JUDGMENT N.D. Ojha, J. The petitioner, Life Insurance Corporation of India, is the owner of house No. 31, situate in premises No. 161116, Civil Lines, Kanpur. It was in the tenancy of one Shri S.N. Roy who in the month of June, 1970, expressed his intention to vacate the house in question. The petitioner made an application on June 11, 1970, to the District Magistrate inter alia saying that most of its officers are in need of residential accommodation and as such it is requested that the above accommodation may be released in favour of the Life Insurance Corporation of India for allotment on lease and licence basis to one of its officers. It was also stated in the said application that its officers hold transferable posts on all India basis and on such transfers to Kanpur they find it difficult to get residential accommodation and some of them have in fact not been able to bring their families on this account. At the moment the house was to be given to Sri S.P Pande, Assistant Secretary. The accommodation was actually vacated by Shri S.N. Roy but instead of releasing it in favour of "the petitioner the Rent Control and Eviction Officer in exercise of the powers delegated to him by the District Magistrate allotted it to Shri Beni Singh (since deceased), respondent No. 4. on June 15, 1970. This order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was challenged by the petitioner by instituting a writ petition in this Court. During the pendency of that writ petition an intimation was received by the petitioner from the Rent Control and Eviction Officer requiring it to appear before him in connection with the aforesaid release application. Shri Beni Singh aforesaid wrote a letter to the District Magistrate on October 12, 1970, a copy of which has been attached as Annexure 9 to the writ petition. By this letter a request was made by him that in place of house No. 31, which had been allotted to him on June 15, 1970, house No. 47, of which he was an earlier allottee, may be reallotted to him. On this application the Additional District Magistrate, City passed an order on October 14, 1970. It was addressed to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer saying that the allotment of premises No. 31/16/116 in. On this application the Additional District Magistrate, City passed an order on October 14, 1970. It was addressed to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer saying that the allotment of premises No. 31/16/116 in. favour of Beni Singh may be cancelled and premises No. 47/16/116 may be allotted to him, and premises No. 31 may be allotted to Shri Raghunath Singh, respondent No. 3. The petitioner appeared before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer in connection with the release application made by it in pursuance of the aforesaid intimation and pressed its claim in regard to the release of the house in question. An affidavit sworn on November 10, 1970, by S.P. Pande, Assistant Secretary in the Life Insurance Corporation of India, was filed before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer in which it was stated that after making of the application dated June 11, 1970, he had been provided with an accommodation by the Life Insurance Corporation. It was, however, asserted that the need of the Life Insurance Corporation of India for the house in question was still there inasmuch as 42 of its employees) were still waiting for allotment of accommodations to them and all of them hailes from districts outside Kanpur. The names with designations of these 42 employees were given in an Annexure to the said affidavit. The application for release was, however, dismissed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on November 16, 1970. A perusal of his order indicates that he was very much impressed by the fact that Shri S.P. Pande, to whom the accommodation in question was intended to be given, had already been provided with another accommodation. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer, however, did not go into the question as to whether the petitioner's need for providing accommodation to its 42 employees whose names and designations were given in the annexure to the affidavit referred to above was bona fide or not. He yet made a superficial observation based on the evidence that the plea in this behalf had been taken to defeat the allotment of the accommodation and accordingly the need of the petitioner did not appear to be genuine and bona fide. He yet made a superficial observation based on the evidence that the plea in this behalf had been taken to defeat the allotment of the accommodation and accordingly the need of the petitioner did not appear to be genuine and bona fide. Indeed in recording this finding he did not really apply his mind at all to the facts stated in the affidavit that 42 employees of the petitioner who had been transferred to Kanpur from outside were waiting for allotment of residential accommodation to them. In view of the nature of its need setup by the petitioner these were fact that the officer who was intended to be given the house in question had in the meantime been provided with another accommodation was hardly relevant when there were other employees who were without any accommodation and were waiting for some accommodation to be given to them. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer on the same date, viz., on November 16. 1970, allotted the accommodation to respondent No. 3, Raghunath Singh. At this place it may be recapitulated that the order of allotment was passed in favour of the same person in respect of whom Additional District Magistrate (City) had already passed an order on October 14, 1970 whereby he had written to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer that the house in question may be allotted to him. It is thus apparent that it had virtually been decided earlier on October 14, 1970, itself that the house in question was to be allotted to respondent No. 3 and the actual order was passed on November 16, 1970, for the sake of compliance of the formal requirement of considering the application for release made by the petitioner on June 11, 1970. Against the order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer dismissing its application dated June 11, 1970, which was an application under Rule 6 of the Rules framed under the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1917, the petitioner made a representation to the State Government under Section 7F of the Act. Against the order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer dismissing its application dated June 11, 1970, which was an application under Rule 6 of the Rules framed under the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1917, the petitioner made a representation to the State Government under Section 7F of the Act. This representation was dismissed by the State Government by its order dated February 18, 19, 1972, which was communicated to the petitioner along with a letter dated February 21, 1972, a true copy whereof has been attached as Annexure 21 to the writ petition Aggrieved the Life Insurance Corporation of India has instituted the present writ petition with the prayer that the aforesaid orders passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and the State Government may be quashed. Having heard counsel for the parties we are of opinion that neither the Rent Control and Eviction Officer nor the State Government has considered the application dated June 11, 1970, made by the petitioner for the release of the accommodation in accordance with law. The error in the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer has already been pointed out above. A perusal of the order of the State Government also makes it clear that it was mainly influenced by the fact that S.P. Pande had already been provided with another accommodation. In so far as the need of the petitioner to accommodate its other employees is concerned the State Government took the view that it did not appear to be obligatory on the part of the petitioner to make provision for its different employees for residential accommodation. The State Government seems to have taken the view that the ground on which the house in question was sought to be released in favour of the petitioner did not fall within the purview of Rule 6 of the Rules referred to above and this is the main argument which has been addressed by counsel for respondent No. 3 before us. According to counsel for respondent No. 3 an accommodation could be released in favour of the landlord under Rule 6 only when it was required for its personal occupation. A distinction was sought to be drawn between 'occupation' and 'possession' and emphasis was laid on the words 'own' and 'personal' used in Rule 6. According to counsel for respondent No. 3 an accommodation could be released in favour of the landlord under Rule 6 only when it was required for its personal occupation. A distinction was sought to be drawn between 'occupation' and 'possession' and emphasis was laid on the words 'own' and 'personal' used in Rule 6. In our opinion the words 'his own personal occupation' used in Rule 6 have to be construed with reference to the facts of each case. In the instant case we are concerned not with an individual landlord but with Life Insurance Corporation of India which is a bodycorporate having been incorporated under the Life Insurance Corporation, 1958. The words 'own' and 'personal' occupation have to be construed in that light. In B. M. Lal v. Dunlop Rubber Co. A.I.R 1968 S.C. 175 suits had been instituted by the Dunlop Rubber Co. for recovery of possession of certain Eccommodation on the ground that the company reasonably required the flats for the occupation of its staff. The tenants against whom the suits had been instituted were not liable to be evicted except on one or more grounds mentioned in Section 13 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. Clause (f) of Section 13(1) of the Act was to the following effect: "Where the premises are reasonably required by the landlord either for purposes of building or rebuilding or for making the rate substantial additions or alterations or for his own occupation if he is the owner or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the premises are held." The Dunlop Rubber Co. claimed that they reasonably required the flats for their own occupation within the meaning of Clause (f) of Section 18(1). The trial court dismissed the suits but on appeal the High Court of Calcutta set aside the decrees passed by the trial court and decreed the suits. The decrees passed by the High Court were affirmed by the Supreme Court. It would thus be seen that the requirement of the accommodation in question in those suits by the Dunlop Rubber Co. for occupation of their staff was accepted to be a requirement of the Dunlop Rubber Co. the accommodation for their own occupation. A similar question came up for consideration before this Court in Life Inswrance Corporation of India v. Second Addl. District Judge, Kanpur 1976 A.L.J. 78. for occupation of their staff was accepted to be a requirement of the Dunlop Rubber Co. the accommodation for their own occupation. A similar question came up for consideration before this Court in Life Inswrance Corporation of India v. Second Addl. District Judge, Kanpur 1976 A.L.J. 78. The provisions of law which came up for consideration in that case was subsection (2) of Section 16 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 which contemplates release of an accommodation on the application of its landlord inter alia on the ground that the landlord needed it for occupation by himself or any member of his family or for any person for whose benefit it is held by him. It was held that the Life Insurance Corporation is entitled to file an application for release of the premises on the ground that the same is needed for the occupation of its employees. The need of the Life Insurance Corporation of the accommodation for the occupation of its employees was thus considered to be a reed of the landlord for occupation by himself within the meaning of Section 16(2). In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Lajpat Pai Bnatia 1976 U.P, Rent Control Cases, 329 also the words 'by the landlord for occupation by himself used in Section 16 (2) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, came up for consideration and it was held that if the Life Insurance Corporation required the flats for occupation by one of its employees, if would be a requirement by the landlord for himself within the meaning of Section 16(2). In our opinion the words 'his own personal occupation' used in Rule 6 of the Rules framed under the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. 1947 have the same connotation as the words 'for occupation by himself used in Section 16(2) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act. 1972. In this view of the matter we are of opinion that the need of the petitioner to accommodate its employees would be the need of the landlord within the meaning of Rule 6 of the Rules aforesaid. 1972. In this view of the matter we are of opinion that the need of the petitioner to accommodate its employees would be the need of the landlord within the meaning of Rule 6 of the Rules aforesaid. It was urged by counsel for respondent No. 3 that there was a distinction between a 'lessee' and a 'licenses' of an accommodation and it was only in the case of a licensee of an employer who is the landlord that it can be said that the need of the employee would be the need of the landlord. In the instant case we find it unnecessary to go into details of this question inasmuch as even accepting the argument of the counsel for the petitioner it appears that on the of the instant case the employees who are accommodated by the Life Insurance Corporation in the accommodationsowned by it are allowed to do so as its licensees. Such an averment has been made in paragraph 43 of the writ petition. Indeed the prof or ma of the agreement which is entered into between the petitioner and its employees at the time when they are permitted to occupy an accommodation is filed as an annexure to the writ petition. Its perusal indicates that the status of such employees is only that of licensees. There are clear stepulations in the said agreement in pursuance of which the employee has no right to continue to occupy the accommodation in question after he is transferred or his services stand terminated. The nature of the occupation has specifically been stated as by way of leave and licence. The amount of money which is to be paid by the employee in lieu of his occupation has been described in the agreement as monthly licence fee. There are other stipulations in the proforma agreement which clearly indicature that the nature of the occupation of an accommodation by the employee is only that of a licensee. Since as pointed out above neither the Rent Control and Eviction Officer nor the State Government has considered the need of the petitioner in its proper perspective their orders cannot be sustained. In our opinion, however, it will not be expedient to quash the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. Indeed it will result in unnecessarily delaying the matter. In our opinion, however, it will not be expedient to quash the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. Indeed it will result in unnecessarily delaying the matter. The interests of justice will be served if the order of the State Government is quashed and the State Government is directed to decide the application of the petitioner under Section 7F of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act afresh in accordance with law. In the result we allow the writ petition and quash the order of the State Government dated February 18/19, 1972, and direct it to decide the application made by the petitioner under Section 7F aforesaid afresh in accordance with Jaw keeping in mind the observations made above The parties will, however, bear their own costs.