Judgment :- 1. In the General Election conducted to the Kerala State Legislative Assembly the petitioner and the respondent as duly nominated candidates contested from the Haripad assembly constituency. The petitioner was the candidate put up by the Communist Party of India (Marxist) whereas the respondent belongs to Praja Socialist Party (P.S.P.) which joined the Government at the relevant time. The polling took place on 19 31977 and the counting took place on 20 31977. The respondent was declared as duly elected by the Returning Officer. The election of the respondent is challenged by the petitioner as invalid for the reasons set out in Para.5 of the petition. The respondent was the President of the Travancore Devaswom Board constituted under Act 15 of 1950 as amended by Act 20 of 1974 at the time when he tiled the nomination paper and he continued to occupy that position till the declaration of the election results The Travancore Devaswom Board is a statutory corporation constituted under Ss 3 and 4 of Act 15 of 1950 receiving contribution from the State Government. The recurring income of the Board is paid out of the consolidated fund of the Kerala Government By the relevant provisions of the Act, Devaswom fund includes a sum given out of the consolidated fund. The President of the Board had absolute control and supervision of the administration of the Board, and consequently, the respondent falls within the ambit of the term'manager' contained in S.10 of the Central Act 43 of 1951. As the President of the Devaswom Board the respondent was receiving a remuneration of Rs 450/- per mensem The respondent was thus disqualified from contesting the election by virtue of Art.191 of the Constitution. There were irregularities in the matter of counting of votes The process of counting adopted by the Returning Officer deviated from the methods adopted during the previous elections. A recounting of the votes is therefore necessary The two prayers contained in the petition are: (a) for a declaration that the election of the respondent is void since he was disqualified to contest, and (b) for a recount of the votes polled to find that the respondent has not polled the majority of valid votes in the election. 2. In his written statement the respondent has raised the following contentions. 2. In his written statement the respondent has raised the following contentions. The petitioner relies on S.10 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 as well as Art.191 of the Constitution. It is submitted that the allegation that the respondent was disqualified under S.10 of the Act falls within clause (I) of sub-clause (e) of Art.191 of the Constitution. In view of Art.192, the question of disqualification on the ground of corrupt practice can be decided only by the President and an enquiry into the allegations made in the petition, by this court, is barred by Art.192 of the Constitution. Again, since the petitioner did not personally present the petition, S.81 of the Act is violated. There is no proper presentation of the petition, and so the petition is liable to be dismissed. The averments in Para.1 to 4 of the petitions are admitted. The respondent was not disqualified to be chosen as a candidate for the election. The respondent was the President of the Travancore Devaswom Board at the time of filing the nomination paper and continued to be the President till the date of the declaration of the election results. No objection was raised at the time of scrutiny of nomination paper. Under S.4 of Act 15 of 1950 the Board is a body corporate. The averment in paragraph D that the capital of the statutory corporation under S.3 and 4 of Act 15 of 1950 are fully contributed by the State Government is denied. The Board is not a statutory corporation. The Devaswom (Amendment) Proclamation of 1123 made it an obligation on the State of Travancore to contribute from its general revenue a sum of Rs. 50 lakhs to the devaswom fund. By the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, Art.238 was repealed and Art.290A was inserted. Art.290A provided that a sum of Rs 46,50,000/-shall be a charge and paid out of the consolidated fund of the State of Kerala every year to the Travancore Devaswom Fund. It is submitted that the amount so charged is not a contribution from the State, but it is in discharge of a liability 0:1 the part of the Government. Art.290A provided that a sum of Rs 46,50,000/-shall be a charge and paid out of the consolidated fund of the State of Kerala every year to the Travancore Devaswom Fund. It is submitted that the amount so charged is not a contribution from the State, but it is in discharge of a liability 0:1 the part of the Government. The liability has been incurred consequent on the assumption of devaswoms in Travancore in the year 987 M. E. In implementation of a sannad dated 3rd Kanni 987 M. E. issued by the then Resident Diwan of Travancore, 348 major devaswoms and 1123 minor devaswoms were brought under the management of the Government. The income from the landed properties of those devaswoms amounted to 15,80,491 paras of paddy and Rs. 53,092/- in cash. This was steadily on the increase and the average of 5 years from 987 was 16,06,281 paras of paddy and Rs. 60,608/-in cash besides the other fluctuating income in the shape of offerings from devotees and income from Cherikkal lands and the increase in revenue. The State was contributing from the general revenue an annual sum of Rs. 2,75 lakhs by way of grant towards the maintenance of the temples. On assumption of management of these devaswoms the income from these devaswoms were added on to the State revenue and brought under Revenue Administration of the State. Large amounts were due to these devaswoms from tenants at the time of assumption of manag-ment By a Proclamation dated 3rd Meenam 987 all the arrears accrued upto 983 M. E were given remission of and arrears were collected only of those accrued from the year 984 Large portion of the immovable properties of the aforesaid devaswoms had been treated in course of time as Pandaravaka lans and inconsequent became incapable of identification and separation. During the survey and settlement many of the temple properties were entered in the accounts then prepared as Sirkar properties and the tenure as Pandaravaka. The determinate income from the devaswom lands amounted to the proportion of 40% of the land revenue of the State. To this extent the devaswoms were entitled to a guarantee from the government Taking into account these and various other circumstances, in 987 M E, the government accepted the position that they are bound to meet from the general revenues the entire cost of the Devaswoms and their administration. To this extent the devaswoms were entitled to a guarantee from the government Taking into account these and various other circumstances, in 987 M E, the government accepted the position that they are bound to meet from the general revenues the entire cost of the Devaswoms and their administration. Thereupon a proclamation dated 30th Meenam 1097 was promulgated organising a Devaswom Department for the better and more efficient management and more effective control of the devaswoms and directing to meet the expenses from the general revenues of the State. The provision to pay as a charge on the consolidated fund of Kerala a sum of Rs. 46.5 lakhs to the Devaswom Fund represents a portion of the annual revenue of the lands which once belonged to the devaswoms but merged in the State. This is not a governmental contribution; but a payment towards a liability. The assumption of management was in exercise of the Melkoima right exercised by the former Ruler of Travancore. The assumption of management of Devaswom is traceable only to the power of superintendence. The position of the government was only that of a trustee. Melkoima rights of superintendence and the administration of the Hindu religions institutions exercised by the Maharaja vested in the Board constituted for the purpose at the time when the Ruler of the State surrendered his sovereignty by the covenant. After the covenant the administration of the devaswoms was not a governmental function. The Board is an autonomous boas corporate. The amount which it receives and which the government pays as enjoined in Art.290 A of the Constitution is really part of the amount belonging to the Devaswoms. The respondent was the President of the Board. The administration of incorporated and unincorporated devaswoms and all Hindu Religious Endowments and all their properties and funds are vested in the Board. The Hindus among the council of ministers nominated one of the members of the Board as its President. The President has no powers apart from that of the Board except to the extent stated in S.13 of Act 15 of 1950. The respondent was not a'manager' within the meaning of S.10 of Central Act 43 of 1951. The Devaswom Board is not a corporation having a share capital. As President of the Devaswom Board the respondent was receiving an honorarium of Rs. 450/- per mensem. He was not receiving any remuneration. The respondent was not a'manager' within the meaning of S.10 of Central Act 43 of 1951. The Devaswom Board is not a corporation having a share capital. As President of the Devaswom Board the respondent was receiving an honorarium of Rs. 450/- per mensem. He was not receiving any remuneration. The respondent was not holding any office of profit under the Government of the State and he was not disqualified for being chosen as a member. Under Art.192 of the Constitution the question has to be referred to the President for his decision. The court has no jurisdiction to enquire into the question as the authority to make such enquiry is the Election Commission under clause (2) of Art.192. The provisions of the Representation of the People Act 1951 to that extent should be deemed to have been repealed by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) At. There was no irregularity in the counting of votes and there was no malpractice. The counting of votes was done in accordance with law. The allegation regarding failure of light and consequent inconvenience is denied. The petitioner is not entitled to any of the reliefs prayed tor. 3. After discussing with both sides the following issues were raised: (1) Whether the respondent is disqualified for being chosen as and for being a member of the Assembly? (2) Were there irregularities in the matter of counting of votes? (3) Regarding reliefs and costs. 4. Issue No. I: The only point urged in this case by the petitioner in challenging the election of the respondent is that the respondent was disqualified from being chosen as and for being a member of the legislative assembly of Kerala. Evidence was not adduced by both sides, and the contesting parties agreed before me that the case may be disposed of on the basis of the facts admitted by both sides It is common case that when nomination paper was filed and also when the election was conducted the respondent was holding the position of President of an authority called the Travancore Devaswom Board. It is admitted by the respondent that till the declaration of the results of the election he was functioning as the President of the Travancore Devaswom Board and that he resigned the office only subsequent to the declaration of the results in his favour. It is admitted by the respondent that till the declaration of the results of the election he was functioning as the President of the Travancore Devaswom Board and that he resigned the office only subsequent to the declaration of the results in his favour. The case of the petitioner is that since the respondent was the President of the Travancore Devaswom Board ho was disqualified from being chosen as and for being a member of the legislative assembly in view of Art.191(1)(a) of the Constitution and also S.10 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. (shortly the Act). Art.191 of the Constitution deals with the disqualifications for membership of the legislature of a State Art.191 (1)(a) was amended by S.32 of the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act 1976. But the notification dated 3rd January, 1977 issued by the Central Government in exercise of the powers conferred by subsection (2) of S.1 of the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act 1976, does not take in S.32. Consequently, for the purpose of this case we have to fall back upon Art.191(1)(a) as it originally stood. The constitutional provision may be read: "191(1) A person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a member of the Legislative Assembly or legislative Council of a State (a) if he holds any office of profit under the Government of India or the Government of any State specified in the First Schedule, other than an office declared by the legislature of the state by law not to disqualify its holder;" 1 be disqualification enumerated by the article relates to the holding of any office of profit under the Government of India or the Government of any State. To attract the provision two conditions must be satisfied, namely, (1) holding of an office of profit; and (2) the holding of such office must be under the government. The respondent as President of the Travancore Devaswom Board was receiving a monthly honorarium, and the respondent did not seriously dispute the proposition that by functioning as the President of the Devaswom Board, he was holding an office of profit. The whole controversy in the case is whether the concerned office of profit is one "under the government". The tests to be applied in determining whether a particular office is "under the government" are considered by the Supreme Court in a few decisions. The whole controversy in the case is whether the concerned office of profit is one "under the government". The tests to be applied in determining whether a particular office is "under the government" are considered by the Supreme Court in a few decisions. After referring to Abdul Shakur v. Rikhab Chand (AIR. 1958 SC. 52), Ramappa v. Sangappa (1959 SCR. 1167) and Govinda Basu v. Sankari Prasad (1964 4 SCR. 311), the Supreme Court in Shivamurthy Swami v. Agadi Sanganna Andanappa (1971-3) SCC 870) held as follows: "This Court in several decisions has laid down the tests for finding out whether an office in question is an office under a Government and whether it is an office of profit. Those tests are-. (1) whether the government makes the appointment; (2) whether the government has the right to remove or dismiss the holder; (3) whether the government pays the remuneration; (4) what are the functions of the holder? Does he perform them for the government; and (5) does the government exercise any control over the performance of those functions?" The dispute raised in that case was whether membership of the Koppal Taluk Development Board would attract Art.102 (1) (a) of the Constitution, and it was held that the disqualification under Art.102 (I) (a) of the Constitution does not apply to that position. The case law on the matter was again elaboratly considered by the Supreme Court in Madhukar V. E Pankakar v. J C. Rajani and other connected cases reported in 1977-1 SCC. 70. In one of the cases decided by the Supreme Court the question raised was whether a panel doctor appointed under the Employees State Insurance Scheme could be deemed to be the holding of an office of profit under the Government. After considering the various rules framed by the State Government bearing on Insurance Medical Practitioners it was found that the Insurance Medical Practitioner is not a freelancer but subject to duties, obligations, control and rates of remuneration under the overall supervision and powers of the government. It was still held that the medical man was not holding an office of profit under the government. The court held as follows: - "For holding an office of profit under Government one need not be in the service of Government and there need be no relation-ship of master and servant. It was still held that the medical man was not holding an office of profit under the government. The court held as follows: - "For holding an office of profit under Government one need not be in the service of Government and there need be no relation-ship of master and servant. Similarly, the substance has to be looked at, not the form. Thirdly, all the several factors stressed by the Supreme Court, as determinative of the holding of an 'office' under government, need not be conjointly present. The critical circumstances, not the total factors, prove decisive. A practical view, not predantic basket of tests, should guide in arriving at a sensible conclusion." It is contended by the respondent that none of the tests laid down by the Supreme Court would apply to the office of President of the Travancore Devaswom Board. 5. The Travancore Devaswom Board is an authority constituted under S.4 of the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, Act 15 of 1950 (briefly called HRI. Act). The statute was enacted to make provisions for the administration, supervision and control of incorporated and unincorporated devaswoms and of other Hindu religious endowments and funds. Part 1 of the Act deals with the devaswoms situated in the erstwhile Travancore State while Part II contains provisions regarding devaswoms situated in the erstwhile Cochin State. Part III of that Act extends to the whole of the State of Travancore-Cochin. For the purpose of this case 1 am concerned only with the provisions in Part I of the H.R.I. Act. Sub-sections (2) and (3) of S.4 of the Act lay down that the Board to be constituted under sub-section (1) shall be a body corporate having perpetual succession and common seal with power to hold and acquire properties for and on behalf of the incorporated and unincorporated devaswoms and Hindu religious institutions and endowments and that the Board may sue and be sued in its own name through its Secretary. 6. The first test that has to be applied is whether the members of the Board or its President are appointed by the government S.4 (1) lays down that the Board shall consist of three Hindu members, one of who shall be nominated by the Ruler of Travancore, one by the Hindus among the Council of Ministers and one elected by the Hindus among the legislative assembly of the State of Travancore-Cochin. The procedure for the election of a member of the Board is laid down in S.5. The qualifications for membership in the Board is contained in S.6, while S.7 deals with disqualification for membership. S.8 relates to supervening disqualifications. S.11 enjoins that the members of the Board may at its meeting elect one of its members as its President. In the case of equality of votes the Ruler of Travancore may nominate one of the members of the Board as its President. The concerned provisions show that of the three members, one is to be elected by the Hindus among the members of the Assembly, one is to be nominated by the Hindus among the Council of Ministers, and the third is to be nominated by the Ruler of Travancore. The members have the right to choose their President, and it is only in the case of equality of votes that the Ruler of Travancore is conferred with power to nominate one member as the President. In view of these provisions by no stretch of imagination can it be said that any member of the Board including its President is appointed by the Government. Even after the formation of the State of Kerala, in pursuance of the States Re-organisation Act 1956, the HRI Act continues to be in force. When the Constitution (Twenty sixth Amendment) Act 1971 extinguished the privileges granted to the Rulers of the erstwhile States and the concept of ruler ship itself was removed from the Con-siitution, a consequential amendment was required in the H R.I. Act. That Act was amended by the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions (Amendment) Act, Act 20 of 1974. By S.2 of the amending Act S.4 of the parent Act was amended as follows: "(I) The Board referred to in S.3 shall consist of three members, two of whom shall be nominated by the Hindus among the Council of Ministers and one selected by the Hindus among the members of the legislative Assembly of Kerala." S. 3 of the amending Act amended S.11 of the parent Act in the following terms: 11. President of the Board. The Hindus among the Council of Ministers shall nominate one of the members of the Board as its President". President of the Board. The Hindus among the Council of Ministers shall nominate one of the members of the Board as its President". In view of the aforesaid amendments of S.4 and 11 of the H.R.I. Act it was contended by the petitioner that the government assumed larger powers regarding the constitution of the Board I am unable to accept that argument As far as S.4 of the Act is concerned what the amended provision does is to confer on the Hindus among the Council of Ministers the power of nomination given to the Ruler of Travancore. When the Ruler of Travancore no longer subsists in the eyes of law consequent upon the Constitution (Twenty sixth Amendment) Act, that authority too was given to the Hindus among the Council of Ministers. Similarly, in the matter of selection of the President of the Board the power is conferred on the Hindus among the Council of Ministers. The Hindus among the Council of Ministers do not represent the entire council of ministers or the State while exercising the authority conferred under S.4 and 11 of the H. R. I. Act. The legal and constitutional grounds for confining that right to Hindus among the Council of Ministers need not be gone into for the purpose of this case. Thus Ss 4 and 11 of the H. R. I. Act, as they originally stood or as they now stand, have not. the effect of laying down that the members of the Board as well as the President of the Board are appointed by the government. If the legislature wanted the government as such to interfere in the matter there was no difficulty in using the expression 'government' in the place of 'Hindus among the Council of Ministers'. When the legislature wanted the functions exercised by the Ruler of Travancore to be taken over by the government when the status of the Ruler was extinguished by the Constitution (Twenty-sixth Amendment) Act. the legislature has chosen to use the expression 'government'. That is evident from S.4 of Act 20 of 1974 amending S.33 of the H R. I. Act as well as S.7 amending S 107 of the H. R. I. Act. While amending S.33 for the words "Ruler of Travancore and Ruler" in both places, the words ' the government' are substituted. That is evident from S.4 of Act 20 of 1974 amending S.33 of the H R. I. Act as well as S.7 amending S 107 of the H. R. I. Act. While amending S.33 for the words "Ruler of Travancore and Ruler" in both places, the words ' the government' are substituted. There is thus ample guidance received from the provisions of the H. R. I. Act that a distinction was clearly kept as between the government on the one part and the Hindus among the Council of Ministers on the other, in the matter of exercising certain powers conferred by the relevant provisions of the H. R. I. Act. Thus, the first test relating to the power of appointment by the government is not satisfied with regard to the members of the Board or the President of the Board, as the case may be. 7. The second test is regarding the right of the Government to remove or dismiss the President or any member of the Board. The provision relating to the removal of a member of the Board is contained in S.9 of the H. R. I. Act. A member can be removed on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity on an application made to the High Court as provided in sub-section (2). According to sub-section (2) the relevant application may be made to the High Court either by the Advocate General or a person belonging to the Hindu community. Sub-section (3) of S.9 provides for the disposal of an application laid under sub-section (2). Thus the High Court is the authority to remove a member of the Board, and a motion to that effect can be made by any person belonging to the Hindu community. The Government does not come into the picture; and thus the second test too is not satisfied in this case. 8. The third test is whether the government pays the remuneration. S.12 of the HRI. Act provides that the President and members of the Board shall receive such honoraria as the Board may decide subject to a maximum of Rs. 450/-per mensem in the case of the President and Rs. 400/-per mensem in the case of each of the two members. S.12 by itself does not mention from what source the honoraria is to be drawn. It can apparently be only from the devaswom fund constituted under S.25 of the HRI. 450/-per mensem in the case of the President and Rs. 400/-per mensem in the case of each of the two members. S.12 by itself does not mention from what source the honoraria is to be drawn. It can apparently be only from the devaswom fund constituted under S.25 of the HRI. Act The government does not thus pay the remuneration to the President nor can the government determine the quantum. 9. The fourth test relates to the function of the President, and the question is whether he performs such functions for the government. By S.15 (I) of the HRI Act the authority and jurisdiction belonging to or exercised by the Ruler of Travancore prior to the 1st of July 1949 in respect of Devaswoms and Hindu religious endowments shall vest in and be exercised by the Board in accordance with the provisions of the Act. S.15 (2) stipulates that the Board shall exercise all powers of direction, control and supervision over the incorporated and unincorporated Devaswoms and Hindu religious endowments under their jurisdiction By virtue of S.16 of the same Act the Board shall subject to the provisions of Part 1 of the Act exercise supervision and control over the acts and proceedings of all officers and servants of the Board and of the Devaswom department. I am not referring to the other provisions of the HRI. Act dealing with the powers and duties of the Board. The Board does not perform any function for an on behalf of the government. 10. The last test is whether the government can exercise any control over the performance of the functions of the Board. Here also the petitioner was not able to point out any one provision in the HRI. Act which confers any authority on the government to exercise any control over the performance of the functions allotted to the Board and its President under the HRI. Act Reliance is placed by the petitioner on S.33 of the HRI. Act. By that section the Board shall for each year prepare a budget for the next financial year showing the receipts and expenditure of the incorporated and unincorporated devaswoms and Hindu religious institutions under the management of the Board during that financial year. A duty is cast upon the Board to submit copies of the budget so prepared to the government within two months of the commencement of each financial year. A duty is cast upon the Board to submit copies of the budget so prepared to the government within two months of the commencement of each financial year. Again, in each financial year the Board has to prepare an annual administration report, and copy of which has to be forwarded to the government. I fail to understand how these directions can be construed as conferring on the government any right to control or direct the Board in the matter of discharge of its functions under the H. I. R. Act. S.32 of the H. R. I. Act shows that even with regard to the auditing of the accounts kept by the Board it is to be done by the auditors appointed by the High Court, and the consequential provisions are contained in sub-sections (3) onwards of S.32. 11. The only remaining aspect to be considered is the source from which the remuneration is to be paid to the members of the Board inclusive of the President. In Abdul Shakur v. Rikhab Chand (AIR. 1958 SC 387) and Gurugo-binda Basu v. Sankari Prusad Ghosal (1964-4 SCR 311) the Supreme Court has held that the source from which remuneration is paid is a neutral factor. I am not, therefore, pursuing that matter further. 12. From the scheme of the Act it is clear that the Board is an auton-mous body, and care has been taken by the legislature to avoid any sort of interference by the government in the constitution of the Board or in the discharge of the functions assigned to the Board under the H. R. I. Act. It may not be out of place in this context to make a reference to S.7 of the H. R.1. Act setting out the grounds of disqualification for membership of the Board. Sub-section (3) of S.7 shows that an office-holder or a servant of government, a local authority, the Devaswom Board, an incorporated or unincorporated devaswom or the trustee of a Hindu religious endowment, is disqualified from being chosen as or for being a member of the Board. Sub-section (6) of S.7 mentions as a ground of disqualification the membership of Parliament or of the legislature of any State. Those categories would unmistakably show that the legislature never wanted persons associated with government to function as a member of the Board. Sub-section (6) of S.7 mentions as a ground of disqualification the membership of Parliament or of the legislature of any State. Those categories would unmistakably show that the legislature never wanted persons associated with government to function as a member of the Board. There is thus a positive indication regarding the broad intention of the legislature regarding the autonomous nature of the Board and also to keep away the government as far as possible from interfering with the constitution and functioning of the Board. From the foregoing discussion it is clear that none of the usual tests that could be applied for determining whether an office is "under the government" is present in the instant case, and T have no hesitation to hold that the President of the Devaswom Board is not the holder of an office of profit under the government of Kerala or the Union. 12. The respondent has got a further case that even if the President of the Board could be treated as a holder of an office of profit under the government the disqualification laid down by Art.191 (1) (a) of the Constitution cannot apply because of the Kerala Legislative Assembly Removal of Disqualification Act. Act 15 of 1951. To incur the disqualification under Art.191 (1) (a) of the Constitution the office of profit must be "other than an office declared by the legislature of the State by law not to disqualify its holder". Act 15 of 1951 was presumably passed in exercise of the powers conferred on the State Legislature under Art.191 (1) (a). Sub-section (2) of S.2 of Act 15 of 1951 would indicate that only an office which is remunerated either by salary or by fees payable out of the consolidated fund of the State that will attract the disqualification laid down by Art.191 (1)(a). The remuneration which the President of the Travancore Devaswom Board receives is neither a salary nor a fee It is an honorarium, the quantum of which is determined by the Board itself subject to the maximum limit mentioned in S.12 of the Act. An honorarium normally suggests a payment or reward usually given as compensation for services on which custom or propriety forbids any fixed business price to be set. It is true that in certain contexts the expression 'honorarium' can be construed as a fee for services rendered by a professional person. An honorarium normally suggests a payment or reward usually given as compensation for services on which custom or propriety forbids any fixed business price to be set. It is true that in certain contexts the expression 'honorarium' can be construed as a fee for services rendered by a professional person. But in the context in which the expression is used in the H.R.I. Act, I feel that the remuneration was never intended by the legislature as a fee or salary. Again, it should be noted that the honorarium payable to the President is not from the consolidated fund of the State. Thus there appears to be considerable force in the contention of the respondent that he can seek protection under S.2(2) of Act 15 of 1951. 13. The alternative case put forward by the petitioner is that President of the Travancore Devaswom Board must be deemed to be disqualified by virtue of S.10 of the Act.1 may read S.10: "A person shall be disqualified if, and for so long as, he is a managing agent, manager or secretary of any company or corporation (other than a co-operative society) in the capital of which the appropriate Government has not less than twenty-five per cent share." It is true that the Devaswom Board is a corporation. The petitioner has no case that the President of the Board is a managing agent or secretary. For the purpose of S.10 his case is that the President must be deemed to be a'manager'. The relevant provisions of the H.R I. Act show that the functions are to be discharged by the Board as a body. Sub section (4) of S.13 of the H.R.I. Act stipulates that in case of difference of opinion among the members of the Board the question before the Board shall be decided by a majority of the votes and where the votes are equally divided the President or the person presiding can have a second or casting vote. Thus in the matter of discharging the functions of the Board the President has no separate or exclusive function, and I fail to understand bow his position can be equated to that of a "manager of a corporation". Thus in the matter of discharging the functions of the Board the President has no separate or exclusive function, and I fail to understand bow his position can be equated to that of a "manager of a corporation". That apart there is the further question whether the Travancore Devaswom Board is a corporation in the capita] of which the Kerala State has not less than 25% share within the meaning of S.10 of the Act. The Board has no share capital and it is not a corporation limited by shares. In fact, there is no averment to that effect in the election petition. But, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner there is an averment in the petition to the effect that the entire property of the Board was subscribed by the government. I find no warrant for any such presumption in any provision of the HRI Act. The Board itself is constituted only for the purpose of administering the Devaswoms mentioned in the Act, and the vesting provision is contained in S.3. There is nothing in S.3 to indicate that any property belonging to the government was transferred to the Board. The other provision having connection between the Board and the government is that relating to the annual payment of a certain amount by the State to the Devaswom fund. That payment is in pursuance of Art.290A of the Constitution. Art.290A was added by the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act 1956. Prior to that the provision for payment of that amount was contained in Art.238 (10) of the Constitution. It was on the repeal of Art.238 that the constitutional obligation of the State of Kerala to pay the amount to the Devaswom fund was included in a separate article as Art.290A. For the purpose of this case I do not think that it is necessary for me to consider the historical and constitutional reasons which led to the addition of Art.238 (10) or its replacement by Art.290A of the Constitution The annual payment received by the Devaswom Board from the State by virtue of Art.290A of the Constitution can by no stretch of imagination be construed as a contribution to the share capital of the Devaswom Board by the Government. The payment is made by the government in discharge of an obligation cast on it by the constitutional provision. The payment is made by the government in discharge of an obligation cast on it by the constitutional provision. What constitutes devaswom fund is laid down by S.25 of the H.R.I. Act. The amount received from the government under Art.290A is only one of the items, the other items being mentioned as items 2 to 5 in S.25 (a). I fail to understand how S.10 of the Act can have any application as far as the Travancore Devaswom Board or its President is concerned. There is thus no substance in the contention of the petitioner that the respondent is disqualified under S.10 of the Act. 14. Issue No. 2. Though in the petition certain vague allegations are made regarding irregularities in the matter of counting of votes the petitioner has not chosen to substantiate them despite the specific denial contained in the written statement of the respondent. There is no evidence to sustain the petitioner's case that there were irregularities in the matter of counting of votes. This issue is therefore answered against the petitioner. 15. Issue No. 3. The petitioner is not entitled to any of the reliefs prayed for by him. In the result, the election petition is dismissed with costs to the respondent. The office will communicate the substance of this order to the Election Commission and to the Speaker of the Kerala Legislative Assembly, and it shall also send an authenticated copy of the order as soon as it is ready to the Election Commission as provided in S.103 of the Act. Dismissed.