SEN (Acting C.J.)— These four references by Kudal J. raise a common question and, therefore, they are disposed of by this common order. 2. The question before the Division Bench is:— "Whether the inherent powers of the High Court under section 462 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 are subject to and controled by section 397 (2) of the Code i.e. in relation to the interlocutory orders against which no revision lies?" 3. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, has brought about many changes. One of the basic changes is the curtailment of revisional jurisdiction. Sec. 397 (2) bare a revision against an interlocutory order. 4. There is a difference of opinion between different Judges of this Court on the question whether section 397 (2) operates as a bar to the entertainment of an application under section 482 of the Code. 5. There is also a sharp conflict of opinion between the different High Courts. The High Courts are equally divided. There are two schools of thought prevalent. The first is that in case of interlocutory orders, the bar created by sub-sec. (2) of section 397 of the new Code, cannot be circumvented by having recourse to section 482. The underlying principle for this view is that section 482 of the new Code, which is analogous to section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 does not apply to cases which are covered by specific provision of the Code. The Advocates of this thought reason that the new Code has mode a clear departure from the old Code and has prohibited interference by, revision in courts with proceedings in inferior court at interlocutory stages. This school of thought is represented by the decisions of the High Courts of Bombay, Andhra Pradesh. Himachal Pradesh and Orissa viz , Changdeo Kisan Jadhav vs. Chindya Jain(l), Isaq Mehboob vs. Vithalrao Nagorao Kelgaonkar(2), Budaraju Seshagiri Rao vs. T. V. Sarma (3), Sant Lal Nagrath, Tis Hazari Delhi vs. Kishan Lal Sun (4), Amarnath Rula Ram vs. Kanwar Joginder Singh (5), Rajanikanta Mehta vs. State of Orissa (6). In this Court, that view has been taken by J. P Jain J , in Har Prashad vs. Radhey Lal (7) and Sharma J,, in the State of Rajasthan vs. Ramnarain Upadhyaya (8). 6. In this Court, that view has been taken by J. P Jain J , in Har Prashad vs. Radhey Lal (7) and Sharma J,, in the State of Rajasthan vs. Ramnarain Upadhyaya (8). 6. In Changdeo Kisan Jadhav vs. Chindya Jain(l) supra, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court observed:— "It is not proper to construe Section 482, which confers inherent jurisdiction on this Court, In such a way as to nullify the iegislative bar to the entertainment of revision applications against the inter-locutory orders in criminal proceedings The inherent powers under sec. 482 are conferred on this Court by the Code not to defeat the mandatory provision, contained elsewhere in the Code; but "to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order" under the Code "or to prevent obuse of the process of the Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice." 7. In Isaq Mehboob vs. Vithalrao Nagorao Kelgaonkar (2) Division, Bench or the same High Court, after referring to section 482 (old section 561-A) observed:— "In the present scheme of codification and amendment of the law relating to Criminal Procedure in the light of the introduction of sub-section (2) of section 397, it would not be unsafe to take a positive view that in so far as inter-locutory orders are concerned, the re. medial measure provided by section 561-A of the old Code (Sec. 482 of the new Code) is rendered ineffective." 8. In Budaraju Seshagiri Rao vs. T. V. Sarma (3)a learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court observed :— "The new Code has made a clear departure from the old Code and has prohibited interference by revisional courts with proceedings. In inferior courts at interlocutory stages. Realizing this position the petitioners invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Sec. 482 Criminal P C. Section 482 Criminal P.C. merely preserves the inherent powers of the High court." He then continues— "It is well established that the inherent powers of the High Court cannot be invoked so as to do an act which would conflict with an express provision of Jaw or other general principles of Criminal Jurisprudence. Therefore the bar under sec. 397(2) cannot be got over by the invocation of the inherent powers of the High Court under sec. 482 Criminal P.C." 9. Therefore the bar under sec. 397(2) cannot be got over by the invocation of the inherent powers of the High Court under sec. 482 Criminal P.C." 9. In Sant Lal Nagrath, Tis Hazari Delhi vs. Krishan Lal Suri (4), a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court also took the same view slating: "A revision petition against such an order is clearly barred by sub-sec. (2) of sec. 397 of the new Code. This bar cannot be circumvented by having recourse to sec. 482 of the new Code. It is now well settled that sec. 482 does not apply to cases which are covered by specific: provisions of the new Code." 10. To the same effect are the decisions of the learned Single Judge of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in Amarnath Rula Ram vs. Kanwar Jogindar Singh, (5), and that of Orissa High Court in Rajanikanta Mehata vs. State of Orissa (6), and of the two learned Single Judges of the Court in Har Prashad vs. Radhey Lal (7) and State of Rajasthan vs. Ramnarain Upadhyaya(8). 11. With due deference to the learned Judges, there is no warrant for Curtailing the inherent powers of the High Court under sec. 482 in the manner that they have done. The decision must turn on the true construction of sec. 482 of the Code which reads:— "482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court. Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this: Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure to ends of justice." 12. Sec. 482 (old sec. 561-A) does not confer any new powers; it only provides that those powers which the Court already inherently possesses shall be preserved and is inserted lest it should be considered that the only powers possessed by the Court are those expressly conferred by the Code. The inherent powers of the High Court preserved by sec. 482 are subject to certain well settled limitations. They are to be exercised (1) to give effect to any order under the Code, or (9) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court, or (3) otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Any other view would render sec. 482 wholly nugatory. 13. 482 are subject to certain well settled limitations. They are to be exercised (1) to give effect to any order under the Code, or (9) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court, or (3) otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Any other view would render sec. 482 wholly nugatory. 13. The provisions of sec. 561-A which were identically the same as those of sec. 482 have been construed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court on more occasions than one, the leading case being that of R.P. Kapur vs. State of Punjab (2), wherein their Lordships have summaried some of the categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court to quash proceedings can and should be exercised, viz :. "(i) Where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the criminal proceeding in respect of the offence alleged. Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance, furnish cases under this category. (ii) Where the allegations in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if these are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety; do not constitute the offence alleged; in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the First Information Report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. (iii) where the allegations made against the accused person to constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge" In dealing with this class of cases it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there is a legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support the accusation in question. In exercising its jurisdiction under s. 561-A the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence is question is reliable or not. In exercising its jurisdiction under s. 561-A the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence is question is reliable or not. That is the function of the trial magistrate, and ordinarily it would not be open to any party to invoke the High Courts inherent jurisdiction and contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the accusation made against the accused would not be sustained." 14. Once these conditions are fulfilled, the High Court has the power as well as the duty to interfere under sec. 482. The opening words of the section, "nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court", clearly give an over-riding effect to the provisions of sec. 482 over those of sec. 397(2). The two provisions relate to the exercise of two different jurisdictions and they operate on two different fileds. While section 397(2) bars the exercise of revisional jurisdiction in relation to interlocutory orders. Sec. 482 relates to the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction to give effect to any order under the Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court or to secure the ends of justice. These are independent and separate powers and the two jurisdictions do not overlap. It is therefore wrong to suggest that the exercise of inherent powers under sec. 482 would be tantamount to circumventing the bar created by sec. 397(2). 15. The decision in Kumar Singh Chhaior Emperor (10) is clearly distinguishable. There, their Lordships were concerned with clause (26) of the Special Criminal Courts Ordinance, 1942 which expressly barred the jurisdiction of all courts. In that context, their Lordships observed that no court can claim inherent jurisdiction to exercise powers expressly taken away be legislation. That apart, the Special Court was not a court subordinate to the High Court. 16. The better view, and which is in consonance with reason and justice, is that represented by the decisions of the Calcutta, Madras, Allahabad and Kerala High Courts and that of a learned Single Judge of this Court (M.L. Jain J.,) in Biswanath Agarwalla vs. The State (11); Davi Ram vs. The State of Himachal Pradesh (12); Sarjoo vs. Babadin (13); President, Hindustan Motors Ltd, vs. K.M. Joseph (14); and Maam Singh vs. State of Rajasthan (15). Incidentally, we may mention that Sharma J in Guman Singh vs. State of Rajasthan (16) appears to have veelred round to the same view. 17. In Biswanath Agarwalla vs. The State (11) supra, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court after referring to the decisions of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Krishnamurty Iyer vs. The State of Madras (17); R.P. Kapur vs. The State of Punjab (9), supra, Delhi Development Authority vs. Lila Bhagat (18); and Superintendent and Remembrancer, West Bengal vs. Mohan Singh (19) observed: "The aforesaid cases, no doubt, showed that in appropriate cases the High Court can interfere with matters like the framing of the charges under its revisional or inherent powers but those cases were decided on the basis of the Old Criminal Procedure Code of 1898. In the old Code there was no bar to the exercise of revisional powers in case of interlocutory order. The imposition of the bar changes the context of use of inherent power of the court in this respect. It is the inadequacy inherent in the Code which fails to provide for all contingencies which has called for the creation of and saving the inherent power of the Court to act ex debito justitios. The same also explains why this inherent power is not to be exercised in matters specially covered by the other provisions of the Code. If such is the nature of the power should it be exercised in fields such as interlocutory orders which have been forbidden for the use of revisional powers by the Court? Sec. 397(2) is a bar which apparently fetters the revisional powers of the Court only." "There is nothing in sec. 482, Criminal Procedure Code that it is to be read subject to sec. 397(2). But even then should the court, when it is unable to exercise its revisional powers in case of interlocutory orders, take recourse to its inherent powers in that filed? Indiscriminate or frequent use of the inherent powers in that fashion would obviously render nugatory the bar put by sec. 397(2). It would be doing indirectly what the Court is directly forbidden to do under sec. 397(2). Indiscriminate or frequent use of the inherent powers in that fashion would obviously render nugatory the bar put by sec. 397(2). It would be doing indirectly what the Court is directly forbidden to do under sec. 397(2). While we would not like to fetter or circumscribe the ambit of the inherent powers of this Court which is a mighty reservoir to be drawn upon by the litigants in cases where the channels of other legal remedies under the Code are dried up at the same time it would be inadvisable to expand its ambit possibly except in rare cases to spheres specifically sought to be excluded by the Code. It would be risky to attempt formulations of principles to be followed in this regard. Circumstances may arise where a failure to exercise the inherent powers in case of interlocutory orders may occasion great hardship. To inhibit or carve or deny the Courts power to provide remedies on such occasion may cause injustice for he removal of which alone the Court exists." 18. We are in respectful agreement with these observations. 19. We are fortified in that view by the recent decision of their Lordships in State of Karnataka vs. L. Munniswamy (20) 188 to the effect: "In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a procreding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. xxx xxx xxx xxx The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere Jaw though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The complelling necessity for making these observation is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provisions which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice between the state and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the witch and contours of that salient jurisdiction." 20. To sum up: The powers under sec 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 can be exercised in relation to interlocutory orders, once the conditions mentioned in sec. 482 are fulfilled and exercise of such powers are not limited or controlled by the bar created by sec. To sum up: The powers under sec 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 can be exercised in relation to interlocutory orders, once the conditions mentioned in sec. 482 are fulfilled and exercise of such powers are not limited or controlled by the bar created by sec. 397(2) of the Code, inasmuch as the two powers are separate and operate in their respective fields. It is needless to stress that the inherent powers under sec. 482 of the Code have to be exercised with due circumspection and in very rare cases The inherent powers can be exercised only for any of the three purposes mentioned. They cannot be invoked in respect of any matter covered by the specific provisions of the Code. Nor can they be exercised to override an express prohibition of law prohibiting inter -ferance or if their exercise would be inconsistent with any of the specific provisions of the Code. The reference is answered accordingly.