S. K. DUTTA, J. ( 1 ) THIS rule is directed for condonation of delay in moving the application and on such condonation for review of the judgment and decree passed by me on November 30, 1973 whereby on reversal of the judgments and decrees of the Courts below, the petitioner's suit was dismissed. ( 2 ) THE relevant facts are as follows: Sm. Mrinalini Devi instituted a suit for recovery of possession of a portion of premises No. 18, Nepal Bhattacharjee Street, Calcutta, which the opposite party held as a monthly tenant at will under her, on ground of her own use and occupation. The allegations were that the plaintiff who was the owner of the premises had no son but only two married daughters, the petitioners in the Rule. The daughters had no suitable accommodation elsewhere and had always lived with her with their respective families. As on account of old age she was suffering from various ailments, for occupation of herself, as also of the said daughters' families the suit premises were reasonably required by her as the accommodation she had was insufficient for the purpose. ( 3 ) THE suit was contested by the defendant and in the course of the proceeding the plaintiff died and the petitioners were substituted in her place. Thereafter the suit was decreed by the trial court and the decree was affirmed on appeal. In the second appeal preferred therefrom, I held following the decision in (1) Sm. Phoolrani and others v. Sk. Naubat Rai Ahluwalia, AIR 1973 SC 2110 , the cause of action o the suit, which was the personal requirement of the plaintiff, was personal and her right to sue did not survive to the substituted plaintiffs in the absence of the deceased plaintiff. The appeal was accordingly allowed and the suit was dismissed by the judgment dated November 30, 1973. ( 4 ) ON September 17, 1976, the petitioners filed this application stating that the Supreme Court by its judgment in (2) Shantilal Thakurdas and Others v. Chimanlal Maganlal Telwala, dated August 23, 1976, since reported in AIR 1976 SC 2358 overruled the decision in Phoolrani's case which was the basis of the above judgment of this court. Accordingly in the context of the said situation, the said judgment should be set aside on review and the suit decreed. Accordingly in the context of the said situation, the said judgment should be set aside on review and the suit decreed. The petitioners further submitted that there was no delay in moving the petition, as immediately on the publication of the newspaper report of the said decision, the petitioners arranged to obtain the certified copy of judgment in Shantilal's case and on receipt of the same on September 10, 1976 the present petition was filed on September 17, 1976. ( 5 ) MR. Manindra Nath Ghose, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioners, contended that as the requirement of the landlord also included the requirement of the members of the family, the view in Phoolrani's case that the cause of action, on the death of the landlord did not survive to his family members, was not found acceptable in Shantilal's case. The court in the latter case expressly held that on the death of the landlord, the right to sue did survive to the members of his family and the earlier view was not approved. ( 6 ) MR. Saktinath Mukherjee, learned Advocate for the opposite party submitted that the decision in Shantilal's case was based on the provisions of the Delhi Act which express provided the personal requirement as including that the members of the family. Further, though the requirement of the landlord included the requirement of his family members, the question still arises whether the requirement of the landlord and his family members can be enforceable without or in absence of the landlord himself. Mr. Mukherjee did not dispute that the petitioners were otherwise diligent in moving the application. ( 7 ) APART from the questions on merit, the real objection of Mr. Mukherjee is that no review is available for a change or reversal of a proposition of law by a superior court or competent authority overruling its earlier exposition of law whereon the impugned judgment is based after it is pronounced. He referred to the decision in (3) Sudananda Moral v. Rakhal Sana, AIR 1927 Cal 920 in which it was held by Dwaraka Nath Mitter, J. that a subsequent reversal of the judgment which formed the basis of the impugned judgment is no ground for review. He referred to the decision in (3) Sudananda Moral v. Rakhal Sana, AIR 1927 Cal 920 in which it was held by Dwaraka Nath Mitter, J. that a subsequent reversal of the judgment which formed the basis of the impugned judgment is no ground for review. The learned Judge referred to the decision in (4) Kotagiri Venkata v. Velanki Venkata, 27 IA 197 wherein it was observed that a ground for review must, at any rate, be something which existed at the time of the decree and the section does not authorise review of a decree, which was right, on the happening of some subsequent event. ( 8 ) IN (5) Ravella Krishnamurthy v. Yarlagadda, AIR 1933 Madras 485 the court observed that for review on ground of discovery of new and important matter, such matter must be existence at date of decree. In (6) Lachhmi Narain v. Ghisa Bihari, AIR 1960 Punjab 43, it has been laid down that once a case is decided, it is hardly permissible to review that decision on the mere ground that subsequent to its date, another decision has been given, the ratio of which may induce the court to change its previous view. ( 9 ) IN (7) A. C. Estates v Serajuddin and Co. and another, AIR 1966 SC 935 , the Supreme Court observed that in case of review under Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure on ground of discovery of a new and important matter, such matter has to be something which existed at the date of the order and there can be no review of an order which was right when made on the ground of happening of a subsequent event. ( 10 ) RELYING on these authorities, Mr. Mukherjee submitted that the subsequent judgment of the Supreme Court overruling its earlier decision could be no ground for review of a judgment based on the earlier judgment for the subsequent judgment was not in existence when the impugned judgment was delivered. Otherwise, it is submitted, there will be no finality in litigation and it would be open for the aggrieved party to challenge any decision which was right when made without any limitation of time. ( 11 ) MR. Otherwise, it is submitted, there will be no finality in litigation and it would be open for the aggrieved party to challenge any decision which was right when made without any limitation of time. ( 11 ) MR. Ghosh in meeting the objection referred to the decision (8) Brindaban Chandra v. Damadar Prosad, 29 CWN 148 where the High Court delivered a judgment relying on a decision of the Privy Council. An application for review was filed but before it was heard, the Privy Council delivered another judgment in which its earlier judgment referred to above was construed in a manner which rendered the High Court judgment wrong. The Division Bench held that the expression error apparent on the face of the record was wide enough to embrace a case like the one before it and the court was justified in granting the review. Strong reliance was placed on this decision in support of the application before me, as, it is said, the interpretation of the basic judgment therein made by the subsequent judgment rendered the High Court's judgment erroneous and similar is the position in the present proceeding. ( 12 ) THE Privy Council, it appears, in the subsequent decision made it clear that law was not in any way altered but an authorititative construction on the decision was given. This the High Court was bound to follow and imagined that it was being so followed, which constituted an error apparent on record. In the case before us, the position is different, as the proposition of law in the earlier decision was in effect overruled by the subsequent decision, laying down a new proposition of law. This new exposition of law was made subsequent to the impugned judgment so that the said impugned judgment when it was delivered, was not erroneous unlike the case cited. ( 13 ) MR. Ghosh also referred to the decision in (9) Pathrose v. Kuttan, AIR 1969 Kerala 186 in which the court reviewed its decision on the basis of a subsequent decision which was binding on it. The court held that a subsequent binding authority taking a different view of law is a good ground of review. For it would be a discovery of a new and important matter under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code or in any case, an error patent on the face of the record. The court held that a subsequent binding authority taking a different view of law is a good ground of review. For it would be a discovery of a new and important matter under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code or in any case, an error patent on the face of the record. The Court was of the opinion that it made no difference whether the binding authority demonstrating the error was a decision rendered before or after the impugned judgment. A judicial decision, it was held, only declares a law and does not make or change it and law does not change with changing judicial construction. When decisions taking a different view are overruled or dissented from, all that is done is to declare that these decisions were wrongly decided. The position, it is said, is analogous to a statute which changes the law with retrospective effect which has been held to be good ground for review. ( 14 ) IN Kuttan's case, reliance was placed on the decision in (10) M. K. Venkatachalam, I. T. O. v. Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. , AIR 1958 SC 875 where the court was considering the effect or retrospective amendment of section 18-A (5) of the Income Tax Act, 1922. By an order dated October 2, 1952, the Income-tax Officer granted in the assessment order a credit of about Rs. 50000/- to the respondent company as representing interest on the amount paid on the whole advance under section 18a. By an amendment Act of 1953 the assessee was made entitled to interest not on the whole amount of advance but on the difference between the amount paid as advance and the tax payable under regular assessment. This provision was made retrospective with effect from April 1, 1952 and in view of this amendment, the Income-tax Officer exercising his powers under section 35 of the Act which provided for rectification of mistakes apparent on record by the Income-tax authorities on their own within specified periods held that the company was entitled to a credit of about Rs. 21,000/ -. 21,000/ -. In dealing with the objection that a completed assessment could not be reopened as it had attained finality, the court observed that having regard to the provisions of section 35, order passed under section 18-A (5) can not be said to be final as it is liable to be modified thereunder, so that the principle of finality of the orders or the sanctity of the existing rights cannot be effective invoked by the assessee in the case. The court, however, found that in view of the retrospective operation of the relevant amended provisions of the Act, the earlier determination of credit would be an error apparent on record, and accordingly liable to be rectified by section 35. ( 15 ) IN (11) Md. Azamat Azim Khan v. Raja Shatranji and others, AIR 1963 Allahabad 541 (F. B.), the majority judgment held that in the event of an amendment with retrospective effect, the judgment rendered earlier on basis of unamended Act, will be incorrect and the error or mistake will be one apparent on face of the record liable to be rectified under Order 47 as the relevant date of determination would be the date of hearing the review petition. To the contention that this interpretation would be reopening of all judgments, it was held that the judgment could be reopened only if there is an appeal or review pending for both of which there are prescribed periods of limitation. In respect of judgments of superior court, in such a case, it was held that the judgment could have no retrospective effect and when the impugned judgment sought to reviewed was rendered, the binding judgments were not there, the position was not free from doubt so that it could not be said that the decision was erroneous on the face of the record then. The position is different when by reason of amendment of a statue retrospectively, the decision is contrary to law even on the day it is rendered. The position is different when by reason of amendment of a statue retrospectively, the decision is contrary to law even on the day it is rendered. ( 16 ) THE Supreme Court on appeal in (12) Raja Shatrunjit (dead) by his legal representatives v. Mahammad Azmat Amim Khan and others, AIR 1971 SC 1474 observed: "the ground of review are the discovery of new matters or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made or the review is asked for on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of record?. . " the Court referred with approval to the following observation of the Privy Council in Katagirl's case approval to the following observation of the Privy Council in Katagirl's case cited earlier. "the section does not authorise the review of a decree which was right when it was made on the ground of the happening of some subsequent event. " it was further held that a decision contrary to a provision of law introduced with retrospective effect would be an error on the face of record. But as the amending provisions gave power to court passing the decree to rectify the decree, notwithstanding any thing in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 or any other law, the instant application was held to be an application not for review under the Code but one under the relevant Act and as such maintainable. ( 17 ) THE case of a legislation amending a law with retrospective effect appears to stand on a different footing. When a particular judgment is rendered, for instance, it is based on the law as it then stood without amendment. If however the law itself is amended with retrospective effect, the judgment may lose its effectiveness and may contain errors apparent on the record in view of the amended provision which are to be deemed always to be in statute even on the day the judgment was rendered, on account of retrospective operation as has been held in the above case. ( 18 ) THE case of a judicial interpretation of law stands on different footing. ( 18 ) THE case of a judicial interpretation of law stands on different footing. When a court with binding authority declares the law in a particular manner, such declaration is effective in all respects and binding on courts under its jurisdiction till and if it is again set aside or held erroneous by a subsequent decision. Accordingly a judgment based on declaration of law by a binding authority valid on the date the judgment was rendered, was then in accordance with law. ( 19 ) THE position emerging the decisions cited above appear to be as follows: - (a) grounds of review under Order 47 (1) of the Code are discovery of new mater or evidence which after exercise of due diligence, was not within the knowledge of the applicant for review or could not be produced by him when the decree was passed or order made, or, some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record. (b)in case of discovery of a new or important matter of evidence such matter has to be one which existed at the time when the decree or order under review was passed or made. (c)Order 47 does not authorise the review of a decree or order which was right when it was made on the ground of some subsequent event. (d)A legislation with retrospective effect rendering erroneous a decree or order passed earlier contrary to such amended law is a mistake or error apparent on record. ( 20 ) ACCORDING to some authority a judicial decision of a binding authority taking a different view of law rendered before or after the impugned judgment is a good ground of review as a discovery of a new and important matter or least as indicating an error apparent on face of record in the impugned judgment while according to some other authority, this is not the position in law. The position will now have to be examined. ( 21 ) AS to discovery of a new of important matter or evidence we have seen that the consistent and uniform view taken by the Judicial Committee and reiterated by the Supreme Court is that such matter or evidence must be in existence at the time the decree or the order was passed or made. ( 21 ) AS to discovery of a new of important matter or evidence we have seen that the consistent and uniform view taken by the Judicial Committee and reiterated by the Supreme Court is that such matter or evidence must be in existence at the time the decree or the order was passed or made. Further, Order 47 does not authorise a review of a decree or order which was right when passed or made on the ground of happening of a subsequent event. In the case of legislation amending a law with retrospective effect rendering erroneous on the face of the record the judgment or order under review the Supreme Court in Bombay Dyeing's case noted that the order of assessment, which by then did not attain finality, was and continued to be liable to modification in view of the powers of rectification of such order by the appropriate authorities on their own motion within specified periods and accordingly no objection against rectification was sustainable. In Azim Khan's case the provision for rectification of the decree was in the amending Act and it was held that the applications were not under Order 47 of the Code. Normally, a statute introducing amendments with retrospective effect contain provisions for rectification or reopening of decrees or orders which on account of such retrospective amendment have become contrary to law even on the day the decree or order was passed or made. ( 22 ) IN the case of a decree or order based on the exposition of law of a binding authority, the position is that such decree or order was not contrary to law on the day the decree or order was passed or made. Such decree or order, on account of the subsequent exposition of law in a different manner by such binding authority may become contrary to law and thus contain an error on the face of the record. Even so such decree or order reaches the finality in the course of the proceedings in so far as the court passing the order is concerned, and it is valid and effective, binding the parties. As such decree or order attains a finality in so far as the court passing the order is concerned there will be no scope for its review under Order 47 of the Code by any subsequent event. As such decree or order attains a finality in so far as the court passing the order is concerned there will be no scope for its review under Order 47 of the Code by any subsequent event. For such review if at all the mistake or error apparent on the face of the record must be in the impugned decree or order at the time when such decree or order was passed or made. Further, after such decree or order any subsequent exposition of law by a competent authority can not unsettle the position by a review under Order 47 of the Code as the impugned decree or order valid when passed had already acquired a finality in that court. Otherwise there will be no sanctity of existing rights nor finality in litigation which are the basic concepts of ownership of property and rights. The provision for limitation for review is also no answer to the question, when a party, coming after ore than two years as here, may successfully invoke the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. ( 23 ) IN the circumstances, though I am inclined to condone the delay, but as the decision in Shantilal's case was made along after the impugned decree had attained its finality in respect of the Court passing the decree, the instant application for review is incompetent and not maintainable in law. The Rule accordingly is discharged without any order as to costs in the circumstances. Rule discharged.