JUDGMENT H.N. Agrawal, Member. - This is a revision against the judgment and order of Sri. S.H. Hasan, Additional Commissioner, Faizabad Division, Faizabad dated January 28, 1972 in Appeal No. 1048 of 1970 against the order dated September 14, 1970 passed by the Tahsildar, Assistant Collector First Class, Tanda in case No. 291 under Sections 137 and 137-A of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. 2. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties and have gone through the record. 3. The present revisionists, S/Sri Vikramajeet Singh and Heera Singh had filed an application before the Tahsildar/Assistant Collector First Class, Tanda on October 26, 1969 for cancellation of the Bhumidhari Sanad issued in the name of Bhagwati Singh on September 26, 1972 claiming that Bhagwati Singh had filed a suit under Section 209, U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act against them but the civil court had on June 13, 1956 dismissed the suit holding the applicants to be Adhivasis of the land. A similar application was moved by Vikrama Jeet Singh alone for cancellation of the Sanad issued in favour of Bhagwati Singh on September 26, 1969 in respect of another Khata. The learned Tehsildar after giving due opportunity to the parties concerned and recording the evidence rejected both these applications by his order dated September 14, 1970. Vikramajeet Singh and Hira Singh filed an appeal before the Additional Commissioner. This appeal was decided by the Additional Commissioner on January 5, 1971 in terms of a compromise arrived at between the parties. Thereafter Ram Yad Singh, Ram Adhar Singh and Ram Sunder Singh filed an application before the Additional Commissioner under Section 151, C.P.C. on January 11, 1971. The learned Additional Commissioner by his order dated January 28, 1972 allowed this application, set aside the order dated January 5, 1971 and ordered that the appeal be heard on merits. Vikramajeet Singh and Hira Singh have now come up in revision against this order. 4. The learned Additional Commissioner by his order dated January 28, 1972 allowed this application, set aside the order dated January 5, 1971 and ordered that the appeal be heard on merits. Vikramajeet Singh and Hira Singh have now come up in revision against this order. 4. The learned counsel for the revisionists has contended that the lower appellate court had no jurisdiction to set aside the order dated January 5, 1971 deciding the appeal in terms of the compromise, that Ram Yad Singh, Ram Adhar Singh and Ram Sunder Singh could not challenge the aforesaid decree dated January, 5, 1971 as they were no parties to the appeal, that the transferee is bound by the acts of the transferee is bound by the acts of the transferor, and as such the compromise made by the transferor is binding on the transferees and that it has not been established that there was any fraud played upon the Court and as such the learned Additional Commissioner had no jurisdiction to set aside the compromise. 5. A perusal of the record shows that Ram Yad Singh, Ram Adhar Singh and Ram Sunder Singh were no parties to the case either before the Tehsildar or before the Additional Commissioner. Before the Tehsilar, Vikramajeet Singh and Hira Singh had filed the application and had impleaded Bhagwati Singh, the person in whose name the Sanad had been issued. In the appeal filed before the Additional Commissioner also only these persons were parties. The legal position is that in proceedings for cancellation of a Bhumidhari Sanad, only the person in whose name the Bhumidhari Sanad is granted and not the transferee is a necessary party. Thus, Ram Yad Singh, Ram Adhar Singh and Ram Sunder Singh cannot claim to be necessary parties as transferees from the Sanad-holder Bhagwati Singh. In view of this matter, Ram Yad Singh Ram Adhar singh and Ram Sunder Singh could not file an application under Section 151, C.P.C. for setting aside the order passed in the appeal, and the learned Additional Commissioner has acted without jurisdiction in passing an order under Section 151, C.P.C. 6. The learned counsel for the revisionists has referred to Laraiti Devi v. Sia Ram, AIR 1957 Allahabad 820, in which a learned Bench of the Allahabad High Court has discussed the principles governing a compromise decree. The learned counsel for the revisionists has referred to Laraiti Devi v. Sia Ram, AIR 1957 Allahabad 820, in which a learned Bench of the Allahabad High Court has discussed the principles governing a compromise decree. The learned Bench has observed as follows: "The view of the learned Civil Judge that it was possible for the defendant to raise in proceedings under Order 23, Rule 3, Civil Procedure Code, the question whether the compromise had been obtained by fraud or misrepresentation can also not be said to be in consonance with the view of this Court. In the case of Union of India v. Raghubir Saran, AIR 1957 Allahabad 120(F), a Bench of this Court has laid down: "A contract vitiated by fraud can be set aside by a decree obtained in a regular suit instituted for that purpose. Order 23, Rule 3 does not not provide any enquiry into the disputed facts collateral to the terms of the compromise. The party alleging fraud cannot be allowed to avoid the compromise admittedly executed by it in miscellaneous proceedings started by an application under Order 23, Rule 3, C.P.C. The Court is bound to give effect to it if it is lawful having regard to its own terms." "The learned counsel for the defendant referred in this connection to the case of Mst. Kalpa v. Sitaram, AIR 1955 Allahabad 187(G) and urged that a different view had been taken in the case. This does not appear to be correct, and the two cases are easily reconcilable. In the cases of Mst. Kalpa v. Sitaram (G) the defendant No. 1 who was alleged to have compromised the suit with the plaintiff had repudiated the compromise before it was acted upon by the court and had alleged that she had neither into a compromise not had she appeared before the Court for the verification of the same. An issue was framed on the point, but the learned Civil Judge held that it was not open to him to go into the question in view of the compromise having been verified earlier before his predecessor. Without considering the question, therefore, he ordered that a decree be prepared in terms of the compromise. An issue was framed on the point, but the learned Civil Judge held that it was not open to him to go into the question in view of the compromise having been verified earlier before his predecessor. Without considering the question, therefore, he ordered that a decree be prepared in terms of the compromise. In these circumstances it was held that when the factum of the compromise was itself disputed the Court was bound to go into the question and to record a finding whether the compromise had in fact been arrived at or not. The case was, therefore, sent back for the decision of that question. The distinction between the case of Mst. Kalpa v. Sitaram, AIR 1955 Allahabad 187(G) and the case of Union of India v. Raghubir Saran, AIR 1957 Allahabad 120(F), lies in the fact that while in the latter case the entering into of the compromise was not disputed but it was sought to be avoided on the ground that it had been obtained by fraud, in the former case the very fact that the compromise has been arrived at was disputed. When a compromise is filed and is alleged to have been made by the parties before recording it the court is bound to arrive at a finding on the question whether the compromise has in fact been arrived at or not. That was the only thing that was laid down in Mst. Kalpa's case (supra). "It the compromise was in fact arrived at the additional question whether it was voidable at the instance of one of the parties on grounds similar to fraud or misrepresentation was according to the Union of India v. Raghubir Saran, AIR 1957 Allahabad 120(F) foreign to proceedings under Order, 23, Rule 3 and could not be considered in those proceedings. The settled view of this Court thus appear to be that it is not open to a party to avoid a compromise admittedly entered into by it in proceedings entered into by it in proceedings under Order 23, Rule 3 by alleging fraud. This is in substance what the defendant wanted to do before the learned Civil Judge." 7. The settled view of this Court thus appear to be that it is not open to a party to avoid a compromise admittedly entered into by it in proceedings entered into by it in proceedings under Order 23, Rule 3 by alleging fraud. This is in substance what the defendant wanted to do before the learned Civil Judge." 7. The learned counsel for the revisionists has further referred to Bindodi Lal v. Virendra Singh, AIR 1958 M.P. 391 , in which the learned Judges of Indore Bench have held as follows: "Thus these decisions seems to lay down clearly that where a consent decree is sought to be assailed on the ground either of fraud of collusion or both said to have been committed by a party to the suit the appropriate remedy is that of a suit and not application under Section 151, C.P.C.". "It is well settled that fraud and collusion vitiate most solemn transactions. Where a decision is alleged to have been affected by either of them then the aggrieved party can seek Court's assistance by means of a suit specially designed for that purpose. The particulars of fraud in such a case have got to be alleged and if traversed proved. In the matter of proof complicated question of fact and law are likely to arise. The decision given in the suit becomes subject to rights of appeal conferred by law on either party." "On the other hand when a resort is had to a remedy under Section 151, C.P.C. the decision practically becomes final with no right of appeal Proceeding under Section 151, C.P.C. from its nature is not meant to be a substitute for a suit. That section in a way express what already vests in Court to be availed of by it to meet the ends of justice where rules of procedure expressly provided do not meet the situation. The power is discretionary and in considering the question of propriety in invoking this residuary power the Court would take into account several matters such as complexity of the questions involved, availability of a more complete and efficacious remedy by means of a suit and the apparent justice of the claim." 8. The learned counsel for the opposite parties has been unable to seriously challenge the above authorities cited before this Court. The learned counsel for the opposite parties has been unable to seriously challenge the above authorities cited before this Court. There is no doubt at all in my mind that the above rulings have laid down the law correctly. In the present case, there is no evidence on record to show that any fraud had in fact been played upon the Court and, therefore, the learned Additional Commissioner had no jurisdiction to set aside the compromise decree on the ground that the compromise was fraudulent. On the other hand, the said compromise is signed by Bhagwati Singh, the Sanad-holder as well as by Hira Singh and Vikramajeet Singh the objectors, and the parties concerned have been duly identified by the responsible Advocates who were counsels for the parties appearing in the Court. The appeal having been decided in terms of the compromise, the compromise could be challenged in the civil Court by either of the parties. As Ram Vad Singh, Ram Adhar Singh and Ram Sunder Singh were merely transferees, the compromise made by the transfer or Bhagwati Singh, who was the Sanad-holder, was binding on them. It was not open to Ram Yad Singh, etc. to challenge the compromise decree under Section 151, C.P.C. nor was it open to the learned Additional Commissioner to set aside the compromise decree under Section 151, C.P.C. 9. The result is that I hereby allow this revision and set aside the impugned order of the learned Additional Commissioner dated January 28, 1972.