ORDER Tankha J. 1. The petitioner by this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution pray, for issue of a writ of certiorari for purposes of quashing the order dated 18.9.1976 (Annexure B) passed by the Labour Court, Burhar (respondent no. 2) and also order dated 15-11-1976 (Annexure D) passed by the Industrial Court (respondent no. 3). 2. The petitioner is a Corporation constituted under Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950. The respondent no. 1 was working as Assistant Mechanic in Sntna Depot of the Corporation. The said respondent applied for leave from 2.4.1974 to 4-4-1974 which was sanctioned. But after expiry of that period of leave, the respondent no. 1 did not join on duty nor applied for leave. On that count his name was struck off from the strength of the rolls by the Corporation vide order dated 25/27-5-1974 with effect from 5-4-1974 under the provisions of section 8 (e) of the M.P.S.R.T.C. Standing Orders. The respondent no. 1 thereafter challenged the legality of that order before the Labour Court That Court by its order dated 18-9-1976 (Annexure B) held that the Depot Manager had the right to terminate the services. It also held that the service of the respondent No. 1 was governed by M.P.S.R.T.C. Service Regulations and not by Standing Orders. It further held that the absence of the respondent no. 1 was on account of his sickness. In view of these findings the said Court directed the petitioner to reinstate the respondent no. 1 with back wages within 30 days of the passing of the said order. The petitioner thereafter challenged that order before the respondent no. 3 (Revisional Authority) under section 66 and 67 of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act, 1960. The respondent no. 3 passed the order (Annexure D) which reads as under :- "Shri Nair, Advocate for applicant; Shri R.K. Gupta, Advocate for non-applicant. Arguments heard. There is no force in this petition hence it is rejected." The petitioner being still aggrieved as the revisional order contained no reasons for the rejection filed the present petition in this Court. 3. Before the start of the hearing a preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the respondent no. 1 that the order of the Labour Court against the petitioner having been already implemented the present petition has be come infructious. In our opinion the objection is devoid of any substance. 3. Before the start of the hearing a preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the respondent no. 1 that the order of the Labour Court against the petitioner having been already implemented the present petition has be come infructious. In our opinion the objection is devoid of any substance. In view of section 35 of the M.P. Industrial Relations Act, 1960 the order is required to be implemented within 72 hours of the communication unless the Court or the Board specifies any time then within such time. In case failure occurs to comply with the order the employer becomes liable for prosecution. It could not be denied also that if the orders are quashed there would be restitution of the departmental order. Therefore, the rights of the employer cannot be allowed to disappear simply on the basis that he complied with the orders of the Labour Court before challenging the same. In our opinion the contention if accepted it would lead to serious consequences and mote so unwarranted in the absence of any provision, which we could not be shown, extinguishing such rights of an employer after implementation. The preliminary objection is accordingly, rejected. 4. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted before us that the order passed by the respondent no. 3 in the instant case being without support of any reasons is bad in law and as such needs to be quashed. On the other hand learned counsel appearing for the respondent no. 1 though admitted that the order passed by the revisional authority was not a speaking one but he submitted that it be not interfered with as the contentions before the respondent no. 3 were only on facts. That being so, no reasons were required to be given by the respondent no. 3 in rejecting the revision. 5. We are of opinion that the submission of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner must prevail. It is incumbent on a quasi-judicial Tribunal while passing an order to see that it is supported by reasons, that is to say it ought to be a speaking order. It is necessary in the interest of justice and also in compliance with the basic principles of natural justice that not only the superior Court but the aggrieved party is in a position to adjudge the reasoning behind that order. It is necessary in the interest of justice and also in compliance with the basic principles of natural justice that not only the superior Court but the aggrieved party is in a position to adjudge the reasoning behind that order. If this is not done by the administrative Tribunals exercising quasi judicial functions public confidence would be shaken in the adjudicatory process. In this connection we may refer to a recent decision of the Supreme Court in The Siemens Engineering and Manufacturing Co. of India Ltd. V. The Union of India and another [AIR 1976 SC P. 1785] the relevant passage reads as under: ".........It is not suggested that the Collector should have made an elaborate order discussing the arguments of the appellants in the manner of a Court of law but the order of the Collector could have been a little more explicit and articulate so as to lend assurance that the case of the appellants had been properly considered by him. If Courts of law are to be replaced by administrative authorities and tribunals, as indeed, in some kinds of Cases, with the proliferation of Administrative law, they may have to be so replaced it is essential that administrative authorities and tribunals should accord fair and proper hearing to the persons sought to be affected by their orders and give sufficiently clear and explicit reasons in support of the orders made by them. Then alone administrative authorities and tribunals exercising quasi-judicial function will be able to justify their existence and carry credibility with the people by inspiring confidence in the adjudicatory process. The rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is like the principle of audi alteram parten, a basic principle of natural justice which must inform every quasi judicial process and this rule must be observed in its proper spirit and mere pretence of compliance with it would not satisfy the requirement of law. ......" "......... We hope and trust that in future the Customs Authorities will be more careful in adjudicating upon the proceedings which come before them and pass properly reasoned orders, so that those who are affected by such orders ale assured that their case has received proper consideration at the hands of the Customs Authorities and the validity of the adjudication made by the Customs Authorities can also be satisfictorily tested in a superior tribunal or court........." 6. In view of the aforementioned decision which applies with all force to the impugned order of the respondent no. 3, the said order has to be quashed as it contains no reasons at all. We do hope the respondent no. 3 in future would pass a reasoned order. In the circumstances it is but proper to remit the case to the respondent no. 3 for hearing the revision afresh and passing the order in accordance with law. 7. For the reasons stated above, this petition is allowed. The order dated 15-11-1976 (Annexure D) passed by the respondent no. 3 is hereby quashed and the said respondent is directed to hear the revision afresh and decide the same in accordance with the directions mentioned above. There will be no order as to costs. The security amount, if any, shall be refunded to the petitioner.