JUDGMENT Muneshwari Sahay, J. The petitioner has been convicted under sections 304A, 279 and 337 of the Indian Penal Code, and has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months, three months and three months, respectively, for these offences. The sentences had been ordered to run concurrently, 2. The prosecution case was that on the date of occurrence, i. e., 3. 5. 1965, the petitioner was driving a truck bearing registration no. B. R. R. 1993, The truck was loaded with coal and three female labourers besides five coolies, were sitting over the coal. The prosecution alleged further that when the -truck reached near a Nala, where there was turning on the road, it fell down in the Nala, causing injuries to some of the labourers, who were sitting over the coal. One of these labourers, Sitarnani Manjhian, succumbed to the injuries which she had sustained. 3. The defence of the petitioners was two fold. He firstly alleged that he was not the driver of the truck which had caused the accident and secondly, it was pleaded that he was not driving the vehicle either rashly or negligently. 4. The trial court did not accept his plea and relying upon the evidence of the prosecution witnesses found him guilty as stated in its judgment. An appeal preferred by the petitioner against his conviction was heard and dismissed by the learned 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Hazaribagh. 5. The petitioner has not challenged the findings of the courts below that be was really the driver of the truck No. B. R. R. 1993. The only point, which bas been urged on his behalf by learned counsel is that there was no evidence in this case to prove that the petitioner was driving the vehicle either rashly Or negligently. 6. All that the witnesses have said is that the petitioner was during the truck with great speed. P. Ws. 2 to 8 were witnesses. who were examined on this point. P. W. 7 among them had been tendered for cross-examination P.W.s. 3 to 6 bad said before the investigating Officer (P. W. 12; that they had fallen asleep and, therefore, they could not say as to whether the truck was driven at great speed. Thus, the prosecution was left with the evidence of P. W s. 2 and 8 only. P. W. 7 among them had been tendered for cross-examination P.W.s. 3 to 6 bad said before the investigating Officer (P. W. 12; that they had fallen asleep and, therefore, they could not say as to whether the truck was driven at great speed. Thus, the prosecution was left with the evidence of P. W s. 2 and 8 only. Both these witnesses of course stated that the truck was being driven at a great speed. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that even assuming that the vehicle was being driven at speed, that by itself would not go to prove that the vehicle was being driven either rashly Or negligently. As it is, learned counsel points out, that the evidence of P. W.8 itself shows that the truck could not have been driven at great speed. In his cross-examination the witness stated that the truck had left the place where coal had been loaded at 6 a.m. According to the witness, the place of occurrence was two miles away from the place where coal had been loaded and it is stated that the accident had taken place at about 8 a m. Learned counsel, therefore, points out that according to the evidence of this witness t be truck had taken about two hours to negotiate a distance of only two miles. It is evident that the estimate of distance and time given by P. W. 8 seems to be faulty, because, if the truck had actually left the place where coal had been loaded, at 6 a m. it could not have taken two hours. howsoever slowly it might have been driven to reach a distance of two miles. Even so, the evidence of this witness does suggest that the vehicle was not being driven at great speed. 7. I have tried to examine the evidence adduced in this case by the prosecution and find that there is complete absence of the evidence as to how the accident had taken place and the truck had overturned. Even assuming that the truck was being driven at some speed, that would not necessarily lead to an inference that the accident had taken place because of that. None of the witnesses had stated that the truck had overturned because it was being driven at a great speed. Even assuming that the truck was being driven at some speed, that would not necessarily lead to an inference that the accident had taken place because of that. None of the witnesses had stated that the truck had overturned because it was being driven at a great speed. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that merely because the truck had overturned and had left the road, that should not raise I any inference that it must have been driven rashly Or negligently. Learned Counsel in this connection has referred to the decision of Natarajan alias Nateesanl. Anantnarayanan, J. observed in that case :- " . . . . . . . . There could be no general presumption that the fact that a car leaves a road, is evidence of rash and negligent driving. A motor vehicle may leave the road, and proceed on the margin, or collide against some fixed structure of the margin under a variety of circumstances. Some of those circumstances, certainly. may probabilise rash and negligent driving but many other circumstances may not. There can be no burden on an accused to prove that he was not driving the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner, merely because the prosecution proves the fact that the car left the road. . . . . . . . . . " 8. Therefore, learned Counsel contends and rightly so that no inference of rash and negligent driving can be drawn merely on the fact that the vehicle was being driven at great speed. In the instant case, learned counsel submits that there was no evidence to show as to how the accident had taken place, had admitted that they had fallen asleep and so they did not even know the vehicle was being driven at great speed. Two of the witnesses of course had stated that the vehicle was being driven at great speed but they as well did not allege that the speed with which the truck was being driven was responsible for the accident. Learned counsel has referred me to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Suleman Rahim'1n Mulafai Vrs State of Maharashtra. In that case a jeep, which was being driven by a person holding learner's licence had struck another person resulting in his death. Learned counsel has referred me to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Suleman Rahim'1n Mulafai Vrs State of Maharashtra. In that case a jeep, which was being driven by a person holding learner's licence had struck another person resulting in his death. The driver was convicted by the trial court and his conviction was upheld by the Sessions Judge as also by the High Court in revision. High Court, however, had specifically stated in its judgment that there was no witness whose evidence could establish rash and negligent driving on the part of the accused. The Supreme Court said that it could go further and say that there was absolutely no evidence to show that the accused was responsible for the accident as on the material on the record it was not possible to find out under what circumstance the accident bad taken place. In the instant case as we\l it is not possible to find out from the evidence as to in what circumstances the truck had overturned resulting in death to one of the labourers and injuries to some others. I am satisfied that in such circumstance the conviction of the petitioner under Section 304A of the Indian Penal Code cannot be sustained. For the same reason the conviction of the petitioners for offences under sections 279 and 337 of the Indian Penal Code cannot be 'sustained. 9. In the result, therefore, the application is allowed and the conviction and the sentences imposed on the petitioner are hereby set aside and he is acquitted of the charges of which he had been convicted. Application allowed.