JUDGMENT : K.C. Agrawal, J.—This revision is directed against the judgment of the II Temporary Civil and Sessions Judge Muzaffar-nagar, dated 19-7-19:3, upholding the conviction of the applicant u/s 304A IPC. 2. The case of the prosecution, briefly stated, is that on 10-12-1970 at about 8-00 a.m. motor truck No. USP 3840 driven by Nafis. the applicant, killed Rajendra son of Attar Singh, aged about 8 years near the Kolhu of Balbir Singh in village Pinna under P.S. Kotwali. The further case of the prosecution is that Rajendra with his uncle Bhanwar Singh had gone to the Kolhu of Balbir Singh and while Bhanwar Singh was talking to Peeru carpenter near the Kolhu, Rajendra was standing in front of the Kolhu along with other children. Motor truck No. USP 3840 driven by the applicant came at a fast speed from Muzaffarnagar side and went further killing Rajendra instantaneously. The truck was stopped at about 1-1/2 miles away. Thereafter a first information report was lodged at the police station at about 11-15 a.m. after investigation, a charge sheet was submitted against the applicant for the offence under Sections 279 and 304A Indian Penal Code. The accused pleaded not guilty to the charges, and although he admitted the accident in which Rajendra was killed and that truck was driven by him at the time of accident but he denied that the accident was the result of rash and negligent driving. He stated that some children, including Rajendra, were running after a monkey and the deceased suddenly came before the truck. To prove its case, the prosecution examined Bhanwar Singh, Dile Ram Bal Singh and Suraj Bhan as eye witnesses besides the Medical Officer, who conducted the post-mortem examination, the police technician Sri Shaukat Ali Khan and the I.O. Sita Singh. 3. After the examination of evidence, the Additional District Magistrate (Judicial) Muzaffarnagar found that the applicant drove his truck in a rash and negligent manner so as to endanger human safety and thereby caused the death of Rajendra. He Nafis Ahmed v. State further held that although the applicant had seen that the boy had been crushed under the vehicle, he took away the truck about 1-1/2 miles away. On these findings, the applicant was convicted under Sections 279 and 304A I.P.C. and was sentenced to 6 months R.I. under the first count and to one years R.I. under second count. On these findings, the applicant was convicted under Sections 279 and 304A I.P.C. and was sentenced to 6 months R.I. under the first count and to one years R.I. under second count. In appeal the conviction and sentence of the applicant were maintained. Hence, this revision. 4. Learned Counsel for the applicant contended that a person can be convicted for the offence contemplated u/s 304A I.P.C. Only when it was found that he was reckless and negligent in driving the vehicle. He urged that at the most the charge which was established against applicant was only of negligence and of recklessness. On this basis he contended that the conviction of the applicant was bad. He took me through the evidence and tried to urge that a number of boys, including the deceased, were running after a monkey, and the applicant having found them crossing the road tried to save them and in the attempt to save those boys Rajendra came under the truck. The submission made cannot be accepted inasmuch as it has been found as a fact by the courts below that the boy was knocked down on the right side of the road. This shows that the children, including Rajendra had already crossed the road and it was because of the truck going towards the wrong side that the boy was knocked down. This could have happened only because the applicant was negligent in driving the truck on the wrong side. In case the applicant really wanted to avert the accident one fails to understand why he drove the truck towards the right side. In the statement u/s 342 Cr. P.C. it was stated that the boys were going from left to the right. He should have attempted to save those children by driving the vehicle towards the left. As he did not do so and took the truck towards the wrong side, he was guilty of reckless and negligent driving of the vehicle. 5. Some argument was advanced by the counsel for the applicant on the question that the evidence of the prosecution did not establish that the vehicle was being driven by the applicant at a high speed. The Counsel submitted that since the vehicle was not being run at a high speed, the finding of negligence could not be recorded against the applicant. The Counsel submitted that since the vehicle was not being run at a high speed, the finding of negligence could not be recorded against the applicant. It is however, not necessary that a person can be convicted for an offence u/s 304A I.P.C. Only when the vehicle is being run at a high speed. May be that the speed of the vehicle is material in most of the cases, but is neither decisive nor determinative of the question for punishing a man u/s 304A I.P.C. The speed is not the only criterion for determining the rashness and negligence of driving of vehicle. The main criterion for deciding whether the driving which led to the accident was rash and negligent is not only the speed at which the vehicle was running, but the density of the traffic as well. In the instant case, as stated above the fact that the applicant went to the wrong side goes a long way to establish that the applicant was negligent and he cannot thus escape the consequence of the offence. It may also be pointed out that the question as to whether the applicant was negligent or not is a question of fact. As laid down by the Supreme Court in Duli Chand Vs. Delhi Administration, , the question whether the accused was guilty of negligence in driving the bus and the death of the deceased was caused due to the negligent driving is a question of fact which depends for its determination on appreciation of evidence. The High Court though can justifiably refuse to depreciate the evidence but I have reviewed the same in order to satisfy myself that there was evidence in support of the finding, and that it was not perverse. In the instant case, the two courts below have carefully examined the evidence and come to the conclusion that the applicant was negligent. This finding is one fact. Accordingly, the revision has no substance. But, seeing the circumstances in which the accident took place, it appears appropriate to reduce the sentence from one year to six months. 6. Accordingly, while maintaining the conviction of the applicant u/s 304A I.P.C., I reduce his sentence from one year to six month s R.I. The applicant is on bail. He shall be taken into custody forthwith to serve out the sentence now modified by this Court. His bail bonds are cancelled.