Judgment :- (RAMAPRASADA RAO, J.) 1. The decision in this appeal and the memorandum of cross objections revolves on a short compass. One Vellachami Chettiar, Pichaikutti Chettiar and Arunachalam Chettiar were owning the suit property until January 1964, when for purpose of convenience the said Vellaichami Chettiar and Pichaikutti Chettiar let out the suit premises to the first defendant for purposes of his business But at all times it was the intention of the co-owners to have a partition effected but the urgency and need of the first defendant was felt and recognised by the other two co-owners and with that object in view they stipulated that they could only let out the premises for a period of three years which satisfied the first defendant as well. It was in those circumstances the first defendant entered into possession of the suit property in or about January 1965. In December 1964 Vellaichami Chettiar died leaving behind him the plaintiffs 1 to 4 as his legal representatives. After the expiry of the original period of demise, apparently at the desire of one of the co-owners, plaintiffs 1 to 4 and the fifth plaintiff who admittedly owned two-third interest in the suit property sought for partition and separate possession of the plaint property which was denied. They therefore came to court by filing a suit for partition and separate possession and incidentally sought for accounting from the first defendant for the value of various zinc sheets which they allege were removed by the first defendant when he was in possession of the suit property. 2. The first defendant in the main resisted the suit for partition on the ground that he was a tenant in occupation of the building within the meaning of Act 18 of 1960 and that even though the plaintiffs in common law were entitled to a right to sue for partition, yet by reason of the statutory law which protected the interests of tenants, the plaintiffs were not entitled to separate possession of the plaint mentioned property. It was this plea which was put in the forefront by the first defendant who whilst conceding the rights of the plaintiffs to their two third share in the common property, resisted their claim for possession. It was this plea which was put in the forefront by the first defendant who whilst conceding the rights of the plaintiffs to their two third share in the common property, resisted their claim for possession. As regards the incidental relief of accounting sought for against him, the first defendant denied that he ever removed any zinc sheets from the quondam property demised to him and on the other hand pleaded that he put in zinc sheets of his own into the property and improved it and if in any event the plaintiffs claim as to possession was sustainable should be paid the value of such improvements made to the quondam property. Defendants 2 and 3 are interested in the suit property by reason of an inter se arrangement between themselves and the first defendant, but we are not however concerned with their interests in the suit property. 3. The learned trial Judge on the above material pleadings framed the following issues— 1. Whether the first defendants in possession of the suit property on permission as alleged by the plaintiffs? 2. Whether the first defendant is a statutory tenant entitled to the benefits of Madras Act 18 of 1960? 3. Whether the first defendant is entitled to be paid compensation before the plaintiffs seek actual possession? 4. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for actual possession of their respective shares to be allotted to them? 5. Whether the relinquishment alleged to have been made by the plaintiffs 3 and 4 is true, valid and binding on the defendants? 6. Whether the zinc sheet partition wall that was existing on the western side of the suit property belongs to the parties herein or to the western owner? 7. What is the value of the zinc sheet partition wall and zinc sheets shed? 8. To what relief, if any, are the plaintiffs entitled? Whilst agreeing with the plaintiffs that they were entitled to their two-third share in the suit property and whilst giving a decree in their favour for a partition of the same, the, trial Judge denied them what he characterised as khas possession, accepting the defence of the first defendant that he was the statutory tenant entitled to the benefits of the Madras Act 18 of 1960. He also negatived the relief of accounting asked for by the plaintiffs and held that the defendants were only liable to account for the zinc sheets or the value thereof. It is the said judgment and decree of the learned trial Judge which is the subject-matter of appeal before as. 4. Mr. Krishnamurthi, learned counsel for the appellants, raised the only legal contention that the conclusion of the learned trial Judge, after having conceded the plaintiffs right to obtain a partition of the suit property, that they were not entitled to khas possession of the suit property is erroneous. According to him, the property admittedly belongs to the co-owners consisting of the plaintiffs on the one hand and the defendants on the other and if by contract, accident or any fortuitous circumstances one of the co-owners is in khas or physical possession of the suit property, he cannot claim any rights which are peculiar privileges available to statutory tenants under the rent legislation such as Act 18 of 1960. The learned Advocate General appearing for the first defendant would not seriously contend against this proposition either, but would say that such a view is not an impossibility having regard to certain judicial pronouncements of courts other than our High Court. He would, in all fairness, accede to the general and well accepted proposition that a co-owner cannot project in himself title to an identified or identifiable share in undivided, joint or common property and in that context it would be incongruous to project in himself a statuary privilege which flows from either contract or from circumstances which are alien to the concepts holding the principle of co-ownership. After this fair deliberation of the question of law, the only question of law mooted in this case, the position has become very simple for us. 5. In the case of co-owners, it would be idle, and indeed strange, for any one of them; to lay their fingers upon any part of such joint property and claim that it is or their own. Such an accent or emphasis upon ownership of an identifiable part of common property is available only after a final decree for partition is obtained by such a co-owner in a manner known to law. Such an accent or emphasis upon ownership of an identifiable part of common property is available only after a final decree for partition is obtained by such a co-owner in a manner known to law. But during the process of that litigation which leads to the passing of a final decree no one amongst such co-owners can project any title to a defined portion of joint property, If this is the concept which is inexplicably attached to the principle of joint or co-ownership, then it follows that the mere accident of possession of a part or whole of such property by one amongst such co-owners does not give him any right as a tenant thereto as is popularly under-stood or understood in the light of the statutory provisions of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, Act 18 of 1960 either. It is only by sufference and mostly by consensus or contract that the co-owner is placed in possession of the joint property without any objection or interference by the other admitted co-owners. His right would be in the nature of that of a licensee, put in possession of the property and no more. His obligation would be to pay such quid pro quo or consideration for the allowance or privilege granted to him by other co-owners to remain in possession of the property either in part or in whole. Such rights and obligations which are centring round a particular jutal relationship, which springs from the right of co-ownership, cannot give the ‘person in actual occupation, such as the respondent a right to claim the statutory privileges available to a tenant in possession of a property not belonging to him and in which is not interested and into which he was inducted by the co-owner as a tenant in the popular sense. It is that incident which led to the induction of the person into possession of the property of a third party that impresses on him the badge of being a tenant in law, as well as under contract an contemporaneously vests in him the statutory privilege of gaining and claiming all the rights which a tenant could claim by virtue of the provisions under the special enactment, Act 18 of 1960. These privileges and rights available to a tenant as above are certainly not available to a co-owner who gets into possession of the property with the consent of the other co-owners or to a person whom he lets into possession of the relative property. Such permissive possession as already stated by us does not vest in him a right to claim the benefits of a statutory tenant under Act 18 of 1960, The lower Court was wrong in having assumed that the defendants were so entitled to. 6. In Kuppuswami v. Balagurumutri 1965-1 M.L.J. 86.= 77 L.W. 559 a similar contingency was dealt with by a Division Bench of our High Court. There a co-owner sold his undivided share to a stranger, but obtained a lease-back of that undivided share in the property sold by him. Thereafter as against his own quondam co-owners he projected a right under Act 18 of 1960. This was negatived by the Division Bench. Ramachandra Iyer C.J. speaking for the Bench said— “By reason of the sale of the undivided share, the vendor and the vendee become thereafter co-tenants of the building, each of whom has an undoubted right to demand and obtain partition by metes and bounds of the joint property, but till that is done, it cannot be said that any of the sharers has got an exclusive right to any part of the joint property Where one co-tenant allows another co-tenant to enjoy his undivided share, it cannot be said that he has such exclusive right to the property, as to be capable of being let out. No co-owner can say that he is the owner of any part or designated part of the building. His interest would be to the extent of the share owned by him in the entirely of the property’. 7. Having regard to this well accepted concept at any rate in our High Court, that co-owner cannot carve out for himself and to his benefit any definable or definable interest of property to the prejudice of other co-sharers, the claim of the appellants has to be upheld. 7. Having regard to this well accepted concept at any rate in our High Court, that co-owner cannot carve out for himself and to his benefit any definable or definable interest of property to the prejudice of other co-sharers, the claim of the appellants has to be upheld. To the extent the court below said that the plaintiffs would not be entitled to Khas possession, though it granted the relief as to partition of the property claimed by the plaintiffs, its judgment is set aside and the appeal is allowed in part to that extent Regarding the other claim as to accounting apart from the finding of the court below being based on material noticed by it, no serious contention was raised before us that the first defendant or the defendants as a whole can be said to have removed any part of the property such as zinc sheets attached to it. We confirm the finding of the court below that the defendants are not liable to account as prayed for by the plaintiffs. 8. Regarding cross-objections, equally there is no merit. The first defendant claimed that he improved the property whilst it was in his possession. As a co-owner he could have improved it, but in the peculiar circumstances of this case, whether he could seek for a reimbursement independently after setting, up statutory possessory title to the property, is very doubtful. Even apart from it the lower court rightly did not on the materials noticed by it accept the defendants case that there was such improvement to the property and that the defendants would be entitled to claim reimbursement towards the value of such improvements. The cross-objections also therefore fail. 9. In the result, the appeal is allowed in part and the other findings of the court below are sustained. The cross-objections are dismissed. Each party would bear their own costs.