JUDGMENT Hari Swarup, J. - This is a defendant's appeal arising out of a suit for ejectment of the tenant from the premises in dispute and for recovery of arrears of rent, etc. 2. The case of the plaintiff in brief was that the tenancy was a monthly tenancy commencing from first of the month and ending with the last date of the month. The defendant-tenant had defaulted in payment of rent and had also sublet the premises without authority of law, The notice of termination of the tenancy under S. 106 of the T. P. Act was given and the defendant was required to vacate after thirty days of the notice. Tenant's plea, inter alia, was that the notice given to him was not in accordance with law because the lease was for manufacturing purpose and there was also an agreement between the parties at the time of the making of the lease to the effect that six months' notice will be given to terminate the tenancy. 3. The trial court held that the notice under S. 106 of the T. P. Act was valid and the defendant had illegally sublet the premises. On these findings the trial court decreed the suit for ejectment. Lower appellate court dismissed the defendant's appeal. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that notice under Section 106 of the T. P. Act was invalid for the reason that it gave only thirty days' notice and not six months' notice. Section 106 of the T. P. Act provides : "106. In the absence of a contract or local law or usage to the contrary, a lease of immovable property for agricultural or manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by six months' notice expiring with the end of a year of the tenancy; and a lease of immovable property for any other purpose shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by fifteen days' notice expiring with the end of a month of the tenancy....." The finding of the court below is that the lease was for manufacturing purpose. It could, therefore, be deemed to be a lease from year to year unless there was a contract to the contrary. It could, therefore, be deemed to be a lease from year to year unless there was a contract to the contrary. In para 2 of the plaint it was pleaded that the lease was a monthly lease commencing from the first of each month and ending with the last date of that month. The averments in this para were admitted in the written statement. In the written statement there is nowhere stated that the lease was year to year lease and not a month to month lease. Relying on these pleadings the courts below have held that there was a contract to the contrary and the duration of the lease would be a month and not a year and the notice of thirty days would be sufficient. 5. Learned counsel for the appellants has contended that the finding is erroneous because there was no positive evidence of contract led by the plaintiff in the present case. I am, however, unable to accept the contention because it is not necessary for a plaintiff to lead evidence in respect of allegation in the plaint which are not controverted in the written statement. The plaintiff had alleged that the tenancy was a monthly tenancy and the defendant had admitted this fact in the written statement. 6. The circumstantial evidence available in the case is also sufficient to prove the assertion. The lease in the present case was created by an oral agreement and delivery of possession and was accompanied by a Qabuliat which showed the terms of the contract. It shows that the lease was a monthly lease, rent was payable every month, and was to last for 11 months. The conduct of the parties thereafter was that the rent was always paid monthly. This showed the tenancy was intended to be a monthly tenancy. 7. The prohibition contained in Section 107 of the T. P. Act also negatives the plea of the tenancy being an yearly tenancy. In Ram Kumar Das v. Jagdish Chandra Deo, ( AIR 1952 SC 23 ) it was impliedly held that presumption about the tenancy being yearly cannot arise if it is not created by a registered instrument as laid down under Section 107 of the T.P. Act. In Ram Kumar Das v. Jagdish Chandra Deo, ( AIR 1952 SC 23 ) it was impliedly held that presumption about the tenancy being yearly cannot arise if it is not created by a registered instrument as laid down under Section 107 of the T.P. Act. As there was no lease by a registered document, there could not be an year to year lease or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving an yearly rent. The lease as created must thus be a lease recurring at intervals less than a year. The payment of monthly rent indicated that the period of lease was a month and the tenancy was a monthly tenancy. In Ram Kumar Das v. Jagdish Chandra Deo (supra) it was held that the mode in which rent is expressed to be payable affords a presumption that the tenancy is of a character corresponding thereto. Consequently, when the rent reserved is monthly rent, the presumption would arise that the tenancy was a monthly tenancy unless there was something to rebut the presumption. 8. Learned counsel for the appellants relied on the decisions in Krishna Das Nandy v. Bidhan Chandra Roy, ( AIR 1959 Cal 181 ) ; Steuart and Co. Ltd. v. C. Mackertich ( AIR 1963 Cal 198 ); Balwant Singh v. Murari Lal, ( AIR 1965 All 187 ) : (1964 All LJ 1033) and Zahoor Ahmad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, ( AIR 1965 All 326 ) : (1965 All LJ 375) in support of his contention that Section 106 of the Act is independent of S. 107 and wherever a tenancy is for manufacturing purpose, the lease will be deemed to be an yearly lease and the notice of termination will be required to be of six months. In all these cases, however, the courts have found that there was in existence no contract to the contrary as contemplated by S. 106 of the Act. All the cases lay down that when there was no such contract, the consequences of the fiction created by S. 106, will come into effect. Such is not a situation in the present case because there is a contract to the contrary in the present case The defendant had not even pleaded in the court below that there was no agreement to the contrary. Such is not a situation in the present case because there is a contract to the contrary in the present case The defendant had not even pleaded in the court below that there was no agreement to the contrary. The only argument was that even though there be an agreement to the contrary the fiction of the law contained in S. 106 of the Act will require the tenancy being treated as yearly tenancy because it was for a manufacturing purpose of six months' notice was needed. It is urged that as the lease was a lease for manufacturing purpose, it must be deemed to be an yearly lease for the purposes of terminating it by a notice to quit under S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The argument is that the fiction of law contained in S. 106 of the Act will apply wherever the lease is for manufacturing purpose. The flaw in the argument is due to the thinking that the fiction of law will apply even though it is proved as a fact that the lease is a monthly lease. The question of applying the fiction arises only in the absence of a contract determining the term of the lease. Ram Kumar Das v. Jagdish Chandra Deo (supra) considering S. 106 of the Act, the Stint erne Court held : "The section lays down a rule of construction which is to be applied when there is no period agreed upon between the parties. In such cases the duration has to be determined by reference to the object or purpose for which the tenancy is created." Hence, if there is a period agreed upon between the parties for the periodicity of the lease, the rule of construction embodied in S. 106 on the basis of the legal fiction will have no application. A lease being the product of a contract must be governed by the terms of the contract. A case similar to the present case came before a Division Bench of this Court in Sri Radha Ballabh v. Bahore Ram Chand (1955 All LJ 304) : ( AIR 1955 All 679 ). It was held in that case, on the circum-stances which are similar to the circumstances of the present case, that the lease was a monthly lease terminable on 30 days' notice. It was held in that case, on the circum-stances which are similar to the circumstances of the present case, that the lease was a monthly lease terminable on 30 days' notice. A similar view was taken in Kishan Lal v. Lal Ram Chander ( AIR 1952 All 634 ). In view of the decision in Sri Radha Ballabh v. Bahore Ram Chander (supra) the notice in the present case must be deemed to be valid. 9. It was next contended that the contract to the contrary mentioned in the opening part of S. 106 of the Act refers not to the character of the tenancy but only to the period of notice, and as there is no averment to the effect that there was a contract that the notice will be of less than six months, the notice required to be given must be deemed to be of six months. It is difficult to accept that the opening part of Section 106 of the Act does not govern the character of the lease. On a proper construction of the sentence it will mean that if there is no contract to the contrary the lease will be deemed to be yearly or monthly according to the purpose of the tenancy and the notice required to terminate the lease will be according to the periodicity of the lease; if the lease is yearly, a six months' notice will be required and if it is a monthly lease then only thirty days' notice will be enough. But if there is a contract about the periodicity of the lease that will prevail and the purpose of the lease will be immaterial. What will be the period of notice will depend on the terms of the contract about the periodicity of the lease. 10. It is, however, urged that it was open to the parties to contract otherwise and to provide for a longer notice. In the written statement it was pleaded that there was a contract to the contrary between the parties to the effect that the notice to terminate the tenancy was to be of six months. An issue on the point was framed and sent down for a finding per order dated 1-12-1975. The finding has been returned by the Court below to the effect that there was no such contract. An issue on the point was framed and sent down for a finding per order dated 1-12-1975. The finding has been returned by the Court below to the effect that there was no such contract. Learned counsel urged that the finding is not in accordance with law because the court below had taken into consideration the terms mentioned in the Qabuliat. He has, however, not been able to show why a Qabuliat cannot be looked into. A qabuliat is certainly not a document which can create a lease because it is a unilateral document, but it could be looked into to find out the terms of the contract. It was for the defendant to prove that even though the lease was monthly lease, there was a contract to the effect that the tenancy will be terminable by a notice of six months. The defendant has failed to prove that there was any such contract. 11. The tenancy was thus validly terminated, and because the tenant had sublet the premises ground existed for the maintainability of the suit for his ejectment. The decree of the court below cannot, therefore, be neld to be contrary to law. 12. The appeal is dismissed. 13. In the circumstances of the case the parties will bear their own costs.