Judgment Madan Mohan Prasad, J. 1. This application in revision is directed against an order passed by the Subordinate Judge, Madhubani refusing leave to sue in forma pauperis. 2. It appears that the petitioner filed an application under Order XXXIII, rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code (hereinafter referred as "the Code") for permission to file a suit in forma pauperis, the suit being one for declaration of title and confirmation of possession and in the alternative for recovery of possession of the lands as per detail given in Schedule no.1 to the plaint. 3. The case of the petitioner in the plaint briefly stated, is that her father left behind him properties of which she came in possession in the year 1974 after the death of her widow mother, who was in possession prior to her, her three brothers having been dead. The widow of one of her brothers was, however, allowed by her to be maintained and to manage the cultivation of lands and participate in the enjoyment of the usufruct along with the plaintiff-petitioner. The defendants appear to be purchasers from the said brothers wife by sale-deeds and deed of gift which are alleged by the plaintiff to bo fraudulent, collusive and inoperative. Since, however, there were interference by the defendants the present suit was filed. 4. In support of her petition for leave to sue in form pauparies it was alleged that she had no property other than those mentioned in Schedule 1 to the plaint ; valued at Rs.500/- and, thus, it was said that she had no sufficient means to pay the court-fee of Rs.2233 /- and odd liable to be paid on this case. 5. The defendants who contested the matter said that she had many other properties which she had concealed. Firstly, it was said that her husband and sons had properties ; next that she was a member of the joint family consisting of her husband and her four sons which had sufficient properties and in which she had 1/6th share, which she had got on partition in the family. Besides these, it was said that she had ornaments and gold. 6. That learned Subordinate Judge docs not seem to have accepted the evidence of the defendants-opposite party with regard to possession of the aforesaid properties. He, however, went upon the statement of the petitioner in the plaint itself. Besides these, it was said that she had ornaments and gold. 6. That learned Subordinate Judge docs not seem to have accepted the evidence of the defendants-opposite party with regard to possession of the aforesaid properties. He, however, went upon the statement of the petitioner in the plaint itself. According to him the petitioner admitted that she was in possession of the suit lands having an area of 7 bighas and odd since 1949 and that she was enjoying the produce thereof and this fact alone was sufficient to show that she was in possession of sufficient means to pay the court-fee. For this reason alone the prayer of the petitioner was refused, hence this application. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that in view of explanation to rule 1 of Order XXXIII of the Code, the court could not take into consideration, for the purpose of the aforesaid finding, the subject-matter of the suit. Rule 1 of Order XXXIII is as follows : - "subject to the following provisions, any suit may be instituted by a pauper. "explanation - A person is a "pauper" when he is not possessed of sufficient means to enable him to pay the fee prescribed by law for the plaint in such suit, or where no such fee is prescribed, when he is not entitled to property worth one hundred rupees other than his necessary wearing-apparel and the subject matter of the suit". It is obvious that first part of the rule deals with the cases where the fee is prescribed by law and the second part deals with the cases where no such fee is prescribed. With regard to the first part of rule, therefore, the court is concerned with the question whether a petitioner is possessed of sufficient means to enable him to pay the fee. With regard to the second part the court is concerned with the question as to whether a petitioner is entitled to property worth rupees one hundred. While so considering the question, the court is bound to exclude from its consideration the value of the necessary wearing-apparel and the subject-matter of the suit. The two portions of the explanation have, therefore, to be read disjunctively. 8 The question, thus, arises as to what is the meaning of the term "sufficient means". A person may have sufficient means if he has sufficient property which fetches sufficient income. The two portions of the explanation have, therefore, to be read disjunctively. 8 The question, thus, arises as to what is the meaning of the term "sufficient means". A person may have sufficient means if he has sufficient property which fetches sufficient income. A person may have sufficient means without having any immovable property, but having a big bank account. A person may have no sufficient means even though he may have plenty of property if they do not yield any income and they have no market value or upon which no money can be raised. The question, thus, is for the court to decide as to whether the evidence shows sufficient means or its absence. It would obviously follow from what I have said that mere possession of property does not lead to the logical conclusion that the person having the same has sufficient means. 9. It follows next, that the court is not merely to decide as to whether a person is possessed of the property, even after that it has to go beyond that to decide whether the property fetches any income, or has a value, or has a capacity of fetching by way of loan or price which would show that the petitioner should be held to have sufficient means to pay the court-fee. In this connection I may refer to a Bench decision of this Court in Dhananjai Prasad Singh V/s. Raj eshwar singh and others (AIR 1947 Pat 34 ). This case was relied upon in a subsequent bench decision of this Court in Mt. Bibi Khudai Jatul Kubra V/s. Mt. Bhagalan and others, (AIR 1950 Pat.364 ). In these cases it was held that what the courts had to see was not whether petitioner was possessed of properties, but whether he was possessed of sufficient means to pay. A mere reading of the rule is enough and no authority is needed in support of the proposition. I, however, venture to say, as I have done, that the question of possession of property is not an irrelevant fact rather it is relevant for the purpose of finding out whether the possession of the property taken with other circumstances relating to its value, income or capacity to raise money. 10. I, however, venture to say, as I have done, that the question of possession of property is not an irrelevant fact rather it is relevant for the purpose of finding out whether the possession of the property taken with other circumstances relating to its value, income or capacity to raise money. 10. The point urged was, as stated earlier, that the subject-matter of the suit could not be taken into consideration in view of the wordings of Rule 1. There does not appear to be any prohibition against the taking into consideration of the properties in suit itself for the purpose of showing sufficient means. It is difficult in such circumstances upon the wordings of Rule itself to hold that the court is debarred from taking into consideration the property which is the subject-matter of the suit. It is so only in regard to second part of the rule and not with regard to first part of the rule and it has been held so in the case of dhananjai Prasad Singh (supra ). 11. In the light of the discussion aforesaid it is obvious that what the court has to decide is whether the petitioner has sufficient means to pay and that decision must be arrived at after consideration of the income or value of the properties in suit, provided the court comes to the conclusion that the suit properties, if in possession of the petitioner, could have fetched an income or that money could have been raised thereon. 12. Coming now the facts of the present case, all that the learned subordinate Judge has done is to say that upon her own statement the petitioner claimed to be in possession of the suit properties since 1949 and to enjoy its usufruct and she must be deemed on that account alone to be possessed of sufficient means. The learned subordinate Judge has committed an error of law. Assuming that the statement of the petitioner in that respect in her plaint is correct, the question still remained to be answered whether the income of the aforesaid properties was sufficient to enable her to pay the court fee. The further question which in the alternative, would remain to be answered is whether the petitioner could have raised alone on the basis of the suit properties. The further question which in the alternative, would remain to be answered is whether the petitioner could have raised alone on the basis of the suit properties. While considering the statement of the petitioner, as I have indicated earlier, it would be necessary to bear in mind the case raised by the defendants. The defendant are not likely in the present case, to admit that the plaintiff-petitioner was in possession over the suit properties since, 1949 or that they have no title thereto by their purchase. All these considerations ought to have been kept in view before coming to the conclusion as to whether the petitioner was possessed of sufficient means to pay. The court below has not done it and, thus, refused to exercise jurisdiction and further in approaching the case from a wrong point of view acted, with material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction. 13. In the result, the order passed by the learned Subordinate Judge is set aside and the application is allowed. He will now come to a decision in accordance with law and in the light of observations mentioned above. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. Application allowed.