JUDGMENT N.D. Ojha, J. - The petitioners in these connected writ petitions other than petitioner No. 1 in the first three petitions are cinema exhibitors having their cinema Muses in several districts of Uttar Pradesh. Petitioner No. 1 in the first three petitions is the U. P. Cinema Exhibitors Federation through its Secretary. In the State of Uttar Pradesh the employment in the cinema industry is also included in Part I of the Schedule at Item No. 19 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The minimum wages of certain categories of persons employed in the cinematograph industry within the State of Uttar Pradesh were fixed by a notification dated August 11. 1972. The State Government of Uttar Pradesh subsequently proposed to revise the minimum wages and the proposals in this behalf as contemplated by Section 5(1) (b) of the Act were published in the Uttar Pradesh Gazette Extraordinary dated February 20, 1975, inviting objections and suggestions from everyone concerned. It was stated in the said notification that only such objections and suggestions shall be considered which were received before March 25, 1975. A corrigendum dated March 3, 1975, was published in the U. P. Gazette (Extraordinary) dated March 3, 1975, to the following effect: For the word and figures "March 25, 1975" occurring in para. 2 of Government Notification No. 5194(V).'XXXVI-5-1015 (MW)-74, dated February 20. 1975, published in the U. P. Government Gazette Extraordinary, dated Feb. 20, 1975, read the word and figures "April 25, 1975"." The effect of this corrigendum was that the notification dated February 20. 1975, was to the effect that only such objections and suggestions shall be considered which were received before April 25, 1975. Several objections were filed and ultimately the Government issued a notification dated November 1, 19"5. which was published in the U. P Government Gazette Extraordinary of the same date notifying the minimum rates of wages in respect of employment in cinema industry in Uttar Pradesh. The rates of wages as notified are as follows : (For Rates of Wages see below) It is this notification the validity of which has been challenged in these four connected writ petitions. 2. The rates of wages as notified are as follows : (For Rates of Wages see below) It is this notification the validity of which has been challenged in these four connected writ petitions. 2. Shri S. C. Khare, appearing for the petitioners in writ petition No. 11973 of 1975, made the following submissions in support of his contention that the notification dated November 1, 1975, was invalid : (1) The notification dated February 20, 1975. even after its being amended by notification dated March 3, 1975, did not mention the date on which the objections were to be considered as required by Section 5(1) (b) of the Act. "1. Basic Rates of Wages : Minimum rates of wages in respect of employment in Cinema Industry in Uttar Pradesh Si. No. Class of employees Rates payable by cinema houses in town with population of one lakh or more Rates payable by touring talkies and cinema houses in towns with population of one lakh or more. of less than one lakh. Rupees per month Rupees per month 1 Head Operator 300 275 2 Accountant/ Cashier 300 275 3 Operator 250 225 4 Booking Clerk/Clerk 250 225 5 Electrician 200 150 6 Painter 200 180 7 Gate keeler 180 8 Carpenter 180 170 9 Rewinder 170 160 10 Line Man 150 145 11 Office Peon 150 145 12 Chowkidar 150 145 13 Sweeper 150 145 14 Publicityman and other class of employees doing work of unskilled nature 150 145 (2) The notification dated March 3, 1975. was anti dated and was also invalid inasmuch as it could not retrospectively validate the notification dated February 20, 1975. As such the notification dated February 20, 1975. was invalid inasmuch as the date fixed in the said notification dated March 25, 1975 fell much within two months whereas Section 5(1) (b) contemplated the specification of a date not less than two months from the date of the notification. The notification dated February 20, 1975. was thus void and non esi and could not be validated by the subsequent. notification dated March 3. The notification dated February 20, 1975. was thus void and non esi and could not be validated by the subsequent. notification dated March 3. 197.5, even if it is accepted that it was not anti dated, (3) The Advisory Board which had to be consulted by the Government as required by the proviso to Section 5(2) of the Act was not properly constituted inasmuch as there was no representative of the cinema exhibitors and the employers of the cinema industry on the said Board whereas the employees of the cinema industry were represented on the Advisory Beard by Shri P. N. Tewari. The Advisory Board was also not properly constituted because the U. P. Government had entered in cinema business. So its officer on the Advisory Board ceased to be an independent person within the meaning of Section 9 of the Act. (4) The procedure contemplated by Section 5(1) (b) of the Act was quasi judicial and the impugned notification was bad inasmuch as no oral hearing was given to the petitioners before issuing the said notification. (5) The impugned notification was also bad inasmuch as it did not contain any reasons the giving of which is essential for a quasi judicial order. (6) No effective consultation was made with the Advisory Board as contemplated by the proviso to Section 5(2) of the Act. (7) No material relevant for fixation of minimum wages in cinema industry was collected. (8) The Government did not apply its mind to the objections filed b; the petitioners. (9) Wages have been fixed in an arbitrary manner. (10) Nature of the arcature houses and paying capacity of the employers was not considered. (11) In cases of cinema exhibitors in the districts of Allahabad and Varanasi the wages had earlier been fixed by Awards given in industrial disputes which were operative and as such no minimum rates of wages could be fixed or revised in respect of the employees on whom the awards were binding in view of Section 3(2-A) of the Act. 3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in the remaining three petitions made a statement before us that they adopted the arguments made by Shri S. C. Khare in writ petition No. 11973 of 1975. 3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in the remaining three petitions made a statement before us that they adopted the arguments made by Shri S. C. Khare in writ petition No. 11973 of 1975. In this view of the matter and in view of the fact that the same notification is under challenge in all these four writ petitions they are being decided together. 4. Before dealing with the submissions made by counsel for the Petitioners it would be useful to quote Section 5 of the Act at this place: "5. Procedure for fixing and revising minimum wages.-(1) In fixing minimum rates of wages in respect of any scheduled employment for the first time under this Act or in revising minimum rates of wages so fixed. the appropriate Government shall either. (a) appoint as many committees and subcommittees as it consider necessary to hold enquiries and advise it in respect of such fixation or revision and the case may be, or (b) by notification in the official Gazette publish its proposals for the information of persons likely to be affected thereby and specify a date not less than two months from the date of the notification. or. which the proposals will be taken into consideration. (2) After considering the advice of the Committee or Committees. appointed under Cl. (a) of subs. (1) or as the case may be all representations received by it before the date specified in the notification under Cl. (b) of that subsection, the appropriate Government -hall, by notification in the official Gazette, fix, or a., the case may be, revise the minimum rate of wages in respect of each scheduled employment and unless such notification otherwise provides it shall come into force on the expiry of three months from the date of the issue : Provided that where the appropriate Government proposes to revise the minimum rate of wages by the mode specified in Cl. (b) of subs. (1) the appropriate Government shall consult the Advisory Board also." 5. In support of his first submission counsel for the petitioners emphasised on the words "on which the proposals will be taken into consideration" occurring in Section 5(1) (b) of the Act. It was urged that the date to be specified in the Gazette should be the date for consideration of the proposals. In support of his first submission counsel for the petitioners emphasised on the words "on which the proposals will be taken into consideration" occurring in Section 5(1) (b) of the Act. It was urged that the date to be specified in the Gazette should be the date for consideration of the proposals. Since the notification dated February 20, 1975 did not state that the proposals will be taken into consideration on the date specified therein it was invalid not being in conformity with the statutory requirement. Reliance was placed on Vasudevan v. State of Kerala, ( AIR 1960 Ker 67 ). In that case the notification which had been issued stated that the proposals will be taken into consideration "after two months" from the date of the publication of the notification and that any representation that may be received before the expiry of the said period will be considered by the Government. It was held that the provisions of Section 5(1) (b) of the Act had not been complied with inasmuch as according to that section the notification should "specify a date not less than two months from the date of the notification" on which the proposals will be taken into consideration. It was pointed out that under subs. (2) of S. 5 the right to make representations is extended to the date specified in the notification under Section 5 (1) (b) and that that right can-:not be confined to a date anterior to it. It was further held that it was not possible for the Government to say that they will receive representations up to a particular date and that the proposals will be taken into consideration not on that date but on some date thereafter. Reliance divas also placed on another decision of the Kerala High Court in V K. Samajom v. State of Kerala. (1972 Lab IC 398) (Ker). in this case the notification stated that the proposals will be taken up for consideration "on or before 15-4-1968". It was held that it did not amount to specifying a date for consideration within the meaning of Section 5(1) (b) of the Act. It was also held that the purpose for specifying a date for consideration implies that the interested persons would be entitled to be heard on that date. It was held that it did not amount to specifying a date for consideration within the meaning of Section 5(1) (b) of the Act. It was also held that the purpose for specifying a date for consideration implies that the interested persons would be entitled to be heard on that date. If the legislature did not intend that the proposals may be taken up for consideration on the date specified it would have been sufficient to specify the date within which the representations have to be filed. Specifying a date for consideration therefore meant that interested persons were entitled to have a hearing on that date. Suffice it to say in respect of these two cases that a Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in a subsequent case in Malayalam Plantations Ltd v. State of Kerala, (1975 Lab IC 429) (FB) (Ker) did not approve of the correctness of the view taken in the aforesaid two decisions. It was held : "Though the Government is required to specify the date on which the proposals are to be taken into consideration, there is no express mention of any further requirement that once such date is -,o specified the Government is obliged to take up for consideration the proposals published by it on the date itself and not at any time thereafter. The right of those likely to be affected by the proposals to file representations at any time before the date specified in the notification and the duty of the Government to consider such representations before finally deciding upon the question of fixing or revising the minimum wages appear to us to be the main content of the procedural requirement of S. 5 when resort is made to the procedure prescribed under S 5 (1) (b) . . . .Hence it is difficult to read into Section 5 of the Act the requirement that the Government which is to specify the date on which the proposals are to be taken up for consideration is also obliged to finalise the matter on the said date. .We see no reason why we should, notwithstanding the undesirable results indicated, hold that S. 5 obliges the Government to consider the proposals on the date specified when the plain language of the provision does not compel such a construction. To us it appears that the specification of the date is for a different purpose. .We see no reason why we should, notwithstanding the undesirable results indicated, hold that S. 5 obliges the Government to consider the proposals on the date specified when the plain language of the provision does not compel such a construction. To us it appears that the specification of the date is for a different purpose. It is only by way of intimation to those who may be interested in filing representations that they should do so before a particular date and to secure to them a reasonable time for that purpose the minimum period is specified in the section." We are in respectful agreement with the view taken by the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in Malayalam Plantation Ltd.'s case (supra). In the instant's case the notification dated Feb. 20, 1975.i read with the corrigendum dated March 3, 1975, specifically mentioned that the objections and suggestions which were received before April 25, 1975 would b( considered. The date specified in the i notification, viz., April 25, 1975, was date not less than two months from the date of the notification. If the purpose( of the date being specified in the notification is only to give an opportunity to suet' persons who may like to file objections to file the same and the purpose is not to heat the objectors on the date specified or t( consider it on that date, the mere fact that the notification in the instant case did not state that April 25, 1975, was the date on which the proposals will be taken into consideration would not invalidate the said notification. The petitioners did file their objections which, as is apparent from the impugned notification dated November 1, 1975, were considered by the (State Government and thus the requirement of S. 5 in this behalf was fulfilled. Reliance was also placed on Bijay Krishna Paul v, State of Assam, (AIR 1969 Assam and Naga 33) . In that case the notification under Section 5 (1) (b) was published in the Gazette on June 22, 1966, inviting objections to be received by the Government for consideration on or before August 20, 1966. It was held that the requirement of Section 5(1) (b) was not fulfilled. The case is clearly distinguishable inasmuch as the date specified in the notification of that case fell within two months of the date of the notification. 6. It was held that the requirement of Section 5(1) (b) was not fulfilled. The case is clearly distinguishable inasmuch as the date specified in the notification of that case fell within two months of the date of the notification. 6. Lastly reliance was placed on Ramkrishna Ramnath v. State of Maharashtra, ( AIR 1964 Bom 51 ). In our opinion that case does not advance the submission made by counsel for the petitioners. On the other hand it appears that the learned Judges in this case also took the same view in regard to the purpose of specifying a date of notification under Section 5 (1) (h) as was subsequently taken by the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in Malayalam Plantations Ltd.'s case (1975 Lab IC 429) (FB) (Ker) (supra). It was held : "The whole idea behind specifying a date as required by Section 5(1) (b) is that the person likely to be affected by the draft proposals should be in a position to make a representation against the draft proposals and know till what date they have to make it, so that Government is precluded from taking a decision upon the draft proposals until the expiry of the date specified. There is however nothing in the statute which requires that Government should consider it on that very date and not thereafter. In fact, it seems to us that it will be impossible for Government to consider all the representations received on one and the same date, namely. the date specified." 6-A. In view of the foregoing discussions we find no substance in the first submission made by counsel for the petitioners. 7. In regard to the second submission we are of opinion that the corrigendum issued by notification dated March 3. 1975. and published in the Gazette of the same date was in no way invalid nor was it antedated. In support of the submission that this notification was antedated it was pointed out that this Gazette was not listed in the next ordinary Gazette. Apart from making the aforesaid submission no provision of law was brought to our notice which required an Extraordinary Gazette i being "listed" in the next ordinary Gazette. 8. In support of the submission that this notification was antedated it was pointed out that this Gazette was not listed in the next ordinary Gazette. Apart from making the aforesaid submission no provision of law was brought to our notice which required an Extraordinary Gazette i being "listed" in the next ordinary Gazette. 8. It was then urged that the objections which were filed on behalf of the petitioners had all been filed before March 25, 1975, which was the date specified in the notification dated February 2fk_ 1975. According to counsel for the petitioners this circumstance indicated that the notification dated March 3, 1975, had not been issued prior to March 25, 1975, for otherwise the objections could have been filed by April 25, 1975. In ours opinion this is no circumstance to hold that the notification dated March 3. 1975. was antedated. No such plea has been brought to our notice which may have) been taken in the objections filed by the petitioners that the notification dated; February 20, 1975, was invalid inasmuch' as the date specified therein fell within) two months. This circumstance indicate] that the notification dated March 3, 1975. had been issued and was in the knowledge of the petitioners before they filed the objections for otherwise it was natural that they would have taken the plea: in their objections which would have been a vital plea. It may be that even; after being aware that the time for filing; objections had been extended from March 25, 1975, to April 25. 1975, the petitioners) to be on the safe side considered it expedient to file the objections before the, date specified in the notification dated February 20, 1975, viz., before March 25, 1975. 9. Our attention was then invited to Annex. III to the writ petition No. 11973 of 1975 which purports to be a receipt of the objections filed on behalf of some of the petitioners. It reads "received objections to the proposals appearing in Gazette Notification No. 5194(V)/36-5-10'15(MW)-74 dated 20-2-1975 from. .". On its basis it was urged that if the notification dated March 3, 1975, had been issued or. that date the receipt would have indicated that the objections were being received in pursuance of the notification: dated February 20. 1975, as corrected by a. notification dated March 3. 1975. In our opinion there is no substance in this submission either. On its basis it was urged that if the notification dated March 3, 1975, had been issued or. that date the receipt would have indicated that the objections were being received in pursuance of the notification: dated February 20. 1975, as corrected by a. notification dated March 3. 1975. In our opinion there is no substance in this submission either. Even after the corrigendum being issued on March 3 1975 this notification containing the proposals continued to be the same which had been issued on February 20, 1975. The notification dated March 3, 1975, was not a second notification. It only purported to correct the date specified in the notification dated February 20. 1975. The objections were filed to the proposals contained in the notification dated February 20. 1975. The notification dated March 3, 1975 did not contain any additional proposals. In these circumstances the mere fact that in the receipt no mention was made of the notification dated March 3, 1975. cannot lead to the irresistible conclusion that the said notification was not issued till the date on which the receipt was granted. 10. Our attention was also invited to the impugned notification dated November 1, 1975, which also mentions the date of the notification as February 20. 1975. and does not make any mention about the notification dated March 3, 1975. The reasons which we have recorded for not placing reliance on the circumstance that the receipt of the objections did not mention the notification dated March 3, 1975, apply with equal force to the circumstance that the impugned notification does not make any mention about the notification dated March 3, 1975. In our opinion the petitioners have failed to substantiate their plea that the notification dated March 3, 1975, was antedated. 11. In regard to the submission that the notification dated March 3, 1973, could not retrospectively amend the notification dated Feb. 20, 1975, it was pointed out that the Government in issuing the notification was exercising a delegated power and in the absence of any express authority for issuing a notification retrospectively having been conferred on it the State Government was not entitled to issue a notification having retrospective effect. Reliance was placed on certain decisions in support of this submission. 20, 1975, it was pointed out that the Government in issuing the notification was exercising a delegated power and in the absence of any express authority for issuing a notification retrospectively having been conferred on it the State Government was not entitled to issue a notification having retrospective effect. Reliance was placed on certain decisions in support of this submission. We, however, find it unnecessary to consider those decisions in detail inasmuch as we are of opinion that in the instant case the notification dated March 3, 1975, did not have the effect of issuing any notification with retrospective effect. As seen above the date which had been specified in the notification dated February 20, 1975, was March 25, 1975. It is long before the date specified in the above notification that the notification dated March 3, 1975. was issued. According to the learned Advocate General appearing for the State of Uttar Pradesh an inadvertent mistake had crept in the notification dated February 20, 1975, and the corrigendum issued on March 3. 1975, and published in the Gazette Extraordinary of that date purported to just correct that mistake. We are inclined to accept the submission of the Advocate General on this point. The effect of the notification dated March 3, 1975, was to extend the date by which) the objections could replied from March) 25, 1975 to April 25, 1975. 12. In this connection it was urged by counsel for the petitioners that even if it is accepted for the sake of argument that the notification dated March :3, 1975, purported to correct a mistake that had crept in the notification dated February 20, 1975, it was invalid inasmuch as the Government did not have any power to correct such a mistake. Reliance was placed on Patna E. S. Workers Union v. A. Hassan, ( AIR 1958 Pat 427 ) where it was held that the appellate authority under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, in the absence of specific provision in this behalf was not entitled to correct a mistake in the Standing Orders finally certified by it under Section 6 (1) of the Act before the expiry of six months from the date on which the Standing Orders or the last modifications thereof came into operation except in the manner provided in Section 10 of the Act. The reason given for taking the said view was that from the scheme of the Act the provisions therein invest the appellate authority with many of the trappings of the Court but they do not invest the appellate authority in express terms with inherent powers so as to enable it to amend mistakes in the Standing Orders which have been finally certified and which have become final under Section 6 (1) of the Act, apart from the procedure indicated in and provided by Section 10 of the Act. It was further pointed out that the rule that every Court, in the absence of express provision to the contrary, must be deemed to possess the inherent power in its very constitution, all such powers, as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in the case of administration of justice, which applies to all Courts, cannot apply to an Appellate Authority under the Act. The principle laid down in the aforesaid case obviously cannot be applied to the facts of the instant case. Here the Government while issuing notification under Section 5 (1) (b) of the Act was not exercising any such power as was invested in the appellate Authority under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act. In our opinion the State Government was competent to correct a mistake by virtue of the power conferred on it by S. 21 of the U. P. General Causers Act. The only manner of issuing a notification as contained in Section 5(1) (b) of the Act is by notification in the official Gazette. The notification dated March 3, 1975. was admittedly published in the official Gazette. No sanction for issuing a notification under Section 5 (1) (b) was needed. In so far as the words "conditions, if any" used in S. 21 of the U. P. General Clauses Act are concerned we are on opinion that the only condition precedent for issuing a notification under Section 5 (1) (b) is the existence of the proposal to revise the minimum rates of wages. Such a proposal existed when the notification dated February 20. 1975. was issued and also existed when the subsequent notification dated March 3, 1975, was issued. Such a proposal existed when the notification dated February 20. 1975. was issued and also existed when the subsequent notification dated March 3, 1975, was issued. It was urged that recourse to the provisions of Section 21 could be taken only if the proposals were also included in the second notification and the second notification specified a date not less than two months from the date of the notification on which the proposals were to be taken into consideration. We are not inclined to accept this submission for if all that was to be done it would be a fresh notification under Section 5 (1) (b) superseding the earlier notification and not a notification which purports to amend the earlier notification. 13. We are also not impressed by the argument that the notification dated February 20, 1975, was void and non est inasmuch as the date specified in the said notification fell within two months. An act can be said to be void and non est if 0 has been done without jurisdiction or authority in law. A mistake committed in the exercise of the jurisdiction will not render the action void or non est. In U. P. State Road Transport Corporation v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal. ( AIR 1975 All 154 ) it was held : "The above observations show that a law enacted by a legislature without having legislative competence would be void ab initio and the same cannot be revived or revitalised even if the legislative competence is conferred on that legislature subsequently. But in a case where the legislature has legislative competence to enact a law, and some of its provisions violate any of the fundamental rights contained in Part III of the Constitution. the same would be rendered void under Art. 13 (2) of the Constitution and would remain unenforceable. The law so enacted is not wiped off the Statute Book nor it stands repealed. Further if the offend in,provisions of the Statute which violate fundamental rights are removed the law would become effective and enforceable even without reenactment. Such a law, whether pre Constitution or post Constitution, is not wholly dead if it violates fundamental rights; it is merely eclipsed by fundamental right and remains as it were in the moribund condition as long as the shadow of fundamental rights fails upon it. Such a law, whether pre Constitution or post Constitution, is not wholly dead if it violates fundamental rights; it is merely eclipsed by fundamental right and remains as it were in the moribund condition as long as the shadow of fundamental rights fails upon it. When that shadow is removed the law begins to operate propriovigore from the date of such removal unless it is retrospective. A law declared void by a court is not effaced from the Statute Book: it is revived and revitalised if Constitutional limitations are removed by Constitutional amendment or by reenactment by legislature." The aforesaid decision was affirmed by a Division Bench of this Court in Jagat Nath v. U. P. State Road Transport Corpn., ( AIR 1977 All 83 ). 14. Once the State Government entertained a proposal to revise the minimum wages it had jurisdiction to issue a notification as contemplated by Section 5(1) (b) of the Act. If some mistake as the one committed in the instant case occurs in the notification it cannot be said that the notification was void and non est so that it could not be revived by a subsequent notification. As seen above the object of specifying a date in the notification issued under Section 5 (1) (b) is to give an opportunity to all persons concerned to file objector by the specified date which has to be not less than two months from the date of the notification. It is true that a mistake was committed in the notification dated February 20. 1975, viz., that the date specified fell within two months. However, long before the expiry of the specified date the time by which objection, could he filed was extended by the notification dated March 3, 1975, and brought in conformity with the requirement of Section 5(1) (b). In our opinion as already pointed out above it was a case of correcting a mistake in the original notification, and the State Government was competent] to do it. We may further point out in this behalf that nothing has been brought to our notice on behalf of the petitioners from which it could be said that any prejudice was caused to anyone of them on account of the date for filing objections being extended from March 25. 1975, to April 25, 1975. We may further point out in this behalf that nothing has been brought to our notice on behalf of the petitioners from which it could be said that any prejudice was caused to anyone of them on account of the date for filing objections being extended from March 25. 1975, to April 25, 1975. It is also not the petitioner's case that due to a wrong mention ,of the date in the notification dated February 20. 1975, someone interested was unable to file objection or that some objection was filed between March 25. 1975 and April 25, 1975, and was rejected on the ground that it had been filed beyond time. In the absence of any prejudice their caused to the petitioners on account of the wrong date being mentioned in the notification dated February 20, 1975, and its subsequently being corrected by another notification dated March 3. 197: we tare of opinion that even if there may have seen some substance in the technical star taken by the petitioners it would no: be a proper exercise of jurisdiction under Art 226 of the Constitution to quash the impugned notification on this sound alone. 15. In regard to the third submission that the Advisory Board referred to in the proviso to Section 5(2) of the Act was not properly constituted, our attention was invited to Section 9 of the Act which reads 9. Composition of committees, etc. Each of the Committees, subcommittee, and the Advisory Board shall consist o_ persons to be nominated by the appropriate Government representing employers and employees in the scheduled employments, who shall be equal in number, and independent persons not exceeding one third of its total number of members, or._ of such persons shall be appointed the Chairman by the appropriate Government." Attention was invited to para. 67 of writ petition No. 11973 of 1975 where it has been stated that the State Government has now also entered into cinema business and has formed a Corporation for exhibiting cinema and on its basis it was urged that the employees of the State Government on the Advisory Board cannot be treated as independent persons and the constitution of the Advisory Board is invalid. Suffice it to any in regard to this submission that no details have been given about any cinema being run by the Government nor has any material been furnished to show that the Corporation talked of in para. 67 aforesaid is a State owned corporation so that it could be said that the State Government is doing cinema business. It cannot, therefore, be said that the employees of the State Government on the Advisory Board were not independent persons as contemplated by 9. Government officials would other wise be independent persons within then meaning of Section 9 of the Act is a per position which cannot be doubted (State off Andhra Pradesh v. N. V. Beedi Mfg. Factory, AIR 1973 SC 1 :307: (1973 Lab IC 878. 16. In regard to the contention that there was no representative of the cinema exhibitors or the employers on the Advisory Board it may be pointed out that the Act does not require that the Board should consist of representatives of all the scheduled industries. The Board is to consist or representatives of employers and employees in the scheduled employments (M/s. B. Y. Kshatriya v S. A. T. B. Kamgar Union, AIR 1963 SC 806 17. In the instant case it is not disputed, that the Advisory Board did consist of representatives of the employers and employees in the scheduled employment. The mere fact that a representative of the employers of the cinema industry was not on the Advisory Board would, therefore. not invalidate the constitution of the Board. 18. In so far as the submission made by counsel for the petitioners that the employees of the cinema industry were represented by Shri P. N. Tewari is concerned it has been brought to our notice by the Advocate General that Shri P. N. Tewari was appointed on the Advisory Board by notification dated January 22. 1964, as a representative of the workmen of the tobacco industry. A copy of this notification has been attached as Annex. C to the counter affidavit of Shri C. S. Pant. At that time cinema industry had not been even included in the Schedule of the Act. Employment in the cinema industry was added as Item No. 19 in the Schedule to the Act by the notification dated Augusts 22. 1968. a copy of which has been filed as Annex. E-2 to the above counter affidavit. At that time cinema industry had not been even included in the Schedule of the Act. Employment in the cinema industry was added as Item No. 19 in the Schedule to the Act by the notification dated Augusts 22. 1968. a copy of which has been filed as Annex. E-2 to the above counter affidavit. Nothing has been brought to our notice that any fresh appointment was made by Shri P. N Tewari on the Advisory Board as representative of the cinema industry. As such ;t cannot be said that Shri P. N. Tewari was on the Advisory Board as a representative of the cinema employees. We are accordingly of opinion that there is no substance in the third submission either. 19. In regard to the fourth submission made by counsel for the petitioners we are of opinion that the procedure contemplated by Section 5 (1) (b) of the Act is not quasi judicial nor are such persons whey may have filed any objection against the' proposals entitled as of right to an oral hearing in support of their objection. In ,Tourist Hotel, Kachiguda v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1975 Lab IC 44) (Andh Pra) a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court dealing with the nature of the power exercisable by the Government under Section 5 of the Act held: "Looking to S. 5 in the background of the scheme of the Act we are, however, of the view that the exercise of power under Section 5 by the Government is neither administrative act, nor is it a quasi judicial act. It is a legislative function delegated to the Government by the Parliament under Section 5 of the Act. It is very common nowadays for Statutes to empower Government to determine minimum rates of wages by a subordinate legislation." In S. I. Syndicate Ltd. v. Union of India, ( AIR 1975 SC 460 ) dealing with the question of fixation of sugar prices under the Sugar (Control) Order, 1966, it was held that price fixation is more in the nature of a legislative measure even though it may be based upon objective criteria found on a report or other material. It was held that even if price fixation affects each factory it could not give rise to a complaint that the rule of natural justice has not been followed in fixation of price. 20. It was held that even if price fixation affects each factory it could not give rise to a complaint that the rule of natural justice has not been followed in fixation of price. 20. It was urged by counsel for the petitioners that since the notification under Section 5 (1) (b) of the Act required a date to be specified on which the proposals were to be taken into consideration it implied an oral hearing. A similar argument that since the notification under Section 5 (1) (b) required specification of a date for consideration of the proposals, the proposal should be considered on the date specified, was repelled in Ramkrishna Ramnath v. State of Maharashtra, ( AIR 1964 Bom 51 ). In Malayalam Plantations Ltd. v. State of Kerala, (1975 Lab IC 429) (FB) (Ker) a Full Bench of the Kerala High Court held that Section 5(1) or Section 5(2) did not provide in express terms for hearing a party likely to be affected. An opportunity is provided to them to place their views before the Government and that is by way of making representations. Section 5 being silent as to any hearing being given to those who make representations it would be proper to assume that by enabling persons who are likely to be affected to file representations to the Government the requirement of this section is satisfied. Those who are likely to be affected are told about the date on which the proposals will be taken into consideration by the Government so that any re M presentations they have to make may be submitted before the date so specified. No hearing pursuant to the representations submitted is called for. If Section 5(1) (b) has provided only for written representations to be made by them there is no scope for insisting upon a further requirement that those who have filed representations must be heard by the State Government. With respect we are inclined to agree with the view taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Tourist Hotel. (1975 Lab IC 44) (Andh Pra) (supra) in regard to the nature of the power exercisable by the Government under Section 5, viz., that it is a legislative function delegated to the Government by the Parliament. With respect we are inclined to agree with the view taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Tourist Hotel. (1975 Lab IC 44) (Andh Pra) (supra) in regard to the nature of the power exercisable by the Government under Section 5, viz., that it is a legislative function delegated to the Government by the Parliament. We are further of the opinion that the purpose of specifying a date on which the proposals will be taken into consideration is to grant the person concerned an opportunity to file objections or representations against the proposals but the said section does not contemplate any oral hearing nor does it make it incumbent upon the Government to necessarily consider and dispose of the objections on the date specified. In this behalf we are in respectful agreement with the view taken by the Kerala High Court in the case of Malayalam Plantations Ltd. (supra). 21. So far as the rules of natural justice are concerned as was pointed out in Nagendra Nath v Commr. of Hills Division, ( AIR 1958 SC 398 ) the rules of natural justice vary with the varying circumstances of the statutory bodies and the rules prescribed by the Act under which they function. The question whether or not any rule of natural justice has been contravened shall be decided not under any preconceived notion but in the light of the statutory rules and provisions. In M. P. Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, ( AIR 1966 SC 671 ) even though the Supreme Court was dealing with an order passed by a quasi judicial tribunal under R. 55 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960, which required that no order shall be passed against any applicant unless he has been given an opportunity to make his representations against the comments if any received from the State Government or other authority, it was held that the said opportunity need not necessarily be by personal hearing. It can be by written representation. Whether the said opportunity should be by written representation or by personal hearing depends upon the facts of each case and ordinarily it is in the discretion of the tribunal. Reliance was placed by counsel for the petitioners on State of Assam v. Bharat Kala Bhandar. It can be by written representation. Whether the said opportunity should be by written representation or by personal hearing depends upon the facts of each case and ordinarily it is in the discretion of the tribunal. Reliance was placed by counsel for the petitioners on State of Assam v. Bharat Kala Bhandar. ( AIR 1967 SC 1766 ) where dealing with sub (4) of R. 126-AA of the Defence of India Rules, 1962, it was held: "It is not for us to indicate in detail what should be the procedure adopted by the Government in a real emergency to consult the interests concerned, as that is a matter for the Government to evolve for itself. But we may indicate that some kind of public notice to the particular interests should be given indicating what the Government intends to do and inviting representations from those interests and if necessary calling for data from them and also giving an oral hearing to the representatives of the interests concerned. Sub rule (4) which fell for consideration in the aforesaid case was in these terms: "The Central Government or the State Government may by order regulate the wages and other conditions of service of persons or of any class of persons engaged in any employment or class of employment to which this rule applied." Dealing with the scope of the power conferred by sub rule (4) it was held that the said power was analog us to the power of the Industrial Tribunals to decide disputes between employers and employees and that the said sub rule not only dealt with wages but also with other conditions of service and thus in a real emergency may practically supersede all industrial adjudication. It was further held that the power conferred was thus of a far reaching nature in the field of the industrial relations and may have the effect of disturbing all such relations for the duration of a real emergency. It is in this context that the observations relied on by counsel for the petitioners were made in the aforesaid case. Even so in para. 28 of the judgment it was emphasised twice that it was for the Government to evolve such procedure as it considers would meet the needs of sub rule. (4). It is in this context that the observations relied on by counsel for the petitioners were made in the aforesaid case. Even so in para. 28 of the judgment it was emphasised twice that it was for the Government to evolve such procedure as it considers would meet the needs of sub rule. (4). The nature of the power exercisable by the Government under Section 5 of the Minimum Wages Act is not as extensive as that which was conferred by sub rule(4) of the Defence of India Rules. Here the Government on being satisfied apparently on some material collected by it that minimum wages required revision issues a notification containing the proposals for such revision, an opportunity is given to the persons concerned to file objections or representations in which they are expected to put forward their case and to provide such material which may be relevant for the purpose of fixation of the minimum wages. In our opinion if on a consideration of the objections or representations that may have been filed the Government in a particular case is of opinion that it is necessary to grant even an oral hearing it may do so. but if it takes the view that the material in its possession including the material supplied in the objections and representations is sufficient to fix the minimum wages, it will not be obligatory in every case on the part of the Government to provide an oral hearing also to the objectors. In Union of India v. Jyoti Prakash, ( AIR 1971 SC 1093 ) it was held that it is not necessarily an ingredient of the rules of natural justice that personal hearing must be given to a party likely to be affected by the order. Except in proceedings in courts a mere denial of opportunity of making an oral representation would not, without more. vitiate the proceeding. We accordingly find no substance in the fourth submission either. 22. Since in our opinion the procedure contemplated by Section 5(1) (b) of the Act is not quasi judicial we are of opinion that even the fifth submission made by counsel for the petitioners that the impugned notification was bad inasmuch as it did not contain any reasons the giving of which is essential in a quasi judicial order cannot be accepted. 23. 23. We now proceed to consider the sixth submission made by counsel for the petitioners that no effective consultation was made with the Advisory Board a~; contemplated by the proviso to Section 5(2) of the Act. On the point as to what is consultation, reliance was placed by counsel for the petitioners on a number of decisions both Indian and English. In our opinion, however. it is not necessary to deal with all of them in detail firstly because the scope of consultation cannot be confined in a watertight compartment and will have to be adjudged with reference to the facts and circumstances of each case. In regard to the scope and purpose of consultation, we, however. consider it necessary to refer to the latest decision of our Supreme Court cited on this point by counsel for the petitioners, viz., Chandramouleshwar Prasad v. Patna High Court. ( AIR 1970 SC 370 ) where while dealing with the scope of consultation under Art. 233 of the Constitution in respect of appointment of a District Judge by the Government it was held that the consultation with the High Court by the Government under the said Article was not an empty formality and that consultation or deliberation is not complete or effective before the parties thereto make their respective points of view known to the other or others and discuss and examine the relative merits of their views. If one party makes a proposal to the other who has a counterproposal in his mind which is not communicated to the proposer, the direction to give effect to the counterproposal without anything more cannot be said to have been issued after consultation. 24. It is true that where the exercise of a power is dependant on consultation with some other authority such exercise of the power would be bad if consultation with the authority concerned has not been made. The crucial question which, however falls for consideration is, as pointed out above as to what is the scope and purpose of consultation under a given statutes. The broad outlines of consultation are certainly those as contained in Chandramouleshwar Pd.'s case ( AIR 1970 SC 370 ) (supra). If there are proposals and counter proposals these have to be 4 communicated to each other and the relatives merits of the views expressed in the proposals and the counter proposals have to be examined. The broad outlines of consultation are certainly those as contained in Chandramouleshwar Pd.'s case ( AIR 1970 SC 370 ) (supra). If there are proposals and counter proposals these have to be 4 communicated to each other and the relatives merits of the views expressed in the proposals and the counter proposals have to be examined. The question is whether any sitting round the table is necessary to discuss the proposals and the i counter proposals or such discussion can be made in writing. Keeping in view the nature of the power to be exercised by the Government to revise the minimum rate of wages by the mode specified in Section 5(1) (b) of the Act we are of opinion that it is not necessary that there should be an oral discussion round the table where the officials of the Government and the members of the Advisory Board may sit together and examine the relative merits of the views expressed by them in the 7 ropoals and the counter proposals. If any It would be seen that Section 5 of the Act does not prescribe any procedure for Consultation. In the instant case the original record was produced before us by the Advocate General which indicated that not only the proposals of the Government but also the objections that had been received against the proposals were Sent to the Advisory Board for consultation. It is not the case even of the petitioners that the Advisory Board was not consulted at all. What was urged' was that no effective consultation was made. A copy of ''': report submitted by the Advisory Board has been placed on the record of the writ petition and its perusal indicates that on the quantum of the minimum wages proposed to be fixed the Advisory Board did not have any counter proposals. In this view of the matter also no discussion was called for. The Advisory Board not having given any counter proposals. it can be presumed that it was in agreement with the proposals of the Government. It is true was pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the report of the Advisory Board was not very elaborate. This. however, in our opinion could not invalidate the fixation of the minimum wages by the Government. it can be presumed that it was in agreement with the proposals of the Government. It is true was pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the report of the Advisory Board was not very elaborate. This. however, in our opinion could not invalidate the fixation of the minimum wages by the Government. In what manner should the Advisory Board express its opinion is the lookout of the Advisory Board and not of the Government. The only duty cast upon the Government under the Act is to, consult the Advisory Board if the :deposal was for revision of minimum wages. That having been done the statutory requirements were fulfilled and we are Unable to accept the submission made by :counsel for the petitioners that the impugned notification is bad because no effective consultation was made by the Government with the Advisory Board. 25. The second limb of the submission made by counsel for the petitioners on this point was that the consultation contemplated by the proviso to Section 5(2) of the Act had to be made at a stage after the State Government had gone through the requirement of subs. (2). viz., after it had considered the objections. This argument was based on the circumstances that the proviso which required it co': saltation to be made where the Government proposed to revise the minimum rate of wages occurred at the end of subs. (2) of S. 5. We are unable to accept this submission either. It is true that the proviso occurs at the end of subs. (2) of S. 5 but from that circumstance alone we are unable to hold that the exercise of the power by the Government under Section 5 would be bad simply because the Government consulted the Advisory Board before considering the objections that may have been filed. The proposals and the objections both having been sent to the Advisory Board, all the necessary material on the question of revision of the minimum rates of wages was available to the Advisory Board and it was thus in a position to express its own views in the matter. The only thing which the proviso contemplates is that where the appropriate Government proposes to revise the minimum rates of wages by the mode specified in Section 5(1) (b) the appropriate Government shall consult the Advisory Board also. The only thing which the proviso contemplates is that where the appropriate Government proposes to revise the minimum rates of wages by the mode specified in Section 5(1) (b) the appropriate Government shall consult the Advisory Board also. In our opinion the word "proses" cannot be read to mean a proposal after consulting the objections also. It only draws a distinction between a case :here minimum rates of wages in respect f any scheduled employment are Pro posed to be fixed for the first time under e Act and a case where the proposal is revise the minimum rates of wages. If the proposal is to fix minimum rates of wages for the first time or to revise the minimum rates of wages by the mode specified in Section 5 (1) (a) no consultation with the Advisory Board is necessary On the other hand if the proposal is to revise the minimum rates of wages by the mode specified in Section 5(1) (b) consultation with the Advisory Board is necessary. In our opinion the stage at which such consultation takes place is not of any material consequence. We are further of opinion that the consultation which was made by the State Government with the Advisory Board in the instant case was in accordance with the requirements of the proviso and the impugned notification is not had on the ground of lack of effective consultation as urged by counsel for the petitioners. 26. A perusal of paras. 31 to 36 of the counter affidavit of Shri C. S. Pant and Annex. H to the said counter affidavit makes it clear that there is no substance in the seventh submission also made by counsel for the petitioners. viz. that no material relevant for fixation of minimum wages in the Cinema industry was collected. In the relevant paragraphs of the ,said counter affidavit it has been stated that a random survey of working conditions and wages of cinema employees was made because the workers engaged in the cinema industry were dissatisfied with the rates of wages which were not fixed category wise. Besides that the dearness allowance was not linked upon with the price index in this industry. It has further been stated that the revision of the minimum rates of wages was done not arbitrarily but in accordance with the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act. Besides that the dearness allowance was not linked upon with the price index in this industry. It has further been stated that the revision of the minimum rates of wages was done not arbitrarily but in accordance with the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act. I Annexure H to the writ petition is a copy of the proposal made by the Labour Commissioner, Uttar Pradesh. to the Secretary of the department concerned of the State Government of Uttar Pradesh. It is dated December 26, 1974 and contains the reasons why revision in the minimum rates of wages was necessary. 27. The eighth submission made by counsel for the petitioners that the Government did not apply its mind to the objections filed by the petitioners also has no substance. In our opinion there is no basis for making this submission. The assertion made in this behalf in para. 63 of the writ petition has been denied in para. 49 of the counter affidavit of Shri C. S. Pant. That apart, the original record. as pointed out, was placed before us by the learned Advocate General. A perusal of the nothings and orders on the file indicates that the whole matter was considered at length and was thereafter placed not only before the Minister concerned but. also before the Chief Minister and both of then) gave their approval to the revision of the minimum rates of wages. 28. The ninth and the tenth submission, viz., that the wages have been fixed in an arbitrary manner and that the nature of the various picture houses and the paying capacity of the individual employers of those picture houses has not been considered, can conveniently be dealt with together. Having considered the respective submissions made by counsel for the parties in this behalf we are of opinion that the impugned notification is not bad on these grounds either. As already pointed out above proposals fort revision of rates of minimum wages were. made on the basis of the prevailing dies satisfaction amongst the employees of the) cinema industry in respect of their minimum rates of wages as brought to the notice of the Government by the Labour) Commissioner. The proposals were published. Objections were invited. The Advisory Board was consulted and it wash only after being satisfied on the basis of, the material before it that the Government issued the impugned notification. The proposals were published. Objections were invited. The Advisory Board was consulted and it wash only after being satisfied on the basis of, the material before it that the Government issued the impugned notification. We are unable to accept the submission made by counsel for the petitioners that the minimum rates of wages have been fixed in an arbitrary manner by the impugned notification. In the instant case a distinction was made between the wages, payable by cinema houses in town.; with population of one lakh or more and wags Payable by touring talkies and cinema houses in towns with population less than one lakh. In our opinion no arbitrariness can be imputed to the Government in making this distinction. The classification is reasonable as it is based on cost of living in smaller and bigger towns. We are further of the opinion that while fixing minimum rates of wages or revising ahem under the Minimum Wages Act the nature of various picture houses and the paying capacity of the individual employer, of those picture houses was not material. In Unichoyi v. State of Kerala, ( AIR 1962 SC 12 ) it was held on the basis of certain earlier decisions that there could no longer be any doubt that in fixing the minimum rates of wages as contemplated by Minimum Wages Act the hardship caused to individual employers or their inability to meet the burden has no relevance. What the Act purports to achieve is to prevent exploitation of labour and for that purpose authorises the appropriate Government to take steps to prescribe the minimum rates of wages in the scheduled industries. In an undeveloped country which faces the problem of unemployment at a very large scale it is not unlikely that labour may offer to ,work on starvation wages. The policy of he Act is to prevent the employment of ,sweated labour in the interest of ,enteral public and so in prescribing the minimum wage rates the capacity of the employer need not be considered. What s being prescribed is the minimum wage rate which a welfare State assumes every employer must pay before he employs labour. In J. P. Industries v. Workmen. AIR 1972 SC 605 the principles laid down in this behalf in the case of Unichoyi (supra) were reiterated .n para. 11 of the report. What s being prescribed is the minimum wage rate which a welfare State assumes every employer must pay before he employs labour. In J. P. Industries v. Workmen. AIR 1972 SC 605 the principles laid down in this behalf in the case of Unichoyi (supra) were reiterated .n para. 11 of the report. In this view of he matter the impugned notification cannot be held to be invalid either on the round that the wages have been fixed in in arbitrary manner or or. the ground hat the nature of the picture house; and )ayin capacity of the individual employer was not considered. 29. In this connection it was also urged by counsel for the petitioners that the wages which had been fixed by the Government under the impugned notification cannot be said to be minimum wages. We are unable to agree with this submission either. In the case of Unichoyi, ( AIR 1962 SC 12 ) (supra) the question as to what are the components of the minimum wage was also considered. After referring to the report of the Committee on Fair Wages, it was held : "The Committee came to the conclusion that a minimum wage must provide not merely for the bare subsistence of life but for the preservation of the efficiency of the worker, and so it must also provide for some measure of education, medical requirements and amenities. The concept about the components of the minimum wage thus enunciated by the Committee has been generally accepted by industrial adjudication in this country. Sometimes the minimum wage is described as a bare minimum wage in order to distinguish it from the wage structure which is 'subsistence plus' or fair wage, but too much emphasis on the adjective "bare" in relation to the minimum wage is apt to lead to the erroneous assumption that the maintenance wage is a wage which enables the worker to cover his bare physical needs and keep himself just above starvation. That clearly is not intended by the concept of minimum wage. That clearly is not intended by the concept of minimum wage. On the other hand since the capacity of the employer to pay is treated as irrelevant it is but right that no addition should be made to the components of the minimum wage which would take the minimum wage near the lower level of the fair wage but the contents of this concept must ensure for the employee not only his sustenance and that of his family but must also preserve his efficiency as a worker. The act contemplates that minimum wage rates should be fixed in the scheduled industries with the dual object of providing sustenance and maintenance of the worker and his family and preserving his efficiency as a worker." Judged in the light of the observations aforesaid the rates of wages fixed in the instant case which have already been quoted above can by no stretch of imagination be said to be excessive particularly keeping in view the price index of various: commodities including essential commodities and the amount of expenditure involved in meeting other obligations which) are relevant for fixing minimum wage. 30. We now proceed to consider the last submission made by counsel for the petitioners in regard to the bar created by Section 3(2-A) of the Act in respect of the cinema exhibitors in the districts of Allahabad and Varanasi. In respect of this submission reliance was placed on an award published in U. P. Gazette dated March 11. 1972, in respect of certain cinema houses situate in the district of Allahabad fixing wages of certain categories of employees and on another award dated July 3, 1965, fixing wages in respect of employees of certain cinema houses in the district of Varanasi. Emphasis was placed in respect of the award regarding cinema houses in the district of Allahabad the observations made by the Tribunal that the wage structure fixed shall operative for ten years. It was urged at ore the expiry of ten years from e date of the award minimum rates of age could not be revised in view of e bar created by Section 3(2-A) of the Act. respect of the award relating to the nema houses in the district of Varanasi was urged that even though it was at e first instance operative for one yearly, since neither of the parties repeated it, it continued to be binding on em. respect of the award relating to the nema houses in the district of Varanasi was urged that even though it was at e first instance operative for one yearly, since neither of the parties repeated it, it continued to be binding on em. Section 6-C of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. 1947, reads: "6-C. Award of Labour Court or Tribunal or Arbitration and its operation. An award shall in the first instance real in operation for a period of one year r such shorter period as may be specified ere in : Provided that the Stag Government any extend the period of operation of an ward from time to time, if it thinks fit: Provided further that where the State government, whether of its own motion or on the application of any party bound by the award, considers that since the award was made there has been a material change in the circumstances on which it withs based, the State Government may after such enquiry shorten the period award." as of it may think fit, operation of the On a plain reading of S. 6-C it is apparent that an award. unless its period has been extended by the State Government, remain: operative only for a period of one year or such shorter period as may be specified therein. In this view of the matter the mere fact that the Tribunal in the :,ward given in respect of enema houses situate in the district of Allahabad made in observation that the wage structure shall be operative for ten years cannot create a bar contemplated by Section 3(2-A) of the Act. When the said section uses the words "and the award made therein is in operation" it apparently mean weened= "in operation contemplated by S. 6-C of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act or it accordance with the other corresponding sections of either the Central Industrial Disputes Act or State Acts as enacted by other States. 31. It was then urged by counsel for the petitioners that since the award relating to the cinema houses situate in the district of Allahabad was made operative for ten years -nd the State Government -published the award, it would be deemed 1077 Lab. T. C'./84 Vi to have extended the period of operation of the award from one year to ten years. We are unable to accept this submission too. T. C'./84 Vi to have extended the period of operation of the award from one year to ten years. We are unable to accept this submission too. It is not the case of the petitioners that the State Government ever passed an order of extension of the period of this award. Indeed the question of extension never came up before the State Government nor did it apply its mind to this aspect of the matter. From the mere fact that the award containing an observation by the Tribunal as stated above was published by the State Government in the official Gazette it cannot be said that the Government extended the period of the operation of the award from one year to ten years as contemplated by the first: proviso to S. 6-C of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. 32. The submission that the valid:to of the award cannot he challenged in collateral proceedings also has no substance. In the present proceedings the validity of the award is not being challenged by the respondents. What is being said is that in view of the statutory provisions contained in S. 6-C of the U P. Industrial Disputes Act the award has ceased to be operative after the expiry of the period of any year contemplated by the said section. Reliance was placed by counsel for the petitioners on Burn & Co. v. Their Employees, (AIR 1957, SC 38). In that case the question which arose for consideration was as to whether even though S. 11. C. P. C. in terms was inapplicable to the industrial disputes. the principle underlying it applied to such disputes or not ? In that connection reliance was placed on Section 19(6) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 1947, in support of the submission that an adjudication lost its force when it is repudiated under the said subsection and the whole controversy is at large. This submission was repel:ed. In the instant case we are not dealing with the question as to whether the principle of res judicata applies to industrial disputes or not. Moreover, we are dealing with a case not under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, but under the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Central Act and the U. P. Act respectively). Moreover, we are dealing with a case not under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, but under the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Central Act and the U. P. Act respectively). In view of Section 19(3) of the Central Act an award subject to the provisions of the section is to remain. 'n operation for a period of one year from the date on which the award becomes enforceable under Section 17-A. Subsection (6), however, is to the effect that notwithstanding the expiry of the period of operation under subs. (3) the award shall continue to be binding on the parties until a period of two months from the date on which the notice is given by any party bound by the award to the other party or parties intimating its intention to terminate the award. There is no corresponding provision in the U. P. Act and as such it cannot be said in respect of an award given under the U. P. Act that it continues to be binding on the parties on account of any statutory provision such as Section 19(6) of the Central Act even after the expiry of the initial period of one year for which it remains operative under Section 6-C of the U. P. Act. Reliance was also placed by counsel for the petitioners on South India Bank v. A. I. Chako, ( AIR 1964 SC 1522 ). There again the provision which came up for consideration was Section 19(6) of the Central Act. It was held that even if an award has ceased to be in operation or in force and has ceased to be binding on the parties under the provisions of Section 19 (6) it will continue to have its effect as a contract between the parties that has been made by the industrial adjudication in place of the old contract. It was urged that the principle laid down in that case will be applicable even in respect of an award given under the U. P. Act notwithstanding the fact that there was no provision in the said Act corresponding to Section 19(6) of the Central Act. It was urged that the principle laid down in that case will be applicable even in respect of an award given under the U. P. Act notwithstanding the fact that there was no provision in the said Act corresponding to Section 19(6) of the Central Act. Without going into this question in detail we are of opinion that even if that be so the bar created by Section 3(2-A) will not be attracted on account of an award which may continue to have its effect as a contract between the parties after the expiry of the period of one year. What Section 3(2-A) of the Act contemplates is that the award should be "in operation". It does not envisage an award which continues to have its effect as a contract between the parties after it has ceased to be in operation. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the bar created by Section 3(2-A) was not attracted on account of the award either in respect of the cinema houses situate in the district of Allahabad or the award in respect of the cinema houses situate in the district of Varanasi. 33. Before parting with the case we may point out that in respect of the writ petitions in which in U. P. Cinema Exhibitors Fed Frat.ion is the petitioner No. I it was urged by counsel for the workmen that a writ petition on behalf of the Federation was not maintainable. Reliance in support of this submission was placed on a Full Bench decision of this Court in Indian Sugar Mills Association v_ Secretary to Government. ( AIR 1951 All 1 ). In our opinion even if this submission. is accepted it will not make much difference inasmuch as in each of the writ petitions where the U. P. Cinema Exhibitors. Federation is petitioner No. 1 there are other petitioners also on whose behalf & writ petition is maintainable. 34. We may also point out that the minimum wages which have been fixed by the impugned notification are n respect of certain categories of employees a bit higher than these as shown in the notification issued under Section 5 (1) (b) containing the proposals. 34. We may also point out that the minimum wages which have been fixed by the impugned notification are n respect of certain categories of employees a bit higher than these as shown in the notification issued under Section 5 (1) (b) containing the proposals. In our opinion however, this would not invalidate the impugned notification in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in C. B. Boarding & Lodging v. State of Mysore ( AIR 1970 SC 2042 ) in para. 15. where it was held-. -We see no substance in the contention that the Government is not competent to enhance the rate of wages mended in the proposals published. If it h. power to reduce those rates as desired by the employers it necessarily follows that it has power to enhance them. They= is no merit in the contention that the Government must go on publishing ; : royals after proposals until a stage is ached where no change whatsoever is salary to be made in the last proposal made 35. The various submissions made by counsel for the petitioners have in ailed each of these writ petitions is dismissal with costs