JUDGMENT K.C. Agrawal, J. - This revision is directed against the judgment of Sri S.D.N. Singh, Special Judge, Mirzapur, dated 6-1-1977, holding that the prosecution of the opposite party No. 1 was not maintainable in respect of charge No. 3. 2. Briefly stated, the facts which led to the filing of this revision are that Jai Ram Dubey, the applicant, filed complaints before the Superintendent of police, Mirzapur, against the opposite party No. 1 to the effect that he had abused his official position in order to procure money illegally and with that end in view he exhorted a sum of Rs. 10,000/- from one Gayadin and Rs. 18,000/- from other villagers, under the pretext that he required the aforesaid sum of Rs. 18,000/- for construction of an institution. After investigation, a charge-sheet was submitted against the opposite party No. 1. The Special Judge, Mirzapur, framed charges against the said opposite party on 27-8-1976. Charge No. 3, which is material for our purposes, is being quoted below : Thirdly that you being a public servant in the police department, viz., as Sub-Inspector of police at police out post Wyndhomganj, by corrupt or illegal means or by otherwise abusing your position as a public servant, obtained for yourself in the name of-Kanya Pathshala a sum of Rs. 18,000/- from the residents of the villages Dudhi and Wyndhomganj and thereby committed an offence punishable u/s 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and within my cognizance. 3. Subsequently, by the order dated 6-1-1977, the learned special Judge found that as no sanction had been accorded for prosecuting the opposite party No. 1 for the aforesaid . charge No. 3, he held that the prosecution of the said opposite party for the aforesaid offence u/s 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (in short 'the Act') was not maintainable., In this view of the matter, he directed that the trial would proceed only in respect of the charges relating to the acceptance of illegal gratification of Rs. 10,000/- from Gayadin. Aggrieved by this order, the present revision has been filed. 4. learned Counsel for the applicant contended that the learned special Judge had no jurisdiction to review the earlier order dated 27-8-1976. by which after examining the record he had already framed charges against the opposite party No. 1, including the charge in respect of the acceptance of Rs. 18,000/-as illegal gratification. 4. learned Counsel for the applicant contended that the learned special Judge had no jurisdiction to review the earlier order dated 27-8-1976. by which after examining the record he had already framed charges against the opposite party No. 1, including the charge in respect of the acceptance of Rs. 18,000/-as illegal gratification. He contended that the learned Special Judge committed an error in holding that the sanction, as required by Section 6 of the Act, had not been accorded by the Prescribed Authority with regard to charge No. 3. The argument raised by the learned Counsel for the applicant necessitates the looking into the order of the Deputy Inspector General of Police (Intelligence) dated 8-4-1976, by which the necessary sanction was granted to prosecute the opposite party No. 1 u/s 6(1)(c) of the Act. It would be found that by this order, the Deputy Inspector General of Police (Intelligence) had granted sanction for prosecution of the opposite party No. 1 with respect to the obtaining of Rs. 10,000/- from Gayadin, and for the connected offence under Sections 342/220 I.P.C. The sanction does not speak anything about the acceptance of Rs. 18,000/- alleged to have been obtained by the opposite party No. 1 from the villagers of Dudhi and Wyndhomganj by corrupt or illegal means or by otherwise abusing his position as a public servant. It is necessary that the sanction should relate the facts constituting the offence for which a public servant is to be prosecuted. As stated above, the sanction does not talk about the illegal gratification of Rs. 18,000/- regarding which the third charge was earlier framed by the Special Judge. The allegations made with regard to the acceptance of illegal gratification of Rs. 10,000/- for which the sanction was granted, by no stretch of reasoning could be extended to the facts constituting another distinct offence but in relation to another case. Counsel, however, led emphasis on the words "for the offences or any other offence which may be made from the evidence on the record" and contended that the scope of these words used in the order of the Deputy Inspector General of Police was so wide that the same included within it the necessary sanction for the prosecution of the third charge as well. I am unable to uphold this contention. These words contained in paragraph 3 cannot be read in isolation. I am unable to uphold this contention. These words contained in paragraph 3 cannot be read in isolation. The sanction order has to be read as a whole. Reading it as such, there is no doubt in my mind that it related to charges Nos. 1 and 2 framed by the Special Judge, and not to charge No. 3. 4a. learned Counsel for the applicant next relied on sub-section (3) of Section 7 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952, and urged that as the offences under the Indian Penal Code also amount to criminal misconduct within the meaning of Section 5(2) of the Act, therefore, the third charge could also be tried by the Special Judge under sub section (3) of Section 7 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952. sub section (3) of Section 7 of the aforesaid Act reads as under : When trying any case, a Special Judge may also try any offence other than an offence specified in Section 6 with which the accused may, under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, be charged at the same trial. 5. After having heard the learned Counsel for the applicant, I am unable to accept the submission made by him. Sub-Section (3) of Section 7 no doubt authorises a Special Judge to try any offence other than the offences specified in Section 6 with which the accused may, under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, be charged, but the only limitation is relating to charges under Sections 230 - 235 Code of Criminal Procedure. In the instant case, however, the two offences are distinct and separate. The offence of obtaining of Rs. 10,000/- by illegally confining Gayadin Prasad is altogether different than receiving of Rs. 18,000/-, by the opposite party for the construction of an institution. These two offences have nothing in common between them so as to attract the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 7 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952. The applicant, therefore, cannot be permitted to say that since the sanction had been accorded in respect of charges Nos. 1 and 2, the same could be made available for the charge No. 3 as well. As, therefore, there was no sanction for the charge No. 3 the Court below rightly held that the trial in respect of the said charge would be null and void and was thus not maintainable. 6. 1 and 2, the same could be made available for the charge No. 3 as well. As, therefore, there was no sanction for the charge No. 3 the Court below rightly held that the trial in respect of the said charge would be null and void and was thus not maintainable. 6. I am also not prepared to accept the submission of the learned Counsel for the applicant that the order dated 6-1- 1977 amounted to discharge of the opposite party No. 1 in so far as the acceptance of Rs. 18,000/- by him is concerned. It is always open to the applicant or to any other person aggrieved to file a complaint against the opposite party No. 1 in respect of the same. By the said order, as observed above, the view of the Special Judge, only was that the prosecution of the opposite party No. 1 was not maintainable without the sanction. He did not record any finding which could amount to discharge of the opposite party No. 1. 7. Another ground on which the revision is liable to fail is that the applicant has no locus standi to maintain it. The present case started on the basis of a charge-sheet. The applicant thus has no locus standi to file this revision. 8. In the result, the revision fails and is dismissed. The stay order is discharged.