JUDGEMENT The two petitioners were prosecuted by the Vasco da Gama Police for offences under S.445 and S.379 of the I.P.C. It was alleged that they trespassed into a property known as 'Baille-Challi' owned and possessed by the first informant, Dr. Adelia D'Costa and plucked coconuts from the trees existing thereon and removed them to their house. To the charges framed under S.379, I.P.C. the accused pleaded not guilty. According to them they plucked coconuts from the property in 'Baille-Challi' which belongs to them. Their case is that there are two properties bearing the same name adjoining to each other and that one of those properties bearing the name 'Baille-Challi' belongs to them and that the first informant's father wanted to grab their property. 2. The trial Magistrate convicted the petitioners under S.379 of the I.P.C. and sentenced them to R.I. for one month and to pay a fine of Rs.200/- each. 3. The petitioners preferred an appeal against that order and the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Panaji, before whom the appeal came up for hearing, by his order dated 21-9-76. partly allowed the appeal. He upheld the conviction of both petitioners, but reduced the sentence in respect of petitioner No.2 to a fine of Rs.200/- though the sentence of petitioner No.1 was confirmed. 4. Shri Tamba, learned advocate appearing for the petitioners has urged before me that the learned Additional Sessions Judge is at a gross error in dismissing the appeal without applying his mind to the evidence on record. According to him he has not at all assessed the evidence adduced by the prosecution as well as the defence and has mechanically come to the conclusion that the finding of the trial Magistrate was correct. He has invited my attention to paragraph 5 of the judgment which deals with the appreciation of evidence. He states that what the learned Additional Sessions Judge has stated in the said paragraph is that the evidence led by the prosecution proves that the plucking was done by the accused in the property 'Baille-Challi' belonging to the complainant's family and in whose possession it was, and that this finding follows necessarily the statements of the complainant and P.Ws. 3, 4 and 5, which statements conclusively prove that the said property where plucking was done and the property 'Baille-Challi' recognized by this Court as belonging to the complainant's father are one and the same. 3, 4 and 5, which statements conclusively prove that the said property where plucking was done and the property 'Baille-Challi' recognized by this Court as belonging to the complainant's father are one and the same. He points out that it is the duty of the Appellate Court to reappraise the evidence in order to ascertain whether the findings arrived at by the Magistrate are justified or not, 5. I have gone through the evidence on record and I find that the evidence of P.W.4, which has been accepted by the two Courts below, shows that the accused did pluck the coconut trees situated in the land belonging to and possessed by the father of the complainant, Dr. Adelia D'Costa: P.W.4 further stated that he was in charge of the property and that the charge has been given to him by the father of the complainant. P.W.5 who taps toddy from trees situated in the land where the coconut trees in question are lying, has also stated that the theft took place in the property belonging to the father of the complainant. This evidence is supported by the complainant who has stated that the suit to restrain the accused from interfering with the property in question had been decreed in favour of her father. The decree was confirmed by this Court. The question that the accused also had a land known as 'Baille-Challi' is irrelevant because the Courts below have accepted the evidence of the said witnesses and have held that the plucking had taken place in the property belonging to the father of the complainant and which was in his possession and custody. 6. The attack on the judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge is also unfounded. Even if I assume for argument's sake, that the reasoning of the Appellate Court was not exhaustive that fact alone does not vitiate the finding of that Court. The judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge was a Judgment passed in appeal and was a judgment of affirmance. There is, in his finding, implicit acceptance of the reasoning adopted by the trial Court. A judgment where an Appellate Court agrees with the finding of the trial Court cannot be set aside merely because no reasons were given by the Appellate Court. There is, in his finding, implicit acceptance of the reasoning adopted by the trial Court. A judgment where an Appellate Court agrees with the finding of the trial Court cannot be set aside merely because no reasons were given by the Appellate Court. This principle is well laid down in Syed Yakodb v. K.S. Radhakrishnan, AIR 1964 SC 477 , by a Bench of five Judges and it was later on followed in 'State of Andhra Pradesh v. Chitra Venkata Rao,' (1975) 2 SCC 557 : ( AIR 1975 SC 2151 ). Seervai, in his book "Constitutional Law of India," Second Edition, Vol.II, at page 944, has dwelt at length on this subject and considered the case law in this regard. The conflicting decisions have been settled by the Supreme Court and there can be no doubt now that the High Court should not interfere with the Judgment of an Appellate Court confirming the findings of the trial Court on the bare fact that reasons had not been given for the finding. 7. In the circumstances, the Criminal Revision Application is dismissed. Revision dismissed.