Judgment :- 1. These writ petitions are by persons described as small scale growers of rubber in this State. They complain of the implementation recently, of a notification issued dated 20 31974 under the Minimum Wages Act, making the minimum wage fixed thereunder applicable to the agricultural workers under the small scale rubber growers of the State. In some cases, for non-implementation of the Act and the Rules notices had been issued for rectification of defects; in some, things had proceeded further, and criminal prosecutions had been either commenced or threatened for nonconformity with the provisions of the Act and the Rules. The petitions challenge the implementation of the notification and the proceedings by way of criminal prosecution or otherwise. 2. Arguments, addressed mostly by Mr. K. S Sebastian, were an admixture, largely of considerations of hardship and distress and the impolitic nature of the implementation of the notification against the petitioners, flavoured a little, with a tinge of the law. The Write up in the "Deepika" dated 17 21976, and "Manorama" dated 2 41976. were freely indented. The drift of the grievance was that the implementation of the impugned notification with respect to the agricultural labourers of small scale rubber growers would wreck their estate and bring about their extermination. Indeed, it was said that the small scale growers and their estates were not meant or intended to be covered by the Minimum Wages Act or the notifications issued thereunder. S 3 clause [1] [b] of the Minimum Wages Act confers on the appropriate Government, the power to review at such intervals as they think fit, not exceeding five years, the minimum rates of wages and revise the said rates. S.5 provides that in fixing or revising the minimum wages, the appropriate Government shall appoint committees and sub-committees to hold inquiries and advise it in respect of such fixation or revision. S 7 provides for the appointment of an Advisory Board; S.9 provides for the composition of the Committees and the Advisory Board. They are to consist of persons nominated by the appropriate Government, representing employers and employees in the scheduled employments and independent persons. It is in pursuance of these provisions that the notification fixing minimum wages was revised on 20-3-1974. Minimum or basic wages were fixed for the various classes of workers in the various forms of employment. They are to consist of persons nominated by the appropriate Government, representing employers and employees in the scheduled employments and independent persons. It is in pursuance of these provisions that the notification fixing minimum wages was revised on 20-3-1974. Minimum or basic wages were fixed for the various classes of workers in the various forms of employment. In paragraphs, under the head "full employment" it stated that the minimum wages notified above were based on the assumption that the employers will provide work for their workers throughout the year, failing which, the workers were to be given their minimum wages for the days on which they are involuntarily unemployed. But the obligation of the employer, it was stated, was only to offer some kind of work connected with the plantation, and the worker who refused to accept that work, will forfeit his claim for wages. The petitioners complained that in the case of small scale growers it was impossible for them to provide work throughout the year, and that notification was impossible of compliance in their case. This, it was said, should furnish another indication that the notification dated 20-3-1974 would not have application to small scale rubber growers. Prosecution was threatened in the light of R.29 and 30A of the Kerala Minimum Wages R.1958 read with S.22 (b) of the Act. 3. Strong reliance was placed by the petitioners on S.1 clause (4) of the Plantations Labour Act 1951 which provided that the Act shall apply only to any lands used or intended to be used, inter alia, for growing rubber which admeasures 10.117 hectares or more, and in which 30 or more persons are employed or were employed on any day of the preceding twelve months. This was related to the definition of "plantation" in S 2 (f) of the same Act as 'any plantation to which this Act applies'. From these provisions it was argued that a small scale rubber grower was outside the purview of the Minimum Wages Act. S.2 (iii) of the Payment of Wages Act 1936, introduced by the Amendment Act 53 of 1964, was stressed. That defined "plantation" as having the same meaning as in clause (f) of S.2 of the Plantations Labour Act 1951. There is nothing to link the Minimum Wages Act with the definitions in the two other Acts as mentioned by the petitioners. That defined "plantation" as having the same meaning as in clause (f) of S.2 of the Plantations Labour Act 1951. There is nothing to link the Minimum Wages Act with the definitions in the two other Acts as mentioned by the petitioners. The purpose, scope and object of the Acts seem to be different. They are also spread over into such different periods or points of time as 1936 (Payment of Wages Act), 1948 (the Minimum Wages Act), and 1951 (the Plantations Labour Act). The earliest of these, as its title enacts, is to regulate payment of wages to certain classes of persons employed in industries. The Minimum Wages Act, 1948, on the other hand, was meant to provide for minimum rates of wages in certain employments. The concept of minimum wage is that it is independent of the capacity of the industry to pay, or the size of the unit of industry. It is a basic necessity or life for labour to exist. The Plantations Labour Act is a social welfare legislation to provide for the welfare of labour and to regulate the conditions of labour. It is difficult to regard the three Acts as in pari materia or as forming parts of one integrated piece of legislation; so that there would be no justification to understand the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act in the light of the provisions of the other two Acts. The rule regarding construction of statutes in pari materia was expounded by the Supreme Court in M/s Shah & Co , Bombay v. State of Maharashtra & Another (AIR. 1967 SC. 1877) as follows: "21. We have been referred to certain passages in certain text books, as well as in certain decisions, to show, under what circumstances, statutes can be considered to be in pari materia, and the nature of the construction to be placed on such statutes. Sutherland, in "Statutory Construction", 3rd Edition, Vol. 1967 SC. 1877) as follows: "21. We have been referred to certain passages in certain text books, as well as in certain decisions, to show, under what circumstances, statutes can be considered to be in pari materia, and the nature of the construction to be placed on such statutes. Sutherland, in "Statutory Construction", 3rd Edition, Vol. 2, at p. 535, states: 'Statutes are considered to be in pari materia-to pertain to the same subject-matter when they relate to the same person or thing, or to the same class of persons or things, or have the same purpose or object." The learned Author, further states at p. 537: "To be in pari materia, statutes need not have been enacted simultaneously or refer to one another." Again, at p. 544, it is stated: "When the legislature enacts a provision, it has before it all the other provisions relating to the same subject matter which it enacts at that time, whether in the same statute or in a separate act. It is evident that it has in mind the provisions of a prior act to which it refers, whether it phrases the later act as an amendment or an independent act. Experience indicates that a legislature does not deliberately enact inconsistent provisions when it is cognizant of them both, without expressly recognising the inconsistency." The canon of construction, under these circumstances, is stated by the author, at p. 531: "Prior statutes relating to the same subject matter are to be compared with the new provision; and if possible by reasonable construction, both are to be so construed that effect is given to every provision of each. Statutes in pari materia, although in apparent conflict, are so far as reasonably possible construed to be in harmony with each other." In Craies, on "Statute Law', 6th Edition, at p, 133, it is stated: "Where Acts of Parliament are in pari materia, that is to say are so far related as to form a system or codex of legislation, the rule as laid down by the twelve judges in Palmer's case (1785) 1 Leach C. C 4th edn; 355, is that such Acts 'are to be taken together as forming one system, and as interpreting and enforcing each other'. In the American case of United Society v. Eagle Bank (1829) 1 Conn. In the American case of United Society v. Eagle Bank (1829) 1 Conn. 457, 470, Hosmer J said: 'Statutes are in pari materia which relate to the same person or thing or to the same class of persons or things " In Maxwell on ‘The Interpretation of Statutes', 11th Edition, at p. 153. the principle is stated thus: "An author must be supposed to be consistent with himself, and therefore, if in one place he has expressed his mind clearly, it ought to be presumed that he is still of the same mind in another place, unless it clearly appears that he has changed it. In this respect, the work of the legislature is treated in the same manner as that of any other author, and the language of every enactment must be construed as far as possible in accordance with the terms of every other statute which it does not in express terms modify or repeal It cannot be assumed that Parliament has given with one hand what it has taken away with the other." In the light of the above principles, we are unable to interlink the Minimum Wages Act with the other two statutes on the doctrine of pari materia or on other accepted principles of interpretation. 4. As rightly pointed out by the learned Additional Advocate-General it appears that there is enough indication from these Statutes, that we would not be justified in placing a limitation on the concept of a plantation on consideration of the size or the extent of the holding. S.1 (4) of the Plantations Labour Act 1951 itself, only restricts its application to plantations of a certain extent; but does not by any means provide that holdings of a lesser extent will not pass as plantations. The definition in S.2 (f) is also unhelpful to apply this limitation on the concept of plantation The Minimum Wages Act contains no definition of a plantation. Despite the efforts made by the Counsel for the petitioners in these writ petitions, neither the etymological derivation of the term, nor its dictionary meaning as expounded in the Law Lexicons to which our attention was called, help us to limit a plantation by reference to the size or the area of the holding. Despite the efforts made by the Counsel for the petitioners in these writ petitions, neither the etymological derivation of the term, nor its dictionary meaning as expounded in the Law Lexicons to which our attention was called, help us to limit a plantation by reference to the size or the area of the holding. We were prepared to be enlightened with reference to any agricultural journals or Manuals or other writings and materials; but Counsel reported after a short break granted for the purpose, that no further or more useful material could be made available. Whatever popular notion we might have, and whatever revulsion of feeling we might entertain, at having to regard small stretches of land planted with a few rubber trees as plantations, should, we think, stand sufficiently dispelled by the thought that the holdings of the petitioners before us are not so small in size or deficient is extent as to draw much of tears. 5. The learned Additional Advocate General again had the position of vantage with respect to the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act, itself. Clause.2[e] defines the expression'employer' as follows: "2(e) "employer" means any person who employs, whether directly or through another person, or whether on behalf of himself or any other person one or more employees in any scheduled employment in respect of which minimum rates of wages have been fixed under this Act, and includes, except in sub-section (3) of S 26. (i) in a factory where there is carried on any scheduled employment in respect of which minimum rates of wages have been fixed under this Act, any person named under clause (f) of sub-section (1) of S.7 of the Factories Act, 1948 (LXIII of 1948) as manager of the factory; (ii) in any scheduled employment under the control of any Government in India in respect of which minimum rates of wages have been fixed under this Act, the person or authority appointed by such Government for the supervision and control of employment or where no person or authority is so appointed, the head of the department. (iii) in any scheduled employment under any local authority in respect of which minimum rates of wages have been fixed under this Act, the person appointed by such authority for supervision and control of employees or where no person is so appointed, the chief executive officer of the local authority; (iv) in any other case where there is carried on any scheduled employment is respect of which minimum rates of wages have been fixed under this Act, any person responsible to the owner for the supervision and control of the employees or for the payment of wages:" By the definition, even the employment of one person would suffice to constitute a'person' an emyloyer. Even so, item 4 of the schedule reads: "Employment in any plantation, that is to say, any estate which is maintained for the purpose of growing cinchona, rubber, tea. coffee or cardamom." There is no limitation by area in the concept of 'plantation' thus expounded, and we have searched in vain to supply such limitation for its variant 'Estate' used in item 4. It is impossible to mark off the frontiers of small scale rubber growers by a process of judicial ingenuity. We are reminded of certain beneficial provisions in the Land Reforms Act regarding small landholders. These are matters for the legislature and not for us The learned Additional Advocate-General laid it on with a trowel by hammering into us that minimum wage is independent of the size of the employer or the unit of industry and is unaffected by its capacity to pay. These, it was stated, are quite consistent with treating even small size rubber estates as plantations. On the main point we are thus of the opinion that the petitioners have made out no case to regard small scale growers of rubber whatever be the meaning of that term as outside the scope of rubber plantations. 6. The other points urged were feeble. It was said that the Advisory Board constituted before the fixation of the minimum wage was defective, in that it contained no representation of small scale rubber growers. We are not impressed by this objection. S.9 of the Act which provides for the composition of the committees does not provide for its compartmentalisation into representatives of small scale, large scale, or medium scale rubber growers, and so on. We are not impressed by this objection. S.9 of the Act which provides for the composition of the committees does not provide for its compartmentalisation into representatives of small scale, large scale, or medium scale rubber growers, and so on. It provides only for a committee with representatives of employers and the employees in the scheduled employments, and independent persons. Besides, the objection is hardly worthy of being entertained at this stage or in these proceedings vide Gangadharan Pillai v. State of Kerala and Others (1968 K. L. T. 952 Para.9). 7. An attack was mounted against Para.5 of the Notification, referred to earlier and headed: "full employment". It was said that an obligation to provide work throughout the year would be impossible of compliance in the case of small scale rubber growers. We cannot accede to this argument. The obligation is only to offer some kind of work connected with the plantation. As is to be expected, there was some controversy as between the Additional Advocate-General and the Counsel for the petitioners, whether wooding, manuring, spade work etc. cannot fill the breach during the non-seasonal periods. We are inclined to regard the provision as designed to bring about a healthy adjustment of relationship between employer and labourer, rather than as an incitement to indolence or idleness, or to break the camel's back by stacking impossible conditions on the employer. One of us (myself) on a difference of opinion of two learned judges of this Court had recently occasion to say something about the similar provision in O. P. No. 4735 of 1975. (Vide para 15 of my opinion). 8. Certain procedural infirmities in regard to the prosecution launched were sought to be canvassed before us. We think these can legitimately be urged before the courts where the proceedings are either pending or proposed to be taken. We see no ground to entertain the objections at this stage. 9. We dismiss these writ petitions with no order as to costs. Dismissed.