JUDGMENT Gopalan Nambiyar, C.J. 1. These two appeals arise out of two writ petitions in respect of a preliminary order of the Industrial Tribunal, Calicut in Industrial Dispute No. 41 of 1974. O.P. No. 376 of 1976 questions the order of the Tribunal on the preliminary objection taken by the management that the dispute referred had become impossible of being continued before the Tribunal with effect from 26th December 1975, as the employer bank, had become a "banking company" with branches in more than one State, falling within the definition in section 2 (bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The preliminary objection was raised by way of a petition filed before the Tribunal and marked as Ext. P-1. The learned Judge, we think, rightly pointed out that the maintainability and the validity of the reference have to be viewed on the doctrine of rebussic standibus i.e., with references to the circumstances existing at the time when the references was made. On the date of making the reference, there was no jurisdictional defect or any other bar operating to prevent the reference being regarded as a valid reference. That being so, as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Pipraich Sugar Mills' Mazdoor Union v. Pipraich Sugar Mills Ltd. 1957 I L.L.J. 235. The machinery under the Act would be available to work out the rights in respect of which the reference was made at the relevant time. Nor was it shown why or how the reference would be incompetent merely by reason of the employer having become a banking company, since the making of the application. We agree with the learned Judge that there is no force or merit in this preliminary objection. The Tribunal was right in overruling the same, and the learned Judge was right in dismissing the writ petition filed to quash the said order on the preliminary objection. We dismiss the appeal with no order as to costs. W.A. No. 299 of 1976. 2. This writ appeal questions the validity of the reference of the industrial dispute to the Tribunal under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. The contention raised is that there was no industrial dispute to be referred to the Tribunal, that the Government had not applied its mind to the question whether there was any dispute as such and that the reference was based on no materials or no evidence at all. The contention raised is that there was no industrial dispute to be referred to the Tribunal, that the Government had not applied its mind to the question whether there was any dispute as such and that the reference was based on no materials or no evidence at all. The learned Judge was of the view that the opinion of the Government in making a reference under section 10 of the Act, is a subjective opinion not open to judicial review. The learned Judge has further, as a matter of caution, also found that even assuming the opinion is open to judicial review, there was ample material for the Government to come to the conclusion that an industrial dispute exists or was apprehended. That was sufficient under the terms of the section to make the reference. We think the learned Judge was right in his conclusion, certainly with respect to the latter part of his reasoning. It is unnecessary to consider and to pronounce upon the question whether the Government satisfaction in making a reference under section 10 of the Act is subjective satisfaction, and whether, and to what extent, the same is open to judicial review. It is enough to point out that in this case, there is enough material on record to show that the satisfaction was come to on an assessment of enough material and evidence. 3. Counsel for the respondent invited our attention to Exts. R-1 to R-14 filed by him, which shows the correspondence that was exchanged between the parties regarding the points in controversy and the matters in dispute. These form sufficient foundation and frame work for the Government to make the reference under section 10. We cannot accept the argument of counsel for the appellant that merely because the dispute referred was outside the charter of demands placed by the workmen before the management, it should be concluded that there was no dispute subsisting on the basis of which the reference could be made. 4. We see no ground to interfere. We dismiss the appeal with no order as to costs.