Short Note : 1. This is a revision filed by plaintiff-applicant against order dated 28.1.1974 whereby appeal of the plaintiff against refusal of injunction by the trial Court has been dismissed. 2. Facts essential for purposes of this revision are that the plaintiff is sitting tenant in premises other than disputed room situated in the first floor of Vidhichand Dharmashala belonging to defendant-non-applicant. The plaintiff alleges that he has taken the disputed room situate on first floor on a monthly rent of Rs. 10 M.P. with effect from 25.8.1970. Rs. 18 were paid by way of advance to the defendant. The cause-grievance which led to the filing of the suit is that on 29.8.1978 the defendant has unlawfully broke open plaintiff's lock from the aforesaid room and put his own lock on it. The plaintiff consequently has filed the suit for recovery of possession, issuance of mandatory injunction for removal of the lock put by the defendant on the aforesaid room and for recovery of an amount of Rs. 250 paid by the plaintiff towards water charges. The plaintiff-applied for issuance of temporary injunction in which one of the reliefs prayed for was that the defendant should not let out the suit premises until decision of the suit. 3. The defendant denied the claim of the plaintiff and has asserted that the disputed room was never let out to the plaintiff. The defendant also opposed the application for issuance of interim injunction. 4. The trial Court rejected the application for issuance of interim injunction. This led to filing of an appeal by the original defendant Popatmal which met with the same fate. 5. Aggrieved by the same, Popatmal filed this revision. During the pendency of the revision he died and instead his legal representative nos. 1 to 10 have been brought on record as applicants in the case. 6. Shri D.K. Katare, learned counsel for the applicant confined his argument only to that part of the injunction application which relates to restraining the defendant-non-applicant from letting out the suit premises. Shri N.P. Mittal, learned counsel for the non-applicant supported the impugned order and argued that there is no ground for interference. 7. After having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the opinion that the revision deserves to be partly allowed. 8. Shri N.P. Mittal, learned counsel for the non-applicant supported the impugned order and argued that there is no ground for interference. 7. After having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the opinion that the revision deserves to be partly allowed. 8. The plaintiff applicants have raised in the plaint serious question of fact to be tried viz. that they are tenants of suit premises at the rate of Rs. 10 P.M. and the defendant after having taken rent of Rs. 10 in advance, has dispossessed the plaintiffs unlawfully. This constitutes a prima-facie case for purposes of issuance of interim injunction. 9. In Shankarlal vs. State of M P. 1978 JLJ 306 it has been held that: "Although it is often said that plaintiff must show a prima-facie case in support of the right claimed by him the suit before he can be granted temporary injunction, the real thing to be seen is only that plaintiff's claim is not frivolous or vexatious, in other words that there is a serious question to be tried Plaintiff is not required to make out a clear legal title but has to satisfy the Court that he has a fair question to raise as to the legal right claimed by him in the suit. It is not the function of the Court at that stage to resolve disputed questions of fact or difficult questions of law which should be left to be decided at the conclusion of the trial. Plaintiff sued for declaration that the allotment of house to defendant was without jurisdiction because the allotting authority wrongly assumed that the rent was Rs. 40 and that the house fell vacant. Plaintiff alleged that I was in occupation as his licence with him and after I left, plaintiff was still in occupation using it as godown for tobacco. He also alleged that the monthly rent of the house did not exceed Rs. 25. Both plaintiff and I filed affidavits to show that I was not a tenant. Plaintiff also filed certified copies of assessment register to show that rent was Rs. 17. The Authorised Officer's conclusion that I was tenant paying Rs. 40 was based on statement of a relation of allottees that 3 had told him that the rent was Rs. 40. Both plaintiff and I filed affidavits to show that I was not a tenant. Plaintiff also filed certified copies of assessment register to show that rent was Rs. 17. The Authorised Officer's conclusion that I was tenant paying Rs. 40 was based on statement of a relation of allottees that 3 had told him that the rent was Rs. 40. It was not disputed and the district Judge on appeal also found that plaintiff was at least on date of suit in possession of the house using it as a god own for tobacco. Plaintiff also showed that the house was a licensed godown under the Central Excise and Salt Act. The allottee was living with his brother-in-law. The trial Court and the appellate Court having refused temporary injunction the orders were challenged in revision. Held, that plaintiff has raised serious questions as to jurisdiction of Authorised Officer and thus made out prima-facie case. If plaintiff was required to vacate and he ultimately establishes his right claimed in the suit he would suffer inconvenience and loss in business which could not be satisfactorily compensated by award of damages, that though it would be more convenient for defendant to live in the house in question during suit and his inconvenience could not be easily compensated in terms of money, inconvenience to plaintiff would be much more if he was required to vacate and that in the circumstances the balance of convenience was in favour of granting temporary injunction in plaintiff's favour and preserve status quo, plaintiff being in physical occupation (1975) 1 All. SR 504 and Woodroffe's law of Injunction, 1964 Ed. pp 185-186 Relied." 10. Applying the aforesaid principles to the present case, it has to be held that the plaintiff has raised serious question of fact to be tried by the Court. It was not the function of the Courts below at this stage to resolve the disputed question of fact as to whether in fact the plaintiff is tenant of the suit premises or not. This question should be left to be decided at the conclusion of the trial. Accordingly, the Courts below erred in holding that there is no prima-facie case in favour of the plaintiff-applicants. Preservation of the status• quo is necessary. It is not the case of the defendant that he has already let out the suit premises to anybody also. This question should be left to be decided at the conclusion of the trial. Accordingly, the Courts below erred in holding that there is no prima-facie case in favour of the plaintiff-applicants. Preservation of the status• quo is necessary. It is not the case of the defendant that he has already let out the suit premises to anybody also. The defendant-non-applicant has merely asserted that he intends to put the suit premises into his own use. The apprehension of the plaintiff-applicants is that the defendant wants to let out the premises and if so let out in these days of rent control legislation it will not be possible to recover possession from the tenant so inducted. Equities in favour of the strangers will intervene. This will add to multiplicity of litigation also since the defendant on his own showing does not want to let out the premises, it appears necessary to direct preservation of the state of things prevailing on the date of the institution of the suit. This is what has been held by this Court in a Division Bench case reported in Durge Transport Co. Pvt. Ltd. Durg vs. Regional Transport Authority, Raipur and Others, 1965 JLJ 583 . 11. The concepts of balance of convenience and irreparable injury are also in favour of the plaintiff-applicants. If injunction is with-held the premises are likely to be let out. If injunction is granted, the defendant is not to lose anything because his own showing he wants to use the suit premises himself. If injunction is not granted, the suit is likely to be rendered infructuous and/or there will be multiplicity of litigation. Therefore, the plaintiff- applicants are entitled to issuance of interim injunction only to the limited extent viz. that the defendant non-applicant will not let out the suit premises during the pendency of the suit. Shri D.K. Katare, learned counsel for the applicant did not agitate before me grievance against the other part of the impugned order which deals with rejection of the interim injunction in respect of other matters. Revision partly allowed.