JUDGMENT This rule has been directed against the order dated 26.2.67 passed by the learned District Judge, Midnapore, in Misc. Appeal No. 148 of 1975 arising out of the order dated 5.7.75 passed by the learned Munsif, Tamluk, in Judicial Misc. Case No. 59 of 1972. 2. The opposite party No.1 Mrityunjoy filed an application for preemption under section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act on 27th February, 1972 in respect of Plot No. 278 appertaining to Khatian No.18/7 of Mouza Jashantapur and that gave rise to Judicial Misc. Case No. 59 of 1972. This plot has been recorded in the Settlement Khatian as a tank. This tank along with some other agricultural lands of Khatian No. 18/7 have been recorded in the name of Dukhabala as a raiyat during the revisional settlement operation. Dukhabala parted with her interest in respect of some plots of the raiyati holding in favour of one Motilal Mahapatra and his brother Jatindra in the year 1960. Mrityunjoy purchased plot No. 275 of the said Khatian from Motital by a Sale Deed dated 27.7.76 and as such became a co-sharer by purchase. Ballav Charan Maity and Bibhuti Bhusan Maity alias Batokristo (O.Ps. 2 and 3) inherited some of the plots of Khatian No. 18/7 on the death of Dukhabala and thus bec1me co-sharers of the said holding Ballav and Bibhuti sold plot No. 278 by the Sale Deed, Ext. 1 dated 12.2.69 to Bankim Behari Jana and Lakshan Chandra Jana the petitioners Nos.2 and 3 before this Court. After this transfer, O.P. No.1, Mrityunjoy filed an application before the Revenue Officer for pre-emption on 7.2.72 against Bankim and Lakshan alleging inter alia, that no notice of sale was served on him and that he was a co-sharer of the holding. Kanailal Jana, petitioner No.1 was subsequently arrayed as O. P. in that proceeding on the ground that petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 had sold the property to him. It appears that an attempt was made by Mrityunjoy to add a ground in the application that being the owner of the adjacent land he was entitled to pre-empt apart from his right as a co-sharer. This Court disallowed the prayer (vide order dated 29.8.74 in C.R. 2489 of 1973). 3. 2 and 3 had sold the property to him. It appears that an attempt was made by Mrityunjoy to add a ground in the application that being the owner of the adjacent land he was entitled to pre-empt apart from his right as a co-sharer. This Court disallowed the prayer (vide order dated 29.8.74 in C.R. 2489 of 1973). 3. Bankim and Lakshan filed written statement alleging that the disputed plot was not a raiyati land nor was it a part and parcel of any raiyati holding; that the application was barred by limitation and that the tank being excluded from the definition of land the application was not maintainable. Ballav and Bibhuti also filed one set of objections on the same line as indicated in that of Bankim and Lakshan. 4. It appears from the order of the learned Munsif that the controversy centered round the question whether the application for preemption in respect of a tank was maintainable in view of the amendment of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act in 1972. It was contended on behalf of the petitioners before the learned Munsif that the right to preempt vested in the petitioners on the registration of the document Ext.1 before the amending Act came into force and that right remained unaffected even after subsequent change in the definition of 'land' given in the West Bengal Land Reforms Act inasmuch as the application for pre-emption was pending since 7.2.72. The learned Munsif accepted the contention. He, further, held that tank and its banks could not be separated and section 8 of the Land Reforms Act is concerned with holding and not land simpliciter and in that view of the matter, he was of the opinion that the amendment by which tank has been excluded from the definition of land, has no bearing so far as holding is concerned. The learned Munsif having allowed the application, the petitioners preferred an appeal to the learned District Judge. The learned Additional District Judge having dismissed the appeal, the petitioners have come with the instant application before this Court. 5. The learned Additional District Judge agreed with the findings of the learned Munsif when he said that the vested right could not be taken away by the amendment of the definition of land. He affirmed the views of the learned Munsif that the tank and its banks constituted an agricultural holding. 6. 5. The learned Additional District Judge agreed with the findings of the learned Munsif when he said that the vested right could not be taken away by the amendment of the definition of land. He affirmed the views of the learned Munsif that the tank and its banks constituted an agricultural holding. 6. Mr. Das appearing for the petitioners has submitted that the Courts below acted illegally and with material irregularity in holding that the vested right of pre-emption remained unaffected by the change of definition of land, which has been given retrospective effect by the legislature. His further contention is that the right of pre-emption has been lost by operation of law as the subject matter of pre-emption has ceased to exist since 12th of February, 1972, when the amendment came into force. 7. Mr. Gorai appearing on behalf of the O.Ps. has raised several contentions in support of the orders passed by the Courts below. He has submitted that the subject matter of the sale the R.S. plot No. 278 comprised of tank with banks on east and south and both together constitute agricultural holding. In support of this contention he relied on a decision of this Court reported in (1) 34 CWN 1063, his second contention is that the lease dated 9.6.53 regarding plot No. 278 (Ext. 1A) granted by the transferor's predecessor in-interest in favour of O.Ps. discloses that the tank was meant for agricultural purpose and hence it was a part of the agricultural land belonging to the raiyat transferor. He has drawn my attention to the definition of raiyat in Section 2(10) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act. His third contention is that in the finally published record of rights Ext.2 prepared under the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act the description of plot No.278 was given by the settlement department as 'pukur' which according to the technical rules and instructions of the settlement department issued by the Director of Land Records and Surveys, West Bengal, is agricultural land. His fourth contention is that the word 'homestead' as defined in West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act also includes tank and this homestead having been included in the definition of land given in Section 2(7) of the West Bengal Lands Reforms Act, the right of pre-emption in respect of the tank remains unaffected. His fourth contention is that the word 'homestead' as defined in West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act also includes tank and this homestead having been included in the definition of land given in Section 2(7) of the West Bengal Lands Reforms Act, the right of pre-emption in respect of the tank remains unaffected. His next contention is that the definition of land as amended was introduced for fixation of ceiling, classification of land and the allied matters. This definition should be construed as not to be repugnant to the context. 8. Section 8 under Chapter II of West Bengal Land Reforms Act gives right of pre-emption to a co-sharer raiyat in the event of a portion or ghare of holding of a raiyat is transferred. Mr. Gorai has submitted that the word 'holding' should not be replaced by the word land and vice versa. In support of his contention he has referred to (2) AIR 1960 SC 971 which has laid down the proposition that different meaning is to be given in different sections of the Act depending upon the subject or the context He has also referred to a decision of this Court reported in (3) 1975(2) CLJ 79 and a decision of the Bombay High Court reported in (4) AIR 1957 Bom 182 for explaining what the word 'holding' conveys. 9. Holding as defined in the West Bengal Land Reforms Act means the land or land held by a raiyat and treated as a unit of assessment. Land means agricultural land other than land comprised in a tea garden which is retained under sub section 3 of Section 6 of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 and includes homestead but does not include tank. Raiyat means a person who holds land for purposes of agriculture. As has been held in (5) Madan Mohan v. Sishu Bala, reported in 76 CWN 1058: AIR 1972 Cal. 502 , land held by a Raiyat constitutes a holding. As headache presupposes a head, similarly holding presupposes existence of land. Tank has been expressly excluded from the ambit of land with effect from February 12, 1971. Mr. As has been held in (5) Madan Mohan v. Sishu Bala, reported in 76 CWN 1058: AIR 1972 Cal. 502 , land held by a Raiyat constitutes a holding. As headache presupposes a head, similarly holding presupposes existence of land. Tank has been expressly excluded from the ambit of land with effect from February 12, 1971. Mr. Gorai has drawn my attention to the definition of homestead in the Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 which runs thus: "Homestead means a dwelling house together with any courtyard, compound, garden, out-house, place of worship, family grave-yard, library, office, guest-house, tanks, wells, privies, latrines, drains and boundary walls annexed to or appertaining to such dwelling house." 10. Mr. Gorai has contended that the West Bengal Land Reforms Act and the Estates Acquisition Act being in pari materia and when the definition of homestead in the Estates Acquisition Act includes tank it should not go out of the purview of 'holding'. The Objects and Reasons for the special definition of land in the West Bengal Land Reforms Act cannot be legitimately taken into account to construe a provision where it is absolutely clear. In this connection reference may be made to the case of (6) R.P. Kapur v. Protap Singh Kairon, reported in AIR 1964 SC 295 . West Bengal Land Reforms Act contains a definition clause wherein the legislature declared the meaning which certain words or expressions are to bear for the purposes of that Act. When a word or phase is defined as having a particular meaning in an enactment, it is that meaning and that meaning alone which must be given to it in interpretation of a section of the Act unless there may be anything repugnant to the context. In other words, the definition section in an Act would ordinarily apply to the provisions of the Act, unless any particular provision therein either expressly or by intendment excludes it by giving to the words used a different meaning or a wider construction. The definition clause-section 2 opens with the words "In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context" and it is true that the statutory definition of the word 'land' must be read subject to those qualifying words. The definition clause-section 2 opens with the words "In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context" and it is true that the statutory definition of the word 'land' must be read subject to those qualifying words. This means that if it is possible to gather the intent of the legislature and it is then found that such legislative intent cannot be given effect because of the legislative definition, the latter should not be allowed to control the former. There does not appear to be any conflict with the legislative intent and the legislative definition in the instant Act and Mr. Gorai is not justified in bringing in the statutory provisions of the Estates Acquisition Act to show what would be the intent of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act which is a complete Code by itself and no question of legislative definition surrendering to the legislative intent does really arise in this case. In (7) Doal Singh v. Gurdwara Sri Akal Takht, reported in AIR 1928 Lahore 325, Tak Chand, J. observed "Where a statute gives a definition for an instrument, that definition may not be controlled by the understanding of the common people, with regard to it." 11. If, however, the definitions are arbitrary and result in unreasonable qualifications or are uncertain, then the Court is not bound by the definition. But where a definition clause is clear it should control the meaning of the words used in the remainder of the Act, for that is the legislative intent. Where the definition is not clear then the Court should use all intrinsic and extrinsic aid to determine the legislative intent but the presumption should be that a fair interpretation of the meaning of the words as defined in the definition section should control. It has been held in the case of (8) Ananta Sadashiv v. Ratnagiri, 54 Bom. LR 841; (9) Saila Patan v. Paltu Chok, AIR 1954 Patna 367, (10) Bhaskar Narayan v. Daihonrai, AIR 1971 Bom. 188 (192) that the definition of an expression given in an Act applies wherever that expression occurs in the statute. It has been held in the case of (8) Ananta Sadashiv v. Ratnagiri, 54 Bom. LR 841; (9) Saila Patan v. Paltu Chok, AIR 1954 Patna 367, (10) Bhaskar Narayan v. Daihonrai, AIR 1971 Bom. 188 (192) that the definition of an expression given in an Act applies wherever that expression occurs in the statute. In (11) Gain Chand v. Bahadur Singh, AIR 1961 Punjab 164, (12) Kannu Pillai v. Pankajakhi, AIR 1960 Kerala 158 the Courts observed that where a particular word is defined in the Act which narrows or restricts its ordinary meaning, the meaning given in the definition must be applied to the word wherever it appears in the Act unless the contrary is indicated. A stock taking of the authoritative pronouncements leads us to the conclusion that the same word or term is used in an Act in the same meaning throughout. When the word ‘land’ has been clearly defined in the West Bengal Land Reforms Act that definition should be adopted for the construction of that word or expression in that enactment whether the definition accords with the definition of homestead in Estate Acquisition Act or not. I am, therefore, unable to accede to the contention raised by Mr. Gorai on this score. 12. No doubt the right of pre-emption accrued on the registration of the document or sale and the application for pre-emption was pending from before the amending Act came into force. There cannot be any difference of opinion that a vested right cannot be taken away by subsequent enactment of an Act. In other words, under ordinary circumstances an Act does not have retrospective operation on substantial right which have become fixed before the date of commencement of the Act. But this Rule is not unalterable. The legislature may affect substantial rights by enacting laws which are expressly retrospective or by using language which has that necessary result [(13) AIR 1963 SC 1436 ]. In the instant case the legislature has made the amended definition of land retrospective since 12.2.71. Mr. Gorai's clients no doubt acquired a right to apply for pre-emption and in fact they applied for it before the amendment came into force but that will not enable them to get an order of pre-emption. In the instant case the legislature has made the amended definition of land retrospective since 12.2.71. Mr. Gorai's clients no doubt acquired a right to apply for pre-emption and in fact they applied for it before the amendment came into force but that will not enable them to get an order of pre-emption. In (14) Bhagawan Das (Dead) by L.R.S. and others v. Chotram, reported in AIR 1971 SC 640 the Supreme Court has observed that the statutory right of pre-emption is one which attaches to the land and is not a mere personal right. The Court further said that the preemptor is an aggressor and as he wishes to dislocate the vendee he must show that the right of pre-emption which he had at the date of the sale subsisted upto the date of the order for possession by pre-emption. In another case of (15) Vidyasagar v. Sudesh Kumar, reported in 1976 1 SC Cases 115 a pre-emption decree was obtained prier to the enforcement of the U.P. Zamandari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. The Supreme Court held that pre-emption decree did not survive for execution after the enforcement of the Act in the particular area in which the land was situated. In the present case the tank has emerged as a new species of property not falling within the purview of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act. In other words, it has lost its character of land and therefore does not form part of the holding as defined in the Act. As a necessary corollary to this it follows that there cannot be .any claim for pre-emption in respect of the tank. 13. Mr. Gorai has submitted that the tank and its banks constitute one holding and that it cannot be split up and the water portion distinguished from the dry portion and pre-emption in respect of a portion of a holding is quite maintainable. I am unable to accede to this contention. Where land is let out for cultivation and there is a tank upon it the tank would go with the land. No evidence has been led to show that the banks were ever used for agricultural purposes. On the showing of the petitioners there are trees on the banks (vide schedule annexed to the application). It will also appear from the recitals in the document Ext. No evidence has been led to show that the banks were ever used for agricultural purposes. On the showing of the petitioners there are trees on the banks (vide schedule annexed to the application). It will also appear from the recitals in the document Ext. 1/A that right of passage was reserved for the claimant over the banks and this also suggests that the banks were not ancillary to cultivation. The banks in the instant case are necessary for the use of the tank and cannot be regarded as agricultural land. I need not dilate on this point any more in view of the specific definition of 'land' as given in the West Bengal Land Reforms Act. 14. In view of the discussions made above; this revisional application will succeed. The Rule is made absolute. The judgment and order dt. 26.2.76 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Midnapore, in Misc. Appeal No. 148 of 1975 arising out of the judgment and order dated 5.7.75 passed by the learned Munsif, Tamluk is set aside. The application under Section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act which gave rise to the Judicial Misc. Case No. 59 of 1972 stands rejected. There will be no order for costs.