Judgement KANGARAJAN, J :- The Judgment in F. A. 32/71 will dispose of F. A. 33/71 also; the respondent in F. A. 32/71 has filed a cross-appeal, but not the respondent in F. A. 33/71. The facts giving rise to these two appeals may be stated briefly; they arise out of the land acquisition proceedings initiated by the Government of Assam under (Notification No. RLA-287/59/10 D/- 13-5-60) S. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act-hereinafter referred to as the Act - and the declaration under S. 6 of the Act, (No. RLA.287/59/16 D/- 4-10-60). A total extent of 286B-3K-8L of land in village Noonmati was acquired as a part of Project No. IIA (there were also other similar projects I and II) for the establishment of Railway Marshalling Yard. The total extent of land belonging to the respondent in F. A. 32/ 71 is 32B-3K-18L and to the respondent in F. A. 33/71 is 16B-3K-8L. The respondent in F. A. 32/71 was given compensation at the following rates by the Land Acquisition Collector, who will be merely called Collector, at Rs. 3,500 per bigha for 3B-2K-1L; Rs. 3,000 per bigha for 11B-3K-1L and Rs. 2,000 per bigha for 17B-3K-17L. The compensation awarded to the respondent in F. A. 33/71 is as follows:- At Rs. 3,000 per bigha for 7B-2K-2L; at Rs. 2,500 per bigha for 9B-1K-16L. 2. On a reference made under S. 18 of the Act by both the said respondents the learned Assistant District Judge No. 2, Gauhati (Reference Court) awarded compensation to both the respondents as follows: The respondent in F. A. 32/71 was awarded Compensation at the rate of Rs. 7,500 per bigha m respect of Basti land (land which could serve as a building site also) and Rs. 7,000 per bigha of paddy land. The Collector was directed to assess the valuation at the above rate and pay the balance of compensation due to each of them along with the additional 15% solatium, but he had directed that the enhanced compensation should be paid by the Land Acquisition Collector within three months from the date of the order dated 2-11-70 (namely, 5-1-71) and that interest of 16% (sic) per annum was payable after expiry of the said three months, namely, 5-1-71, failing compliance with the earlier direction. It is seen, however, on a perusal of Section 28 of the Act, that on the enhanced compensation ordered by the Court, the Collector shall pay interest at the rate of six per cent per annumfrom the date on which he took possession;S. 34 of the Act provides that when the amount of compensation is not paid or deposited on or before taking possession of the land, the Collector shall pay the amount awarded with interest thereon at the rate of six per cent per annum from the time of taking possession until the amount is so paid. The above direction given by the learned Asstt. District Judge is not in conformity with the above provisions; the proper direction to make is that the interest payable on the enhanced amount isalso,from the date of taking possession till date of payment. The date of taking possession not being known the Collector would ascertain that date and work out the compensation payable to both the respondents in these appeals on that basis. 3. The learned Assistant District Judge recorded the oral testimony of some witnesses and also exhibited certain documents. It may be noticed that the references made at the instance of both the respondents, were heard together and the evidence was recorded in common in both the cases. After examination of the witnesses was over on 3-9-1870, 14-9-70 was fixed for arguments, but arguments were not heard on that day. We And the following note made in the order-sheet maintained in respect of the reference made at the instance of the respondent in F. A. 33/71. "A certified copy of a judgment is filed and it is marked as Ext. 8." 4. Obviously the same was marked not only without objection but also by consent; without the consent of the counsel for the State the same would not have been exhibited at the instance of the claimant, especially at that late stage, In the grounds of appeal by the State no objection has been taken that Ext. 8 should not have been taken into consideration on account of the same not having been proved etc. We have, therefore, proceeded on the footing that Ext. 8 was marked by consent. It has become necessary to mention this specifically because, as the subsequent discussion will show, it is a very important document for the claimants in both the appeals. 8 should not have been taken into consideration on account of the same not having been proved etc. We have, therefore, proceeded on the footing that Ext. 8 was marked by consent. It has become necessary to mention this specifically because, as the subsequent discussion will show, it is a very important document for the claimants in both the appeals. Evidently because the claimants realised that the other evidence adduced was not sufficient they felt obliged to produce Ext. 8, even though they were claiming a larger amount of compensation than awarded in Ext. 8; the State, on its part, could not properly object to it because it was relevant in these proceedings and the State, which was a party to the same, had not even appealed against it. The awards in four other land acquisition cases have also been exhibited in these cases; they are Exts. 4, 5, 6 and 7. Exts. 5 and 7 relate to land acquisition proceedings commenced long after we date of the notification under S. 4 of the Act in the present cases. Therefore, they have to be left out of consideration. 5. Ext. 4 is the judgment of the reference Court arising out of the award passed involving lands comprised in a notification under S. 4 dated 21-3-60, no doubt about three months earlier than the date of notification in the present cases; the compensation awarded was Rs. 12,500 per bigha. As Ext. 4 itself will expressly show most of the lands therein were part of a tea estate. Four claims - Cases Nos. 262, 263, 264 and 265/66 were disposed of by Ext. 4. While it is seen that the three cases involved lands which had been utilized for tea plantation, the precise nature of the land involved in one case, namely, Misc. Case No. 262/66, is not known. None of the claimants concerned in that case has been examined in the present cases and there is no worthwhile evidence aliunde regarding the nature and quality of the said lands. The respondent in F. A. 32/ 71, who was examined as the 5th witness for the applicant, did not mention, not only anything about the quality but even the situation of the lands involved in Ext. 4. The respondent in F. A. 33/ 71, who was examined as the 2nd witness for applicant, stated that the land involved in Ext. The respondent in F. A. 32/ 71, who was examined as the 5th witness for the applicant, did not mention, not only anything about the quality but even the situation of the lands involved in Ext. 4. The respondent in F. A. 33/ 71, who was examined as the 2nd witness for applicant, stated that the land involved in Ext. 4 (in village Japarigog) was two furlongs away from his land and that the land was cultivable. land like his, This statement does not seems to be supported by what appears from Ext. 4; on the contrary, the learned Assistant District Judge No. 2 has referred to the fact of the land involved in Ext. 4 being fit for tea plantation; this is probably the reason for higher amount of compensation being awarded. There is no other evidence concerning this. 6. Ext. 6 relates to compensation vis a vis notification dated 19-2-60 where the Collector himself has awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 10,000 per bigha and the Reference Court had awarded at the rate of Rs. 15,000 per bigha. Even on the face of it, judging by the higher price awarded the quality of the two lands appears different. Besides this involves lands in Bamuni maidan village which is said to be a village adjacent to Noonmati, nearer to Gauhati town and obviously more valuable for that reason. In these circumstances, Ext. 6 was also rightly not taken into account by the learned Assistant District Judge No.2. Gauhati. He observed as follows:- "It cannot be ascertained from the Judgment Ext 6 if the lands involved therein were of nature and quality with that of the lands of these cases." 7. Claimants witness Allauddin (P.W. 3) conceded that he did not know the boundary of the acquired land and that it would not even be possible for him to point out the said land. 8. It thus turns out that none of the four awards Exts. 4 to 7 is of any material assistance to the claimants. The 4th witness for the petitioners, is the Patwari, who spoke of the lands covered by Ext. 1 is not of much assistance to the respondents in these appeals. 9. The claimant also examined Shri Shyam Sundar Das, P.W. 1, who is an employee of the Sub-Registrars office at Gauhati. He proved Ext. The 4th witness for the petitioners, is the Patwari, who spoke of the lands covered by Ext. 1 is not of much assistance to the respondents in these appeals. 9. The claimant also examined Shri Shyam Sundar Das, P.W. 1, who is an employee of the Sub-Registrars office at Gauhati. He proved Ext. 1, a copy of the sale deed dated 11-9-62, which was a couple of years later than the notification, hence it is not of much assistance to the petitioner. P.W. 1 also spoke about an entry in Book I of the Sub-Registrars office concerning a sale (Ext. 2 dated 29-6-59). Both these Exts. 1 and 2, were objected to on the ground that the original had not been summoned. The lower Court does not appear to have dealt with this objection in the order or even separately. It seems that in the absence of summons being taken to cause the production of the original, no case for the respondents to adduce secondary evidence had been made out; for this reason alone we have not been able to take Exts. 1 and 2 into consideration, But it was also argued for the appellant in C. A. 33/71 that C. W. 1 had also spoken orally about the entry, obviously made in Book I of the SubRegistrars office, but without producing an extract or certified copy of it. In the circumstances, neither respondent could derive assistance from S. 57 of the Indian Registration Act. Even if Ex. 2 or even the oral evidence concerning the entry in Book I can be taken into account there being no other evidence concerning the same we do not even know about the quality of those lands or even how far from the land concerned in these cases they were situate. 10. The Government had not examined any other witness except an office assistant in the office of the L.A.O. who merely proved the notification and declaration (Exts. A and B, Map Ext. C, the justification report Ext. D and the Award Ext. E). He admitted in cross-examination that he had no personal knowledge of the justification. The above is all the material, either oral or, documentary in the case. 11. In these circumstances the question for consideration pointedly is whether we can act upon the valuation of the Reference Court in Ext. 8. It is worth recalling that Ext. E). He admitted in cross-examination that he had no personal knowledge of the justification. The above is all the material, either oral or, documentary in the case. 11. In these circumstances the question for consideration pointedly is whether we can act upon the valuation of the Reference Court in Ext. 8. It is worth recalling that Ext. 8 was concerned with the same notification of acquisition under S. 4 as well as of the declaration under S. 6 of the Act. These lands as well as those with which we are now concerned are in the same village (Noonmati); it would be seen from Ext. 8 itself that the land in question in that case (as stated by P.W. 4 in that case) was a good cultivable land and that it was also fit for residential purposes (vide page 127 of the paper book). We also find a still later reference in the same judgment (Ext. 8) to the nature of the land, for which compensation at the rate of Rs. 7,500 was awarded, being agricultural land (vide page 131 of the paper book). There being thus no dispute that the lands involved in this case were also paddy cultivable land, part of which was Basti land Ext. 8 would be the best evidence of the value of such property, on the date of the said (same) notification. 12. This very question about the admissibility of such awards/judgments and whether they could be taken into consideration by the Reference Court, seized of land acquisition cases, came up for consideration before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Secretary of State for India v. India General Steam Navigation and Railway Company Ltd (ILR 36 Cal 967). The judgment of Calcutta High Court against which the appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council had been preferred, is printed in the said report; summaries of the arguments for both sides also appear. The High Court had referred to certain awards (which had also come up to the High Court) of property which was situate near the land in question and had considerable, if not exactly similar, advantages as in the other cases. One of the arguments for the appellant before the Judicial Committee was that the awards/judgments in the previous cases, relied upon by the High Court, was not evidence of the value in dispute. One of the arguments for the appellant before the Judicial Committee was that the awards/judgments in the previous cases, relied upon by the High Court, was not evidence of the value in dispute. Lord Collins, who delivered the judgment of the Judicial Committee, dismissed the appeal with the following observations:- "It seems to their Lordships that there is no question of principle involved in this appeal. In fact the main argument of the appellant is a practical denial of the right of the High Court to review the findings of the Special Judge, whose great experience in such cases, they suggested, ought to outweigh all other considerations. Indeed, when one comes to close quarters with their objection to the decision it seems to resolve itself into no more than this, that the court gave undue weight to the prices paid on the sale of a particular piece of land in the vicinity as affording a guide to the compensation to be awarded in the case before them. It is by no means clear to their Lordships that there is any good ground for this suggestion." 13. A similar question came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Khaja Faizuddin v. State of Hyderabad (Civil Appeal No. 176 of 1962), D/- 10th April 1962 (SC). This case does not appear to have been reported. Subba Rao, J. (as he then was), speaking for the Court, allowed the appeal against the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and relied upon the decision of the Judicial Committee. The Chief Judge of the Small Causes Court who heard the reference under the Land Acquisition Act had awarded a higher amount of compensation, relying upon three earlier awards in land acquisition cases but the High Court had reduced the amount of compensation. As it would be seen from the contentions for the appellant before the Supreme Court the High Court had not accepted the evidence afforded by the previous awards in toto. As it would be seen from the contentions for the appellant before the Supreme Court the High Court had not accepted the evidence afforded by the previous awards in toto. Subba Rao, J. while dealing with this contention made the following observations:- "If a sale deed of a land comparable in time and quality with the land acquired can be of evidentiary value, equally clearly the awards of a Court of comparable dates in respect of such lands will also be of valuable assistance in assessing the market value, for by the award the Court fixes the market value of such a land having regard to the same principles which should guide a court in fixing the value of the land acquired. If at all, such an award would be better evidence, as it would have the merit of an objective ascertainment of the market value on the basis of relevant evidence. The Judicial Committee in Secretary of State v. I. G. S. N. Co. (1909) ILR 36 Cal 967) gave its approval to the reliance placed by the High Court on earlier awards in ascertaining compensation payable to the land acquired. It is also true that just like sales of comparable lands the awards to be of any use must also relate to comparable lands, that is to say, the awards should be in respect of lands similarly situated as the land acquired and in respect of a period in and about the same time as of the notification issued in respect of the land acquired." 14. After referring to the decision of the Judicial Committee Subba Rao, J., discussed the actual evidence pertaining to the said three awards and was of the opinion that the said awards afforded a comparable data and were the best evidence adduced in the case. It was found that the other evidence let in by both sides was not helpful; it was described as equally worthless. Subba Rao. J., then summed up as follows:- "The foregoing discussion shows that the three awards are of comparable dates, situation, extent and quality. They afford the best piece of evidence. The Chief Judge. Small Causes Court, relied upon them and accepted the rates disclosed by them and adopted than to the land acquired. Subba Rao. J., then summed up as follows:- "The foregoing discussion shows that the three awards are of comparable dates, situation, extent and quality. They afford the best piece of evidence. The Chief Judge. Small Causes Court, relied upon them and accepted the rates disclosed by them and adopted than to the land acquired. The High Court on the basis of vague evidence practically rejected them on the ground that they differ in quality, for which there is no reliable evidence end awarded compensation on pure surmise." 15. The above decision of the Supreme Court was relied upon by the Division Bench of this Court consisting of Sarma and Pathak, JJ. in Kacharigaon Tea Co. Ltd. v. The Collector of Darrang ( AIR 1975 Gau 78 ). Expressing their view contrary to the decision of the Bombay High Court in S. L. A. Officer v. Lakhamsi ( AIR 1960 Bom 78 ), Sarma, J., speaking for the Division Bench, observed as follows:- "9. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court as mentioned above, we have no difficulty to hold that the decision in AIR 1960 Bom 78 has not laid down the correct law and that awards in previous L. A. cases for comparable lands and of approximately the same time are good evidence for determination of the market price of land." 16. The Supreme Court again considered the same question in the State of Madras v. A. M. Nanjan ( AIR 1976 SC 651 ). Headnote A, in that case reads as follows:- "The awards given by the Collector are at least relevant material and may be in the nature of admission with regard to the value of the land on behalf of the State and if the land involved in the awards is comparable land in the reasonable proximity of the acquired land, the rates found in the said documents would be a reliable material to afford a basis to work upon for determination of the compensation on a later date. The awards, therefore, cannot be dismissed as inadmissible for the purpose of determination of the compensation. Held, that having regard to the location, advantages and facilities of the land and to the admitted rise of price of land between the years 1951 and 1957, it could not be said that the High Court was far wrong in raising the compensation to Rs. Held, that having regard to the location, advantages and facilities of the land and to the admitted rise of price of land between the years 1951 and 1957, it could not be said that the High Court was far wrong in raising the compensation to Rs. 3,000 per acre in the case. The High Court did not depart from any well recognised principles in determining the compensation." In paragraph 7, Goswami, J., who spoke for the Court, observed as follows:- "As a matter of fact these awards given by the Collector are at least relevant materials and may be in the nature of admission with regard to the value of the land on behalf of the State and if the land involved in the awards is comparable land in the reasonable proximity of the acquired land, the rates found in the said documents would be a reliable material to afford a basis to work upon for determination of the compensation on a later date." 17. It being common ground that there was no appeal against Ext. 8, it may be in the nature of admission on behalf of the State concerning the value of the land, as pointed out by Goswami, J. 18. Our attention has been drawn to a later decision of the Division Bench consisting of Sadanandaswamy and Baharul Islam, JJ. in Kailash Chandra Sen v. Collector of Kamrup in F. A. No. 7 of 1969 disposed of on 5-1-1977 along with F. A. 61 of 1969. The Division Bench has referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Nanjans case ( AIR 1976 SC 651 ) as well as the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Kacharigaon Tea Company, AIR 1975 Gau 78 cited above, as well as the case of Khaja Faizuddin. We have only to point out that only a portion of a sentence has been quoted from the judgment of Goswami, J., in the State of Madras v. A. M. Nanjan omitting reference to the admission on behalf of the State. The whole of that sentence has been extracted by us. The above Division Bench of this Court, also followed the earlier decision of this Court in the case of Kacharigaon Tea Estate. We need not be detained about how the legal principle was applied by the said Division Bench to the facts of that case. 19. The whole of that sentence has been extracted by us. The above Division Bench of this Court, also followed the earlier decision of this Court in the case of Kacharigaon Tea Estate. We need not be detained about how the legal principle was applied by the said Division Bench to the facts of that case. 19. In the result we find that the compensation for the Basti land and paddy land has to be fixed in the present case also only at Rs. 7,500 per bigha (without making any distinction) as was done with reference to lands of comparable quality and near situation, and which were covered by the same notifications under Ss. 4 and 6 of the Act in Ex. 8. 20. It, therefore, follows that both the appeals filed by the Government claiming that the compensation should be only as awarded by the Collector are not sustainable and they are accordingly dismissed. The cross-appeal filed by the respondent in F. A. 32/71, which seeks to raise the rate of compensation from Rs. 7,500 to Rs. 10,000 per bigha is, for the reasons set out earlier not sustainable. 21. It is rightly contended, for the respondent in F. A. 33/71 that, in any case, on the basis of Ext. 8, Rs. 7,500 per bigha should have been awarded in respect of the entire land with which the respondent in F. A. No. 32/71 is concerned; the Basti land is said to be only superior in value to the paddy land. There seems no warrant for making any distinction between paddy lands situate near the road; as a fact there is a P.W.D. road near the lands in question. The evidence in this case being that all the lands taken from the respondent in F. A. 32/71 consisted of either Basti land or of paddy land, the same rate of Rs. 7,500 per bigha, adopted in Ext. 8 for such lands generally, should be adopted in this case also. 22. So far as the respondent in F. A. 33/71 is concerned, for reasons best known to him, he did not file any cross-appeal. He would not, in our view, be entitled to the benefit of the uniform rate of Rs. 7,500 per bigha - a benefit which the respondent in F. A. 32/71 is getting in this appeal. 22. So far as the respondent in F. A. 33/71 is concerned, for reasons best known to him, he did not file any cross-appeal. He would not, in our view, be entitled to the benefit of the uniform rate of Rs. 7,500 per bigha - a benefit which the respondent in F. A. 32/71 is getting in this appeal. In terms of O. 41, R. 33, C.P.C., the respondent in F. A. 33/ 71 will, however, be entitled to the benefit of interest on the entire amount of compensation including the enhanced amount of compensation with interest at 6 per cent per annum from the date of dispossession (not from 5-11-70 (sic) as directed by the lower Court) till date of payment in accordance with the legal provisions, noted above. This would be only to give effect to the plain statutory provisions in this respect. 23. Since neither the appellant nor the respondent in F. A. 32/71 has succeeded fully we consider it a proper case for making each party bear its own cost. 24. So far the respondent in F. A. 33/ 71 is concerned the appeal is dismissed with costs. 25. The appeals are disposed of accordingly. 26. LAHIRI, J.:- The role of a Judge, it is said, is to compose inconsistencies, unravel confusions, deliver unrecognised implications, to make interstitial advances. The arduous task of the Judges of the superior Courts is to find through clash of ideas and conflict of interests solutions which are considerate of the past, adequate for the present, helpful and beneficial for the future, It is gratifying and indeed heartening to find that in Kacharigaon Tea Co. Ltd. v. Collector of Darrang, reported in AIR 1975 Gau 78 , B. N. Sarma and D. Pathak, JJ., performed the interstitial advances in laying down the principle of law that awards made in previous land acquisition cases relating to comparable lands and contemporaneously made are admissible and are guiding factors for determination of market value of land acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The learned Judges waded through the unreported judgments of the Supreme Court, searched for the relevant decision and picked up the most appropriate judgment of the Supreme Court, namely, Khaja Faizuddin v. State of Hyderabad, (Civil Appeal No. 176 of 1962, D/- 10th day of April, 1963). The learned Judges waded through the unreported judgments of the Supreme Court, searched for the relevant decision and picked up the most appropriate judgment of the Supreme Court, namely, Khaja Faizuddin v. State of Hyderabad, (Civil Appeal No. 176 of 1962, D/- 10th day of April, 1963). The principles of law laid down by their Lordships are the first reported decision of High Court in India. It is interesting to note that the views expressed by this Court in Kacharigaon Tea Co. Ltd. (supra), is the law of-the land after the same is finally settled by the Supreme Court in the State of Madras v. A. M. Nanjan reported in AIR 1976 SC 651 . 27. Another intriguing feature is that the importance of the unreported decision of the Supreme Court, namely, Khaja Faizuddin (supra), was noted by their Lordships in the Supreme Court in Padma Uppal v. State of Punjab, reported in AIR 1977 SC 580 at p. 583, so much so that a passage from the said unreported judgments was quoted with approval by their Lordships. 28. After noting the silver lining, I find certain black clouds in the proceedings conducted before the Land Acquisition Officer. There is a Manual styled as "The Assam Land Acquisition Manual," wherein all the forms have been set out for the convenience of the Land Acquisition Officers. In the instant proceedings, the Land Acquisition Officer did not note that he was to act in accordance with the law. In form 15, there is a column indicating that the Collector is to show the rate of interest to be paid under S. 34 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Act No. 1 of 1894). There is also another form, being form No. 25, in column No. 13 whereof the Collector is required to show the rate of interest. I find that in spite of the helpful forms provided for the convenience of the Officers, they do not pay any heed to set out their orders in proper form, which is very much deprecated at this end. 29. I entirely agree with the observations and the conclusion arrived at by Rangarajan, J. Orders accordingly.