Judgment.-This second appeal raises a point about limitation in regard to a suit for goods sold and delivered. The suit was filed in the District Munsif’s Court, Pondicherry. It was dismissed as time-barred under the Limitation Act, 1963 (Central Act XXXVI of 1963) . The District Court, on appeal, took the same view. Before the District Court the plaintiff contended that the question of limitation in relation to his suit was governed not by Central Act, XXXVI of 1963, but by the French Civil Code. It was further contended that the suit was within time under that Code. But these contentions were rejected. 2. The question in this second appeal is: which is the appropriate limitation law applicable to this suit? Central Act XXXVI of 1963 or the French Civil Code? 3. A few further facts may be mentioned. The plaintiff is a maligai merchant in Pondicherry. He based his suit claim against the defendant on a sale bill dated 24th January, 1967 in respect of goods sold by him on credit to the defendants. The suit was filed on 23rd June, 1971. The plaintiff pleaded that the suit was within time. He relied on an esdorsement of part-payment dated 25th June, 1968 stated to be in the defendant’s handwriting. The defendant resisted the suit, pleading that it was time-barred. He denied the alleged endorsement of 25th June, 1968. The Principal District Munsif, Pondicherry, who tried the suit, upheld the defendant’s plea in bar and dismissed the suit. His findings as to the bar of limitation were confirmed in appeal by the learned Principal District Judge, Pondicherry. Before him, for the first time, the plaintiff put forward the submission that the question of limitation must be considered under the French Civil Cede and not under Central Act XXXVI of 1963. This contention was also rejected. The learned District Judge held that the French Civil Code stood repealed by Central Act XXXVI of 1963 and the Code could not be invoked in respect of suits, like the present one, filed subsequent to 1st January, 1964. The correctness of this decision is now challenged in this second appeal. 4. Mr. Masilamani, appearing for the plaintiff, submitted that the provisions of the French Civil Code relating to limitation of actions are still in force in the territory of Pondicherry and they govern the present suit. The correctness of this decision is now challenged in this second appeal. 4. Mr. Masilamani, appearing for the plaintiff, submitted that the provisions of the French Civil Code relating to limitation of actions are still in force in the territory of Pondicherry and they govern the present suit. He said that the Limitation Act, 1963 did not repeal the limitation provisions contained in the French Civil Code. According to him, the only law repealed by that Act was the earlier Indian Limitation Act, 1908, and he referred, in that connection, to section 32. He further submitted that far from repealing the limitation provisions enacted in the French Civil Code, Parliament actually saved those provisions. He relied for this argument on section 29 (2) of Central Act, 1963. 5. Mr. R. S. Venkatachari for the defendant contended that section 29 (2) cannot be invoked to save the articles of limitation laid down in the French Civil Code. He pointed out that the French law stood impliedly repealed the moment Central Act XXXVI of 1963 came into force, which was on 1st January, 1964. He said that the Parliamentary enactment extended to the whole of India. He said that, by that time, Pondicherry had already become part of India even on 16th August, 1962 under the Constitution Fourteenth Amendment. On this basis, he contended that for suits filed in Pondicherry after 1st January, 1964 the appropriate law in force relating to limitation would be the Limitation Act, 1963 and not the French Civil Code. 6. The Limitation Act, 1963, as its preamble indicates, was enacted to consolidate and amend the law in this country relating to limitation of suits. Under section 1 (2), the Act extended to the whole of India. It seems to me, however, that from this provision alone I should not proceed to conclude that the provisions of the Act are intended to apply without any savings or exceptions whatever. Section 1 (2), itself, for instance, expressly excludes Jammu and Kashmir from the ambit of the Act. Section 29 (2) relied on by the plaintiff in this case affords another instance of a saving provision. So, Mr. Section 1 (2), itself, for instance, expressly excludes Jammu and Kashmir from the ambit of the Act. Section 29 (2) relied on by the plaintiff in this case affords another instance of a saving provision. So, Mr. Venkatachari’s contention cannot be accepted in the way he asks me to do, by rivetting my attention to section 1 (2), which, lays down, in a preliminary, fashion, the extent of the Act, without examining also the scope of the provisions enacted in section 29 (2) of the Act. 7. Section 29 (2), so far as is relevant to the present discussion is in the following terms: “Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the schedule.......” The words of this section leave no doubt in my mind that Parliament intended to save the operation of special laws and local laws relating to limitation. The marginal note to the section summarises the provision in one word, “Savings”. But the section does not stop with merely saving these local and special laws. The text of the section goes much farther. The words indicate that the local or special law concerned shall clearly prevail over the articles in the schedule. This overriding effect is given to the special and local laws by a familiar drafting device, namely, to treat the periods of limitation peculiar to the local and special laws “as if” they had been prescribed in the schedule to this Act. Nor is this all. The Act goes still further. It gathers unto its fold, and incorporates into its own statutory structure, the special and local laws referred to therein. This is done by expressly enacting that “section 3 of the Act shall apply” to those special provisions. The sum-total of the consequences of section 29 (2), if I may so put it, is to preserve unity in diversity in our laws of limitation. The Act is no doubt an all-India enactment and purports to consolidate the law relating to limitation. But as I understand the statutory scheme, we now have as many schedules as there are local and special laws, in addition to the schedule appended to the Act. 8. The reason behind this scheme is not far to seek. The Act is no doubt an all-India enactment and purports to consolidate the law relating to limitation. But as I understand the statutory scheme, we now have as many schedules as there are local and special laws, in addition to the schedule appended to the Act. 8. The reason behind this scheme is not far to seek. Whey Parliament passedthe Limitation Act in 1963, it obviously did not intend, by a stroke of its pen to abolish local and special laws relating to limitation. Jammu and Kashmir was an obvious exception. There were also other territories in the Union which for long had been having peculiar provisions for limitation. These were vestiges of distinct local history, as in the former Portugese possessions and French establishments in India. For some reason valid in its own eyes, the legislature wished to allow the suitors in those areas to continue to have the laws of limitation to which they were long accustomed. This must be the rationale behind the saving provision in section 29 (2). I cannot explain its presence otherwise in a consolidating enactment with an all India bias. 9. If so much is granted, namely, that local and special laws are not only preserved under the Limitation Act, 1963,but even murtured, if not pampered under its provision, then the only further question for consideration in the present case would be whether the articles of limitation contained in the French Civil Code can be brought within their comprehension. Mr. Venkatachari said they cannot be. He said that the French Civil Code is neither a special law nor even a local law within the meaning of section 29 (2) of the Act. 10. The Act does not define what a special law is and what a local law is for the purposes of the section. Mr. Masilamani referred to a decision of S. Maharajan, J., in Goodman and Company v. Thirunavukkarasu1and said that the learned Judge regarded the French Civil Code as a local law within the meaning of the section Mr. Venkatachari, however, submitted that this view of the learned Judge was based on a concession made at the bar. It is not necessary to go into this aspect, for the matter has been fully argued before me. Venkatachari, however, submitted that this view of the learned Judge was based on a concession made at the bar. It is not necessary to go into this aspect, for the matter has been fully argued before me. But even as a matter of first impression it seems to me that the Articles of limitation laid down in the French Civil Code answer the description of “local law” in section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. The expression “local law” in the section must, in my opinion, be understood in the context of the Limitation Act being an all-India enactment. In that context, any law having currency only in a limited area must be regarded as a local law. “Local”, as used in this section, has no technical meaning. It is not to be regarded as a term of art, unlike as it the case of the expression “local authority” which is specically defined in the General Clauses Act to include a Port Trust. The French Civil Code is a local law because it applied, and was in force, in the former French establishments of Pondicherry. It was not in force anywhere else in India. After the de jure merger of Pondicherry in the Indian Union on 16th August, 1962, all the laws formerly in force in that territory were continued, by force of section 4 (1) of the Pondicherry (Administration) Act, 1962. This meant that the laws so preserved continued to remain local laws. The law of limitation in the French Civil Code has thus to be regarded as a local law, because that is what its character was at the time when Parliament passed the Limitation Act, 1963. 11. Mr. Venkatachari argued that the French Civil Code applied universally, not only to France but to the French legal systems all the world over, and in that sense the French Civil Code in Pondicherry cannot be regarded as a local law. This argument tends to mistake the Pondicherry of to-day with the French empire of yesterday. Whatever might have been the position of Pondicherry as part of the ancient French polity, with the passing of the Sixteenth Amendment it ceased to be part of Greater France in every sense. This argument tends to mistake the Pondicherry of to-day with the French empire of yesterday. Whatever might have been the position of Pondicherry as part of the ancient French polity, with the passing of the Sixteenth Amendment it ceased to be part of Greater France in every sense. The French Civil Code and other laws which Pondicherry had, may be, as part of a universal French legal system in time became purely local laws in the context of the Indian legal system. I must, therefore, reject the view that the words of section 29 (2) do not apply to preserve in Pondicherry the limitation law imbedded in the French Civil Code. In view of this conclusion of mine, I do not find it necessary to consider whether the French Civil Code is also a special law within the meaning of the same section. 12. The position I have taken in this case is not wholly bereft of authority. I have earlier referred to the judgment of Maharajan, J. There are also decisions which had arisen under parallel provisions relating to the Portuguese settlements in India. Mr. Masilamani cited two cases decided by the learned Judicial Commissioner, Goa. They are reported in J. A. De P. Bareto v. A. V. de Fonseca2and Cristina D’ Souza v. Zurana Peretra3. In both the cases, the question of interpretation and application of section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 came up for consideration in the context of local laws of limitation in force in Goa. It was held that the Portuguese Code must be regarded as local law within the meaning of section 29 (2) . In the former case, the learned Judge observed that far from there being any repeal of the Portuguese Code by any implication which can be spelt out from the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, the presence of section 29 (2) showed that the said Code was clearly saved as a local law. His further observations deserve to be quoted verbatim: “It is true that breathing time of about 88 days was provided before the 1963 Act came into force in the territory but this action, by itself, does not imply that the Portuguese Civil Code was repealed by necessary implication. As stated already Parliament left the Portuguese Civil Code untouched when the 1963 Act was enacted. As stated already Parliament left the Portuguese Civil Code untouched when the 1963 Act was enacted. Parliament could have brought the Portuguese Civil Code within the sweep of the 1963 Act, but in its legislative wisdom, and in order to avoid hardships to litigants governed by an entirely different system of law before the appointed day, Parliament confined itself only to the repeal of the Limitation Act, 1908. I have no hesitation in agreeing with Mr. M. S. Usgoakar that the doctrine of implied repeal is not attracted. The situation in this case at bar differs widely from the aforesaid cases reviewed .” I respectfully agree with the above observations. 13. The question that remains is whether the present suit is within time under the local law, namely the French Civil Code. Mr. Masilamani submitted that the relevant provision relating to bar of limitation applicable to the present suit must be found in Article 2262 of the French Civil Code. Article 2262 of the French Civil Code reads thus: “2262. All rights of action whether in rem or in personam are extinguished by prescription after thirty years. The person who sets up a title by prescription for thirty years is not obliged to rely on any title; nor can a plea alleging bad faith be set up.” 14. The French Code contains another article of limitation vis., Article 2272. That Article to the extent relevant, is as follows: “2272. The following rights of action are extinguished after a year:- ...... The right of action of merchants for goods they sell to private persons, not merchants..........” Mr. Masilamani pointed out that Article 2272 is restricted in its application to suits filed by merchants for goods sold by them to non-merchants. He, accordingly, urged that the period of limitation prescribed by that Article can have no application to a suit filed by a merchant for goods sold and delivered to another merchant. To such a suit, according to him, no other article of the Code applied, excepting the residuary Article 2262 under which the period of limitation is 30 years. 15. There was some argument at the Bar as to whether the present suit can properly be regarded as one filed by a merchant against another merchant. The plaint filed by the plaintiff did not, in so many words, aver that the defendant was a merchant. 15. There was some argument at the Bar as to whether the present suit can properly be regarded as one filed by a merchant against another merchant. The plaint filed by the plaintiff did not, in so many words, aver that the defendant was a merchant. There was nothing also in the written statement to show in what capacity the defendant purchased the goods from the plaintiff. There was, however, an admission by the defendant, giving evidence at the trial as D.W. 1, to the effect that he was a merchant carrying on business and in that capacity he had purchased the goods from the plaintiff. On this basis, it was argued by the plaintiff’s learned counsel that Article 2262 of the French Code Civil applied to this case, and the suit must be held to .. be within time, having been filed within 30 years of the transactions of sale. 16. I did not hear Mr. Venkatachari contend that Article 2262 did not apply to this case. It follows that the judgment and decree of the learned District Judge in appeal must be reversed. But I find from the discussion in his judgment that the plaintiff’s appeal was dismissed only on the issue as to limitation. But apart from the plea in bar, the defendant had contested the suit also on merits by pleading discharge. This issue was also tried by the learned District Munsif and a finding was rendered therein in favour of the defendant and against the plaintiff. The learned District Judge had no occasion to deal with this issue, which has been raised as a ground in the plaintiff’s appeal before him, since he had held against the plaintiff on the issue as to limitation. Now that I have reversed that finding and held that the suit is within time, it would be necessary for the appeal to be heard again by the learned District Judge on the other matters raised by the plaintiff in his appeal against the judgment and decree of the trial Court. Accordingly, while setting aside the judgment and decree of the learned District Judge in appeal, I direct him to take the appeal on file and hear the same on the other points which are at large. Subject to this direction, the appeal is allowed . But I make no order as to costs. Accordingly, while setting aside the judgment and decree of the learned District Judge in appeal, I direct him to take the appeal on file and hear the same on the other points which are at large. Subject to this direction, the appeal is allowed . But I make no order as to costs. There will also be refund of Court-fee to the appellant.