JUDGMENT 1. THE petitioners viz., 12 and 16 I, C. Bose Road Tenants' association (hereinafter referred to as the said Association), have impeached in the Rule, a declaration in Annexure "d" dated December 29, 1975, made under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) and although not specifically mentioned in the prayers, the subsequent change of the alternative alignment and consequent acquisition of premises No. 12, I. C. Bose Road (hereinafter referred to as the said premises), on the allegations that the interest of the members of the said Association, who are occupiers and tenants of the same, have been adversely affected. 2. ON or about December 2, 1974, a notification was made under section 4 of the said Act to the effect that the lands as described therein, in the District of Howrah, were likely to be needed for a public purpose viz., for the construction of Northern approach road in connection with the reconstruction of Buckland Bridge at new site from Hari Mohan Basu Road, in Howrah Municipal Ward No. 4 to Chand Mari Road at the crossing of Moulana Abul Kalam Azad Lane and Chand Mari Road in the said Municipal Ward No. 4, Mouza Golabari, District Howrah. In the said notification, it was further mentioned that a piece of land comprising cadastral survey pilots as described in the connected Schedule, and measuring more or less, 0,56230 hectere (1. 3895 acres), was likely to be needed for the said public purpose at the expenses of the Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as the C. M. D. A.) within the said Ward No. 4 of the Municipality. 3895 acres), was likely to be needed for the said public purpose at the expenses of the Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as the C. M. D. A.) within the said Ward No. 4 of the Municipality. There is also no dispute that the said premises became involved under the said notification and the tenants, who were occupying their respective portions and were carrying on their diverse business and were earning their livelihood, filed objections under section 5a of the said Act, before the Land Acquisition Officer, (Howrah Improvement Trust), Respondent No. 2 (hereinafter referred to as the said Respondent), on the ground that the said acquisition for the proposed approach Road, was not a must, the same could be avoided and they further prayed that in case such acquisition is given effect to, then alternative accommodations should be provided for by the Government, so that they may mot lose their business, thereby their livelihood and may not also be stranded with the members of their family. It has been alleged that from the copy of a notice (Annexure C) which is dated March 18, 1975 and whereby April 4, 1975 was fixed for hearing of the objections under section 5a of the said Act, it was learnt for the first time by the members of the said Association that only South Western portion of the said premises would fall within the proposed acquisition, as there was a change of the alignment. It has been alleged further that immediately on such detection, the matter was brought to the notice of the said Respondent, apart from making the submissions as referred to hereinbefore. But they were of no avail. The said Association has stated that it was or is not known either to them or their members, as to at whose instance of for the protection of whose interest, such change of alignment was required, needed and made. It has also been submitted that the acquisition under the original alignment was less onerous and expensive and furthermore the same; was much more easier from all points of view including acquisition, engineering and construction. 3. It has also been submitted that the acquisition under the original alignment was less onerous and expensive and furthermore the same; was much more easier from all points of view including acquisition, engineering and construction. 3. HOWEVER, the impugned declaration under section 6 of the said Act (Annexure D), was thereafter made on december 29, 1975 and thereby the members of the said Association viz., the tenants in occupation were directed to file their claims in regard to their interest in the said premises. 4. THE fact of the formation of the said Association, the relevancy whereof would be found later, on the basis of the objections as raised by the appearing Respondents, should be first noted here. Admittedly, the said Association was formed on April 24, 1976 and the aims and objects of the same would be available from the Constitution which has on my request been produced and filed by Mr. Maitra. The aims of the said Association amongst others are, to render all possible help to the members to run their tenancy smoothly, secure redress of the grievances of the members, to promote harmonious relation amongst all the members residents and to secure settlement of all disputes by peaceful negotiation and bargaining without interference from, outside individuals or organisations, to cooperate with the appropriate Government authorities for speedy negotiation and implementation of all developmental activities and also to look after the well being of the members, to protest from time to time against action or actions of any individual or concern or any authority, whereby the business interest of the members of the Association are hampered and to do all such things as may be deemed incidental or conducive to the attainment of the objects. It may also be mentioned that initially the c. M. D. A. i. e. for whom or on whose behalf the acquisition has been made, was not made a party. But thereafter, on objection being taken, they were added on an application being made on that behalf and served on them. In fact the C. M. D. A. and its Chairman, Respondents Nos. 7 and 8 respectively have entered appearance through Mr. Biswas, but have not filed any affidavit-in-opposition It may also be mentioned that the owners of the said premises have not also been impleaded in the Rule. In fact the C. M. D. A. and its Chairman, Respondents Nos. 7 and 8 respectively have entered appearance through Mr. Biswas, but have not filed any affidavit-in-opposition It may also be mentioned that the owners of the said premises have not also been impleaded in the Rule. At this stage, the preliminary points as raised by the appearing Respondents should also be indicated. It was submitted by Mr. Biswas that the said Association had or has no right to move and maintain the present petition as none of their rights or any legal right have been infringed or violated. It was also submitted that on the admitted incorporation of the said Association after the proceedings under sections 4 and 6a and immediately prior to the declaration under section 6, would be a factor which will have to be considered too on the question of the existence of such or any right to maintain the petition. Mr. Biswas has also submitted that the petition, in the absence of the owners of the said premises, would not be maintainable and that apart, the said association cannot also maintain the petition, because admittedly its members or at least a major portion of them, have filed claims under section 9 of the aid Act and all the more so when objections under section 5a of the said Act were filed by the tenant members of the said Association and not by them and those objections have been duly heard and considered. Mr. Biswas has further stated that enquiry under section 11 of the said Act is complete but the same has not been given effect to because of the assurance to this Court as given and recorded on November 18, 1976. For the purpose of establishing the fact of filing the claims, reference was made by Mr. Biswas to Annexure "h" of the application for injunction of the said Association. It may be mentioned that the said application was directed to be heard along with the Rule on April 21, 1977 and the parties further agreed that the affidavits in the said application would be treated as affidavits in the Rule and they have filed no other affidavit. 5. It may be mentioned that the said application was directed to be heard along with the Rule on April 21, 1977 and the parties further agreed that the affidavits in the said application would be treated as affidavits in the Rule and they have filed no other affidavit. 5. THE Respondent No. 6 in his return to the Rule, apart from raising the points with regard to the maintainability of the petition at the instance of the said Association, contended that because of the conduct of the tenant members, particulars whereof have been mentioned hereinbefore, no writ could or should be issued. That apart, they contended, the steps or actions as taken, as due, legal and bonafide. It was also contended by the said Respondent that the C. M. D. A., was and is an appropriate authority for whom and at whose instance, the acquisition in question could be made. It was further contended that the purpose in the instant case was a public purpose and all steps were duly taken for the acquisition of lands and the said premises or portion thereof. It was also contended that the present alignment was thoroughly scrutinised and found to be the mast suitable one from the engineering point of view. It has been contended that the present alignment, according to technical experts also, was perhaps the best one for traffic control and smooth plying of all types of vehicles at the area in question and there has been no illegality or any irregularity in such change. The said Respondent has further stated that the Board of Trustees for the Improvement of Howrah, constituted under the Howrah Improvement Act, has been long prior to the date of issue of the present Rule, superseded by publication of a notification in the issues of the Calcutta Gazette and all assets and liabilities including its funds have vested in the C. M. D. A., a body corporate and constituted under the Calcutta metropolitan Development Authority Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as title said C. M. D. A., Act. It has further been contended that the persons who will be displaced because of the execution of the scheme, have no legal right to claim alternative accommodation and since the trustees of the Raghumal Charity Trust viz., the owners of the said premises have no objection to the acquisition in question, so the tenants cannot have any right to challenge the same as they cannot claim greater or higher title or interest than that of the owners. As stated hereinbefore, Mr. Biswas also argued that in the absence of the said owners, this Rule should also be deemed to be incompetent. 6. THE Respondents Nos. 1 to 4 apart from raising similar defence as those of Respondents Nos. 6 and 7 regarding the maintainability of the petition and the conduct of the tenant members of the said Association, contended that such conduct should be considered as estoppels against their right to challenge the acquisition. They also contended that the said Association not having filed any objection to the acquisition, which incidentally they could not do, was not also entitled to maintain the petition. They have also stated that after disposal of the objection under section 5a of the said Act, individual notices to all interested persons, meaning thereby the tenant members of the said Association, were given under section 9 inviting applications for compensation and in fact many of such members filed necessary objections, which were considered on December 20, 1976, on necessary enquiry under section 11 of the said Act for the purpose of making the Award under section 12. It has also been contended that the objections against the change of the alignment were also duly considered by the said Respondent and the decision of such change of alignment was accepted by the State Government. It has also been contended that there has been no inherent or any defect in the scheme in question. It is also the case of these Respondents that C. M. D. A. is a body corporate under the said C. M. D. A. Act and as such is not a Company and for that reasons the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules as alleged were not required to be complied with or followed. Let me first take up the consideration of the preliminary points as mentioned hereinbefore. Let me first take up the consideration of the preliminary points as mentioned hereinbefore. The purposes for which the said Association has been formed have been mentioned hereinbefore and there is also no dispute that the said Association was formed after the notification under section 4 and filing of objections by some of the tenant members under section 5a. It is also an admitted fact that the said Association has not filed any objection to the proposed acquisition at any stage and some of their tenant members have also filed claims under section 9 of the said Act and barring some representations as mentioned in the petition, which have been said to be entertained for and on behalf of the State of West Bengal, there was or has been no claim by the said Association. It is also an undisputed fact that the said Association is neither a tenant nor occupier of the said premises or any part or portion thereof. In reply to the arguments about lack of interest or locus standi of the said Association, Mr. Maitra referred to the representations in the petition and more particularly those to the Hon'ble Chief Minister and the Hon'ble Minister-in-charge, Public Works Department and the reply dated August 5, 1976, whereby they were informed that the Hon'ble Chief Minister has requested the Department of Public Works for consideration of the matters. He also referred to another acknowledgement of the said representation to the Hon'ble Chief Minister, by the said Respondent, whereby the said Association was informed that the Director, C. M. D. A. was asked to look into the matter and to take final decision in the matter of rehabilitation of the: affected shopkeepers. In view of the acknowledgments of the representations by the said Association, Mr. Maitra submitted that the application by or at their instance would be maintainable. 7. ARTICLE 226 does not lay down any rule as to the person by whom an application for relief can be made but indicates the purpose for which writs, directions and orders can be issued and obtained. Under the Article, such orders as aforesaid can be obtained only for the purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights and for any other purpose. Thus the relief under the Article is based, as has been found in the case of Anwar Khan Mehboob Co. Under the Article, such orders as aforesaid can be obtained only for the purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights and for any other purpose. Thus the relief under the Article is based, as has been found in the case of Anwar Khan Mehboob Co. vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors., A. I. R. 1966 S. C. 1637, on the existence of a right. The powers under the Article can normally be invoked only by a person whose personal rights and interests are adversely affected by the impugned flaw or order. So the right which is the foundation of an application under Article 226, is a personal and individual right. A person who alleges any infringement as the basis of his application, must prove and establish that he himself has been the victim or action has been taken to his prejudice. Thus the rights that can be enforced in a writ petition, must ordinarily be, as observed in the cases of State of Orissa vs. Ramchandra, A. I. R. 1964 S. C. 685, State of Punjab vs. Suraj Prakash, A. I. R. 1963 S. C. 507, Kalyan Singh vs. State of UP A. I. R. 1962 S. C. 1183 and Jonnala Narasimharao and Co. Ors., vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors., A. LR. 1971 S. C. 1507, the rights of the petitioner himself. Mr. Biswas further relied on the determination of the Supreme Court in the case of Muni Subrat, Jain vs. State of Haryana and Ors., A. I. R. 1977 S. C. 276, where on the question of who can apply for a writ of Mandamus, it has been observed by the Supreme Court that it is : "elementary though it is to be restated that no ors can ask for a mandamus without a legal right. There must be a judicially enforceable right as well is a legally protected right before one suffering; a legal grievance can ask for a mandamus. A person can be said to be aggrieved only when a person is denied a legal right by some one who has a legal duty to do something or to abstain from doing something. There must be a judicially enforceable right as well is a legally protected right before one suffering; a legal grievance can ask for a mandamus. A person can be said to be aggrieved only when a person is denied a legal right by some one who has a legal duty to do something or to abstain from doing something. That apart, in order to obtain a writ of or a writ in the nature of mandamus, the petitioner must establish that he has a legal right to the performance by the adversely of a legal duty imposed by a statute and such right must exist at the date of the petition. In the petition, there is also admittedly a prayer for Certiorari and Mr. Biswas submitted that in that case or for the issue of a writ of Certiorari or a writ in the nature thereof, the Court should also be satisfied that the petitioner is entitled to the same and unless such right is established, no such writ could or should be issued. The position seems to be so, in view of the determination in the case of Josbhai Motibhai Desai vs. Roshan Kumar, Hazi Bashir Ahmed and Ors., (1976) 1 S. C. C. 671. In that case it has been observed that : "article 226 has been couched in comprehensive phraseology to enable the High Court to reach injustice wherever it is found. In a sense, the scope and nature of the power conferred by the article is wider than that exercised by the writ courts in England. However, the adoption of the nomenclature of English writs, with the prefix, "nature of" super added, indicates that the general principles grown over the years in the English courts, can, shorn of technical procedural restrictions, and adapted to the special conditions of this vast country, in so far as they do not conflict with any provision of the Constitution or the law declared by the Supreme Court, be usefully considered in directing the exercise of this discretionary jurisdiction in accordance with well-recognised rules of practice. Though the jurisdiction under Article 226 in general, and certiorari in particular, is discretionary, in a country like India where writ petitions are instituted in the High Court by the thousand, many of them frivolous, a strict ascertainment, at the outset, of the standing of the petitioner to invoke this extraordinary jurisdiction, must be insisted upon. In that case it has also been observed that: according to most English decisions, in order to have the locus standi to invoke certiorari jurisdiction, the petitioner should be an "aggrieved person" and, in a case of defect of jurisdiction, such a petitioner will be entitled to a writ of certiorari as a matter of course, but if he does not fulfill that character, and is a "stranger", the Court will, in its discretion, deny him this extraordinary remedy, save in a very special circumstances. The expression "aggrieved person" denotes an elastic, and to an extent, an elusive concept. It cannot be confined within the bounds of a rigid, exact and comprehensive definition. At best, its features can be described in a broad tentative manner. Its scope and meaning depend on diverse, variable factors such as the content and intent of the statute of which contravention is alleged, the specific circumstances of the case, the nature and extent of the petitioner's interest, and the nature of the prejudice or injury suffered by him. English courts have sometimes put a restricted and sometimes a wide construction on the expression "aggrieved person". 8. APPLYING the tests as indicated hereinbefore, there is no other alternative but to hold that the instant petition at the instance of the said Association, when none of their rights or any legal right has been infringed or interfered with, would not be maintainable. Right if any, or if at all, belonged or belongs to the tenants members and they not having obtained the Rule, the Rule at the instance of the said Association would be incompetent. Further, the petition at the instance of the said Association, when admittedly their tenant members have filed objections. under section 9 of the said Act without any reservation, would not also be maintainable and in fact those members, because of their conduct, in fact are estopped from challenging the acquisition in question. Further, the petition at the instance of the said Association, when admittedly their tenant members have filed objections. under section 9 of the said Act without any reservation, would not also be maintainable and in fact those members, because of their conduct, in fact are estopped from challenging the acquisition in question. Since their members are so estopped, the said Association, which cannot if at all, claim a higher or greater right than those members, would not also be entitled to maintain the petition. There is also no substance in the submissions of Mr. Maitra that since their representations, in the manner as indicated hereinbefore, were entertained by the Hon'ble Chief Minister and the Hon'ble Minister-in-charge, the application at the instance of the said Association would be maintainable. The fact that the owners of the said premises, who admittedly have some interest in the acquisition in question, have not been impleaded in the Rule, is also fatal and in their absence, the Rule, in my view cannot also proceed. There is no provision in the connected statute to make provisions for alternative accommodation for the tenants in question in the instant case and as such they cannot have or claim to have any legal right to get such alternative accommodation and in that view of the matter the acceptance of the representations or the considerations thereof, if any or the assurances as mentioned, hereinbefore, would not create a legal right for those tenants, who are members of the said Association. Thus on that ground also no interest or any right has been created in favour of either the tenants or the said Association. The next or the remaining question which is to be decided on the basis of the arguments as advanced is what is the character of C. M. D. A. whether the same would come under the term Company or is a statutory body and whether the acquisition in the instant case, which is not for a State or a Company but for such authority like c. M. D. A., was valid and permissible. 9. IN support of his contentions that the acquisition for such a body or organisation like C. M. D. A. was improper and invalid, Mr. 9. IN support of his contentions that the acquisition for such a body or organisation like C. M. D. A. was improper and invalid, Mr. Maitra first relied on the second proviso to section 6 (1)of the said Act, which lays down that no declaration under the said section shall be made unless the compensation to be awarded for such property, is to be paid by a Company, or wholly or partly out of public revenue or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority. Since "local Authority" has not been defined in the said Act Mr. Maitra further submitted with reference to the definition in section 3 (31)of the General Clauses' Act, which according to him will have application and which defines "local Authority" and mean a Municipal Committee, District Board, body of Port commissioners or other authority legally entitled to, or entrusted by the Government with, the control or management of a Municipal or Local fund, C. M. D. A. will not come under or within such definition. He of course contended that C. M. D. A. may at least be an other authority. 10. MR. Maitra first placed section 3 of the said C. M. D. A. Act, which deals with establishment (of the C. M. D. A. and made particular reference to subsection (2) there under, which is to the following effect: -3 (1)3 (2)-The Metropolitan Authority shall be a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal with power, subject to the provisions of this Act, to acquire, hold and dispose of property, and to contract, and may sue and be sued in its name. He then referred to section 4 of the C. M. D. A. Act which deals with the composition of the C. M. D. A. and section 7 which deals with funds of the said authority and to the following effect: section-7 : There shall be a Fund for the Metropolitan Authority to which shall be credited- (a) such monies as may be paid to it by the State Government under the Taxes on Entry of Goods into Calcutta Metropolitan Area act, 1972, (b) all monies borrowed by the Metropolitan Authority, (c) such other monies as may be paid to the Metropolitan Authority by the State Government or any other authority or agency. Thereafter, Mr. Thereafter, Mr. Maitra made a reference to section 12 of the C. M. D. A. Act dealing with their power to appoint staff and made particular reference to sub-section (2) there under, which is to the following effect: 12 (1)12 (2) Every expenditure incurred by the Metropolitan authority, including the expenditure incurred by it for meeting the salaries and allowances of the staff employed by it, shall be defrayed out of the Funds of the Metropolitan Authority. And also to section 18, which deals with compulsory Acquisition of land for C. M. D. A., which is to the following effect: section-18 : Any land required by the Metropolitan authority for carrying out its functions under this Act shall be deemed to be needed for a public purpose and such land may be acquired by the State Government in accordance with any law for the time being in force. And submitted that thus C. M. D. A, would not be a authority or the authority under the proviso to section 6 (1) of the said Act, for whom or at whose instance the acquisition in the instant case could be made or undertaken. On a reference to the provisions of the said. C. M. D. A. Act, Mr. Maitra submitted that the declaration under section 6 of the said Act was wholly illegal inasmuch as no part of the cost of the acquisition is being met by the State Government, which he submitted to be a condition precedent. He thereafter relied on the determination of the Supreme Court in the; case of Valjibhai Muljibhai Sonaji and Anr. vs. The State of Bombay, A. I. R. 1963 S. C. 1890 and relied on the observations of the Supreme Court to the following effect : "the proviso to sub-sec. (1) of s. 6 precludes the Government from having a notification under sub-sec. (1) of S. 6 unless (a) the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid by a company or is to come (b) wholly or partly out of (i) public revenues or (ii) some fund controlled or managed by a local authority. Where, therefore, a land is being acquired for the benefit of a company and the entire compensation is to come out of the funds of the company, the terms of the Proviso will be said to have been satisfied. Where, therefore, a land is being acquired for the benefit of a company and the entire compensation is to come out of the funds of the company, the terms of the Proviso will be said to have been satisfied. However, the acquisition of land will be bad when the provisions of part VII of the Land Acquisition act, 1894, have not been complied with. And wherein Bombay State Transport Corporation has been held not to be a "local Authority", in terms of section 3 (31) of the General Clauses Act and submitted that on such determinations, the C. M. D. A. should not also be held to be a "local Authority," but the same is a Company and as such in the facts of the case, the acquisition should be held to be improper. It was also submitted by Mr. Maitra that since C. M. D. A. is a Company or has the character of the same or like that, so Part VII of the said Act was applicable and those Rules not having been admittedly followed or complied with, the acquisition for or at the instance of C. M. D. A. should be held to be void. The General Clauses Act in section 3 (31) has defined "local Authority". The various city improvement acts, viz., the Calcutta Improvement Act, the Bombay Improvement Act, the Lahore Improvement Trust Act, the Delhi Improvement Trust Act, contain "trusts" which are "local authorities" within the meaning of the same. The case of Valjibhai Muljibhai Sonaji vs. State of Bombay (Supra) on which strong reliance was placed by Mr. Maitra is distinguishable from the facts of the present case. The definition in section 3 (31) itself opens with the statement that the meanings assigned by it to several terms are to apply unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context. So the definition would not apply if it is repugnant to the context or subject. The Bombay Act, as involved in the case and as referred to hereinbefore not having received the President's assent could not prevail against the meaning of the expression "local Authority" in section 3 (31. But the position is different in the case of C. M. D. A. as the C. M. D. A. Act duly got the necessary assent. 11. The Bombay Act, as involved in the case and as referred to hereinbefore not having received the President's assent could not prevail against the meaning of the expression "local Authority" in section 3 (31. But the position is different in the case of C. M. D. A. as the C. M. D. A. Act duly got the necessary assent. 11. THE C. M. D. A. Act received the assent on 4th May, 1972 and the same was incorporated for making provisions for the establishment of an Authority for the formation and execution of plans for the development of the Calcutta Metropolitan Area, for the coordination and supervision of the execution of such plans and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The C. M. D. A. in view of its constitutions, functions, formation, powers and dealings as mentioned in the provisions of the said Act read with the tests as laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Sukhdeb Singh vs. Bhagatram, (1975) 1 S. C. C. 421, has already been held in the case of Tushar Kanti Mitra vs. State of west Bengal and Ors., 79 C. W. N. 605, to be an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and cannot be regarded as a private employer. In that view of the matter and also in view of the tests regarding "local Authority" as laid down in the case of Bhikari Behara vs. Sm. Dhanapalie Bentia, A. I. R. 1970 Cal. 176 and Patel Premji Jivaete vs. State of Gujrat and Ors., 1971 (3) S. C. C. 815, C. M. D. A. should also be held to be a "local authority". Thus, I hold that C. M. D. A. is not a Company but a "local Authority" and as such the proviso to section 6 (1) of the said Act, as submitted by Mr. Maitra would not be a bar and the acquisition cannot be held to be void, bad or irregular on that ground. Under the proviso to section 6 (1), the fund out of which the Cost of acquisition is to be met is the public revenue or some fund under the control of a local authority, in case of acquisition for a public purpose. Thus, such fund must either be a fund belonging to Government Treasury or to some other statutory bodies. 12. Thus, such fund must either be a fund belonging to Government Treasury or to some other statutory bodies. 12. THUS the points raised by Mr. Maitra fail, so also the Rule and the same is discharged. There will be no order for costs. Let the Memorandum of Association of the said Association, as filed by Mr. Maitra be marked as Ext. A and let the same be kept in the record. 13. IN view of the above the application for injunction which was directed to be heard along with the Rule is rejected. Let it further be noted that in terms of the directions as above the C. M. D. A, was added by consent of parties to the proceedings. The application for such sub-section (1) of Section 13. Rule discharged.