Judgment :- 1. The plaintiffs who succeeded in the trial court, but lost in the lower appellate court, are the appellants. They are the son, wife and daughter of one Narayanaswamy Naicker who died in 1969. They filed the suit for a declaration that the maintenance deed, Ex. A.1, dated 17th February, 1905, executed by Narayanaswamy Naicker in favour of one Sayammal, the widow of his brother, Venkataswami Naicker, was not valid and binding on them, for a declaration that the subsequent sale deed Ex. A.3 dated 31st August 1959 executed by Sayammal in favour of the first respondant-first defendant in respect of the suit properties is not valid and binding on them and for recovery of possession thereof with past profits at Rs. 500 per annum and future and mesne profits at Rs. 250 per annum. 2. The suit properties have been described in Sch. A and B. The description of the property in the A schedule is as per the document Ex. A.1 while the description in schedule B is as per the re-survey and the sale deed Ex. A.3. The suit properties are 6-11 acres made up of 3-49 acres in S. No. 159/2 and 2.62 acres in S. No. 164/1, of Vadapalli village, Palladam Taluk. The second respondent-second defendant said to be a tresspasser is alleged to be in possession of the suit properties after the death of Sayammal on 17th October, 1967. The 3rd respondant-3rd defendant is said to be a mortgagee of the properties originally belonged to one Genga Naicker, and subsequently to his two sons, Venkataswami Naicker and Narayanaswami Naicker, who inherited the same prior to 1905. Venkatasami Naicker died prior to 1905, leaving behind his wife, Sayammal and his daughter Krishnammal. After the death of Venkataswami Naicker, his brother Narayanasami Naicker executed the maintenance deed Ex. A.1, in favour of Sayammal and Krishnammal conferring maintenance right in the properties in favour of Sayammal and an absolute estate on Krishnammal who was then a minor. On the same day, Sayammal executed the counter document Ex. A-2 acknowledging the document Ex. A.4, and the receipt of possession of the properties in pursuance thereof. Krishnammal died unmarried in or about 1917 or 1919. The case of the appellants was that under Ex. On the same day, Sayammal executed the counter document Ex. A-2 acknowledging the document Ex. A.4, and the receipt of possession of the properties in pursuance thereof. Krishnammal died unmarried in or about 1917 or 1919. The case of the appellants was that under Ex. A.1 Sayammal had only a right to enjoy the properties for life and it did not get enlarged as per the provisions of S. 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (Act 30 of 1956), (hereinafter referred to as the Act), and she had therefore no right to execute the sate deed Ex. A.3 in favour of the first respondent. It was further contended that Narayanasami Naicker had a son Subba Naicker and therefore, he had no right to execute the document Ex. A.1, in respect of the joint family properties and that he had been made to execute Ex. A.1 by undue influence of Sayammals sister and her husband. The defence was that Krishnammal had a vested right in the properties and on her death in 1917 or 1919, Sayammal inherited the properties as her heir and even if Sayammal had a right to maintenance, her right got enlarged under the Hindu Succession Act. 3. Both the courts below found that it has not been proved that Narayanaswam Naicker had a son Subba Naicker and that there was an undue influence on Narayanaswami Naicker for the execution of Ex. A.1. The trial court found that Sayammal had merely a right to enjoy the properties for her maintenance under Ex. A.1, that her daughter, Krishnammal had not acquired any absolute interest in the properties as she predeceased her mother, and therefore, S. 14(2) of the Act applied and not S. 14(1), and therefore, Ex. A.3 executed by Sayammal was not valid and binding on the appellants. On these findings, the trial court decreed the suit as prayed for, namely, for declaration and possession with past mesne profits at Rs. 500 per annum and future mesne profits at Rs. 250 per annum. But on appeal it was found that Krishnammal had a vested right in the properties and that on her death, her mother Sayammal had become the absolute owner of the properties, and therefore, the sale deed Ex. A.3 was valid and binding on the appellants. 4. 500 per annum and future mesne profits at Rs. 250 per annum. But on appeal it was found that Krishnammal had a vested right in the properties and that on her death, her mother Sayammal had become the absolute owner of the properties, and therefore, the sale deed Ex. A.3 was valid and binding on the appellants. 4. The concurrent findings of the courts below that the appellants have not proved that Narayanaswami Naicker had a son Subba Naicker and was therefore not competent to execute Ex. A.1, in respect of the joint family properties and that there was any undue influence on Narayanaswami Naicker to execute Ex. A.1, by Sayammals sister and her husband, are on questions of fact and they cannot be gone into this second appeal. 5. The questions for consideration are whether Sayammal had only a limited right in the properties and it got enlarged by the provisions of S. 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and whether Krishnammal had a vested right in the properties and on her death Sayammal became entitled to the absolute right in the properties and whether the sale deed Ex. A.3, is binding on the appellants. 6. Sayammals husband, Venkatasami Naicker, had died prior to 1905 and on the date of the document, Ex. A.1, it is not disputed that she had a right to be a maintained from the income from the joint family properties. It is seen from Ex. A.1 that Venkatasami Naicker and Narayanasami Naicker were undivided and that even after the death of Venkatasami Naicker, Sayammal continued to live with her husbands brother, Narayanasami Naicker. The relevant recitals in the document Ex. A.1 are these: Tamil 7. The learned counsel for the appellants submits that Krishnammal did not get a vested right in the properties. But, in respect of the contention that Sayammals right will not get enlarged under S. 14 (1) of the Act, he submitted that the right conferred on Krishnammal by the document would amount to a restriction imposed on the maintenance right conferred on Sayammal in respect of the properties. S. 14 of the Hindu Secession Act 1956 runs thus— 14(1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. S. 14 of the Hindu Secession Act 1956 runs thus— 14(1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. Explanation: In this sub-section, ‘property’ includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or service, or at partition or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own-skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as Stridana immediately before the commencement of this Act. (2) Nothing contained in sub-sec. (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property.” 8. Learned counsel for the first respondent stresses on the words ‘or in lieu of maintenance’ in the explanation to sub-S. (1) of S. 14, and submits that since Sayammal had a right to be maintained from the income from the joint family properties of her deceased husband and his brother, and the suit properties had been given to be enjoyed by her in lieu of maintenance, it would be property within the meaning of S. 14(1) of the Act, and the right would get enlarged by that clause in S. 14. In this connection he submitted that the observations of a Bench of this court in Hussain Uduman v. Venkatachala Mudaliar 1974-2 M.L.J. 275=87 L.W. 583, would amount to reading into the explanation to S. 14(1) of the Act certain words which are not there and that there is no warrant to hold that S. 14(1) would apply only to properties in the possession of a woman in respect of which she had a pre-existing right. The Bench hat observed as follows — “A perusal of the Section makes it, clear that S. 14(1) governs all kinds of estate ‘acquired’ by a female Hindu before or after the commencement of the Act whether by way of inheritance or devise at a partition or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person or by her own skill or exertion or by purchase or by prescription or in any other manner whatsoever, or by way of Stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act, On the other hand, sub-Sec. (2) of S. 14, which is in the nature of an exception to sub-S. (1) provides that nothing contained in sub-Sec. (1) shall apply to any property acquired by a female Hindu by way of gift or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award, where the terms of the gift, will, or other instrument or the decree or order or award ‘prescribe’ a restricted estate in such property. In other words, the intention of the Legislature was to remove the disability imposed on women by Hindu Law on the ground of sex, but not to interfere with the sanctity of contracts and grams, whereby only a restrictive estate had been deliberately conferred upon them. Sub-Sec. (1) removes the restriction imposed by Hindu Law, on the ground of sex, upon the estate held by a woman and enlarges it into an absolute estate. On the other hand sub-Sec. (2) leaves intact the restriction on the estate of a woman not imposed by law on account of her sex but prescribed by the terms of a contract or grant. Some difficulty may arise in the application of sub-Sec. (2) of S. 14 to the facts of an given case. The document, instrument, decree or award may, in certain cases, of its own force, create a restricted estate in property and may in certain other cases only restate the restricted estate which the female Hindu possessed even prior to the date of the instrument, decree or award. Before applying sub-Sec. (2), the proper question to ask is does the instrument or decree ‘prescribe’ restricted estate in the property, or does it merely acknowledge and recognise (and not prescribe) a pre-existing estate upon which the Hindu Law had imposed a restriction, because the holder of the estate was a woman”. Before applying sub-Sec. (2), the proper question to ask is does the instrument or decree ‘prescribe’ restricted estate in the property, or does it merely acknowledge and recognise (and not prescribe) a pre-existing estate upon which the Hindu Law had imposed a restriction, because the holder of the estate was a woman”. Though it cannot be stated that there is no substance in the submission of the learned counsel for the first respondent, it is unnecessary to go into that question in this second appeal, in the view that I have taken regarding the right which Krishnammal had under the document, Ex. A.1. 9. Learned counsel for the appellants invited by attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in Narayanamma v. Venkata Subbiah A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 2144, in support of his contention that Krishnammal should be held to have had no vested right in the suit properties. In that case, one Nagiah, a member of a joint Hindu family consisting of himself and his brothers-died leaving behind him his widow Ragavamma and daughter Venkatasubbamma. The brothers of Nagiah executed a gift deed on 29th April; 1930 in favour of the widow and her daughter in the following words— “Raghavamma of you is our sister-in-law and Venkatasubbamma our elder brothers daughter and we have been living jointly even during the lifetime of our brother and uptill now. So we, had as per your wish and that of ours given in marriage Venkatasubbamma of you to our nephew Madanapalli Pichaiahs son Nagiah. Subsequent thereto, you being unwilling to remain joint with us, represented to us, that you would remain separate from us, to which we had agreed and so on the advice given by our relations to which both of us have agreed, we have executed this deed in your favour settling that the seri land of the extent of K. 4-14 described in the schedule hereunder should be taken by you towards your maintenance and after the death, of Raghavamma by Venkatasubbamma towards; ‘Pasupu Kunkuma’ and that you should have nothing to do with our joint family debts. It is therefore settled that you should take possession of the said property this day itself and enjoy only the income there from and that on the death o f the said Raghavamma of you, the said property should pass to Venkatasubbamma. It is therefore settled that you should take possession of the said property this day itself and enjoy only the income there from and that on the death o f the said Raghavamma of you, the said property should pass to Venkatasubbamma. Further, it is settled that Venkatasubbamma of you and her children (Santhathivaru) should be in enjoyment thereof with absolute powers of gift transfer and sale etc. It is settled that Raghavamma of you should not in any manner claim any separate maintenance etc., to be given to her during the rest of be lifetime by us. So you may, subject to the aforesaid terms, take possession of the aforesaid property and and be in enjoyment thereof. You yourselves shall pay the sarkar kist etc., thereon and get the said land entered in your name in the Government accounts. In respect hereof, we or our heirs shall not raise any dispute whatsoever either with you or your descendants. This deed is executed with the arrangement that in case no female or male issue is born to the said Venkatasubbamma, the said schedule mentioned property should on her death, pass to us or our descendants, and not to the heirs of the said Venkatasubbdmma”. The Supreme Court observed as follows— “This is not a case of an immediate conferment of absolute title on Venkatasubbamma subject to a right of maintenance for Raghavamma. It is a case of right of maintenance for both maturing into an absolute estate in favour of Venkatsubbamma on Raghavammas death. If Venkatasubbamma had survived Raghavamma, she would have got the properties absolutely and the question might have arisen whether the subsequent provision in the document one is repugnant to the earlier one and therefore void or is only a defeasance clauses which came into effect on Venkatasubbamma dying childless. As it was Venkatasubbamma died before she became the absolute owner”. The Supreme Court held that Venkatasubbamma did not get a vested interest in the properties. As it was Venkatasubbamma died before she became the absolute owner”. The Supreme Court held that Venkatasubbamma did not get a vested interest in the properties. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the first respondent relied on the decisions in Akkaraju Viswanatha v. Duthalur Anjaneyalu A.I.R. 1936 Mad, 865=42 L.W. 746 and Pappammel v. Kuppuswamy 1972-4 M.L.J. 481=85 L.W. 387 and submitted that having regard to S. 19 of the Transfer of Property Act, Krishnammal must be held to have had a vested right in the properties and that Sayammal had inherited that right on the death of Krishnammal in 1917 or 1919 and therefore she was entitled to convey the properties to the first respondent under Ex. A.3. The principle laid down in both these decisions is that if an absolute estate is devised to B after the the lifetime of A, it is not a contingent interest that B gets, but a vested right that he gets and that does not matter if B predeceased A. Learned counsel for the first respondent further submits that the said decision of the Supreme Court in Narayanamma v. Venkatasubbiah A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 2114 could not be made applicable to the facts of the present case having regard to the fact that no reference has been made to S. 19 of the Transfer of property Act in that decision. The learned Judges themselves have observed in paragraph 3 of the judgment in that decision that it is a principle settled beyond dispute that each document has to be interpreted on the words of that document itself and the other documents interpreted in earlier decisions cannot provide a binding precedent in interpreting a document. There is no reference to S. 19 in that decision. S. 19 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 reads thus: “Where, on a transfer of property, an interest therein is created in favour of a person without specifying the time when it is to take effect, or in terms specifying that it is to take effect forthwith or on the happening of an event which must happen, such interest is vested unless a contrary intention appears from the terms of the transfer. A vested interest is not defeated by the death of the transferee before he obtains possession. A vested interest is not defeated by the death of the transferee before he obtains possession. Explanation—An intention that an interest shall not he vested is not to be inferred merely from provision whereby the enjoyment thereof in postponed or whereby a prior interest in the same property is given or reserved to some other person or whereby income arising from the property is directed to be accumulated until the time of enjoyment arrives, or from a provision that if a particular event shall happen the interest shall pass to another person”. Sayammal had been given the right to enjoy the properties for her life and Krishnammal had been given an absolute interest in the properties thereafter. The death of Sayammal would put an end, to the right to enjoy the properties for her maintenance which is a certain event, and therefore, it will be clear from a leading of S. 19 of the Transfer of Property Act, that the right which Krishnammal got under the document is a vested interest. Consequently, though Krishnammal had predeceased her mother, Sayammal would inherit that right as the heir of the daughter. It is not possible to agree with the learned counsel for the appellants that S. 19 of the Transfer of Property Act would not apply and that a contrary intention has been expressed in the document, namely, that Krishnammal would get the properties only if she survives Sayammal. No such contrary intention could be inferred from the terms of the document, for, if Narayanasami Naicker had intended that the properties should revert back to the family in the event of Krishnammal predeceasing Sayammal, he would have made a specific provision for that purpose in the document itself. It is significant in this connection note that Narayanawami Naicker himself had attested the document, Ex. A-3 and that he had not taken any steps to see that the alienation was not binding on him beyond the lifetime of Sayammal even though he had lived for nearly two years thereafter and had died only in 1969. Under these circumstances, I agree with the learned Subordinate Judge that Krishnammal bad a vested interest in the suit properties, and that Sayammal had become the absolute owner off the properties, as the heir of Krishanammal in 1917 or 1919 and that she was therefore to alienate the properties in favour of the first respondent under Ex. Under these circumstances, I agree with the learned Subordinate Judge that Krishnammal bad a vested interest in the suit properties, and that Sayammal had become the absolute owner off the properties, as the heir of Krishanammal in 1917 or 1919 and that she was therefore to alienate the properties in favour of the first respondent under Ex. A-3 and that it is not ( sic ) open to the appellants to contend that Exs. A-1 and A.3 are not valid and binding on them. 10. In the result, the Second Appeal fails and the same is dismissed with the costs of the first respondent. No leave.