JUDGMENT DESHPANDE J.- 7. The principal contention of Mr. Dwivedee is that the amount of Rs. 15,000 admitted to have been received by the widow, towards the Life Insurance policy is liable to be deducted from the above amount of Rs. 55,200. This, according to him, is the pecuniary advantage received by the claimants by reason of the death in terms of the ratio of Gobald Motor Services Ltd. v. R. M. K. Veluswami1 It is nobody's case that it was an accident policy entitling the claimants to such amount, on the death of the deceased only in such an accident, and the amount could not have been received by them, had the death been due to otherwise, than such an accident. We express no opinion if this could have made any difference as there is no unanimity in the decided cases as to the liability of even such amounts to deduction from compensation. Judicial opinion is also sharply divided en the question whether life policy amount can be said to have come to the claimants by reason of the death of the deceased to justify its deduction from the amount of compensation payable to the claimants towards their pecuniary loss. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Zaveri, the learned advocate for the respondents, to a few judgments, of High Court of Gujarat in L. I. C. of India v. Legal representatives of deceased Naranbhai Munjabhai2. High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Sood and Company v. Surjit Kaur3, as also Delhi High Court in Bhagwanti Devi v. Ish Kumar4 and several other judgments of same High Courts, which do support his contention that amounts so received are not liable to be deducted as the same cannot be said to have come to the claimants by reason of the death of the deceased. Mr. Dwivedi, on the other hand, drew our attention to the judgments reported in Union of India v. S. Ghosh5, Sushila Devi v. Ibrahim6, Sabita Pati v. Rameshwar Singh7 Orissa High Court and Automobiles Transport v. Dewalal8, and a few other judgments of the same Courts taking the contrary view. We may at once observe that Patna High Court supports deduction only of such policy amounts as are subscribed to meet accident contingency and not other policy amounts. It rather supports Mr. Zaveri's contention and not that of Mr. Dwivedce. Mr. We may at once observe that Patna High Court supports deduction only of such policy amounts as are subscribed to meet accident contingency and not other policy amounts. It rather supports Mr. Zaveri's contention and not that of Mr. Dwivedce. Mr. Zaveri also drew our attention to some other judgments of Delhi High Court, including in the case of Orissa Road Transport Co. Ltd. Y. Sibananda Pattanaik9, which justify deduction only of a portion and not of the entire policy amounts. 8. The answer turns really on whether such policy amount can be said to be "pecuniary advantages" that come to the claimants "by reason of the death of the deceased"? That such amounts amount to pecuniary advantage admits of little doubt. Controversy really centres round if it comes to the dependants "by reason of death". Reading of the decided cases only go to show how this very question can arise under variety of circumstances giving rise to different considerations, pregnant with equally different legal implication, and it is by no means easy to lay down any inflexible rule as to which pecuniary benefit can be said to have been received "by reason of the death." It is pertinent to note that in the absence of any provision to the contrary, such policy amounts form part of the estate of the deceased and come to his heirs or dependants by way of inheritance, unless it is sought to be disposed of by the deceased otherwise. Nominee mentioned therein is not necessarily the beneficiary but invariably happens to be merely an authorised Collector thereof for the benefit of all heirs. We are unable to see any difference between this amount, and any other income yielding estate, that comes to the dependants either by way of inheritance or pursuant to any will or settlement. The causal connection between receipt of such amounts, and death is too apparent and both really stand on the same footing legally. Donations by the charitable trusts, or provisions for such dependants by some public spirited institutions, or gifts or contributions by relatives or sympathisers, of course stand on different footing and are clearly distinguishable, and can never be treated as advantages or benefits or having received by reason of the death of the bread winner, though the death may furnish an occasion for such receipts. We are ourselves unable to see how and why the policy amount or other amounts from income yielding assets, such as bank balances, or interests thereon, or on fixed deposits, or dividends from shares and securities, left or settled by the deceased on the dependants, cannot be said to have come to the claimants by "reason of the death" of the deceased and why it should not be balanced against the pecuniary losses caused by the death of the bread winner in terms of Gobald Motor's case (supra). The Supreme Court has been at pains in the above quoted passage to indicate how source of such pecuniary advantage is irrelevant, by words "from whatever sources". It should not be forgotten that these essentially are compensatory and not punitive damages. 9. It will be of interest in this context to note that, in England, the insurance policy amount was considered to be such pecuniary advantage coming to the dependants by reason of the death of the deceased, and was liable to be deducted under the common law from the amount of compensation payable under Fatal Accidents Act of 1846. This situation was reversed firstly by Fatal Accidents (Damages) Act of 1908 and improved further for the benefit of the claimants by Law Reforms (Personal Injuries) Act of 1948 and altered drastically by the Fatal Accidents Act of 1959 ensuring that various kinds of insurance and pensionary benefits are not excluded from the compensation payable by the tort feasers. Claims for such compensation in India as discussed earlier are still determined mainly by reference to principles underlying the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, analogous to English Act of 1846; and the decided cases thereunder prior to 1908 enactments contemplate reducing the amount of compensation by such insurance amounts, if received by the dependants. In the absence of any statutory provisions analogous to the above referred to English enactments of 1908, 1948 and 1959, it should be difficult to find any basis or trace any rationale not to deduct such life policy amounts when on the face of it, these amount to pecuniary advantages and are received by the dependants by reason of the death of the bread winner victim. 10. 10. While holding to the contrary, the High Courts of Gujarat, Punjab and Haryana and Delhi appear to have treated the receipt of such amounts as collateral benefits coming to the dependants not so much by reason of the death of the deceased, as by reason of the contract that the deceased had entered into with the Life Insurance Company. With respect, this view and the reasoning, in support thereof is open to grave doubt. The learned Judges have mainly relied on the Bradburn v. Great Western Rly. Co.10 and Parry v. Cleave11. As noted by Sen J. in the case of Sushila Devi v. Ibrahim, in both these cases, injured persons had claimed damages for their own injuries, resulting in their physical disabilities, and the learned Judges and noble Lords were not called upon to deal with the claims of the dependants of the deceased, killed in any fatal accident. Policy amounts were received by the injured claimants, in these cases, as a result of arrangements or contracts made by them with their employers or insurers, to meet some such specific contingencies to their ownselves. 11. These amounts obviously stood on different footing from the life policy amounts payable to his dependents on the death of the insured. Principles governing award of damages in these two events cannot be identical. Amongst other distinguishing features, there was a risk of benefit of the premiums being lost to the insured in Bradburn's case, if no accident causing injuries had occurred, while entire life policy amount is refundable to the insured on maturity, in some cases with interest or dividend, if death does not take place during the prescribed number of years. The Courts in both these cases found, and with respect rightly that benefits receivable by the injured claimants, from the arrangements of their own creation, cannot be allowed to go to the wrongdoers and set off against the compensation payable by them. No question of benefits of the amounts saved and contributed by the deceased and consequentially inherited or received by the dependents by reason of death of any one could arise in anyone of these cases. 12. Now, Lord Reid, in the Parry's case (supra) based his view on the public policy reflected in the above referred to 1959 enactment, and extended the same to the pensionary benefits in dispute not specially covered by the Act. 12. Now, Lord Reid, in the Parry's case (supra) based his view on the public policy reflected in the above referred to 1959 enactment, and extended the same to the pensionary benefits in dispute not specially covered by the Act. Judgment of Bramwell B., on the other hand, in the firstly named Bradburn's case (supra) itself refers to the distinction between claim for injuries by the injured and the claims of the dependents for fatal injuries caused to the deceased. Indicating how under the Fatal Accidents Act, Lord Campbell laid down, for the first time, the rule in Franklin v. South Eastern Railway Co,13 for taking into account whatever comes in possession of family of the deceased, the learned Judge observed "But that bas no bearing on the case of a person suing upon his Common Law right for injuries caused to him by the defendant's negligence." Curiously enough this 'Passage does not find place in the reprint i.e. (1874-80) All E R 195. Text of this para in original report, i.e. (1874) 10 Exh. 1, is slightly different in details, though not in purport and substance. In the case of Union of India v. S. Ghosh14 the Division Bench quoted the entire para including this passage at page 136 from the original report presumably in support of its view that policy subscribed specially to meet accidents contingencies stand on different footing from the policies on life. Generally, and the amount of the former, and not of the latter is so deductible, which point is not relevant in this case. We have ourselves verified the correctness of the passage. With respect, the learned Judges of the above High Courts seems to have lost sight of this distinction emphasised in Bradburn's case itself. 13. As indicated earlier. in some cases, the Delhi High Court as also Orissa High Court have found justification for deducting some portion of such policy amounts. This view is based on the assumption that the claimants could have the benefit of the policy amount even if the deceased had died otherwise than in the accident, or would have shared the benefit thereof had the policy matured during his life time. Death in fatal accident only accelerates its receipt by the dependants, according to this view, and interest chargeable for the estimated accelerated years alone represents the deductible portion of such benefit. Death in fatal accident only accelerates its receipt by the dependants, according to this view, and interest chargeable for the estimated accelerated years alone represents the deductible portion of such benefit. This approach is adopted in some cases even to other liquid assets receipt of which as owner is merely assumed to have been accelerated, which, according to this approach is receivable and enjoyable by the dependants in either case, even without such death. In the case of Amarjit Kaur v. Vanguard Ins. Co. Ltd.15, Deshpande J. of the Delhi High Court justified deduction of only some portion of the policy amount on this ground. In support of his view the learned Judge relied on Grand Trunk Railway Company of Canada v. Jenninas16. 14. It is true that liquid assets possessed and owned by the deceased in certain cases, are open to the enjoyment of all such dependants during life time of the deceased and they can claim certainty of inheriting or receiving it otherwise in the ordinary course. Accidental death in such cases can be said to have only accelerated the process of their ownership. Pecuniary benefit to the dependants is bound to be far lesser than in cases where such certainty of enjoyment actual receipt, in any manner whatsoever, is absent or slender. Cases of the former type are bound to be far and few. The amount of the life policy standing in the name of the deceased is exposed to more uncertainties in majority of the cases, there being no guarantee even of continuation thereof. In the Privy Council case of Jenninas (supra), the deceased had subscribed to the policy expressly for the benefit of the wife and the wife was bound to receive the benefits thereof irrespective of death of the husband and of the accident. This forms the basis of the ratio of the case. This cannot be true of all the policies. No inflexible rule, therefore, can be laid down in this behalf as is suggested by the Delhi High Court. The question of discount on account of accelerated receipt of compensation in lumpsum is being separately dealt with. Such amount ordinarily must be taken to have been received by reason of death and deducted from the compensation unless any specific case justifying deduction of lesser amount is made out. The question of discount on account of accelerated receipt of compensation in lumpsum is being separately dealt with. Such amount ordinarily must be taken to have been received by reason of death and deducted from the compensation unless any specific case justifying deduction of lesser amount is made out. We have already shown how the word "just" in section 110B of the Motor Vehicles Act does not justify ignoring such benefits. 15. Had the deceased not met with accident, policy amount would have gone to the husband on maturity, and there was no guarantee that the amount would have been spent for the benefits of the dependants alone in this case. Deceased is not shown to have been possessed of any other property. Instability and insecurity to which a driver's life is exposed, introduces high degree of uncertainty of the dependants having been ever benefited. 16. Mr. Zaveri's contention that policy amount consists partly of the contribution made by the deceased and the excess over it payable thereunder. According to Mr. Zaveri, the accelerated value of the contribution made may be deducted at the most and not the excess which is the benefit of the contract and not the death. Apart from the absence of any good reason, to so split 20. Shrimati Punamma (D. W. 1) stated that Taneja had a knife in his hand and Shri Sharma had caught hold of him, but she does not explain the injuries sustained by the deceased Arjundas. A. G. Umman (D. W. 2), brother-in-law of the appellant, is also silent regarding the injuries of Arjundas. Their contention that the persons who had collected there had assaulted L. D. Taneja, Sharma and the deceased not be accepted. 21. Ex. P-1, the report of the incident, was lodged by Shrimati Chanchal Taneja (P. W. 1) at 8.40 p. m. on 20-7-1975 within H hours of the occurrence, which lends full corroboration to the prosecution version. Ex. P-26 is the report lodged by the appellant himself in which he also admitted that Shri Taneja, his wife and another person were present inside the quarter and that he not only questioned them as to how they had occupied the quarter, but also attempted to enter inside the quarter. Ex. P-26 is the report lodged by the appellant himself in which he also admitted that Shri Taneja, his wife and another person were present inside the quarter and that he not only questioned them as to how they had occupied the quarter, but also attempted to enter inside the quarter. Though in this report, he has stated that Shri Taneja had assaulted him with a knife, yet there is no reference that the persons collected there had assaulted either Shri Taneja or Arjundas. Thus the defence version that Arjundas was subjected to assault by persons collected there is definitely an after thought and is clearly false. It is established beyond doubt that the appellant was the aggressor, he had gone there to force his way in the quarter by show of force and when prevented, he assaulted L. D. Taneja and Sharma and also severally assaulted Arjundas who was definitely an intervener. 22. In these circumstances, the question is whether the appellant is entitled to the benefit of exception 4 to section 300 of the I. P. C. The exception runs as under: Exception 4-Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight, in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender's having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. Explanation- It is immaterial in such cases which party offers provocation or commits the first assault. Thus the requirement is that the sudden fight must be without premeditation and without the offender's having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. The facts established in this case excluded any possibility of a sudden fight without premeditation, because the evidence established beyond doubt that the appellant had gone there duly determined and armed to force his way into the quarter. As stated above, the appellant did not prefer the legal course of approaching the Estate Officer or the police, but he went there duly armed which indicated that he had gone there with the prior determination to meet the situation which might develop on the Spot. Thus it could not be said 4hat the fight developed without premeditation. 23. As stated above, the appellant did not prefer the legal course of approaching the Estate Officer or the police, but he went there duly armed which indicated that he had gone there with the prior determination to meet the situation which might develop on the Spot. Thus it could not be said 4hat the fight developed without premeditation. 23. In Sarjug Prasad v The State1, what is meant by undue advantage or acting in unusual manner, has been stated in the following words: “The expression 'undue advantage' as used in Exception 4 to section 300 means 'unfair advantage' and cannot be limited to a case where the victim is made physically incapable to defend himself. An assailant cannot but be said to have taken undue advantage of his victim if the latter is taken completely unawares and is struck when he does not even suspect that he is about to be struck. Furthermore, no reasonable person can expect that a man would whip out a knife and strike another on a vital part of the body with it on account of a petty quarrel. If the weapon or manner of attack by the assailant is out of all proportion to the offence given, that circumstance must be taken into consideration for deciding whether undue advantage has been taken. In such a case, the assailant must also be held to have acted in an unusual manner." 24. Chamru Budhwa v. State of Madhya Pradesh2 dealt with a case of severe exchange of abuses between the parties preceding the incident, during the abuses the tempo rose and both the parties came out of their respective houses in anger and in that course of quarrel, the appellant dealt a fatal blow on the head of the deceased with his Lathi. Shri Datt for the appellant relied on this case, but this does not help him, because it was the appellant who had gone duly armed to pick up a quarrel and to force his entry into the quarter. In our case, the weapon used was a knife and not a lathi and there were more than one injuries of serious nature on the body of the deceased. In the circumstances, this case does not help the appellant. 25. Lalsingh and another v. The Crown3 dealt with a case of sudden quarrel in which the appellant and the deceased exchanged blows. People separated them. In the circumstances, this case does not help the appellant. 25. Lalsingh and another v. The Crown3 dealt with a case of sudden quarrel in which the appellant and the deceased exchanged blows. People separated them. The accused then ran towards his house close by and returned with a deadly weapon by which he struck a blow on the vital part of the deceased who was standing unguarded and thereby caused on injury which was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. It was held that the offence was murder and exception 4 to section 300 Indian Penal Code had no application. Our case is more or less the same. Shri L. D. Taneja and the appellant exchanged abuses in which Shri Homa intervened and on production of the rent receipt of the appellant, he refused to intervene. Thus the quarrel ended there but for the aggressive attitude of the appellant who struck repeated knife blows on an unguarded person Arjundas and thus the offence in question will not be covered by exception 4 to section 300, Indian Penal Code but will be one of murder. 26. In this connection reference may be made to Sunnu Muduli v. Emperor4 where the following observations will definitely negative the appellant's contention of benefit of exception 4 to section 300 of the Indian Penal Code: "The proper test of the applicability of Exception IV to section 300 is whether or not the accused shows that he acted solely out of provocation engendered b)' the heat of a sudden quarrel followed by a sudden fight. There may be cases where a word or gesticulation may be regarded as being so provocatory as to make it clear that the accused did act solely and excusably out of provocation. But such cases are rare and they' fall more appropriately within Exception 1 than Exception IV to section 300. The ordinary inference, where one person picks up a knife and stabs another in stomach merely following an exchange of heated words, is that the former has acted out of some other motive as well as the provocation. But such a person cannot be heard to say that he did not know that his act was so imminently dangerous that it would, in all probability, result in an injury likely to cause death. Every sane man must be deemed to have that knowledge." 27. But such a person cannot be heard to say that he did not know that his act was so imminently dangerous that it would, in all probability, result in an injury likely to cause death. Every sane man must be deemed to have that knowledge." 27. In Babu alias Bulbul Peerakhan of Indore v. State of Madhya Pradesh5 the following observations be relevant: "The learned counsel for the appellant contends that the case comes under Exception 4 to section 300, Indian Penal Code. Exception 4 comes into operation when it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offenders having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner…. If there are only two persons present one is killed and the other is killer, it is the killer who has to explain the circumstances under which killing took place. He has not offered any explanation. The evidence on record does not at all show that the killing was done under grave and sudden provocation. The knife has been produced in the Court. It has a handle and it is 13" long and the blade is half of its length. In the case of the Supreme Court referred to above, there was evidence of grave and sudden provocation and the weapon used was lathi. In the instant case, the weapon used is a dagger and even assuming that there was sudden fight, we do not think Exception 4 will apply in this case. There is enough evidence on record of appellant's thrusting knife in the chest of the deceased. There is nothing on record to indicate that he had intended to cause a different injury. A man is always presumed to have intended the consequences of his act." 28. In Siyasharan v. State of M. P.6, it is held that in order to apply exception 4 to section 300, Indian Penal Code, it is necessary to prove three things: (1) there was a sudden fight; (2) there was absence of pre-meditation; and (3) no undue advantage was taken for the act of cruelty perpetrated. In our case, the appellant had gone there with pre-meditation to use force, if necessary, and he definitely took undue advantage and perpetrated an act of cruelty by severally assaulting Arjundas who was only an intervener. In our case, the appellant had gone there with pre-meditation to use force, if necessary, and he definitely took undue advantage and perpetrated an act of cruelty by severally assaulting Arjundas who was only an intervener. Our case is fully covered by Narayanan Nair Raghvan Nair v. The State of Travancore Cochin7 which runs as under- ''The fight was between V and the accused. The deceased had no hand in it. He did not even try to separate the assaillants. All be did was to ask V to stop fighting and said that he would settle their dispute. The accused thereupon stabbed the deceased causing injury resulting in death. Held that the exception requires that no undue advantage be taken of the other side. It was impossible to say that there was no undue advantage when the accused stabbed the unarmed person who made no threatening gesture and merely asked the accused’s opponent to stop fighting. Then also, the fight must be with the person who is killed. Here the fight was between V and the accused. The exception, therefore, did not apply." 29. In view of the above, it is crystal clear that the appellant definitely took undue advantage and acted with c1'uelty and used force which was out of all proportion. Arjundas was not outside the quarter initially and came out after he saw L. D. Taneja and Charanjit Sharma being assaulted by the appellant. The moment Arjundas came out, the appellant assaulted him, though, he had shown no threatening or menacing attitude towards the appellant. In view of the law as stated above, we are definitely of the view that exception 4 to section 300, Indian Penal Code is not at all attracted in this case. 30. The evidence of Dr. Shukla (P. W. 8) disclosed that under injury No.3, intestine and mesentery were protruding out of the wound. These injuries could be cased by sharp object and injuries 2 and 3 were individually sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. 31. The evidence of Dr. Hireshchandra (P. W. 21) who performed the post mortem examination, disclosed that the tract of wound No.3 passed superficially to the stomach and perforated the left lobe of the liver and damaged the porta hapatis. Depth of the wound was 16 c.m.s. Under wound No.5, the tract had cut the walls, the peritoneum and coils of intestine. Hireshchandra (P. W. 21) who performed the post mortem examination, disclosed that the tract of wound No.3 passed superficially to the stomach and perforated the left lobe of the liver and damaged the porta hapatis. Depth of the wound was 16 c.m.s. Under wound No.5, the tract had cut the walls, the peritoneum and coils of intestine. The wounds were ante mortem in nature and injury No.3 was fatal. Death was due to the stab wounds of the abdomen, particularly wound No.3, causing shock and haemorrhage. 32. Thus the appellant used a dangerous, weapon like a knife the blade of which was 11 c.ms. and handle 14 c.m.s. and used the same repeatedly on vital parts of the body causing serious internal damage. The injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death of the victim. These facts established that the appellant intended to cause the injuries with the help of knife and caused them which were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The intention to kill is apparent and, therefore, the act of the appellant would definitely be within the purview of section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. 33. In the circumstances, we are definitely of the view that the appellant had neither the right of defence of person, nor was he entitled to the benefit of exception 4 to section 300 of the Indian Penal Code. He took undue advantage and acted with cruelty in attacking an unarmed person who had exhibited no aggressive or menacing attitude against him, by repeatedly striking at him with a dangerous weapon like knife and causing serious injuries on vital parts of the body. He had definitely intended to kill him and hence he was rightly convicted under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The sentence of imprisonment for life appears to be proper. We find no ground to interfere in the conviction and the sentence. Also see: Hardevsingh and another v. The State of Punjab8 and Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab9. 34. For the reasons given above, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. Conviction of the appellant Majin Thomas George under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentence of imprisonment for life are confirmed. Appeal dismissed.