Judgment 1. This revision by the plaintiff is directed against the order dated 8-3-1973, passed by the Munsif of Bettiah in title suit No. 81 of 1972 impleading the intervenor as party defendant No. 5 in the suit. 2. The suit was filed for declaration that the lands described in the schedule of the plaint were kaimi lands of the petitioner and that opposite parties Nos. 1 to 3 defendants 1 to 3 (defendants 1st party) had no right to settle the suit land with opposite party No. 4 (defendant No. 4 - defendant 2nd party) and as such the said settlement in favour of defendant No. 4 is illegal and void and has not conveyed any right, title and interest in the suit lands. 3. The plaintiffs case in short was that he is the raiyat of village Manguraha and is in possession of the suit land since the last 30 to 32 years and ultimately those lands were settled with him by the circle officer in case No. 13 of 1961-62 after due enquiry and rent was fixed in his name. The further allegation was that defendant No. 4 filed an application for fixation of rent with regard to the suit lands which was registered as rent fixation case No. 148 of 1963 but the same was dismissed for default on 20-4-1965. According to the plaintiff, defendant No. 4 again applied for fixation of rent which was registered as case No. 21 of 1967-68 and rent was fixed in his name for the suit land. The plaintiff moved the Land Reforms Deputy Commissioner for cancellation of the said fixation of rent in the name of defendant No. 4 which was registered as case No. 14 of 1967-68 but the same was dismissed and in appeal the said order was affirmed. Thereafter the plaintiff served notice under S. 80, C. P. C. upon defendants 1 to 3 and thereafter filed the present suit. It appears that after service of notice of the suit on defendant No. 4, a compromise petition between the plaintiff and defendant No. 4 was filed in which defendant No. 4 admitted the claim of the plaintiff and a prayer was made therein to record a compromise. From the order sheet of the Court below it appears that the said compromise petition was filed on 6-10-1972. From the order sheet of the Court below it appears that the said compromise petition was filed on 6-10-1972. The order sheet further shows that on 22-11-1972 a petition was filed by plaintiff to expunge the names of defendants Nos. 1 to 3 and record the compromise. The order dated 28-11-1972 shows that defendant No. 4 filed a petition alleging therein that the compromise may not be recorded as it was obtained by fraud. Before any of these matters could be disposed of it appears that on 5-1-1973 the intervenor opposite party No. 5 filed an application to add him as party defendant in the suit on the allegation that he had purchased a property by a registered sale deed dated 15-12-1970 for a consideration of Rupees 3,000.00 from defendant No. 4 and was put in possession and since then he has remained in possession of the suit property to the knowledge of the plaintiff and others. It has also been alleged that he has been mutated in the Sherista of the State of Bihar and though the plaintiff knew the aforesaid facts he deliberately did not implead the intervenor as party defendant, only with an intention to obtain a collusive and fraudulent decree. It has also been stated that the petitioner came to know for the first time on 3-1-1973 from one Bechu Behari Singh about the filing of this collusive suit and also about the filing of the collusive compromise petition in the suit. It was further stated that the intervenor is a necessary party in the suit and in his absence the suit could not proceed and that in the interest of justice and equity it requires that the intervenor should be added as party defendant. With these allegations the intervenor filed an application. A rejoinder however was filed on behalf of the plaintiff denying the allegations made by the intervenor in his petition under Order 1 Rule 10 C. P. C. The matter was heard by the court below and by the impugned order it added the intervenor as party defendant No. 5 in the suit. Relevant portion of impugned order reads thus : "So far as the compromise with defendant No. 4 is concerned there is no harm in recording the compromise. The compromise against defendant No. 4 is accordingly recorded. To 9-4-1973 in filing W. S. by defendant No. 5. Relevant portion of impugned order reads thus : "So far as the compromise with defendant No. 4 is concerned there is no harm in recording the compromise. The compromise against defendant No. 4 is accordingly recorded. To 9-4-1973 in filing W. S. by defendant No. 5. The suit will proceed ex parte against defendants 1 to 3." 4. Mr. Mahendra Prasad Sinha learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner vehemently argued that the portion of the impugned order, by which the intervenor has been added as defendant No. 5 in the suit, far illegal and without jurisdiction inasmuch as the petitioner could not be forced to fight a litigation, against his wish, with the intervenor. According to the learned counsel the intervenor was neither a necessary nor proper party for determination of the controversy in the suit and that the controversy having already been settled by compromise with defendant No. 4 new issues could not be allowed to be cropped up in the suit by adding the intervenor as party defendant. It was also contended that the intervenor having no direct interest in the suit property could not have been added in the suit. Mr. Ramji Saran, appearing on behalf of the intervenor, on the other hand, contended that in the facts and in the circumstances of the case the court below was perfectly justified in exercising the discretion in favour of the intervenor by adding him as party defendant in the suit. Learned counsel, further contended that the intervenor has direct interest in the property as distinguished from commercial interest as pointed out in Razia Begum V/s. Sahabzadi Anwar Begum, AIR 1958 SC 886 . According to the learned counsel the intervenor having claimed title by purchase from defendant No. 4 under a registered sale deed before the suit could be filed and having claimed possession in the suit land after purchase would be vitally affected by the collusive compromise between the plaintiff and defendant No. 4 and as such the trial court was fully justified in exercising its discretion in adding him as party defendant to the suit. According to the learned counsel, the compromise having been challenged by defendant No. 4 himself, the court below without disposing the said application after making proper enquiry under O. 23 C. P. C. acted illegally in recording the said compromise. According to the learned counsel, the compromise having been challenged by defendant No. 4 himself, the court below without disposing the said application after making proper enquiry under O. 23 C. P. C. acted illegally in recording the said compromise. I may state here that the intervenor claimed to have purchased the suit property from defendant No. 4 under two registered sale deeds executed on 15-12-1970 and registered on the next date, namely, 16-12-1970. These two registered documents were produced before this court along with two rent receipts granted by the State of Bihar in the name of the intervenor. They contain the seal of the court below showing that they were filed there on the 9th March, 1973. The registered sale deeds show that one of them was for a consideration of Rs. 1,000.00 and the other for a consideration of Rs. 2,000/-. They relate to different portions of plot No. 68 khata No. 96. 5. I have already indicated above the allegations made by the intervenor, on the basis of which he claimed to be added in the suit. He claimed possession over the property by virtue of purchase under the aforesaid deeds from defendant No. 4 and claimed mutation and payment of rent for those lands. He also alleged that such intention of the plaintiff was to get a collusive decree against defendant No. 4 to his great prejudice. It has also been indicated above that after the compromise was filed on 6-10-1972, defendant No. 4 himself filed an application challenging the said compromise on the ground that it was obtained by fraud. However, it appears that on the date when the intervenors petition was heard, defendant No. 4 did not choose to appear and therefore, the court below though added the intervenor as party defendant in the suit but at the same time said that no harm would be caused if the compromise between the plaintiff and defendant No. 4 is recorded and the suit is allowed to proceed ex parte against defendants 1 to 3 (defendant No. 1 being the State of Bihar, defendant No. 2 Land Reforms Deputy Collector and defendant No. 3 Circle Officer). 6. Some decisions were cited at the Bar in support of the respective contentions which I shall discuss here. 6. Some decisions were cited at the Bar in support of the respective contentions which I shall discuss here. Leaned counsel for the petitioner relied upon in Gouri Shankar V/s. State of Bihar, 1970 0 PLJR 531, a single Judge decision of this Court. In that case the suit was filed against the State of Bihar for declaration that the entry in the record of rights in favour of the State was wrong and so also the entry showing the illegal possession as monthly tenant in the name of plaintiffs parents. Opposite party Nos. 2 to 7 of that case wanted to intervene in the suit alleging that they were in possession of the suit land for which correction was sought for by them. The High Court pointed out that the plaintiffs suit was only for declaration as against the State of Bihar and if the intervenors were allowed to be added as defendants on the allegations made by them then it would change the nature of the suit and in that case the plaintiff would have to value the properties, pray for consequential relief and thereby converting the suit from a declaratory suit to a regular title suit. It has also been pointed out that if the intervenors were not made parties they would not be prejudiced in any way as the decision in the plaintiffs suit even if it is favourable to them would not affect the right, title and interest of the intervenors. In those circumstances the order of the court below was set aside and the revision application was allowed by this Court. Thus in my opinion on the facts itself that case is distinguishable. 7. The next case relied upon was again a Single Judge decision of this Court in Motiram Roshanlal Coal Co. (P) Ltd. V/s. District Committee, Dhanbad, AIR 1962 Pat 357 . On a perusal of this case, it appears that opposite party No. 6 of the case filed an application for adding him as party defendant in the suit. The report does not mention the allegation on the basis of which the State opposite party No. 6 wanted to be added as party defendant in the suit. The court below added it as a party saying that no harm would be caused if petitioner No. 6 was added as party defendant in the suit. The report does not mention the allegation on the basis of which the State opposite party No. 6 wanted to be added as party defendant in the suit. The court below added it as a party saying that no harm would be caused if petitioner No. 6 was added as party defendant in the suit. After considering the case relied upon by the respective parties in that case the learned Judge pointed out that the intervenor could be added as party if it be shown that he was a person who ought to have been added as party defendant in the suit or whose presence before the court below was necessary to enable the court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon all the questions involved in the suit. It has also been pointed out that where a person is neither a proper nor a necessary party the court has no jurisdiction to add him as party under sub-rule (2) R. 10 of O. 1 C. P. C. It has also been pointed out that under O. 1 R. 10 (2) only in two cases a person may be added as party namely (1) where he ought to have been joined as plaintiff or defendant, and has not so joined, or (2) when, without his presence the question in the suit could not be competely decided. After stating the aforesaid principle it has been stated in the judgment as follows : (at p. 359) "......... a person should not be added as defendant merely because he would be incidentally affected by the judgment in the suit. Here, however, this is not the view of the trial court." It has however been pointed out that the plaintiff cannot be compelled to add a party against his wish to fight a litigation. As it was found by the learned Judge that the intervenor would not even be incidentally affected by the judgment in the suit, he set aside the order of the court below by which the intervenor was added as party. The principle laid down in this case cannot be disputed by anybody but the case read as a whole does not help the petitioners argument in any way. The next case relied upon is Dharam Narain Sahu V/s. Kapildeo Pd. Naik, 1971 0 BLJR 749, a Bench decision of this Court. The principle laid down in this case cannot be disputed by anybody but the case read as a whole does not help the petitioners argument in any way. The next case relied upon is Dharam Narain Sahu V/s. Kapildeo Pd. Naik, 1971 0 BLJR 749, a Bench decision of this Court. It has followed the principle laid down in Razia Begums case, AIR 1958 SC 886 (supra), the decision strongly relied upon by learned counsel for the intervenor also. This case, in my opinion, does not lay down anything which goes against the contention of the intervenor-opposite party No. 5. The Supreme Court case was a case where the appellant (before the Supreme Court) as plaintiff brought a suit against respondent No. 3 alleging him to be her husband, for declaration that she was the legally wedded wife and entitled to Rs. 2,000.00 per month as Kharche pandan. After the aforesaid suit was filed, respondent No. 3 filed a written statement admitting the entire claim. On that very day an application under O. 1, R. 10 C. P. C. was filed on behalf of the respondents Nos. 1 and 2. Respondent No. 1 claimed as the lawful and legally wedded wife of the Prince, respondent No. 3 and respondent No. 2 claimed as minor son of the said prince by respondent No. 1. In the petition filed by respondents Nos. 1 and 2 they claimed that they were equally interested in denying the right and status of the plaintiff. They also alleged that they had reason to believe that the above suit was the result of collusion and would affect adversely the relationship of the intervenor and the defendant the prince and also deprive them of the right and interest of the defendant in the estate. It appears that the plaintiff filed a rejoinder denying the allegation and the defendant the prince also filed another rejoinder in which he again reiterated all the admissions that were made in the written statement though he did not deny that respondent No. 1 is his wife and respondent No. 2 is his son. The trial court allowed the application of the intervenor and added respondents 1 and 2 as party defendants in the suit. This order was affirmed by the High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad. The Supreme Court also upheld the order. The trial court allowed the application of the intervenor and added respondents 1 and 2 as party defendants in the suit. This order was affirmed by the High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad. The Supreme Court also upheld the order. After discussing the case laws on the subject, the following principles have been laid down in that case. "(1) That the question of addition of parties under R. 10 of O. I of the Civil P. C. is generally not one of initial jurisdiction of the court but of a judicial discretion which has to be exercised in view of all the facts and circumstances of a particular case, but in some cases, it may raise controversies as to the power of the court in contradistinction to its inherent jurisdiction, or in other words, of jurisdiction in the limited sense in which it is used in S. 115 of the Code. (2) That in a suit relating to property, in order that a person may be added as a party he should have a direct interest as distinguished from a commercial interest in the subject-matter of the litigation. (3) Where the subject-matter of a litigation is a declaration as regards status or a legal character, the rule of present or direct interest may be relaxed in a suitable case where the court is of the opinion that by adding that party, it would be in a better position effectually and completely to adjudicate upon the controversy. (4) The cases contemplated in the last proposition have to be determined in accordance with the statutory provision of Ss. 42 and 43 of the Specific Relief Act. (5) In cases covered by those statutory provisions, the court is not bound to grant the declaration prayed for on a mere admission of the claim of the defendant if the court has reasons to insist upon a clear proof apart from the admission. (6) The result of a declaratory decree on the question of status, such as in controversy in the instant case, affects not only the parties actually before the Court but generations to come and in view of the consideration, the rule of present interest as evolved by case law relating disputes about property does not apply with full force. (6) The result of a declaratory decree on the question of status, such as in controversy in the instant case, affects not only the parties actually before the Court but generations to come and in view of the consideration, the rule of present interest as evolved by case law relating disputes about property does not apply with full force. (7) The rule laid down in S. 43 of the Specific Relief Act is not exactly a rule of res judicata. It is narrower in one sense and wider in another." 8. Mr. Ramji Saran, learned counsel for the intervenor opposite party No. 5 also relied strongly upon a Supreme Court decision in Razia Begums case ( AIR 1958 SC 886 ) (supra), and contended that when the court below has exercised the discretion in favour of the intervenor in adding him as party defendant in the suit no interference should be made in his revision application as it cannot be said that the exercise of discretion was not made judicially. 9. Learned counsel relied upon principle No. 1 aforesaid and drew my attention in particular to a portion of the aforesaid Supreme Court decision where the point as to the exercise of judicial discretion has been dealt with. Attention was drawn towards the end of para 7 and the beginning of para 8 of the said Supreme Court decision where it has been stated as follows : "It would thus appear that the Courts in India have not treated the matter of addition of parties as raising any question of initial jurisdiction of the Court. It may sometimes involve a question of jurisdiction in the limited sense in which it is used in S. 115 of the Civil P. C. It is no use multiplying references appearing on the Construction of the relevant rules of the Code relating to the addition of parties. Each case has to be determined on its own facts and it has to be recognised that no decided case has been brought to our notice which can be said to be in all fours with the facts and circumstances of the present case.........." 10. Each case has to be determined on its own facts and it has to be recognised that no decided case has been brought to our notice which can be said to be in all fours with the facts and circumstances of the present case.........." 10. Two single Judges decisions were also cited at the Bar namely Chakori Mahton V/s. Mahadeo Singh, AIR 1952 Fat 433 and Umesh Chandra V/s. Kapildeo Narain, 1969 0 BLJR 264, for the principle that where presence of a person before a court is necessary in order to enable the court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions in the suit such person should be added as party defendant. This principle again is well known and cannot be disputed and its applicability depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case. 11. Mr. Ramji Saran contended that principle No. 1 laid dawn in Razia Begums case ( AIR 1958 SC 886 ) (supra), which I have quoted above fully applies to the present case according to which, no interference should be made if judicial discretion has been exercised in favour of adding a party under O. I R. 10 considering all the facts and circumstances of the case. It is, therefore, necessary to note the circumstances under which the petition under O. 1 R. 10 C. P. C. was entertained and allowed. I have already pointed out above that defendant No. 4 joined in the compromise with the plaintiff was (illeg) afterwards he himself alleged it to be a collusive (illeg) it would appear that defendant No. 4 would suffer a collusive decree in favour of the plaintiff. It is not disputed that the intervenor is claiming the right title and interest in the property under the said defendant No. 4. The intervenor has also produced in support of his claim two registered sale deeds which support the allegation made in the petition under O. 1 R. 10 and it cannot be said, in the circumstances of the case, that his claim was baseless. It is also clear that defendant No. 4 having parted with the right, title and interest in the suit land was least interested to fight the litigation and in fact filed a compromise petition though afterwards he resiled from it. It is also clear that defendant No. 4 having parted with the right, title and interest in the suit land was least interested to fight the litigation and in fact filed a compromise petition though afterwards he resiled from it. It is further clear that the petition which was afterwards filed by defendant No. 4 challenging the compromise was not contested and he suffered a decree by allowing the said compromise to be recorded ex parte. Thus, the intervenor who claims under defendant No. 4 is vitally interested to safeguard the title of defendant No. 4 and see that he had good title to convey to the intervenor on the date of purchase by him. In these circumstances the court below has exercised its discretion to add the intervenor as party defendant No. 5 and therefore, in the circumstances of the case it is difficult to hold that the discretion was not judicially exercised. 12. For the reasons discussed above, I am of the view that there is no merit in this application and it is accordingly dismissed with costs. Hearing fee is assessed at Rs. 100/-.