies injury, there can be no injury. This argument must be rejected. A mere threat of damage in this case is enough to sustain the maintainability of this writ petition. This argument of the learned Junior Standing Counsel Mr. Chand Kishore is, therefore, rejected. 16. The next sub-head of this argument is that the petitioner Major Dharmpal Kukrety can still show cause against the show cause notice Of course, he can show cause and the Central Government can, if so pleased, accept his explanation. The question that remains is whether he should put himself into jeopardy by submitting his answer to the show cause notice issued by the Chief of the Army Staff. The officer concerned has been acquitted by a court-martial. As has been held in the earlier part of this judgment, the verdict must be deemed to have been confirmed by the confirming authority, even though it has purported to refuse to confirm the second verdict of the court-martial. It is obvious that the petitioner would have a remedy by filing a writ petition against an ultimate order of the Central Government removing him from service. Should this court drive him into that precarious position? If the notice has been issued without jurisdiction. it must be quashed at this stage. The officer can no longer be put into jeopardy. 17. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order of the Chief of the Army Staff dated November 12, 1976 (Annexure VII to the writ petition) is quashed. The respondents are directed not to take any further action against the petitioner on` the basis of the aforesaid notice. The petitioner shall be entitled to the costs of this writ petition.