SACHAR, J.—This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking a direction to quash and set aside the order of respondent No. 1, State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur, dated March 7, 1977, by which it has granted a temporary permit to respondent No. 3 on Kota-Mangrole route and to quash the permit issued to it. 2. A draft scheme u/sec. 68-C of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter called "the Act" for nationalisation of a number of routes was published on April 24, 1973. One of the routes published (with which we are concerned) was Kota-Kasbathana via Tater. The distance between the Kota Municipal limits and Tater is 6 5 kilometers. The objections to the draft scheme came to be considered by the Joint Legal Remembrancer, who, by order dated May 7, 1976, approved the scheme with the modifications etc. mentioned in the said order. One of the points pressed before him was that as Tater is only at a distance of 6 5 kilometers from the Municipal Council, Kota, overlapping by private buses up to Tated, should by allowed. The said plea was accepted by him and he therefore held,— "...in public interest, I consider it appropriate that upto Tater the buses of private operators shall be allowed to pass and there shall be no curtailments from the permits. To this extent these concessions shall be available not only to existing operators but to others also, who may be allowed to bifurcate their route from this traffic point." (Itilic supplied) The said scheme was approved and published under section 68D of the Act on June 15, 1976. A further corrigendum was issued to the said notification by the Government notification of July 16, 1976. As a consequence, clauses 4 and 5 of the scheme provided that excepting the State Transport undertaking and State Transport under takings of other States either under existing interstate agreements or interstate agreements to be entered into future and also operattors on the existing amalgamated route of Kota-Khatoli-Geta-Piploda route and other routes which bifurcate from Tater, no other person will be entitled to ply stage carriage on this route. 3. A draft scheme under section 68-C of the Act for the route Kota-Khatoli via Tater-Dhabri has also been published on April 3, 1976. The said scheme has not yet been approved under sec. 68D of the Act. 4. 3. A draft scheme under section 68-C of the Act for the route Kota-Khatoli via Tater-Dhabri has also been published on April 3, 1976. The said scheme has not yet been approved under sec. 68D of the Act. 4. There is a Kota-Tater-Dhabri-Magrol route on which the petitioners along with certain other persons are operating. This route of Kota Mangrol overlaps the notified route under sec. 68 D of Kota to Kasbathana from Kota upto Tater. It also overlaps the route of draft scheme under sec. 68C of the Act of Kota to Khatoli from Kota to Dhabri via Tater. The portion from Dhabri to Mangrol is not on a route under 68D or 68C of the Act. 5. It appears that prior to 1971, there was a scope of 4 buses and three services on Kota-Mangrol route. This has now been revised to 7 buses with six return services. The Ragional Transport Authority has granted two temporary permits on this Kota-Mangrol route (the same however is not under challenge before me) and need not to concern us. 6. As there was scope for one permit, respondent No. 3 applied on January 29, 1977 for a temporary permit under section 68-F(l-C) and section 62(1)(c) of the Act on the ground that there is shortage of buses to cope up with the increased traffic from Kota to Mangrol via Sultanpur-Dhabri to Swali. This application was rejected by the R. T. A. on February 11, 1977 on the ground that there was no temporary need and also because part of the route had been notified and that part of the route has been notified under section 68-C. Respondent No. 3 was aggrieved and went in appeal Define respondnet No. 1 which by its order dated March 7, 1977, has granted temporary permit for a period of 4 months to respondent No. 3 with the condition that the same will be invalid when the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporations buses start on the route or a part of the route under nationalisation scheme. The petitioner is aggrieved and has come up to this court challenging the grant of the impugned temporary permits to respondent No. 3. 7. Sec. 68FF of the Act puts a restriction on the grant of permit in respect of a notified route. Proviso to sec. The petitioner is aggrieved and has come up to this court challenging the grant of the impugned temporary permits to respondent No. 3. 7. Sec. 68FF of the Act puts a restriction on the grant of permit in respect of a notified route. Proviso to sec. 68FF however permits that where no application for grant of permit has been made by the State Transport undertaking, a temporary permit may be granted to a person in respect of the said notified area subject to the condition that such permit shall cease to be effective on the issue of a permit to State Transport undertaking. Section 68-F(l-A) provides that where any scheme has been published by the State Transport undertaking under section 68 C, the said undertaking may apply for temporary permit in respect of any area, route or portion thereof specified in the scheme and the State Transport Authority shall grant the temporary permit. Subsection (1-G) of section 68 F further provides that if no application fur a temporary permit is made under subsection (1-A), the S.T.A. or the R.T.A may grant temporary permit to any person in respect of the area or route or portion thereof specified in the scheme.........It is common ground that no application for a temporary permit has been made under sub-section (1-A) of sec. 68-F for the route or a portion of the route from Kota to Khatoli via Tater-Dhabri for which a scheme has been published under sec. 68-C of the Act. 8. The contention by the learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Sharma and Mr. Munshee, who was allowed to intervene in support of the petitioner, was that Kota to Kasbathana is a notified route of total exclusion barring from Kota-Tater but only for the existing operators at the time the scheme was approved in June, 1976. The respondent No. 3, who had admittedly been given a permit in March, 1977 could not have been thus given a temporary permit on Kota to Mangrol route which overlaps the portion of the notified route of Kota-Kasbathana from Kota to Tater. This argument naturally assumes that the portion of Kota to Tater of the notified route is a portion of total exclusion for all operators excepting those who were operating in June 1976. This argument naturally assumes that the portion of Kota to Tater of the notified route is a portion of total exclusion for all operators excepting those who were operating in June 1976. The counsel for the petitioners admit that the petitioner as well as some other operators who were plying at the time the scheme was approved and notified under sec. 68-D, are operating on Kota-Mangrol route even at present and thus overlap Kota to Tater, a portion of notified route. This they purport to justify by invoking to their aid paras 4 and 5 of the approved scheme published on June 15, 1976, along-with the corrigendum of July 6 1976. The petitioner wants to read paras 4 and 5 to mean that persons who were plying buses on Kota Khatoli route as well as other roules, which bifurcate from Tater, were alone allowed to operate on a portion of notified route of Kota-Kasbathana i.e. from Kota to Tater. Thus according to this argument, portion of Kota to Tater is not a portion of total exclusion so far as the then existing operators are concerned, but is a portion of total exclusion, so far as any other persons like the respondent No. 3 in future may seek to ply on portion. I cannot agree. A reference to the order of the Joint Legal Remembrancer dated May 7, 1976 will show that he was greatly impressed with the fact that the distance between Kota Municipal limit to Tater is only 6-5 kilometers and that he had been permitting the overlapping in other schemes up to 5 kilometers, beyond the municipal limits. He also noticed that at Tater about 38 services pass to and fro from Kota-Khatoli-Itawa and total number of persons travelling is 1500. Kota was said to be a fastly developing industrial centre. Keeping all thase considerations in view, he directed that up to Tater, the buses of private operators shall be allowed to pass. He specifically held that this concession will be available not only to the existing operators but to other also who may be allowed to bifurcate their route from this traffic point, (italic supplied). It is thus clear that when the scheme was notified under sec. He specifically held that this concession will be available not only to the existing operators but to other also who may be allowed to bifurcate their route from this traffic point, (italic supplied). It is thus clear that when the scheme was notified under sec. 68-D and the portion from Kota to Tater was allowed to be plied by private buses if the buses bifurcate at Tater, the concession was not restricted only to then existing permit holders but was to operate in favour of all permits holders who may in future be allowed to bifurcate their route from Tater. The over all consideration was that as the distance between Kota to Tater was very small and as the requirement of traffic was heavy, it may work great inconvenience to the public if because of this small overlapping, buses were not to be allowed to operate on other routes like Kota-Mangrol even though they were to bifurcate from Tater. 9. Mr. Munshee had sought to urge that resolution in permitting of the existing operators and no1 others is not, perse, discriminatory and had referred me to Mushtaq Ahmed vs. State (l). I need not go in the question of discrimination, because on the interpretation that I have given of the notified scheme, I have no doubt that the overlapping was permitted not only to the existing operators, but to any other person whose route may be bifurcated from Tater. That case is therefore no help to the petitioner. 10. Mr. Munshee had also referred me R.M.D.C. vs. Union of India (2) for the contention that as the notified scheme is law, one must try to see the intent of them that made it and that could be gathered from the wordings actually used in the Statute. The proposition is unexceptionable. The words mentioned in the notified scheme are clear and do not make any special concession only in favour of the then existing operators. I can also see no legitimate reason why it should have been done so when the whole purpose was that the short distance from Kota to Tater should not be excluded because otherwise it may interfere and harm the travelling public. In that view, as the approved scheme under sec. I can also see no legitimate reason why it should have been done so when the whole purpose was that the short distance from Kota to Tater should not be excluded because otherwise it may interfere and harm the travelling public. In that view, as the approved scheme under sec. 68 D itself does not provide for the total exclusion of the portion of Kota to Tater so long as the buses to bifurcate from Tater, the argument that the permit of respondent No. 3 from Kota to Mangrol is invalid because he would ply on a portion of notified route from Kota to Tater is not maintainable. 11. As the State Transport undertaking has not yet applied for temporary permit on Kota Khatoli-via Dhabri route, (under section 68 C of the Act), prima facie, there could be no objection to the respondent No. 23 being granted temporary permit under sec. 68F (1C) for the portion Kota to Dhabri. This is of course not disputed by the petitioner. What is, howeuer, objected is that the temporary permit to respondent No 3 has not been issued from Kota to Dhabri, but from Kota to Mangrol, and as Dhabri to Mangrol is not a part of the draft-scheme route, therefore, a permit could not have been issued by invoking the power under sec. 68 F (1 C) of the Act. The next corollary to this argument necessarily implies that a permit cannot be issued by invoking power both under sec. 68-F(l-C) and sec. 62 (l)(c) of the Act. The underlying assumption in this argument is that as Chapter IV wherein section 62 is found, and Chapter IV-A, which comprise sec. 68.F (1-C), are separate chapters, the power in these two sections cannot be combined for issuing temporary permits. It is maintained that the power to issue a temporary permit can either be exercised by invoking power separately under sec. 62 or sec. 68-F (I C) but not by combining both of course, if this argument of the petitioner has any validity, obviously, the respondent No. 3 could not have been granted a temporary permit because of a portion from Kota-Tater-Dhabri is under a draft scheme under sec. 68 C, to which sec. 68 F (1-C) applies while the portion from Dhabri to Mangrol is not under either an approved or draft scheme. 68 C, to which sec. 68 F (1-C) applies while the portion from Dhabri to Mangrol is not under either an approved or draft scheme. There is however fallacy in the argument The Act provides for the issue of a non-temporary permit and a temporary permit. Section 62 of the Act lays down a condition under which a temporary permit can be issued. So when a person applies for a temporary permit, it can be issued to him if conditions laid down under sec. 62 are complied with. But sec. 68-F (1-C) has laid down an embargo on the issue of the temporary permit on the route on the draft scheme (even if conditions of sec. 62 are complied with) unless the conditions laid down under sec. 68 F (1-C) are complied with. The consequence is that when a person applies for a temporary permit, the issuing authority has to see that not only he complies with the condi-tions laid down in sub-sec. (1 C) of sec. 68-F, if temporary permit is also to include a portion of the route mentioned in draft scheme under sec. 68 C of the Act. It is not as if a hybrid composite permit is being issued as was the objection which was accepted in special appeal No. 539 of 1971 (Umraosingh vs. R.T.A., Udaipur decided on November 13, 1972, by this Court. In that case, a permit had been issued with the remarks that it would be a temporary permit on a part of the route and a non-temporary one for another part of the route. It was in that context that it was observed by the Division Bench that permits contemplated under the Act are of two kinds, non temporary and temporary, and no third category of permit could be granted under the Act. In the present case, however, the permit issued is a temporary permit contemplated under the Act and Umraosinghs case (supra) has no applicability, The permit, here, is temporary one. The embargo of section 68-F (1-G) of the Act does not apply and therefore respondent No. 3 is in a position to obtain a permit from Kota to Mangrol. The argument of the petitioner really boils down to as this that because a reference has to be made to both Chapters IV and IV-A, before a temporary permit can be issued to respondent No. 3, the permit becomes invalid. The argument of the petitioner really boils down to as this that because a reference has to be made to both Chapters IV and IV-A, before a temporary permit can be issued to respondent No. 3, the permit becomes invalid. There is no warrant in law for such an argument. Objection to issue of a temporary permit to respondent No. 3, can only succeed if it is shown that there is a legal bar to the issue of temporary permit to respondent No. 3 This the petitioner could only do if they were successful in proving that there was an embargo under sec. 68-F (1-G) to the issue of a permit on the portion Kota to Dhadri. But as I have already mentioned, there is none because State Transport undertaking has not applied for a temporary permit under sec.68-F (1-A). There is thus no embargo on granting temporary permit to respondent No. 3. I have previously also in Bhanwarlal Jain vs. Regional Transport Authority, Udaipur (3) rejected the contention that though the power be with the Transport Authority under Chapters IV and IV-A, the same cannot be exercised at the same time. For the reasons mentioned above, I am of the view that the temporary permit issued to respondent No. 3 could not be objected to on the ground that a portion of the route, i. e.Kota- Tater-Dhabri was comprised in the route of draft-scheme under section 68-C of the Act. 12. The next objection sought to be raised was that the R.T.A. had held there was no need and the S.T.A. respondent No. 1 had illegally held that there was a temporary need under sec. 62. It is obvious that whether temporary need exists requiring a temporary permit to be issued, is really for the authorities under the Act to determine. It is true that the R.T.A. found that there was no temporary need requiring an issue of a temporary permit, but then its decision was subject to appeal and respondent No. 1, as an appellate authority, was perfectly competent to decide whether in the facts and circumstances, grant of a temporary permit was justified. Mr. Sharma referred me to Capoor vs. Regional Transport Authority Jaipur Region, Jaipur(4) wherein it was said that mere increase of scope of permits on the route docs not mean that necessarily there is a temporary need. Mr. Sharma referred me to Capoor vs. Regional Transport Authority Jaipur Region, Jaipur(4) wherein it was said that mere increase of scope of permits on the route docs not mean that necessarily there is a temporary need. In that case, the learned Judge found that no temporary need was mentioned and from the order of the R.T. A. it appeared that it had not taken into consideration the question of shortage of vehicles for the purpose of maintaining existing services on the route. It was in that context that it was held that even though the scope of permits have been increased, it did not mean that there was a temporaryreed. It is no doubt true that existence of permanent vacancies may not necessarily mean that there is a particular need within meaning of s. 62(1)(c) of the Act. But it is equally true that the existence of permanent vacancy and a temporary weed can coexist. There may be circumstances in which both may co-exist and in that case, the grant of temporary permit would be permissible. As held in Madhya Pradesh State Road Trasport Corporation, Bairagarh, Bhopal vs. B.P. Upadhyaya, R.T.A., Raipur (5), there is no anthesis between a particular temporary need and a permanent need and it is manifest that these two kinds of needs may co-exist on a particular route and that sub-section contemplates that there may exist a temporary need for transport facilities on a particular route even in case of permanent need for such facilities. A reference to the order of respondent S.T.A. shows that it has referred to the fact that the R.T.A. has itself on January 19, 1977, increased the scope from 5 to 7 buses indicating that there was need to increase the buses on the route; the respondent No 1 also found it strange that immediately thereafter, the R.T.A. should have taken the view by its impugned order of Febuary 11, 1977 that the bus service on the route was satisfactory and that travelling public was not experiencing any difficulty. Respondent No. 1 has clearly found that it has not been established which conditions of section 68-F (1-C) and sec. 62(1) (c) have not been complied with by respondent No. 3. Respondent No. 1 has clearly found that it has not been established which conditions of section 68-F (1-C) and sec. 62(1) (c) have not been complied with by respondent No. 3. It is also mentioned that there is a rush of travelling public with an increase of traffic and that it was for the convenience of the travelling public to issue permit. A firm finding has been given by respondent No.l that travelling public requires the grant of a temporary permit. It will be seen that this decision by respondent No. 1 is based on the assessment of the various facts and circumstances and being within its jurisdiction, cannot be interferred with by this court unless it was manifesly perverse or capricious, vide Bherulal vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Rajasthan(6) where I have said,— "......To ask this Court to substitute its own satisfaction for that of the Regional Transport Authority, a body of experts and specialists who have been entrusted by the statute to look after the needs of the travelling public is to ask the court to take on matters for which it is obviously not fully equipped either with reference to the full materials, local condition, and other circumstances on the basis of which alone a satisfactory decision can be made." This Court under Article 226 of the Constitution does not sit as a court of appeal over the decision on facts given by the authorities under the Act, unless there the authorities under the Act have completely misdirected themselves on a point of law or have based their decision on no evidence, their decision cannot be interferred with. Such is not the situation here. This plea of the petitioner also fails. 13. The result is that I find no merit in the writ petition and the same is dismissed with costs.