JUDGMENT.-The property in dispute is an unenfranchised minor inam in a village called “Kurumbirai” in Chingleput District comprised in T.D. No. 1034. On the abolition of the Minor Inams under the Tamil Nadu Minor Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1963 (XXX of 1963) the lands stood transferred to the Government and vested in them with effect from 15th February, 1965. Nobody had preferred any petition for grant of any ryotwari patta for this land as required by the rules framed under the said Act. An enquiry regarding the grant of patta was, therefore, taken up suo motu by the Settlement Tahsildar on the basis of the materials gathered by the field staff to decide whether anybody is entitled to ryotwari patta. A notice was accordingly issued to a mosque at Salavakkam Village and the notice was served on mulla Sulaiman Sahib. In the enquiry before the Settlement Tahsildar he deposed that the said land was granted for the services of mulla in the mosque at Salavakkam and the services were being rendered. He claimed patta in his name and filed a petition therefor. The karnam of the village was examined and he deposed that the suit land was a religious minor inam and granted for doing mulla service and that the income was utilised for the said service, while the kudiwaram in the land vested in the mosque. The Settlement Tahsildar in his order dated 20th November, 1967, marked as Exhibit A-1 in the present proceedings, held that it was clear from the records and from the evidence of the karnam and the entries in the registers that the suit land was granted for the services of mulla for the time being in the mosque and that the grant was to the mosque for an office of mulla to be remunerated from the income of the suit land. He also held that it was not a personal grant. He, therefore, granted patta in favour of the mosque. This order was challenged on an appeal before the Minor Inams Abolition Tribunal. Before the Tribunal, an extract from the Register of Inams was filed. According to the Tribunal the said extract showed that the land in question was “Dharmadayam” grant in favour of an individual and not in favour of any institution in which case it would have been described as “Devadayam”. Before the Tribunal, an extract from the Register of Inams was filed. According to the Tribunal the said extract showed that the land in question was “Dharmadayam” grant in favour of an individual and not in favour of any institution in which case it would have been described as “Devadayam”. As the mulla claimed that he was doing the services in the mosque, the Tribunal considered that the only course open was to order the issue of ryotwari patta in favour of mulla Sulaiman Sahib. This order was dated 30th January, 1971. 2. No further proceedings were taken thereafter by any party to the said order. It may be mentioned here that the mosque itself had been impleaded as the respondent in the appeal before the Minor Inams Abolition Tribunal. The third respondent in the appeal before the said Tribunal was shown as “the Mosque at Salavakkam by its mulla Sulaiman Sheriff”. Since the mosque in whose favour the patta had been ordered to be issued was not represented by a proper person, a notice was issued to the Wakf Board and the Wakf Board was represented by counsel before the Tribunal. The Wakf Board did not take any further proceedings against the said order of the Minor Inams Abolition Tribunal. 3. However, the plaintiffs representing the mosque filed the present suit for declaration and injunction impleading the said mulla Sulaiman Sahib and the Tamil Nadu State Wakf Board as the defendants. It was stated in the plaint that the first defendant was not a mulla doing mulla services in the mosque, that the grant of patta in his favour was erroneous, that the suit property was always in the possession and enjoyment of the mosque and that the first defendant was threatening the tenants for the purpose of getting the produce delivered to him. 4. The first defendant was the main contesting defendant in the suit. The Wakf Board, the second defendant, stated in its written statement that it was an unnecessary party and prayed that the suit may be dismissed as against it. ,The contention of the first defendant was that the lands had been granted to his forefathers for service of mulla in the mosque and that the inam was a personal inam and not a religious inam as contended by the plaintiffs. ,The contention of the first defendant was that the lands had been granted to his forefathers for service of mulla in the mosque and that the inam was a personal inam and not a religious inam as contended by the plaintiffs. According to him the property was always in his possession and in the possession of his forefathers and the suit was barred by the principles of res judicata, limitation and adverse possession. 5. The learned District Munsif of Chingleput held that the mosque had no title to the property, that the first defendant was rendering service as mulla, that the suit was barred by the provisions of sections 43 and 46 of the Tamil Nadu Act XXX of 1963 and also by res judicata and limitation. The suit was, therefore, dismissed with costs. 6. The plaintiffs appealed and the appeal came before the learned Principal Subordinate Judge of Chingleput. He held that the grant was not a personal grant, but only in the nature of service inam for rendering services in the mosque and that the first defendant was not entitled to the property. He held, however, that the plaintiffs in the suit could not seek to nullify the effect of the order of the Minor Inams Tribunal and that an appeal should have been preferred against the said order of the Minor Inams Tribunal if anyone was aggrieved. Having allowed its right to be lost by default, he considered that the plaintiffs could not agitate the claim once over again. The suit was, therefore, held to be barred by section 43 of Act XXX of 1963. He held also that the first defendant was in possession of the property and that in the event of the finding that it was only a service mam, there was no question of adverse. Possession for over the statutory period enuring in favour of the first defendant. He, ultimately, confirmed the judgment and decree of the trial Court. It is this judgment which is now sought to be challenged by the plaintiffs in Second Appeal. 7. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the lower appellate Court was not justified in taking the view that the suit was barred by the provisions of section 43 of Act XXX of 1963. It is this judgment which is now sought to be challenged by the plaintiffs in Second Appeal. 7. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the lower appellate Court was not justified in taking the view that the suit was barred by the provisions of section 43 of Act XXX of 1963. For the respondents the submission was that the judgment of the Court below on this point was correct and that, in any event, the grant should be held to be a personal grant in favour of the person who was rendering services in the Mosque and that the decision to the contrary by the lower appellate Court was wrong. The result of these contentions is to raise two points for consideration: (1) Whether the present proceedings are barred by the provisions of section 43 of the Tamil Nadu Act XXX of 1963 and (2) whether the grant was a personal grant in favour of the person rendering services, so that the plaintiffs cannot claim any title to the property. 8. It is convenient to consider the second question first. The original title deed relating to the property is not in evidence. The only evidence that is available is Exhibit B-1, being the certified copy of the Inam Register of No. 217, Kurumbarai Village bearing T. D. No. 1034. It is necessary here to set out the entries under the different columns of the said Inam Register. They are as follows:— Clause (21) Remarks To be confirmed to the present holders and their successors so long as the ‘mulla’ service is performed. Clause (22) Decision of the Inam Commissioner of his Assistants. Confirmed. 9. The question as to whether the grant in any particular case is a grant in favour of the institution or in favour of the person concerned has been agitated in a number of cases in this Court. In Vadlamannaty Bala Tripura Sundaramma v. Secretary of State and others1 the grant was described as follows: “Devadayam granted for the performance of certain rites in the mosque. The ceremonies are duly kept up”. It was held in that case that the inam was only a service inam granted to an individual and his descendants in consideration of his learning for doing some nominal rites in the mosque, but practically for his maintenance. The ceremonies are duly kept up”. It was held in that case that the inam was only a service inam granted to an individual and his descendants in consideration of his learning for doing some nominal rites in the mosque, but practically for his maintenance. In the course of the said decision, after referring to the earlier cases on the point, Ramesam, J., with whom Cornish, J., agreed pointed out: (1) that the use of the word ‘devadayam’ was not conclusive in favour of the temple or mosque though it might be some evidence along with other circumstances; (2) that where the grant was made to a person in the capacity of mutavalli, manager etc., and where it did not appear that there was some other trustee, it might be regarded as a grant to the temple or mosque itself; (3) that where it appeared that a substantial part of the income went to the benefit of the institution, the grant might be considered as a grant to the institution itself, even though some surplus might be used by the trustees for their own maintenance; and (4) that where none of the above indicia was fulfilled in any particular case, it must be considered as a grant to the grantee named and if services were mentioned, it was a grant for service. 10. In Subramania v. Srivaikuntam Kailasanatha Swami Koil2 the inam title deed showed that it was an inam for the service of the chanting of hymns and that the “inam was confirmed to him and his successors so long as the conditions of the grant were duly fulfilled”. It was held that the grant was a personal one, subject to the conditions of the service being performed. Again in Sami Ayyangar and others v. Venkataramana Ayyangar and another3 the same learned Judge, Venkatasubba Rao, J., was concerned with this question in a case where the grant was in the name of an individual and it was also called as “Devadayam”. It was confirmed to the party “so long as he continues the performance of the services”. The services were as the archaka of a temple. It was held that the grant was to the individual burdened with service. 11. In Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Thadikonda Koteswara Rao4 the grant was for “Nithya Naivedya Deeparadhana”. It was confirmed to the party “so long as he continues the performance of the services”. The services were as the archaka of a temple. It was held that the grant was to the individual burdened with service. 11. In Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Thadikonda Koteswara Rao4 the grant was for “Nithya Naivedya Deeparadhana”. The decision in that case was that the grant was in favour of the deity. One of the tests laid down for finding out whether the grant is personal or in favour of the institution is to see the language employed in the inam grant. The expression used “so long as he continues the performance of the services” evidences a personal grant, while the expression “so long as the service is performed” evidences a grant to the deity. This aspect received the approval of the Supreme Court in Nanduri Yogananda Lakshminarasimhachari v. Sri Agastheswaraswamivaru5. That was a case in which the grant was for for performance of the service called “Kalyanothsavam” for the deity. The Supreme Court affirmed the view taken by this Court that the grant was a specific trust and not a grant to an individual with the added obligation of spending from out of the income on the particular service to the deity. In the course of the said judgment it was observed at page 63 as follows:- "It was urged by counsel for the appellants that the words in the Inam Register that the grant was to continue as long as the service is performed were indicative of the fact that the grant was not to the deity but to them individually with the added obligation of spending from out of the income on the particular service to the deity. A combined reading of the two documents, i.e., statement of the ancestor of the appellants and the Inam Register shows that the grant was a specific endowment and that the lands, were endowed for the purpose of Kalyanotsavam and for other purposes incidental thereto and constituted a specific trust. A combined reading of the two documents, i.e., statement of the ancestor of the appellants and the Inam Register shows that the grant was a specific endowment and that the lands, were endowed for the purpose of Kalyanotsavam and for other purposes incidental thereto and constituted a specific trust. The Courts below have found this is to be the nature of the trust and even if two inferences were possible from the reading of these two documents there is no reason why the view taken by the Courts below should be interfered with particularly when there are admissions by the predecessors of the appellants which support the view of the Courts below. Besides those words do not necessarily mean that the grant was to the individual with the added obligation to spend on the performance of service. In the present case it is not stated in the Inam Fair Register that the grant was to be confirmed in favour of Buchayya and continue so long as the service was performed. This kind of language used in Inam Registers has been discussed in some decided cases in the Madras High Court, i.e., Hindu Religious Endowments, Board, Madras v. Thadikonda Koteswara Rao1 where this distinction was prominently brought out between the words "to be confirmed so long as the service is performed" and "to be confirmed to the party so long as he continues the performance of the services".. The latter was held to be a personal grant and the former was not so held. We are therefore of the opinion that the finding of the High Court that the grant was a specific endowment for Kalyanotsavam of the deity and therefore a specific trust and not a grant to the appellant with the added obligation of spending on the service must be accepted to be correct." 12. The Supreme Court had occasion to consider the question as to the nature of the inam in the Roman Catholic Mission v. State of Madras and another2 The inam in that case was described as Devadayam inam and as Stalathar Inam Porupu manyam "conducted for Meenakshi Sundareswaral Temple, thaatie Devasthanam". The inam was entered in the names of certain persons described as "Bhattars". The name of the original grantee was not given there. The inam was entered in the names of certain persons described as "Bhattars". The name of the original grantee was not given there. It was held that the inam was for remunerating the archakas and that the Inam Fair Register speaks of the inam as Devadayam and reads it as permanent and that if the Inam was to a Brahmin personally, it would have been shown as ‘Brahmadayam’ and ‘hereditary’. 13. The same question again came up for consideration before a Bench of this Court in Ayya Nadar and others v. Sri Vaidyanathaswami Koil Devasthanam3 and it was pointed out as follows: "Column (2) of the inam extract refers to the inam as devadayam padikasuvaithan kulam. It is true the use of the word devadayam is not decisive or conclusive to denote that it was a grant to the temple. In Subramania v. Kailasanatha4 it has been pointed out that the word ‘devadayam’ is used in inam registers not only in connection with religious grants strictly so called but also where the ultimate purposes are religious. It is clear from the decision that the decision that the test to be applied in distinguishing a grant to an institution from a grant to an individual is the intention and that each case depends upon its own facts. In Sami Ayyangar v. Venkataramana1 it was held that devadayam as a grant does not necessarily import that the grant is made to the temple. It was further held that where a grant contains the clause that it is to be confirmed to party as long as he continues the performance of the service, it is a grant to the party burdened with service and not to the deity even though the word ‘devadayam’ is used as the inam register disclosed that the land was continuously held at least for two generations by the family of the party. It appears from page 260 of Sundararaja Iyengar’s Land Tenures that the mere description of an inam as devadayam is not conclusive that the grant is in favour of a religious institution, though it is a strong proof that the institution is a public one. It appears from page 260 of Sundararaja Iyengar’s Land Tenures that the mere description of an inam as devadayam is not conclusive that the grant is in favour of a religious institution, though it is a strong proof that the institution is a public one. It appears from the same page that where an inam was granted to the family of the defendant for service as acharya purusha in a temple confirmed so long as the service was rendered, the grant is not one made to the grantee for the benefit of himself and the temple, but one made for the support of the temple officer performing the duties of acharya purusha. It is clear from column 8 of the inam extract relating to the description of the inam in the present case that the inam is for the service of sthaladars, or puja paricharahams, sthanikams, karivalam, Sripadam, etc., of the pagoda of Sri Vaidyanathaswami at Madavarvilagam. Thus the inam is not to a particular person,or to benefit a particular individual and the emphasis is really on the office of sthalandars. The description in column 10 referring to the inam as permanent instead of as hereditary is more consistent with the inam being a service inam, rather than a personal grant burdened with service…. The inams have been granted, principally to the several officers attached to the temple the holders of the offices being remunerated by the enjoyment of the inam for rendering various services in the temple“. The only other decision that requires to be noticed in this connection is the one reported in Jamia Masjid Mosque Karur v. Syed Anwar Batcha Sahib and others2. In that case the grant stated that it would continue so long as kazi service was rendered, and the inam was also described as ”dharmadayam“. A bench of this Court pointed out as follows: "The term dharmadayam invariably has been held to be inconclusive in determining the character of an inam. Nonetheless, in particular context, the expression does throw light, more especially when read conjointly with other relative entries in the inam extract…… If it is a personal grant and it is hereditary under column 10 that word would have been used, but instead the entry is “permanent”. It is also significant that the grantee has not been mentioned and in fact the entry shows that it was not known. It is also significant that the grantee has not been mentioned and in fact the entry shows that it was not known. The inam was confirmed free so long as the kazi service was rendered. This entry would have been different, in our view, if it was a personal grant burdened with service. The entry would have read in that case that the grantee would be entitled to the inam so long as he performed the service. More important than all these entries is the statement which we referred to, to wit. This will be confirmed as inam attached to the mosque at Karur……“ Taking all the recitals which we have mentioned and also the observations we have just now made, we are of opinion that the inam is not shown to be a personal inam. We also think that the inam is attached to the mosque. The office of kazi is not and cannot be hereditary. The fact that the properties covered by the title deed have been found to be in possession of the members of KaziSyed Abdullah Batcha’s family for several years cannot be the basis, by itself, for the view that the inam was a personal inam. They apparently happened to hold the properties as in succession they were appointed as kazis”. 14. The result of the above discussion is to show that the use of the expression " dharamadayam " or " devadayam ", though relevant is not conclusive. The matter will have to be decided in the light of the language employed either in the inam grant or in the entries in the inam register. Where the inam was confirmed "so long as he continues to do service " it is personal and where it was confirmed " so long as the service is performed " it is in favour of the institution. The entries in columns 8and 10 of the Inam Register would be particularly relevant to show whether the inam is a service inam or it is in favour of the institution. Examined in the light of these indicia in the present case as against column 8 which describes the inam, it is stated " for service as ‘mulla ‘in the Mosque at Salavakkam. The service is rendered to this day". Examined in the light of these indicia in the present case as against column 8 which describes the inam, it is stated " for service as ‘mulla ‘in the Mosque at Salavakkam. The service is rendered to this day". In column 10 which describes the hereditary or other nature of the grant, it is stated " so long as the service is rendered". Particularly column 10 shows that the grant is not a hereditary one. If it was a hereditary one, then it would show that the grant was a personal one. As pointed out by this Court in Jamia Masjid Mosque, Karur v. Syed Anwar Batcha Sahib and others1 which dealt with the case of a kazi, and where the grant was held to be in favour of the institution and not a personal one, there is nothing to show that the office of mulla is a hereditary office, so that so long as the service of mulla is performed by the family, as such, it could be taken to be a personal inam. The entry in the inam register showing under columns 18 to 20. "parties performing the service of ‘mulla’ in the mosque " shows that the names of these parties came to be described in the Inam Register only because they were rendering the particular service. The use of the expression " their successors " in column 21 viz., " to be confirmed to the present holders and their successors so long as the ‘mulla’ service is performed" shows that the office of mulla is not a hereditary office and that the inam is in the nature of a remuneration to the person who renders the service as mulla. In the present case, therefore, the conclusion of the lower appellate Court that the grant was not a personal grant, but was a grant in favour of the institution is, thus unexceptionable. The contention to the contrary advanced by the learned counsel for the respondents deserves to be rejected. 15. This leads to the determination of the question as to whether the present proceedings are barred by the provisions of section 43 of the Tamil Nadu Act, XXX of 1963. That Act was passed for the acquisition of the rights of inamdars in minor inams in the State and for introduction of ryotwari settlement in such inams. 15. This leads to the determination of the question as to whether the present proceedings are barred by the provisions of section 43 of the Tamil Nadu Act, XXX of 1963. That Act was passed for the acquisition of the rights of inamdars in minor inams in the State and for introduction of ryotwari settlement in such inams. Under section 3 of the said Act, any minor inam which is not an estate coining within the scope of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908 and the Tamil Nadu Minor Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1963 would be vested in the Government. The Assistant Settlement Officer has the power to enquire into the claims of any person for ryotwari patta under the said Act. Under section 8 of the said Act, every person who was lawfully entitled to the Kudivaram in an inam land immediately before the appointed day, was entitled to ryotwari patta in respect of the land. Section 11 of the said Act provides that the Assistant Settlement Officer is entitled to enquire into the claims of any person in respect of a ryotwari patta and decide such a claim. Against a decision of the Assistant Settlement Officer, any person aggrieved may, within 3 months from the said date appeal, to the Tribunal. Section 30 of the said Act provides for a further appeal to the special Appellate Tribunal consisting of two Judges of the High Court nominated from time to time by the Chief Justice in this behalf. Against a decision of the Assistant Settlement Officer, any person aggrieved may, within 3 months from the said date appeal, to the Tribunal. Section 30 of the said Act provides for a further appeal to the special Appellate Tribunal consisting of two Judges of the High Court nominated from time to time by the Chief Justice in this behalf. Section 43, which is the relevant provision for our present purpose, runs as follows: "Res judicata.- (1) The decision of a Tribunal or the Special Appellate Tribunal to any proceeding under this Act on any matter falling within its jurisdiction shall be binding on the parties thereto and persons claiming under them, in any suit or proceeding in a civil Court, in so far as such matter is in issue between the parties or persons aforesaid in such suit or proceeding, (2) The decision of a civil Court (not being the Court of a District Munsif or a Court of Small Causes) on any matter falling within its jurisdiction shall be binding on the parties thereto and persons claiming under them in any proceeding under this Act before a Tribunal or the Special Appellate Tribunal in so far as such matter is in issue between the parties or persons aforesaid in such proceeding". Section 46, which is also to be noticed in the context of this case, provides as follows: "46 (1) Any order passed by any officer, the Government or other authority or any decision of the Tribunal or the Special Appellate Tribunal under this Act in respect of matters to be determined for the purposes of this Act shall, subject only to any appeal or revision provided under this Act, be final. (2) No such order or decision shall be liable to be questioned in any Court of law." Section 43 provides that the decision of a Tribunal in any proceeding under the Act on any matter falling within its jurisdiction is binding on the parties and persons claiming under them, in any suit or proceeding in a civil Court, !in so far as such matter is in issue between the parties in such suit or proceeding. The binding nature is restricted to any matter falling within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal. The binding nature is restricted to any matter falling within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal. In the present case the decision which is relied on by the respondents as constituting the bar to the present proceedings is the one decided by the Tribunal exercising jurisdiction under section 11 (3). Section 11, as already pointed out, provides for the grant of ryotwari patta and the Assistant Settlement Officer has to decide this question in respect of the land over which any claim is made. The jurisdiction of the Assistant Settlement Officer is merely for the purpose of granting a patta and not to decide any dispute as to title. It is his decision, which is the subject matter of the appeal before the Tribunal and the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is also restricted to finding out the person in whose favour the ryotwari patta is to be issued. As the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to go into the question of title to the land, as such, I do not consider that the bar enacted in section 43 operates in the present case so as to disentitle the plaintiffs from filing the present suit. There is a series of decisions on the question as to how far the jurisdiction of the civil Court is excluded and the finality attached to the order of a Tribunal or other authority constituted under an Act operates. 16. I had occasion to examine this question in Rajasekharan and others v. Elumalai Gounden and others1 and it was pointed out in that case that in determining the title to the property, the civil Courts have jurisdiction to go into all the incidental questions including the character of the lands and that any decision in any proceeding under section 11 of the Estates Abolition Act would not be binding on a civil Court and that any decision under the provisions of section 18 or 19 of the Act with reference to grant of patta to buildings or vacant lands could not also have a finality beyond the scope of examination by a civil Court. It was held that the finality under section 64-C of the Estates Abolition Act was only for the purpose of the Act and that it had no effect in a suit for declaration of title. All the relevant authorities have been noticed in that case. It was held that the finality under section 64-C of the Estates Abolition Act was only for the purpose of the Act and that it had no effect in a suit for declaration of title. All the relevant authorities have been noticed in that case. It is not, therefore, necessary to cover the same ground here. 17. The learned counsel for the respondents, however, submitted that the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Act XXX of 1963 are different from the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Estates Abolition Act, which was the subject of consideration in that case and that the decision rendered under that Act would not be applicable to the cases to which the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Act XXX of 1963 would apply. The learned counsel for the respondents contended that the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Act XXX of 1963 correspond more to section 15 of that Act than to section 11 with which the Court was concerned in the decision in Rajasekharan and others v. Elumalai Goundan and others1 and the other cases referred to therein. The Assistant Settlement Officer has under section 11 power or jurisdiction to inquire into the claims of any person for a ryotwari patta in respect of any inam land and decide in respect of which land the claim should be allowed. The order of the Assistant Settlement Officer could be the subject of an appeal to the Tribunal under section 11 (3). If the question in the present case were as to who is entitled to a ryotwari patta, then clearly the machinery provided under the said Act would alone be the one to which the parties could have recourse. The present case is not one in which the prayer is for the grant of ryotwari patta. A civil Court is not concerned with the issue of a patta, as such. The civil Court in the present case has been approached for a declaration of title to the property. There is no provision in the said Act for the purpose of finding out whether the inam grant is a personal grant or in favour of the institution. It is this aspect which is agitated in the present case and so long as there is no machinery under the said Act for the purpose of agitating that issue, the civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain a suit for this purpose. It is this aspect which is agitated in the present case and so long as there is no machinery under the said Act for the purpose of agitating that issue, the civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain a suit for this purpose. I am not, therefore, satisfied with the correctness of the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that the provisions of this Act are so different from the Estates Abolition Act XXVI of 1948, that the decisions rendered under the said Act have no manner of application here. The general principles of the jurisdiction of the civil Court and the finality attached to the orders of the authorities constituted as laid down in the decisions under the said Acts would be applicable here also. 18. It would, therefore, follow from the discussion that the inam being one in favour of the institution so long as the service was rendered, the title to the property is only in favour of the institution, that is the Mosque here. The result would be that the plaintiff would be entitled to the declaration of title. The second appeal is partly allowed. But there will be no order as to costs.