( 1 ) THIS writ petition arising under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 (hereinafter called 'the Act') is directed against the order of the land Tribunal, Bhalki, (respondent-1) made under Sec. 48a of the Act declaring that respondent-2 is the tenant of the agricultural lands comprised in S. Nos. 199, 200/1 and 200/1b of Chincholi, Bhalki Taluk, measuring in all 8 acres 37 guntas and consequently entitled to the grant of occupancy right. ( 2 ) THE petitioner is the land-holder. Respondent-2 made an application before the Land Tribunal for grant of occupancy right under Chapter iii of the Act alleging that he is the tenant personally cultivating the lands in question immediately prior to 1-3-1974. On receipt of the said application, the Land Tribunal issued, in the prescribed form, notices to show cause why the application should not be granted. The petitioner appeared before the Land Tribunal and filed written objections contending, inter alia, that the applicant is not a tenant but a mortgagee in possession under an agreement entered into between the parties; that the land-holder, in consideration of the applicant having paid a sum of rs. 2,500, has put the applicant in possession of the lands; that no rent is stipulated under the said agreement but the applicant has to appropriate the profits of the lands in satisfaction of the mortgage-money. He further contended that the time for redemption of the mortgage not having arrived, the applicant as mortgagee has remained in possession. It is staged before me that the applicant produced before the Tribunal an earlier agreement between the parties which, according to him, amounted to a lease of the lands. The fact that the applicant-respondent-2 is personally cultivating the lands in question, is not in dispute between the parties. What is in dispute is the question whether respondent-2 is in possession as mortgagee or as a tenant. If respondent-2 is in possession as mortgagee and not as tenant, he is not entitled to grant of any occupancy right under Chapter III of the Act. ( 3 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner drew my attention to the fact that in his written objections filed before the Tribunal it has been expressly stated that the Records of Rights show that respondent-2 is in possession as mortgagee. There is not even a reference, much less discussion, on this question in the order of the Tribunal. ( 3 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner drew my attention to the fact that in his written objections filed before the Tribunal it has been expressly stated that the Records of Rights show that respondent-2 is in possession as mortgagee. There is not even a reference, much less discussion, on this question in the order of the Tribunal. The Tribunal has observed that the petitioner-land-holder has borrowed a sum of rs. 2,500 from respondent-2, that no rent had been stipulated and that respondent-2 has not paid any rent. The order of the Tribunal reads : the English translation of the above reads :"applicant and respondent are present. From the respondent's mother's mother, i. e. , from 1959, lands S. No. 19 measuring AG. 0-30 assessed at Rs. 2-4 P of Khataka Chincholi village, S. No. 200/l measuring AG. 2-01 assessed at Rs. 7-40 P of K. Chincholi and S. No. 200/1b measuring AG. 4-32 assessed at Rs. 30-93 P are being cultivated. The respondent has taken a hand-loan of Rs. 2,500 from the ryot in the year 1965. Rent has not been fixed. Thereafter, the applicant has not paid any rent. Therefore, the Land Tribunal, Bhalki, declares unanimously that the applicant is entitled to be registered as occupant in respect of the above lands. " ( 4 ) IT was urged before me by Shri Hosmath, learned Counsel for the petitioner, that the order of the Tribunal is not a speaking order, that no reasons have been assigned for the conclusions reached by the Tribunal and that there is no discussion of the evidence produced on either side and, therefore, the order is null and void. ( 5 ) IN my judgment, the grounds urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioner have to be sustained and the impugned order has to be quashed. Whether the relationship between the parties is one of landlord and tenant or mortgagor and mortgagee has not been determined by the Tribunal. There is no objective consideration by the Tribunal of the material issues raised in the case. The Tribunal has merely expressed its subjective satisfaction that respondent-2 should be proclaimed as a tenant. The impugned order of the Tribunal not being a speaking order, is void in law. The Tribunal's void order has affected the petitioner's right to property and consequently has resulted in substantial injustice. The Tribunal has merely expressed its subjective satisfaction that respondent-2 should be proclaimed as a tenant. The impugned order of the Tribunal not being a speaking order, is void in law. The Tribunal's void order has affected the petitioner's right to property and consequently has resulted in substantial injustice. ( 6 ) BEFORE parting with this case, I consider that it is my duty to make some observations in regard to the functioning of the Land Tribunals constituted under the Act. More than ten thousand Writ Petitions have been admitted by this Court and several thousands are yet to come up in the future. In thousands of Writ Petitions, one common error that has come to my notice is that the orders of the Tribunals, by and large, are not speaking orders as the Tribunals as constituted do not possess the requisite competency to understand the provisions of the Act and the law of the land bearing on the issues raised, nor have they the competency to apply the law as laid down by this Court to the facts of the cases coming up before them. It has been laid down by the supreme Court and this Court that an order which is not a speaking order is void in law ; that subjective satisfaction of the Tribunal is not sufficient to support an order and that reasons for the conclusions must be stated. Under the Act, the orders of the Tribunal are made final not being subject to appeal or revision. The High Court in the exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution as amended by the 42nd amendment is virtually helpless and cannot render adequate justice to set right the injustice done by the Tribunals, The High Court can quash the orders of the Tribunals but cannot decide whether a person is a tenant or not as the said question is ordinarily a mixed question of law and fact. No useful purpose is served by quashing the orders of the Tribunals and remitting the matters back for adjudication afresh, when the Members of the Tribunals being ignorant of the law are inherently incapable of rendering decisions in accordance with law. There can be no meaningful constitutional difference between a trial that is fundamentally unfair because of the Tribunal's possible bias and one that is fundamentally unfair because of the Tribunal's ignorance of law. There can be no meaningful constitutional difference between a trial that is fundamentally unfair because of the Tribunal's possible bias and one that is fundamentally unfair because of the Tribunal's ignorance of law. ( 7 ) A truly competent and impartial administrative Judiciary is a precious prize. Much progress has been made in the United States of america, United Kingdom and France by the emergence of the Administrative law Judges. In America, the Members of Administrative tribunals are styled as "administrative Law Judges". But it presupposes that the Administrative Judge or Tribunal is one who competently adjudicates upon the cases arising under special enactments. Our system of adjudicating the controversies presumes that an advocate who presents his case is an impartial fact finder ; it is the advocate who is an expert on facts, who should be in the foreground. But the Act bars Advocates from appearing before the Land Tribunals and thus the parties are denied the basic right of having their case properly represented before the Tribunals. There is no parallel to. the kind of Land Tribunals constituted under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act in any other State in India or as a matter of fact anywhere in the democratic world where the Rule of law prevails. ( 8 ) UNDER the pretext of enacting radical land reforms, Land Tribunals are constituted in Karnataka under the Act with the exclusive jurisdiction to decide complicated issues of fact and law. The Chairman of the tribunal is an Assistant Commissioner but the rest of the Members are all politicians appointed by the Executive Government ; they are persons wholly incompetent to comprehend the nature of the issues raised before them and the law bearing on the subject. The decisions of the tribunal are made final and conclusive. ( 9 ) UNDER the Andhra Land Reforms Act, the Land Tribunal consists of a Revenue Officer of the cadre of an Assistant Commissioner and against his decision an appeal lies by the aggrieved party to an Appellate Tribunal consisting of a District Judge and a Revenue Officer of the rank of a Collector. Against the decision of the Appellate Tribunal, a revision lies to the High Court on questions of law. Against the decision of the Appellate Tribunal, a revision lies to the High Court on questions of law. Under the Kerala Land reforms Act, a Tahsildar is appointed as the Land Tribunal and against his decision an appeal lies to the District Judge and against the decision of the District Judge, a revision lies to the High Court on questions of law. If, under a law, the right of a citizen to life, liberty or property is left to be decided by a body of persons appointed by the Executive government on political considerations only without being required to possess any legal qualifications or by persons incapable of understanding the law and applying the same to the issues involved, and there is no light of appeal or revision given to the aggrieved parties, such a law, in my opinion, amounts to the denial of one of the recognised basic human Rights. Such a law is also repugnant to the basic features of the Constitution of India ; but Courts in India are helpless and cannot give relief to the aggrieved parties as the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 as amended by Act 1 of 1974 and subsequently, is not open to judicial review as the same has been included in the Ninth Schedule to the constitution. ( 10 ) I am constrained to make these observations hoping that with the restoration of the fundamental freedoms in this country and the re-establishment of the Rule of law persons in authority will take due notice of these observations and make appropriate amendments to the act. ( 11 ) FOR the reasons stated above, the impugned order of the Tribunal is quashed. The Rule is made absolute. The Tribunal is directed to make a fresh adjudication in accordance with law after affording reasonable opportunity of being heard to the parties. Parties to bear their own costs. --- *** --- .