JUDGMENT: S.A. No. 2041 of 1974:- The plaintiff is the appellant. The suit was filed by him for a declaration of his title to the suit property and for possession. The suit property originally belonged to one Venkatachala Chettiar. He had two wives by name Kamasundari and Kamalammal. Kamasundari had two daughters, namely, Muthialu and Ellammal. The plaintiff is the son of Muthialu. Kamalammal had a daughter by name Dhanalakshmi and the said Dhanalakshmi was married to one Kubendra, the brother of Kamalammal herself. After the death of Venkatachala in 1945, Kamasundari also died and Kamalammal inherited the property as the sole surviving widow along with some other properties. On 9th April, 1959, she executed a settlement deed in favour of the plaintiff and his maternal aunt bequeathing separate items of properties to each of them. One of the properties that was settled on the plaintiff is the suit property. That document was presented for registration on 26th May, 1959. But the execution of that document was denied by Kamalammal. In the meantime on 6th May, 1959, Kamalammal executed another settlement deed conveying the suit property and other properties in favour of her son-in-law Kubendra. That was registered on 7th May, 1959. The Sub-Registrar before whom the document dated 9th April, 1959 was presented refused to register the same on the ground that the execution had been denied by Kamalammal. The plaintiff then applied to the Registrar under section 72 for compulsory registration of the document. To this application, Kamalammal alone was shown as a party-respondent. The Registrar also refused to register the document finding that the document had not been proved to have been executed by Kamalammal. It may be mentioned that the document contained keeral (that is no signature or thumb impression but only a line). The plaintiff filed a statutory suit under section 77 impleading Kamalammal alone as the defendant in the suit. The suit was originally decreed directing the Registrar to compulsorily register the document. Kamalammal preferred an appeal. That was allowed. But in a second appeal preferred by the plaintiff to this Court, the order of the Appellate Judge was set aside and the matter was remanded again for fresh consideration. The suit was originally decreed directing the Registrar to compulsorily register the document. Kamalammal preferred an appeal. That was allowed. But in a second appeal preferred by the plaintiff to this Court, the order of the Appellate Judge was set aside and the matter was remanded again for fresh consideration. In the remanded appeal which was numbered as A.S. No. 175 of 1962, by judgment and decree dated 28th December, 1966, the learned Subordinate Judge of Vellore held that the plaintiff had proved the execution of the document by Kamalammal and that he might present the document for registration within 30 days from the date of the decree and thus confirmed the decree of the trial Court. The document was later on presented for registration and it was registered. Subsequently the present suit has been filed on the ground that the defendant claiming to have purchased the suit item from Kubendra under a sale deed dated 20th July, 1959 had trespassed into the property. The suit was accordingly filed for declaration of the plaintiff’s title and for recovery of possession. 2. The defendant contended that Kubendra, the vendor of the defendant got a valid title to the property under the settlement deed, dated 6th May, 1959, that on the date when that settlement deed was executed, Kamalammal was the owner of the property and had every right to settle the same in favour of Kubendra and that the settlement deed in favour of the plaintiff which was later on registered subsequent to the settlement in favour of Kubendra did not confer any title on the plaintiff. In fact, the defendant contended that though the settlement deed in favour of the plaintiff is dated 9th April, 1959, it was executed some time subsequent to 6th May, 1959, the date on which the settlement deed in favour of Kubendra was executed. The further case of the defendant was that the decision in O.S. No. 221 of 1960 filed under section 77 of the Registration Act was not binding on him even with respect to the question of execution of the document as neither Kubendra nor the defendant was a party to those proceedings. On merits also, the defendant contended that Kamalammal did not execute the settlement deed dated 9th April, 1959 in favour of the plaintiff; nor was the document executed by her voluntarily. On merits also, the defendant contended that Kamalammal did not execute the settlement deed dated 9th April, 1959 in favour of the plaintiff; nor was the document executed by her voluntarily. It was her case that it was got executed, if at all, fraudulently and under coercion and undue influence. The defendant also pleaded that the settlement deed in favour of the plaintiff was never acted upon and not given effect to either. 3. Both the Courts below have concurrently held that the settlement deed dated 9th April, 1959 was not executed by Kamalammal out of her free will and volition and that since neither the defendant nor her vendor Kubendra was a party to the suit O.S. No. 221 of 1960 and since the validity of the settlement deed dated 9th April, 1959 was not considered and could not have been considered in the statutory suit under section 77, the decree in O.S. No. 221 of 1960 was not binding on the defendant and his vendor. On the question whether the settlement deed dated 9th April, 1959 was given effect to, both the Courts below held that it was not given effect to and that Kubendra took possession of the property in pursuance of the settlement deed dated 6th May, 1959 and thereafter the suit property was put in possession of the defendant in pursuance of her purchase under the sale deed dated 20th July, 1959. In that view, the suit was dismissed. It is as against this judgment that the present appeal has been filed. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant strenuously contended that the question of execution was concluded by the decision in O.S. No. 221 of I960 and that could not be re-agitated in these proceedings. In fact, it was even the contention of the learned counsel that the voluntary nature of the execution was also concluded by the decision in that suit. 5. Under section 74, when the document is presented before the Registrar for registration, he has under section 74 to enquire (a) whether the document has been executed; and (b) whether the requirements of the law for the time being in force have been complied with on the part of the applicant or person presenting the document for registration, as the case may be, so as to entitle the document to registration. If he is satisfied that the document had been executed and the requirements of the law had been complied with, he shall order the document to be registered. If he is not satisfied either with the execution of the document or that the requirements of the law for the time being in force have been complied with, he could refuse to register the document. On such refusal, any person claiming under such document or his legal representative or assign could file a statutory suit under section 77 for a decree directing the document to be registered. 6. In a decision of this Court in Nalla Gounder v. Krishnaswami1, relating to the scope of clause (b) of section 74, this Court held that “the requirements of the law for the time being in force” in section 74 (b) relates to the requirements of the law relating to registration which entitle the Registrar to refuse registration if not complied with and that the Act contains provisions with regard to the time of presentation for registration, the proper office to which a document must be submitted for registration and the persons who are entitled to present it for registration. 7. Having regard to the scope of section 74, therefore, which is also the scope under section 77 in the statutory suit, the decision in the statutory suit could only relate to the factual execution of the document but not the voluntary nature of the execution or the validity of the document itself. Complying with the requirements of the law under section 74 having a relevance only to those provisions relating to registration, it could not also comprehend within it the validity or the voluntary nature of the execution. The decision in O.S. No. 221 of 1960, therefore, must be taken as final only with reference to the factual execution of the document by Kamalammal. But even here, the finding could not be said to be concluded and final as against the defendant herein and her vendor, Kubendran as they were not parties to the document. 8. He also contended that the scope of the suit will include the question of determination of the date on which the document was executed. I am unable to agree with this contention of the learned counsel. 8. He also contended that the scope of the suit will include the question of determination of the date on which the document was executed. I am unable to agree with this contention of the learned counsel. The Registrar is concerned only with the date as found in the document and if on the date when the document is presented, four months have elapsed from the date which the document bears, he had to reject the registration as under section 23, the document shall be presented for registration within four months from the date of its execution. If the date which the document bears is within four months prior to the presentation of the document, the Registrar is not concerned as to whether the document was actually executed on that date or whether it has been ante-dated. The question whether the document is ante-dated, therefore, could not be decided by the Registrar even under section 74 (b). 9. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that since the document is dated 9th April, 1959 and since the registration of the document subsequently makes the document effective from 9th April, 1959 itself, it was necessary for him to have impleaded either the defendant or her vendor Kubendra as a party in the earlier proceedings in order to make it binding on the defendant. I am unable to agree with this contention of the learned counsel. As already seen, the document was presented for registration only on 26th May, 1959, long subsequent to the settlement in favour of Kubendra. At the time when the settlement deed in favour of Kubendra was executed, Kamalammal had title to the property and, therefore, the settlement conveyed her interest in favour of Kubendra. It is only by reason of section 47 which provided that a registered document shall operate from the time from which it would have commenced to operate if no registration. thereof had been required or made, and not from the time of its registration that the registration takes retrospective effect from 9th April, 1959. On the date when the document was presented for registration on 26th May, 1959 the parties knew of the execution of the settlement deed in favour of Kubendra. thereof had been required or made, and not from the time of its registration that the registration takes retrospective effect from 9th April, 1959. On the date when the document was presented for registration on 26th May, 1959 the parties knew of the execution of the settlement deed in favour of Kubendra. But still, no notice was issued by the Registrar during the enquiry under section 74, nor the defendant or her vendor was made a party to the suit O.S. No. 221 of 1960 filed under section 77. It is seen from the judgment in O.S. No. 221 of 1960 that the settlement deed in favour of Kubendra was also marked as an exhibit in those proceedings, thereby putting the fact beyond controversy that the plaintiff in this case knew the execution of the document even during the proceedings for compulsory registration. In spite of it, for reasons best known to the plaintiff, the defendant or her vender had not been impleaded. It is, therefore, not unreasonable to think that there might have been even a collusive decree for compulsory registration which could not have been prevented by the defendant or her vendor because they were not parties to the same. 10. It was then contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that once under section 47 of the Registration Act, a retrospective operation is given for registration we have to imagine that the document itself was registered on 9th April, 1959 and the entire interest of Kamalammal had already been parted with and that, therefore, there was nothing to be conveyed under the settlement deed dated 6th May, 1959 in favour of Kubendra. It might be that if we come to the conclusion that there was a valid execution of the document in addition to the factual execution in view of the retrospective operation, the plaintiff will get title to the property though the registration was effected subsequent to the settlement deed in favour of the defendant’s vendor. But on that question, as already stated, both the Courts below have concurrently held that the execution of the document by Kamalammal was not voluntary and that the settlement also was not given effect to. But on that question, as already stated, both the Courts below have concurrently held that the execution of the document by Kamalammal was not voluntary and that the settlement also was not given effect to. In fact, in view of the dispute relating to the execution itself which came in the form of a suit under section 77, it is not really possible to conclude that there was any voluntary execution of the document. In any case, as I said, within the scope of section 100, Civil Procedure Code, J could not interfere with the finding that the execution was not voluntary. It has been found by the Courts below and there is clear evidence in support of that finding that immediately after the execution of the settlement deed in favour of the defendant on 20th July, 1959, she took possession of the property from her vendor Kubendra and she had continued in possession from that time onwards in her own right. The plea of the plaintiff that the defendant trespassed into the property some time in October, 1966 has been found against by the Courts below, which could only be on the basis that possession was not taken by the plaintiff in pursuance of the settlement at any time in order to hold that the settlement deed was given effect to. 11. The second appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. 12.C.M.P. No. 11691 of 1974.- The documents which are sought to be produced as additional evidence relate to some property other than the suit property and they have no relevance to the point for consideration in the second appeal. This petition is accordingly dismissed.