JUDGMENT H.N. Agrawal, Member. - This is a second appeal against the judgment and decree dated August 29, 1969 in First Appeal No. 1418, Faizabad passed by Sri S.M. Hasan, Additional Commissioner, Faizabad Division, Faizabad arising out of Case No. 164/91/5 under Sections 209/202 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. 2. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties and have gone through the record. 3. Respondent No. 1 Babu Ram had filed a suit seeking possession and the ejectment of the defendant-appellant Ram saran as a trespasser. The trial court decreed that suit. The lower appellate court has upheld the order of the trial court. 4. The first contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the courts below had no jurisdiction to try the suit at all. A perusal of the plaint shows that the land in suit is a grove, over a substantial portion of which the defendant-appellant is alleged to have constructed a house and three thatched huts. The defendant-appellant has also in his written statement taken the plea that it is a residential house and is fifty to fifty-five years old, and that a revenue Court had no jurisdiction in the case. The trial court had framed an issue to the effect whether the suit was cognizable by the revenue Court. The trial court's finding is that the suit was first instituted in the civil court and the Civil Court had ordered the Amin on November 18, 1964 to prepare a site plan and show the constructions etc. The Amin prepared a site plan and submitted a report. On the basis of the report of the Amin, the Civil Court returned the suit for presentation to the proper court. The trial court has recorded the finding that the suit was triable by the revenue Court. In this connection two rulings have been referred to. The first is Mukteshwari Prasad v. Ram Wali and other, 1966 R.D. 1 in which B. Dayal and D.D. Seth, JJ., have held that a civil court cannot take cognizance of a suit for possession of agricultural land and for demolition of unauthorised construction standing thereon but can take cognizance of a suit merely for demolition of unauthorized construction made on agricultural land. Reference is also made to Mewa v. Baleo, 1966 R.D. 392 in which the same learned Judges have further held that the primary important thing to be observed in each case filed in civil court is, where an objection is raised as to its maintainability in a civil court, as what is the cause of action and whether on the basis of that cause of action any relief can be granted by the revenue court Since in the present case the primary relief is the declaration of Bhumidhari rights, the trial court as well as the civil court had rightly held that the suit was maintainable in the revenue Court. 5. The next contention is that the suit was barred for non-joiner of the necessary party. Gaon Sabha and that the finding of the courts below that Gaon Sabha was not a necessary party in a suit under Section 209 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act is wrong and illegal. The record shows that only the appellant Ram Saran and the State of U.P. were impleaded as defendants, and that the appellant has specifically raised the objection in para 18 of his written statement that the suit was not maintainable on account of non-impleadment of Gaon Sabha which was a necessary sue No. 5 on this question but decided in the negative holding that Gaon Sabha was not a necessary party in a suit under Section 209. The position is that if a suit under Section 209 or Section 202 is filed by the Gaon Sabha, the Gaon Sabha is naturally a necessary party as the plaintiff. If, however, the suit has been filed by a person other than Gaon Sabha, the Gaon Sabha is not necessary party. Sub-section (2) of Section 209 merely provides that to every suit relating to a land referred to in clause (a) of sub-section (1) the State Government shall be impleaded as a necessary party. The requirement of this section has been met in this case. The Gaon Sabha is not a necessary party in all kinds of suits unless it has been especially provided in the Act. Thus, the Gaon Sabha is a necessary party in a suit under Section 229-B as it is expressly provided in the section. The requirement of this section has been met in this case. The Gaon Sabha is not a necessary party in all kinds of suits unless it has been especially provided in the Act. Thus, the Gaon Sabha is a necessary party in a suit under Section 229-B as it is expressly provided in the section. However, in the absence of any such provision, the Gaon Sabha is not a necessary party in a suit under Section 209 or Section 202. 6. Another contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the suit was barred by principles of estoppel and acquiescence. The learned counsel has, however, failed to show anything on the record which may either amount to acquiescence of the plaintiff or estoppel against him. 7. The learned counsel for the appellant has further argued that the courts below have erred in law in holding the suit to be barred by Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. According to the learned counsel, the proceedings were decided by the consolidation authorities ex-parte in the absence of the defendant-appellant, and the finding of the courts below that the defendant was present but declined to sign is based on no evidence. Before the trial court, neither the plaintiff nor the defendant-appellant had taken the plea that the suit was barred under Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. Consequently, no such issue was framed, nor have the courts below anywhere recorded the finding that the suit was barred by Section 49 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings act. Had they done so, they would not indeed have decreed the suit also. Thus, this contention is meaningless and is disproved from the record. 8. The learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the findings of the courts below are based on conjectures and surmises. I, however, find that the trial court has duly considered and judicially scrutinised all the material oral and documentary evidence, and there is nothing to show that its findings are based on conjectures and surmises. The judgment of the learned Additional Commissioner is an affirmative one and has duly taken into account the evidence on record. Thus, there is no force in this contention. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the judgment of the lower appellate court is no judgment in the eyes of law. The judgment of the learned Additional Commissioner is an affirmative one and has duly taken into account the evidence on record. Thus, there is no force in this contention. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the judgment of the lower appellate court is no judgment in the eyes of law. In this connection he has referred to Mohd. Mustafa v. Abu Kakar etc., AIR 1971 S.C. 361 , in which a learned Bench of the Supreme Court has observed that the finding having been reached without proper pleadings and necessary issues, the same cannot bind any of the parties to the suit. However, it in my opinion, the courts below have recorded proper judgments and it cannot be said that these judgments suffer from any serious legal shortcomings. 10. The learned counsel for the appellant has also stressed on the fact that the original sale deed has not been filed by the plaintiff-respondent. A perusal of the record shows that the sale deed was duly registered on September 25, 1958 and a copy certified by the Sub-Registrar has been filed. The plaintiff-respondent Babu Ram has stated in his oral testimony that he was a minor at the time of the execution of the sale deed and the original sale deed has been lost and is now not forthcoming in spite of search. The question is whether in such circumstances a certified copy of the original sale deed was admissible or not. Section 61 of the Indian Evidence Act provides that the contents of documents may be proved either by primary or by secondary evidence. Section 63 says that secondary evidence means and includes certified copies given under the provisions hereinafter contained. Section 65 reads. 'Secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition of contents of a document in the following cases .....(c) when the original has been destroyed or lost, or when the party offering evidence of its contents cannot, for any other reason not arising from his own default of neglect, produce it in reasonable time. 11. Section 65 reads. 'Secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition of contents of a document in the following cases .....(c) when the original has been destroyed or lost, or when the party offering evidence of its contents cannot, for any other reason not arising from his own default of neglect, produce it in reasonable time. 11. The learned counsel for the appellant has referred to Roman Catholic Mission v. State of Madras, AIR 1966 S.C. 1457 at p. 1461, in which a learned Bench of the Supreme Court has observed as follows: "In reaching the conclusion that both waram were included, the District Judge took into consideration certified copies of certain leases from the record of an old case O.S. No. 124 of 1944 of the Court of Subordinate Judge, Madurai. These documents are Exts. B-4, 5, 6 and A-68, A-69 and 77. Ext. B-4 is a Karalnama (agreement) executed for the Fasli year 1340 and 1349 by which the lessees undertook to handover ? share of the produce as Melwaram and to retain ? share as Kudiwaram from the lands learned out of Keelapappapathu. Ext. B-5 is another lease for cultivating the whole of Keelapappapathu Nanja (wet) lands Ext. B-6 is a Muchilika in respect of Nanja lands in Keelapappapathu by which lessee undertook to pay half produce as Melwaram and to retain the other half as Kudiwaram. These documents undoubtedly would have thrown light upon the matter but they were not admissible because they were only copies. The originals were not produced at any time nor was any foundation laid for the establishment of the right to give secondary evidence." 12. The learned counsel has further referred to Jai Narain Das v. Zubeda Khatton, AIR 1972 Allahabad 494, in which it has been held that entries in regularly kept account books have only corroborative value and primary evidence is always necessary in their case and even then only particular entries therein become relevant. 13. To my mind, the above decisions are not applicable to the present case which is fully covered by clause (c) of Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act. That the plaintiff-respondent was a minor at the time of the execution of the sale deed is not in doubt. It is, therefore, quite plausible that the original sale deed is not in doubt. That the plaintiff-respondent was a minor at the time of the execution of the sale deed is not in doubt. It is, therefore, quite plausible that the original sale deed is not in doubt. It is, therefore, quite plausible that the original sale deed in his favour would have been lost. Further, the secondary evidence in the form of the certified coy of the sale deed given by the Sub-Registrar taken from his Government record is irrefutable in nature. Thus, the secondary evidence in the form of the certified copy was admissible in evidence, and the courts below have rightly treated so. 14. The result is that I find no force in this second appeal and hereby dismiss it.