JUDGMENT 1. - This writ petition is directed against the order of the learned State Transport Appellate Tribunal dated 12th Nov. 1976. It is stated in the petition that Sadulpur to Bhadra route is a 'C' Class route and had a scope of two permits and one returned service daily. One bus of Shri Bhimraj husband of the petitioner is plying on the said route, while a vacancy of one permit existed there. One Babulal applied for a permit and was granted the same by the RTA Bikaner on 6-1-75. But Babulal did not a ail of the permit. The petitioner was the holder of one stage carriage permit of a different route, namely, the Sadulpur Sardarsahar via Taranagar but that route was curtailed on account of nationalisation and the petitioner's permit was rendered ineffective. Thus, she became a displaced operator having experience of the transport business with a bus of 1966 model. She submitted an application for a temporary permit on the Sadulpur Bhadra route and the RTA Bikaner granted a temporary permit on 3-7-76, valid upto 31-10-76. The petitioner also submitted an application for grant of a stage carriage permit on the said route. The non-petitioner one Mr. S.N. Soni, brother of the said Babulal, also filed an application for the similar purpose as a sole proprietor of M/s Goldsmith Transport Co. But they had only a read bus of 1962 model. The RTA by its resolution dated 12-10-76, however, found the non-petitioner more suitable. It was of the view that both the operators were displaced operators and had a previous experience of providing transport service. But the proprietor of M/s Goldsmith Transport Co. was a conductor and driver himself and was also a displaced goldsmith. On the other hand, the petitioner's husband already had one permit for the same route. 2. On appeal, the learned STAT by its order dated 12-11-76 upheld the decision of the RTA. The only contention raised before the STAT was that the appellant-petitioner had a superior claim to the grant of a permit as it had a 1966 model vehicle, while the respondent had a vehicle of 1962 model. The learned STAT did consider this aspect, but was of the view that if both the permits were allowed to Bhimraj and his wife, it will amount to a grant of monopoly, which is not in the interest of the public generally. 3. The learned STAT did consider this aspect, but was of the view that if both the permits were allowed to Bhimraj and his wife, it will amount to a grant of monopoly, which is not in the interest of the public generally. 3. Aggrieved by the order of the STAT, the petitioner filed this writ petition. It may be stated, however, that the non-petitioner actually got a permit on 1966 model instead of 1962 model. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the RTA was bound to consider the comparative merits of the parties. as they stood on the date of the resolution and the fact that the respondent had subsequently provided a 1966 model has no relevance. In Ajantha Transports (P) Ltd, Coimbatore v. M/s TVK Transport, Pulampatti, AIR 1975 SC 123 , it was observed that the power to grant permit under section 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (herein called the Act) is limit d to the purpose specified in Cls. (a) to (f) of section 47 (1) for which it is meant to be exercised Clause (a) gives the dominant purpose viz. interest of the public generally and Cls. (b) to (f) are only its sub categories or illustrations. If any matter taken into consideration is not shown to be correlated to the dominant purpose or, the relationship or the effect of a particular fact, which has operated in favour of a grant is such as to show that it is opposed, on the face of it, to public interest, the grant will be bad. Relevancy or otherwise of one or more grounds of giant or refusal of a stage carriage permit could be a jurisdictional matter. A grant or its refusal on totally irrelevant grounds would be ultra vires or a case of excess of power. If a ground which is irrelevant is taken into account wish others which are relevant or, a relevant ground, which exists, is unjustifiably ignored, it could be said to be a case of exercise of power under section 47 of the Act, which is quasi-judicial, in a manner which suffers from a material irregularity. If a ground which is irrelevant is taken into account wish others which are relevant or, a relevant ground, which exists, is unjustifiably ignored, it could be said to be a case of exercise of power under section 47 of the Act, which is quasi-judicial, in a manner which suffers from a material irregularity. The contention is that the STAT failed to take into consideration or rather to give weight to a relevant factor regarding a later year model and dismissed the petitioner's claim simply on the basis of a consideration that if a permit was granted to the wife when the husband already holds a permit on the same route, will amount to monopoly. The learned counsel urged that the year of the model is one of the relevant considerations because a better model is expected to serve the public in a better manner. As was held in Krishana Kumar v. TAT Rajasthan, AIR 1968 RLW 432 , the availability of a better bus is also a relevant and material consideration. The public will find it more advantageous if they are to travel in a bus of later model in comparison to one of an older model. Where an appellate order has overlooked a very material consideration that had weighed with the sub-ordinate authority, then it can not be said that the order does not suffer from any defect. In Ikramkhan v. STAT, AIR 1976 SC 2333 , the respondent had a later model and it tilted the balance in his favour. The Supreme Court considered that this was an aspect well arising under clauses (a) to (f) of section 47 of the Act, the learned Tribunal too should have, therefore, upheld the claim of the petitioner. 4. It was next contended that no application for a permit can be rejected solely on the ground of a monopoly. Rather an application already providing a service on the route had a better claim for the grant of a permit. In K. Balasubramania Chetty v. N.M. Sombandamoorthy Chetty, AIR 1975 SC 818 a rule in the State of Tamil Nadu permitting a person to have five permits was held valid did because an applicant could be able to achieve greater efficiency, if he had a larger number of stage carriages. In K. Balasubramania Chetty v. N.M. Sombandamoorthy Chetty, AIR 1975 SC 818 a rule in the State of Tamil Nadu permitting a person to have five permits was held valid did because an applicant could be able to achieve greater efficiency, if he had a larger number of stage carriages. The rule set a limit of five stage carriage as it was thought, that that would be sufficient to constitute a viable unit which could legitimately be permitted to an applicant, consistently with the requirement of a socialistic pattern of society that there should be distributive or social justice and no undue economic disparities. So long, therefore, as an applicant has not more than four stage carriage; it can- not by itself be regarded as a factor against him. In Kandhari Babu v. STAT, AIR 1975 Raj 203 , Lodha J., pointed out that the fact that a person already holds one or more permits is not necessarily a disqualification or a factor against him. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent relied upon Shri Ram Vilas Service (P) Ltd. v. VC Chandrasekaran and others, AIR 1965 SC 107 , wherein it was observed that in granting permits, the appropriate authorities are required to consider the interests of the public generally and in assessing the merits of an individual applicant for a permit on any route, it would be open to the appropriate authority to inquire whether the service, which the individual applicant would render to the public, if he is given a permit, would be efficient and satisfactory or not. Encouraging operators who own a fleet of buses and discouraging monopoly on the route is consistent with the interests of the general public, which is of paramount importance under section 47 (1) (a) of the Act. Absence of any competition from another bus operator is likely to develop a feeling of complacence in the monopolist and that is factor which the appropriate authority can certainly take into account in the matter of granting or refusing a permit. The consideration that the granting of monopoly to a bus-operator would be prejudicial to the public interest is by itself a relevant consideration under section 97(l) (a) of the Act. The consideration that the granting of monopoly to a bus-operator would be prejudicial to the public interest is by itself a relevant consideration under section 97(l) (a) of the Act. Where, therefore, the appropriate authority refuses a permit to an applicant on that ground that the applicant is, or would be in the position of a monopolist, if a permit is granted to him and would be liable to neglect the interest of the public and may not be very keen on taking all the steps to keep his service in good and efficient order, it cannot be said that the decision of the authority is based on irrelevant considerations. 5. Thus, upon a consideration of the aforesaid decisions the consideration that two permits in a family one in the name of the wife and another in the name of the husband would amount to monopoly was a relevant consideration. The learned STAT did not fail to take into consideration the year of the model but tilted the balance in favour of the non-petitioner because of the other consideration namely, creation of a monopoly in favour of the petitioner. It cannot, therefore, be said that the learned Tribunal did not take into consideration a relevant factor and further that it rejected the petitioner's claim simply on the ground of monopoly. As a matter of fact, in case of a displaced operator even a model as old as 13 years is permitted and that is a position not controverted by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Therefore, there is no error in the order of the Appellate Tribunal apparent of the face of the record. Nor does the order of the learned STAT suffer from any other kind of infirmity. 6. Consequently, there is no force in this writ petition and it is hereby dismissed with costs, which shall be Rs. 150/-.Writ dismissed with costs. *******