Sheth, J.-This appeal is directed against the order of acquittal recorded by the learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad, in Sessions Case No. 48 of 1975 in which the accused was charged with having committed an offence punishable under section 302, India Penal Code. 2. The facts of the case briefly stated are as under: The accused and his friend Yadgiri went to Khaja restaurant at about mid-night during the night intervening between 5th and 6th June, 1975, and took a cup of tea and snacks. The restaurant-keeper demanded the payment of the bill but it was not paid. The accused not only refused to pay the bill but assaulted Mohammad Ilyas, the restaurant-keeper. Mohammad Ilyas rang up the police. The accused and Yadgiri started running away from the restaurant. Mohammad Ilyas asked, his employees to chase the accused. One of the employees, Sheikh Abdullah, overtook the accused at some distance in Jail street. Immediately thereupon the accused took out the knife and stabbed Sheikh Abdullah (hereinafter referred as “the deceased”) in his chest and escaped. Sheikh Abdullah ran for some distance and collapsed. He was taken to Gandhi hospital where he was declared to have been dead. The accused was arrested on 6th June, 1975 at 10. p.m. The police investigation followed. At the conclusion of the police investigation he was charged with haying committed an offence punishable under section 302, Indian Penal Code. The prosecution examined as many as 18 witnesses. The learned trial Judge found that the accused had stabbed the deceased as a result of which the deceased died but that he had done so in exercise of his right of private defence. He therefore acquitted the accused. It is that order of acquittal which is challenged by the State of Andhra Pradesh in this appeal. 3. P.Ws. 1 to 6 have deposed that the accused stabbed with his knife the deceased as a result of which the deceased died. The plea of private defence raised by the accused suggests that a fatal injury has been caused by him with his knife to the deceased. The prosecution evidence amply bears the prosecution case. Mohammad Ilyas, P.W.1 runs Khaja restaurant near market in Secunderabad. At the relevant time on the material date he was at the counter. The accused and Yadgiri went to his restaurant and ordered a cup of tea and a bun. The prosecution evidence amply bears the prosecution case. Mohammad Ilyas, P.W.1 runs Khaja restaurant near market in Secunderabad. At the relevant time on the material date he was at the counter. The accused and Yadgiri went to his restaurant and ordered a cup of tea and a bun. The bill which they were required to pay was 60 paise. The witness asked the accused to pay the amount and the accused told him that he would pay to the father of the witness. The witness insisted on payment of money. Thereupon the accused caught hold of his left-hand and gave him jerks as a result of which his wrist watch fell down. He also slapped the witness twice on his face. Sanaullah, P.W.2 advised this witness to call the police. Meanwhile the accused and Yadgiri left the restaurant. Yadgiri said that he would pay the amount and asked the witness not to inform the police. Thereupon the accused returned to the restaurant and dashed his head against the head of Sanaullah, P.W.2. Obviously at the development of this scene the other employees of the restaurant gathered together at the counter. The accused and Yadgiri started running away from the restaurant. The employees working in the restaurant chased the accused and Yadgiri. He informed the market police station of the incident. About 5 or 6 minutes later the workers who had chased the accused brought Sheikh Abdullah with a stab injury in his chest. They told him that the deceased was stabbed by the accused with a knife. He thereupon sent the deceased in a cycle-rickshaw to Gandhi Hospital. Narsing (P.W.3), Baburao (P.W.4) and Mohammad Jaffar (P.W.5) accompanied the deceased. Some other persons also accompanied him. Sometime thereafter the persons who accompanied the deceased returned to the restaurant and told the witness that the deceased had died. The police thereupon went to his restaurant. The witness went to the market police station and lodged the information of the offence, Ex. P-1. In his cross-examination he has stated that if a customer is unable to pay the bill for whatever he has consumed, the practice of the restaurant, is to take some article from the customer as and by way of security. The employees working in the restaurant had chased, the accused because he had asked them to catch the accused and bring him back. The employees working in the restaurant had chased, the accused because he had asked them to catch the accused and bring him back. They did not chase the accused with arms. He has denied the suggestion that the accused was manhandled by his employees. 4. P.W.6 Yadgiri was the person who accompanied the accused to Khaja restaurant. His evidence brings out the following facts. They consumed a bun and a cup of tea. They were required to pay 60 paise to the restaurant-keeper for what they had consumed. P.W.1 insisted upon paying the amount immediately. There was exchange of words. He has stated in categorical terms that neither he nor the accused paid the amount of bill to P.W.1 but slapped him. The accused also struck his head with the head of P.W.2. P.W.2 asked P.W.1 to telephone to police. While P.W.1 was lifting the telephone, this witness asked P.W.1 not to telephone to the police. Yet P.W.1 telephoned to the police. Thereupon he and the accused started running. The employees of the restaurant also started running behind them. One of the workers the deceased reached very near the accused. Therefore the accused took out the knife and stabbed him in his chest and started running. The injured person was also running behind him but he fell down near a school opposite the library. Both of them ran away in different streets. There is nothing in his cross examination which requires to be noted. 5. P.W.2, Mohammed Senaullah is one of the employees working in the restaurant. He supports P.W.1 and P.W.6 in material particulars. Deposing the incident he has stated that when the accused and Yadgiri (P.W.6) started running, the deceased, Taher, Jaffar, Baburao and Narsinga Rao ran behind the accused and Yadgiri. They brought the deceased back to the restaurant five minutes later with a stab wound in his chest. Those who brought the deceased to the restaurant told P.Ws. 1 and 2 that the accused had stabbed the deceased. 6. P.W.3 had been working in Khaja restaurant at the material time. He supports P.W.1 and P.W.6 in material particulars. Deposing to the incident he has stated that he himself, the deceased, Taher and Jaffar started chasing the accused. When they passed beyond super bazaar the deceased caught the accused near an electric pole. He and P.Ws. 4 and 5 were behind them. He supports P.W.1 and P.W.6 in material particulars. Deposing to the incident he has stated that he himself, the deceased, Taher and Jaffar started chasing the accused. When they passed beyond super bazaar the deceased caught the accused near an electric pole. He and P.Ws. 4 and 5 were behind them. The accused at that time took out a knife and stabbed the deceased in his chest. The deceased even after he had suffered the injury ran for about 15 paces and fell down. He was found bleeding. The accused ran away and the deceased was brought to the restaurant and taken to the hospital where he died. 7. Baburao, P.W.4, had also been working as a waiter in the Khaja restaurant at the material time. He was one of the persons who chased the accused. He supports P.W.3 in all material particulars. In his cross-examination he has particularly stated that the deceased has been crying ‘PAKADO’ until he fell down. The deceased first fell with his face down and then turned his face up. This witness and other employees of the restaurant who accompanied the deceased were behind him. All of them had seen the accused stabbing the deceased. Even after the deceased was stabbed he had cried ‘PAKADO’. When the accused stabbed the deceased, the deceased caught the accused from behind. The deceased caught the shoulders of the accused. The accused thereupon pulled out a knife from his back and then stabbed the deceased from the vertical direction downwards holding it in his fist. 8. Mohammad Jaffar P.W.5 had been working as a cleaner in the restaurant. He was One of the persons who had chased the accused and P.W.6. He supports P.Ws. 1 to 4 in material particulars. In his cross-examination he has expressly stated that when the accused struck his head against the head of P.W.2, they did not catch him because they were not asked to do so by their master. If they were ordered to do so by their master, they would have done it then and there. It was under the orders of their master that they had chased the accused. Their master asked them only to catch the accused. They did not catch P.W.6. They were running after the accused. The deceased was well-built. If they were ordered to do so by their master, they would have done it then and there. It was under the orders of their master that they had chased the accused. Their master asked them only to catch the accused. They did not catch P.W.6. They were running after the accused. The deceased was well-built. The accused stabbed the deceased, released himself from the grip and then ran away They did not chase the accused with knives, rods or any other implements. 9. The evidence of these six witnesses whom the prosecution has examined and whose evidence suffers from no infirmity establishes the following facts beyond any shadow of doubt. The accused and Yadgiri (P.W.6) had consumed a cup of tea and snacks and Khaja restaurant without paying the bill fully. When P.W.1 demanded the payment of the bill, the accused assaulted P.W.1 by giving him two slaps on his face and by striking his head against the head of P.W.2, Sanaullah. When P.W.1 tried to telephone to the police to inform them of the misbehaviour of the accused, he and Yadgiri started running away. P.W.1 asked P.Ws. 3, 4, 5 and the deceased to run after the accused and catch him to bring him back to the restaurant. None of those who ran after the accused had any arms or weapons with them. In the process of running the deceased was ahead of his other companions and caught the accused from behind. The accused thereupon took out a knife and thrust it in the chest of the deceased as a result of which the deceased within a few moments died. After having suffered the knife blow at the hands of the accused, the deceased ran for a few minutes after the accused, fell down on the ground and collapsed. He was removed to hospital within moments and was pronounced dead. 10. The accused in his plea recorded under section 313, Criminal Procedure Code, has admitted all the material facts which happened prior to his having stabbed the deceased except that he slapped P.W.1 and struck his head against the head of P.W.2. He has stated that when he started running away he was chased by the employees of the restaurant with sticks and knives. He has also denied having stabbed the deceased. He has stated that he did not know how the deceased received the stab injury. He has stated that when he started running away he was chased by the employees of the restaurant with sticks and knives. He has also denied having stabbed the deceased. He has stated that he did not know how the deceased received the stab injury. His statement that those who chased him did so with sticks and knives cannot be accepted because there is nothing in the prosecution evidence even to remotely suggest that those who chased him had sticks, knives or anything else with them. So far as stabbing is concerned, the evidence of P.Ws. 3, 4, 5 and 6 is clear beyond doubt and satisfactorily shows that he stabbed the deceased as a result of which the deceased died. That those who were chasing him had sticks and knives is also rendered highly improbable by the fact that if they or any of them had sticks and knives, the accused would not have escaped unhurt after having stabbed the deceased. 11. Dr.B. Narasimha Reddy, P.W.7 examined the dead body of the deceased and found the following external injury: "A stab injury of 1. 7 cm. x 5 cm. spindle shape obliquely placed on the left-side of the chest in front 10. 5 cm. from the midline. Inner angle is 3 cm. below and outer angle of the wound 2. 5. cm. below the left nipple in the 4th inter-costal space. Gaping present and fat protruding and blood oozing out of the wound. Margins of the wound clear cut. Angles of the wound sharp." On dissection, the following internal injuries were discovered: "The intercostal muscles and pluera in the 4th space cut 1.5. cm. x5. cm. below the 4th rib. Left plural cavity contained 980 cc. of fluid and clot of blood. Lower lobe of the left lung at the anterior margin shows stab injury of 1.3. cm. x 5. cm. x 1 cm. The second internal injury which he found was as follows: "An oblique cut in the pericardium at the left outer aspect 2.5 cm. x 1 cm. margin and angle regularly cut". The third internal injury was as follows: "An incised injury of 6 cm. X 2 cm. in the left ventricle of the heart at the left border 2.5. c.m. above the apex of the heart. Complete thickness of the myocardium is cut. Direction of cut is below upwards. Pericardial cavity contained 20 cc. margin and angle regularly cut". The third internal injury was as follows: "An incised injury of 6 cm. X 2 cm. in the left ventricle of the heart at the left border 2.5. c.m. above the apex of the heart. Complete thickness of the myocardium is cut. Direction of cut is below upwards. Pericardial cavity contained 20 cc. of clotted blood. Direction of the wound left to right medially and upwards". In his opinion internal injury No. 3 was fatal and in ordinary course it would produce death. His evidence shows that the stab wound which the deceased suffered at the hands of the accused was given with a good deal of force which cut the vital tissues of the body. It also shows that it was not accidentally given but that it was deliberated one because the stab injury had moved from down to upwards in the heart region of the deceased. It clearly shows that not only the accused thrust the knife in the vital part of the body of the deceased but, after having done so, he moved it upward causing much greater damage to the living organs of the deceased and producing his death within moments. 12. Mr. Ayyapu Reddy who appears on behalf of the accused has argued that the stab wound which the deceased suffered was not intentionally inflicted by the accused upon the deceased. We are unable to uphold this argument of his on account of two reasons. It was a forceful blow which the accused gave to the deceased and which led to very serious damage to the physical system of the deceased. Secondly the movement of the knife after it was thrust in the body of the deceased from below upwards shows that the accused had moved the knife from below upwards causing much greater damage to the physical systems of the deceased. We have, no doubt in our mind, therefore, that the stab wound which the accused caused to the deceased in the vital part of his body was caused with the intention to kill him. The next argument which has been raised by Mr. Ayyapu Reddy is that the accused was running away to save his life and that therefore he had the right in private defence to cause the death of the deceased. The next argument which has been raised by Mr. Ayyapu Reddy is that the accused was running away to save his life and that therefore he had the right in private defence to cause the death of the deceased. He has relied in that behalf on clauses fifthly and sixthly of section 100 of the Indian Penal Code. Third part of section 99 provides that there is no right of private defence in cases in which there is time to have recourse to the protection of the public authorities and that the right of private defence in no case extends to infliction of more harm than it is necessary to inflict for the purpose of defence. Clause 5 of section 100 provides as follows: "The right of private defence of the body extends, under the restrictions mentioned in the last preceding section to the voluntary causing of death or of any other harm to assailant, if the offence which occasions the exercise of the right be of the descriptions hereinafter enumerated, namely: * * * * Fifthly-An assault with the intention of kidnapping or abducting." Clause secondly provides as follows;- "Such an assault as may reasonably cause the apprehension that grievous hurt will otherwise be the consequence of such assault." Section 101 provides that if the offence is not of any of the descriptions enumerated in the last preceding section, the right of private defence of the body does not extend to the voluntary causing of death of the assailant, but extends under the restrictions mentioned in section 99, to the voluntary causing to the assailant of any harm other than death. In light of the circumstances of the case which we have analysed, the first question which arises for our consideration is whether the accused had a right or private defence within the meaning of clause "fifthly" of section 100 or within the meaning of clause "secondly" of that section. Mr. Ayyapu Reddy has argued that what P.Ws. 3, 4, 5 and the deceased had been doing was to abduct the accused. Section 362 of Indian Penal Code defines ‘abduction’ in the following terms: "Whoever by force compels, or by any deceitful means induces, any person to go from any place, is said to abduct that person." Reading clause ‘fifthly’ of section 100 with section 362 the question which we are required to decide is whether P.Ws. Section 362 of Indian Penal Code defines ‘abduction’ in the following terms: "Whoever by force compels, or by any deceitful means induces, any person to go from any place, is said to abduct that person." Reading clause ‘fifthly’ of section 100 with section 362 the question which we are required to decide is whether P.Ws. 3, 4, 5 and the deceased were trying to compel by force the accused to go from one place to another. 13. In Vishwanath v. State of U.P.1, a similar question arose. After having examined different sections of the Indian Penal Code and reviewed a number of decisions the Supreme Court has laid down the following principle: "On a plain reading of clause fifthly of section 100, there does not seem to be any reason for holding that the word "abducting used in the clause means anything more than what is defined as ‘abduction’ in section 362". It has next been observed by the Supreme Court that before the extended right under section 100 arises there must be an offence of assault and that this assault must be of one of the six types mentioned in the six clauses of that section. While referring to the view of the Allahabad High Court on the right of private defence in Ram Saiya’s case2, it has been observed that each of the six clauses enumerated in section 100 indicates an offence against human body, namely, assault. Proceeding further the Supreme Court has observed that the 5th clause of section 100 contemplates only that kind of abduction in which force is used and that the assault is made with the intention of abducting. In such a case the right of private defence by reason of such an assault extends even upto the causing of the death. It has been further observed that it would not be right to expect from a person who is being abducted by force to pause and consider whether the abductor had intention as provided in one of the sections of the Penal Code before he takes steps to defend himself, even to the extent of causing death of the person abducting. It is clear therefore from this decision that in order to attract clause 5 of section 100 there must be an assault which is an offence against human body and that that assault should be with an intention of abducting. It is clear therefore from this decision that in order to attract clause 5 of section 100 there must be an assault which is an offence against human body and that that assault should be with an intention of abducting. In Ram Sewak v. Emperor1 , the appellant Ram Sewak was attacked by Kala Singh with lathis. Therefore the learned single Judge of the Allahabad High Court held that Ram Sewak who was attacked with lathies had a right to turn back in private defence and to kill him. In Daroga Lohar v. Emperor2the creditor asked his men to drag his debtor against his will. It was therefore held that it was an act abduction within the meaning of section 362 and gave the debtor the right of private of defence of his body even to the extent of causing death of these who dragged him. In Munney Khan v. State of Madhya Pradesh3, it has been held that the right of private defence is essentially a defensive right circumscribed by the statute and available only when the circumstances clearly justify it. It should not be allowed to be pleaded or availed of as a pretext for a vindictive, aggressive or retributive purpose. This right is available against an offence and therefore where an act is done in exercise of the right of private defence such an act cannot give rise to any right of private defence in favour of the aggressor in return. The facts of that case in light of which the Supreme Court has laid down the above principle were briefly stated, as follows: In Berkhedi village, the residents in accordance with their usual practice were celebrating Durga Utsav on 1st October, 1965 and in that connection they were staging a drama of Amar Singh at night. Reotisingh-the deceased-was one of the volunteers who was posted on duty in connection with the arrangements close to the sitting place reserved for ladies in order to check men from entering that area. At about 10-30 p.m. Munney Khan and his brother Zulfiquar went there and wanted to pass through the ladies’ corner but were prevented by Reotisingh from doing so. Reotisingh asked them to go through another lane. It was longer route. Munney Khan was annoyed and therefore pushed Reotisingh’ and insisted on passing through the ladies1 corner. There was a short scuffle which subsided when other persons intervened. Reotisingh asked them to go through another lane. It was longer route. Munney Khan was annoyed and therefore pushed Reotisingh’ and insisted on passing through the ladies1 corner. There was a short scuffle which subsided when other persons intervened. Sometime thereafter Reotisingh went to his house to take his meals and he was replaced by Pooranlal. When Reotisingh was returning from home after taking his meals, he met Munney Khan and his brother Zulfiquar and a quarrel started between them. The learned Sessions Judge found on evidence that it was Reotisingh who had picked up quarrel with Zulfiquar first. He overpowered Zulfiquar, threw him on ground, sat on his chest and started giving fist blows. Therefore Munney Khan having seen that his brother was being overpowered and beaten, rushed to his rescue and tried to save him by giving fist blow? to Reotisingh. When he did not succeed in that attempt of his, he took out his knife and stabbed Reotisingh in the back. In the meantime other persons arrived and Munney Khan and Zulfiquar ran away. Supreme Court held on these facts that since Reotisingh had picked up the quarrel with Zulfiquar, had overpowered him, was sitting on his chest, was giving him first blows and could not be prevented from doing so by Munney Khan by mere use of his first he was the aggressor and was causing hurt to Zulfiquar. Therefore, according to the Supreme Court, Munney Khan had a right of private defence of the body of Zulfiquar. However, it was held that while stabbing Reotisingh he exceeded the right of private defence. He was therefore convicted by Supreme Court of an offence punishable under section 304, Part I of the Indian Penal Code. In Dominic v. State of Kerala4, the Supreme Court has laid down that the right of private defence rests on three ideas: firstly, there must be no more harm inflicted than is necessary for the purpose of defence, secondly, there must be reasonable apprehension of danger to the body, and thirdly, the right does not commence until there is reasonable apprehension. The Supreme Court has further observed that it is entirely a question of fact in the circumstances of a case as to whether there has been excess of private defence within the meaning of the 4th clause of section 99 of the Indian Penal Code, which provides that no more harm shall be inflicted than is necessary for the purpose of defence. It has also been observed by the Supreme Court that no one can be expected to find any pattern of conduct to meet a particular case. The circumstances must show that there was apprehension to life or property or of grievous hurt. If it is found that there was apprehension to life or property or of grievous hurt, the right of private defence is in operation. The person exercising the right of private defence is entitled to overcome the threat. 14. In light of the principles laid down in the decisions referred to above, we have to consider whether P.Ws.1 and 2 and the deceased would have caused any apprehension of grievous hurt in the mind of the accused to his body. It has been argued by Mr. Ayyapu Reddy, that the accused was chased when he was running away to save his life. The facts of the case do not warrant that conclusion. The facts found by us show that the accused did not pay the bill which he was bound to pay for having consumed a cup of tea and snacks. Not only he failed to pay the bill but adopted overpowering and threatening posture by assaulting P.Ws.1 and 2. He gave two slaps on the face of P.W.1 the keeper of the restaurant and struck his head against the head of P.W.2. P.Ws.1 and 2 and other employees could have assaulted the accused then and there if they wanted to do so. On the contrary at the instance of P.W.2, P.W.1 had telephoned to the police and summoned the police help. When the accused knew that P.W.1 had summoned the police he started running away. P.Ws.3, 4, 5 and the deceased did not have any arms, weapons, implements or instruments. This evidence clearly shows that they bad been chasing the accused with a dual purpose of recovering the bill which was due from him and for surrendering him to the police to whom P.W.1 had telephoned for having assaulted P.Ws.1 and 2. P.Ws.3, 4, 5 and the deceased did not have any arms, weapons, implements or instruments. This evidence clearly shows that they bad been chasing the accused with a dual purpose of recovering the bill which was due from him and for surrendering him to the police to whom P.W.1 had telephoned for having assaulted P.Ws.1 and 2. We are therefore of the opinion that in the instant case P.Ws.3, 4, 5 and the deceased did not go to use force to abduct the accused nor did they have any intention of committing any assault on him. If the intention of P.Ws.3, 4, 5 and the deceased was to commit assault on the deceased to use force against him and to abduct him, they could have certainly armed themselves with some instruments or weapons. Therefore there was no reason for the accused who had committed default in payment of moneys and had assaulted P.Ws.1 and 2 to entertain an apprehension that P.Ws.3, 4, 5 and the deceased were chasing him to assault or, abduct him. In these circumstances the accused could not have used this knife to kill the deceased. It is difficult to imagine that a person who commits default in payment of bill which he is required to pay on the spot and assaults one who demands the payment of bill can run away and then if any attempt is made to bring him back he can turn round and say that since an attempt was made to abduct him he had the right to take the life of one who was trying to catch him or hold him even if such a person had made no attempt to assault him whatsoever. In our opinion in a situation like this if an attempt is made by one to catch another either for recovering his dues which he is required to pay on the spot or for surrendering him to the police for having assaulted another, it does not constitute an act of assault and therefore does not fall within the definition of ‘abduction’ given in section 362 of the Indian Penal Code. To accept the argument of Mr. Ayyapu Reddy, is to permit the defaulters and marauders to be at large after having committed their misdeeds. If A slaps B, the act of slapping by A is over. To accept the argument of Mr. Ayyapu Reddy, is to permit the defaulters and marauders to be at large after having committed their misdeeds. If A slaps B, the act of slapping by A is over. If B tries to catch A because he slapped him, can we say that since the act of slapping by A was over it would amount to abduction? We do not think we can take any such view. The situation can also be illustrated thus. If a thief commits a theft in a shop or in a house and after having done so tries to run away, has the owner of the house or the shop a right to catch him or not? If we accede to the argument of Mr. Ayyapu Reddy it would mean that the thief would be at large and if the owner catches him the owner would be committing an offence of abduction and thief in exercise of his right of private defence would have a right to cause his death. Therefore to take any such view is to upset the balance of social order, to expose the society to danger and to leave it to the mercy of the marauders. We are therefore of the opinion that. P.Ws.3, 4, 5, and. the deceased made no assault on the accused nor did they have any intention to do so. It may be noted in this context that the prosecution evidence clearly shows that P.W. 1 had directed P.W. 3, 4, 5 and the deceased only to catch the accused and to do nothing more and that he had done so after informing the police of the assault which the accused had made on P.Ws.1 and 2. The only intention therefore which P.W. 1 and his employees had, was to catch the accused with the object of surrendering him to the police in connection with the assault which the accused had made on P.Ws.1 and 2. To prevent or to make an attempt to prevent a wrong-doer or offender from escaping scot free and to catch him with the object of dealing with him in accordance with law or preventing him from enjoying the fruits of his misdeed docs not, in our opinion, amount to assault or abduction. 15. It has next been argued by Mr. Ayyapu Reddy, that within the meaning of second clause of section. 15. It has next been argued by Mr. Ayyapu Reddy, that within the meaning of second clause of section. 100 the accused had reasonable apprehension that grievous hurt would be caused to him by those who were chasing him. This argument which he has raised is much weaker. In the first instance there was no assault by P.Ws.3, 4, 5 and the deceased. Secondly the accused knew that he was armed with a knife. He also knew that P.Ws.3, 4, 5 and the deceased were chasing him at the instance of P.W.I without anything in their arms. Since he was possessed of a knife of which he had the knowledge and since his chasers did not have anything in their hands, he could not have developed any reasonable apprehension of grievous hurt to his body. Therefore second clause of section. 100 is not attracted to the instant case. 16. The learned trial Judge was therefore unduly impressed by the argument that merely because P.Ws.3, 4, 5 and the deceased had been chasing the accused, the accused had a right of private defence within the .meaning of clause 5 of section 100. The last argument which Mr. Ayyapu Reddy, has raised is that the view which the learned trial Judge has taken is not so unreasonable that we should interfere with the order of acquittal recorded by him in favour of the accused. On a proper scrutiny of the facts, we are of the opinion that the view which the learned trial Judge had taken is perverse and requires to be set right. In light of the reasons which we have given the question whether the accused exceeded his right el private defence does not arise. 17. In the result we allow the appeal, set aside the order of acquittal recorded by the learned trial Judge and convict the accused of having committed an offence punishable under section 302, Indian Penal Code, and sentence him to under go imprisonment for life.